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Abstract
My thesis explores what kind o f work is performed by affective terms such as ‘passion’, 
‘excitement’, or ‘poetic feeling’ in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare. 
While Coleridge might be regarded as a fore-runner of twentieth-century critical trends 
such as formalism and reader-response criticism, his interest in different forms of 
emotion in connection with poetry links his thought to theoretical concerns of his own 
and of the immediately preceding age. I situate Coleridge in the context o f British 
‘philosophical criticism’ in the second half o f the eighteenth century, a critical discourse 
that had paid particular attention to problems related to the role o f feeling in literary 
language. I argue that Coleridge’s interpretations of Shakespeare and the critical stance 
they articulated both continued and challenged important aspects o f this critical tradition.
The Introduction offers an overview of the problem of feeling and (poetic) 
language in Coleridge’s thought, followed by a definition o f ‘philosophical criticism’, its 
reliance on Shakespeare and the productive tensions between ‘feeling’ and ‘philosophy’ 
that characterise it. The Introduction ends with a survey of recent scholarship. I proceed 
in the first chapter with an analysis o f Coleridge’s lectures as ‘performances’, that is, as 
events grounded in the lecturer’s performance of immediate thought and feeling in front 
of his audience, generated by his encounters with the Shakespearean text. I argue that 
Coleridge’s rhetorical awareness in these situations reveals the influence of the New 
Rhetoric, developed in the second half of the eighteenth century by a number of 
philosophical critics, who recommended improvisation and argued for the decisive role 
of the passions in rhetorical persuasion. I end this chapter by suggesting that the 
ambivalent theatricality of Coleridge’s lectures might be seen as expressing his 
understanding o f the role o f criticism and of the theatre in early-nineteenth-century 
Britain.
The second chapter deals with Coleridge’s theory o f Shakespearean 
poetry as expounded in the lectures, focussing especially on ‘passionate’ aspects of 
language and on the connections Coleridge establishes between these and bodily 
movement, gesture, tone, and rhythm, as well as ‘embodied’ or ‘performative’ uses of 
rhetoric. I attempt to show that in these speculations Coleridge is responding to the idea 
of ‘passionate language’ developed by a number of earlier British philosophical critics, 
who often demonstrated the work o f passion in language through the example of King 
Lear’s mad speeches. Coleridge’s remarks on the same passages articulate his 
relationship to their thought, revealing a more complex understanding of the links 
between passion and imagination, nature and artifice.
In the third chapter I continue to explore the ways in which Coleridge 
extends the scope o f the New Rhetorical concept of passionate language by pushing 
back its pre-established limits. On the one hand, philosophical critics endorsed the 
notion that the strongest passions were defined by the impossibility o f expressing them 
in language (above all, in the case of grief), and criticised Shakespeare’s Constance for 
‘unnatural’ verbosity. On the other, they speculated about wordplay and the pun as 
verbal figures inconsistent with passion, and therefore as figures out o f place in serious 
drama. Coleridge challenges both of these assumptions, as his comments on Constance’s 
personifications and his repeated speculations on the pun reveal. In doing so he 
overturns the established hierarchies of the New Rhetoric and implies the inseparability
of passion and its expression through both verbal and bodily ‘symptoms’. Meanwhile, he 
also re-fashions criticism as ‘sympathetic’ reading, an activity defying formulation, 
which is capable o f responding to and analysing even the most subtle modifications of 
language and feeling.
The fourth chapter compares Coleridge’s often dismissed character 
criticism with the ‘philosophical analysis’ of character developed by William 
Richardson, a Scottish philosophical critic whose latest publications appeared at the time 
o f Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare. Here I aim to point out some of the 
philosophical and moral underpinnings of Richardson’s and Coleridge’s concept of 
‘character’, and their respective stances towards passion and analysis. By reconstructing 
the ‘character’ Coleridge drew of Shakespeare, I show how his idea o f the management 
of the passions is related to poetic ‘embodiment’ in the form o f fictitious characters. By 
comparing Richardson’s and Coleridge’s analyses of Macbeth, I show how both critics 
stress the pathological aspects of the imagination, and how Coleridge adds to this a 
strong emphasis on imagination’s healing power through reflection on fiction. While the 
differences between the two critics may be explained by their different views of the 
mind, they are also related to their different historical perspectives: Richardson wrote his 
analysis of Macbeth just before the French Revolution, while Coleridge returned to the 
play again and again to make sense of the events in France and of the rise and fall of 
Napoleon.
In my discussion, I will sometimes refer to Coleridge’s play Remorse, 
staged in 1813, that is, in the middle of his lecturing career. Coleridge’s interest in 
theatre can be recognised throughout his lectures in several of his statements on 
Shakespeare and passionate language, especially since he often thinks about the 
expression o f feeling as inherently theatrical. In the last chapter I turn to Remorse in 
order to show how some major concerns of Coleridge’s lectures -  with the rhetoric of 
passion or the analysis of character -  appear in his own play, and how his play casts a 
new light on those concerns. With Remorse, Coleridge crosses the divide between 
philosophical reading and poetical creation; however, the play also reveals the 
persistence of philosophy in Coleridge’s work, not only in the form o f his grounding 
assumptions, but also as a problem to be ‘staged’ in drama.
By reconstructing Coleridge’s exchanges with earlier philosophical 
critics -  most importantly, with Kames, William Richardson, Alexander Gerard, and 
Joseph Priestley - 1 intend to highlight aspects o f his critical practice that have rarely 
received sustained attention. In doing so, I also offer an interpretation of the complicated 
and often ambivalent role of feeling in Coleridge’s criticism.
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Introduction
Writing to John Murray in 1814, Coleridge looked back on his ‘long 
habits of meditation on Language, as the symbolic medium of the connection of Thought 
with Thought, & o f Thoughts, as affected and modified by Passion and Emotion’ {CL 3: 
522). He could assume that Murray knew what he was talking about, for even though he 
had not published any substantial work of criticism by that date, he was widely 
recognised as a public lecturer, and most of all, as the ‘philosophical’ interpreter of 
Shakespeare. In other words, 1 think that the short summary he offered to Murray of the 
subject of his meditations also described one of the main theoretical concerns of his 
lectures. I am of course not alone in suggesting that concerns with language, thought, 
and feeling were central to Coleridge’s criticism. R. A. Fogle in 1971 went as far as to 
claim that possibly ‘all his literary criticism is an attempt to explain the language of 
passion, or the “logic of passion,” and its relations with and differences from the 
language o f ordinary logic and exposition’.^  This might be a little too general; Fogle 
himself has given a nuanced account of other areas of Coleridge’s criticism. Moreover, 1 
am not certain that the distinction between the ‘logic of passion’ and ‘ordinary logic’ 
would have been made quite as sharply by Coleridge himself. But in spite of these 
objections, I think that Fogle here identifies one of the most important aspects of 
Coleridge’s critical thought that is still capable of challenging its interpreters.
In a series of articles David Miall has demonstrated that concepts like 
‘feeling’, ‘emotion’, and ‘passion’ played a crucial role in the development of 
Colerdge’s ideas about literature.^ He has also suggested that in the Biographia 
Coleridge often omitted ‘reference to the role o f feeling, and in other statements its role
'Fogle, ‘Coleridge and Criticism: II. Critical Practice’, in R. L. Brett, ed., S. T. C oleridge (W riters and  
their Background) (London: G. B ell & Sons, 1971), 147-166, pp. 151-2.
Miall, ‘Coleridge on Emotion; Experience into Theory’, The Wordsworth Circle, 22 (1991), 35-39, p. 35; 
see also “‘I See It Feelingly”: Coleridge’s Debt to Hartley’, in C oleridge’s  Visionary Languages: Essays 
in Honour ofJ. B. Beer, ed. Tim Fulford and Morton D. Paley (Cambridge; D. S. Brewer, 1993), 151-163; 
‘The Body in Literature: Mark Johnson, Metaphor, and Feeling’, Journal o f  L iterary Semantics, 26 (1997), 
191-210.
seems to be downplayed’.^  I will argue that in Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare -  
corresponding to the ‘middle years’ of his career and constituting an important source 
for the Biographia -  such affective concepts still play a central, albeit highly 
complicated, role. In other words, I believe that his 1796 declaration according to which 
‘My philosophical opinions are blended with, or deduced from, my feelings’ {CL 1: 279) 
is still relevant to his critical activities between 1808 and 1818."  ^What I would like to 
investigate is not the dependence of Coleridge’s philosophy or ‘philosophical criticism’ 
on his own feelings or personal experience, but what makes him think of philosophy and 
criticism as necessarily dependent upon feeling. In other words, 1 attempt to investigate 
what kind of work is performed by affective terms like ‘feeling’ in Coleridge’s lectures; 
in trying to answer this question 1 will focus not only on his critical theory and practical 
criticism, but also on his praxis as a lecturer.
After a decade of public lecturing, The Courier described Coleridge as a 
man who had ‘studied our great Bard with an intensity of the reasoning faculties, and at 
the same time with a fervor and sensibility of poetical feeling which rarely unite in the 
same person’ {LL 2: 334). This combination of reason and ‘poetical feeling’ or 
‘sensibility’ seems to have been thought of by several contemporaries as one of the 
hallmarks of Coleridge’s lectures. Its most succinct expression is the ‘philosophical tact’ 
attributed to him by the Bristol Gazette, ‘which perceives causes, and traces effects 
impalpable to the common apprehension’ {LL 1:530), The metaphor is apt because ‘tact’ 
implies both conceptual ‘grasp’ and intuitive ‘feeling’, and Coleridge appears to have 
thought of the two as dynamically interrelated.^ His representative example of this is 
Shakespeare, who had ‘first studied, deeply meditated, understood minutely -  the 
knowledge become habitual gradually wedded itself with his habitual feelings, & at 
length gave him that wonderful Power by which he stands alone, with no equal or 
second in his own class, any where - ’ {LL 1: 244). Such synthesis o f knowledge and 
feeling was, 1 think, also the quality Coleridge was aiming at as Shakespeare’s
 ^M iall, ‘Coleridge on Em otion’, p. 35.
Paul Hamilton has explored this affective orientation in relation with Coleridge’s idealism, see his 
‘Coleridge and the “Riffacciamento” o f  Philosophy: Communicating an Idealist Position in Philosophy’, 
European Romantic Review , 14 (December 2003), 417-429.
’ Raimonda Modiano, ‘Coleridge’s V iew s on Touch and Other Senses’, Bulletin o f  Research in the 
Humanities, Vol 81 (1978), 28-41.
interpreter. His capacity for systematic thought and readiness to reach out for what is 
outside his already established systems (if ‘feeling’ might be thought o f in that way) 
may also account for the fact that his criticism has been rediscovered and reinvented in 
so many different forms throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This unique combination o f ‘philosophy’ and ‘feeling’, I would argue, 
can be thought o f as the result of a sustained interaction between lecturer and his public, 
in which both parties contributed with their own views about what Coleridge was doing 
and what he was supposed to do. Coleridge ‘the lecturer’ (a public image, circulated in 
journals, letters, reminiscences, and in his own writings) was thus partly shaped by his 
audiences -  as he was perfectly aware.^ Having read a newspaper account of one of his 
own lectures, Coleridge ‘the Philosopher’ saw in it a ‘proof o f the effect o f all un­
commonplace Discourses on the commonplace minds’; however, he could not help 
admiring ‘t ’other me, the Lecturer. The account is a compleat Lord’s Prayer read 
backwards -  of course a most charming, bewitching hccoxmC {CL 3: 456). This is 
telling, because the report in question contains one of the warmest commendations of 
Coleridge’s critical genius, written about the Bristol series where he seems to have felt 
most at home with his audience. If such accounts were ‘charming’, they must have 
charmed Coleridge in the first place. But while ‘the lecturer’ was thus shaped through 
interactions with his public, audiences themselves were partly Coleridge’s creation. His 
display o f ‘feeling’ was inseparable from the necessity o f evoking feelings in his 
listeners; their sympathy was the ‘genial Climate’ {LL 2: 530), without which, he 
insisted, his critical ideas could not be discussed.
Coleridge also acknowledged ‘feeling’ as one o f the means through 
which poetry could be approached. Shakespeare was to be read with both feeling and 
understanding, uniting what Coleridge thought of (like most of his contemporaries) as 
male and female strengths. If the understanding failed, feelings could still be relied on, 
but only if the reader was in a morally healthy state. As he once stated, on ‘any subject
 ^ See also Peter J. Manning, ‘Manufacturing the Romantic image: Hazlitt and Coleridge lecturing’, in 
James Chandler and Kevin Gilmartin eds., Romantic M etropolis (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 227-245, esp. 
325-240.
of taste, he would sooner appeal to the tact of an innocent woman than to the wisest 
man’ {LL 1:594) -  ‘innocent’ being crucial here /
Coleridge never drew a sharp distinction between criticism and moral 
philosophy, and his lectures often explicitly engage with questions regarding the 
education of feelings. He devoted a number o f lectures to education -  in Bristol, for 
instance, he said that children should learn ^distinct truths, animated by sincere and vivid 
feelings' {LL 1: 594) -  and quite a few to the theme of love, which he regarded as the 
evidence o f human ‘perfectibility’ {LL 1: 334). Henry Crabb Robinson thus accurately 
described one o f his literary lectures as developing a ‘moral philosophy’, in which ‘he 
shews himself to be a man who really thinks and feels for him self (IT  1: 195). Moral 
education was also performed through Coleridge’s analyses of Shakespeare’s characters. 
Assessing the pathologies of tragic and sometimes even of comic figures, he repeatedly 
pointed out the consequenees of separating the understanding from the feelings or from 
the moral sense -  in other words, he rediscovered his own methodological and 
philosophical assumptions in the very plays he interpreted.^ In conjunction with this, he 
also identified symptoms o f passion in the characters’ language — as he argues, figures of 
speech and effects o f rhythm make language, like a living body, ‘simple, sensuous, and 
passionate’-  and, since these symptoms do not obey external rules, they can only be 
interpreted by a critic who unites intelligence with sensibility.
It would be impossible to discuss all these aspects o f ‘feeling’ in 
Coleridge’s lectures without some guiding idea, and I have chosen to think about them 
in connection with rhetoric. This is useful, I think, because rhetoric is a concept that 
connects characteristics o f Coleridge’s public discourse as a lecturer to his literary 
analyses and theoretical speculations; in other words, ‘rhetoric’ is relevant to both the 
‘manner’ and the ‘matter’ o f his lectures. Furthermore, the connection is suggested by 
Coleridge himself, for he almost always discusses language in terms o f feeling and 
feeling in terms of language -  this is what enables his readings o f ‘passion’ in the first 
place. However, the connection is far from straightforward or symmetrical. His
7 Julie Ellison discusses the gender implications o f  ‘feeling’ and ‘understanding’, and compares Coleridge 
to Schleiermacher in D elicate Subjects: Romanticistn, Gender, and the Ethics o f  Understanding  (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 103-118.
» See Elinor S. Shaffer, ‘la g o ’s M alignity Motivated: Coleridge’s Unpublished “Opus Magnum”, in 
Shakespeare Q uarterly  19 (1968), 195-203.
theoretical speculations are full of attempts at registering its complications as, for 
instance, a notebook entry from 1814 defining language as ‘the medium of all Thoughts 
to ourselves, o f all Feelings to others, & partly to ourselves’ {CN 3: 4237). Coleridge 
here assumes the existence of feelings without language, that is, o f feelings directly 
manifesting themselves to the self. However, he also identifies feelings that exist to 
others, and even to the self, through language. The rest of the notebook entry suggest 
that such feelings come to being in interaction with others, through which words are 
associated with a whole range o f bodily sensations, thoughts, and emotions (his example 
is a mother teaching a child 'prest to her warm Bosom -  Blood -  Tact -  Eye -  all’, an 
image recurring in his love poetry). Language immersed in feeling is intersubjective, 
that is, it is capable of conveying one’s feelings to others, whether one likes it or not.
This mechanism, occurring in everyday communication, also forms the basis of poetry, 
where consciously built associations of words and feelings create an illusory sense of 
immediacy. The idea o f communicable feelings seems to have been also one of 
Coleridge’s justifications for public lecturing, the medium in which his words were 
supplemented by the ‘comment of looks and tones’, which made his meaning more fully 
available to perceptive listeners.
Back in 1800, Coleridge mentioned to John Thelwall a projected 
‘metaphysical Investigation of the Laws, by which our Feelings form affinities with each 
other, with Ideas, & with words’ {CL 1: 626). Two months later, he seems to have 
concluded that such an investigation had to begin with poetry, writing to Davy about his 
plan to ''concenter my free mind to the affinities of the Feelings with Words & Ideas 
under the title of “Concerning Poetry & the nature of the Pleasures derived from it”’ {CL 
2: 671). I believe that what Coleridge was doing in his lectures was, to a considerable 
extent, a realisation of this plan. His philosophical views, of course, changed markedly, 
and his thinking about language became more sophisticated. But in his lectures he still 
continued to assume that feeling somehow left its mark on language, arguing, for 
instance, that ‘[t]he word was not to convey merely what a certain thing is, but the very 
passion & all the circumstances which were conceived as constituting the perception of a 
thing by the person who used the word’ {LL 1: 273). This line o f thought also found its 
way into the Biographia, where he states that ‘language is framed to convey not the
object alone, but likewise the character, mood and intentions of the person who is
representing if  {BL 2: 115-6).
One of the problems Coleridge had to face again and again concerned the 
limits of such an expressive view of language.^ Words as ‘half-embodiments’ of thought 
could only articulate half, or less than half, of the self, and even that ‘h a lf  appeared to 
him as constantly shifting and variable. Moreover, the self articulated in language was in 
some sense also artificial, for its articulation necessarily relied on something external to 
itself, most crucially, language. The self represented in language was therefore both 
more and less than its ‘real’ counterpart, which, in turn, was by definition inaccessible; 
indeed, at times this ‘visible’ self seemed to come close to fiction. In 1811 Coleridge 
argued that style had to be ‘cultivated in order to make the movement of words 
correspond with the thoughts & emotions they were to convey, so that the words 
themselves are part of the emotion’. When this is successfully accomplished, it is ‘no ill 
compliment to call another, “a man of words’” {LL 1: 273). I take this to mean that 
associations with thoughts and feelings ‘naturalise’ words that otherwise would remain 
external or foreign to the self. A style in control of such associations can be understood 
as expressing the self. The question, however, remains how much of the man of feeling 
is lost in such translations, and how much is in fact the product of verbal expression. 
Another question concerns the mode of expression: by what means are feelings 
conveyed through language? Are there any identifiable formal traits corresponding to 
them? In other words, how should one read a text to follow in it the intricate interplay of
thought and feeling?
I am not suggesting that Coleridge gave a full and final answer to any of
these question (this would be expecting the wrong thing of Coleridge). Rathei, I am 
trying to indicate the nature of his fascination with feeling in language and what he 
regarded as its fullest manifestation, in the language of poetry. While evidently artificial, 
poetic language, and especially that of Shakespeare, is for Coleridge a medium in which 
interactions between words, thoughts, and feelings are staged in an exemplary fashion.
 ^The classical discussion o f  the ‘expressive’ view  and o f  Coleridge s relation to it is M. H. Abrams s The 
M irror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the C ritical Tradition  (N ew  York: Norton, 1958 (1953)), esp. 
pp. 114-124. It has been discussed in various other studies, e.g. in A. C. G oodson’s Verbal Imagination. 
Coleridge and the Language o f  M odern Criticism  (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
esp. Chapter 4: ‘Expressive Language and the Commitment o f  Poetry’.
Shakespearean language is artificial in the sense that it clearly distinguishes itself from 
everyday communication; it is language used self-consciously for the purposes of art. At 
the same time, it is the ‘language of nature’, capable of deeply affecting the reader due 
to its reliance on ‘all the possible associations of Thought with Thought, Thought with 
Feelings, or with words, or of Feelings with Feelings, & words with words’ {LL 1: 66). 
Due to this dense web o f associations, Shakespeare’s language conveys a sense of 
fullness; his characters are by definition men and women of words, but they can become 
‘living words’, or ‘absent friends’ to the re a d e r.M o s t modern criticism is deeply 
suspicious of this way of thinking, arguing that such constructions of character are no 
more than private or communal fantasies. In my reading of him Coleridge was aware 
o f the illusory nature of such ‘friends’, but wanted to know how and why they were 
created, while he was also mindful of their moral consequences. If  the self was 
accessible even to itself through its representations in language, as he seems to have 
thought, there was every reason to suppose that it could be affected by other 
representations. Coleridge returned to this question regularly; ‘when he remembered 
how much our characters were formed from reading pourtrayed,’ he remarked, ‘he could 
not deem it a slight subject to [be] passed over as if it were a mere amusement like a 
game at Chess’ {LL 1:313). However, if poetry was a serious kind o f game, what were 
the rules? For instance, to what extent did the reader experience his or her own feelings 
when reading a text, and in what sense were they the feelings of an ‘other’? And was 
there a clear distinction between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ feelings?
Shakespeare himself was not so much a man of words as a ‘man of 
works’ -  that is, an author made up of his several writings. However, Coleridge 
maintained that he dives in and through the Play’ {LL 2: 368). In Confessions o f  an 
Inquiring Spirit, he explained this with the help o f a rhetorical question. ‘Would not 
every genial mind’, he asks, recalling his lectures, ‘understand by Shakespeare that unity
‘When you look upon a portrait, you must not compare it with the face when present, but with the 
recollection o f  the face. It refers not so much to the senses, as to the ideal sense o f  the friend not present.’ 
{LL 1: 225)
" Deidre Lynch, for instance, argues that the invention o f  characters with an interiority was an effect o f  
the bourgeois market economy, see Lynch, The Economy o f  Character: Novels, M arket Culture, and the 
Business o f  Inner M eaning  (Chicago and London; University o f  Chicago Press, 1998). For an ethical 
reading o f  ‘character’ see Christy D esm et, Reading Shakespeare’s  Characters: Rhetoric, Ethic and  
Identity  (Amherst: The University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1992).
of total impression comprizing, and resulting from, the lOOOfold several and particular 
emotions of delight, admiration, gratitude excited by his Works?’ (SW&F 2: 1130) The 
implied answer, of course, is yes, which means that the ‘genial’ reader’s Shakespeare is 
made up of all the affective responses generated in the appreciation of his works. We 
might think o f Coleridge’s lectures as exemplifying the process by which this 
‘Shakespeare’ is being created. While Coleridge was thus ‘constructing’ both the 
audience and the subject matter of his criticism, he also continuously reflected on his 
own activity: looking through his notes, one finds him again and again trying to account 
for what it is in Shakespeare’s plays, and what it is in the ‘genial’ (or ideal) reader, that 
enables such boundary-crossings between language and feeling.
I am going to approach this huge area of Coleridge’s thought obliquely, 
by situating it in the context of the so-called ‘new rhetoric’, that is, in a critical discourse 
developed in the second half of the eighteenth century which had anticipated several of 
Coleridge’s questions about feeling and language, and which overlapped with the 
tradition known as ‘philosophical criticism’. O f course, no matter how close or how 
distant these critics are to Coleridge, any attempt to explain his criticism with reference 
to its predecessors has its own limitations. At best, such an inquiry can yield a partial 
view, while its greatest danger lies in short-circuiting Coleridge’s thought by tracing it 
back to fixed ‘origins’. However, I think such a method might still be justifiable exactly 
because o f Coleridge’s famous or infamous disruption of fixed origins in critical 
thinking. In almost all cases, that is, he can be thought of as ‘annotating’ other texts -  
sometimes by himself - ,  which is not to say that he is unoriginal but that his most 
interesting ideas are generated in response to ‘others’. But if his criticism is 
understood as something like an aggregate of several ongoing debates, it also has to be 
acknowledged that some of his critical terms are not entirely his own. Even if he 
‘naturalises’ them to his own arguments, they at the same time belong to those
Christensen argues that this strategy (the ‘marginal method’) relieved Coleridge ‘o f  the responsibility 
for systematic discourse’, albeit at the cost o f  making him dependent on a series o f  authorities ‘on which 
he obsessively relies and which he compulsively disrupts’. See Christensen, C oleridge's B lessed Machine 
o f  Language (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1981), pp. 108-9.
discourses with which he engages in dialogue. For this reason, I think it is necessary to 
look at the wider context in which his ideas were formulated and possibly understood. 
Taking a closer look at ‘philosophical criticism’ in the second half of the eighteenth 
century is especially important for my concerns, because some of the most challenging 
developments in this tradition evolved exactly around terms like ‘feeling’, ‘passion’, and 
‘excitement’ -  terms that Coleridge returned to again and again.
The ‘new rhetoricians’ or ‘philosophical critics’ o f the later eighteenth 
century include, among others, Adam Smith, Lord Kames, George Campbell, Alexander 
Gerard, Hugh Blair, and Joseph Priestley; while William Richardson who was not 
strictly a rhetorician, can certainly be counted amongst the ‘philosophical critics’. Most 
of these writers were associated with the Scottish Enlightenment and were moral 
philosophers, as well as being critics or rhetoricians. Their unique perspective follows 
from this: on the one hand, they aim at renewing classical rhetoric, while on the other, 
they are students of the mind, participating in the capacious project Hume had called the 
‘science of man’. As James Engell has persuasively argued, these critics were crucial in 
the evolution o f Romantic poetics; moreover, they were ‘the first British critics to mount 
a collective effort to explain literature and literary form in light o f semiotics and the 
structure of language’. L i k e  Coleridge, they believed that language and thought were 
inseparable from each other (having learned this from Locke and Condillac), while they 
also laid an unusual emphasis on passion and feeling in their theories of language. 
Moreover, they assumed that ‘movements’ of rhetoric performed movements of 
passion - 1 allude to ‘performance’ here not only because of its modern associations 
with speech act theory (a meaning that is relevant to the old view), but also because the 
term emphasises the ‘embodied’ aspect o f feeling that was important for both Coleridge
Engell, James, ‘The N ew  Rlietoric and Romantic Poetics’, in Bialostosky, Don H. and Lawrence D. 
Needham eds, R hetorical Tradition and British Romantic Literature (Bloom ington and Indianapolis; 
Indiana University Press, 1995), 217-232, p. 217. The fullest account o f  the ‘N ew  Rhetoric’ is to be found 
in W. S. Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), pp. 441-691. The ‘new rhetoric’ is related to Coleridge in James Mulvihill, 
Upstart Talents: Rhetoric and the Career o f  Reason in English Romantic Discourse, 1790-1820  (Newark: 
University o f  Delaware Press, 2004), pp. 21-63.
For Condillac’s significance see Hans Aarsleff, ‘Wordsworth, Language, and Romanticism’, in From  
Locke to Saussure: E ssays on the Study o f  Language and Intellectual H istory  (London: Athlone Press, 
1982), 372-381. See also N icholas Hudson, ‘Theories o f  language’, in N isbet, H. B ., and Claude Rawson, 
eds.. The Cam bridge H istory o f  L iterary Criticism, Volume 4: The Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 335-348.
and his predecessors/^ Thus, notwithstanding Coleridge’s antagonism towards ‘Scotch 
Doctors’, I think that in an important sense these critics set the stage on which 
Coleridge’s lectures were performed. I use the term ‘philosophical criticism’ to 
emphasise this connection, for the critics whom Engell calls ‘new rhetoricians’ tended to 
describe the activity in which they were engaged by using this Coleridgean-sounding 
term. One of the aims of my thesis is to show that this connection is not merely 
superficial, even if Coleridge rejected much o f the philosophy o f his predecessors. By 
way o f introduction, however, a short explanation might be in order o f what I take to be 
the discourse o f ‘philosophical criticism’ and why I think that Coleridge can be regarded 
as one of its later proponents.
James Harris in his posthumously published Philological Inquiries 
(London, 1781) distinguished ‘philosophical criticism’ from ‘historical’ and ‘corrective 
criticism’ (the latter two, he argued, were dominant in his age). He identified the 
philosophical critic’s leading assumption as ‘Nothing excellent in literary Performances 
happens from Chance’ -  in other words, what is recognised as excellent can be 
explained on theoretical grounds:
Effects indeed strike us, when w e are not thinking about the cause; yet may we be assured, i f  we 
reflect, that a cause there is, and that too a cause intelligent and rational. Nothing would perhaps 
more contribute to give us a taste truly critical, than on every occasion to investigate this cause, 
and ask ourselves, upon feeling any uncommon effect, why w e are thus delighted; why thus 
affected; why melted into pity; why made to shudder with horror?
The relationship between language and ‘action’ in 18''’-century rhetoric is discussed in H. Lewis Ulman, 
Things, Thoughts, Words, and  Actions: The Problem o f  Language in Late Eighteenth-Century British 
R hetorieal Theory (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994). A recent 
attempt at relating Austinian speech act theory to the ‘passions’ is Stanley C avell’s ‘Performative and 
Passionate Utterance’, in Philosophy the D ay after Tomorrow  (Cambridge, M ass. And London; Belknap 
Press o f  Harvard University Press, 2005), 155-191.
For Coleridge’s ambivalent engagement with the Scottish Enlightenment see Cairns Craig, ‘Coleridge, 
Hume, and the chains o f  the Romantic imagination’, in Leith Davis, Ian Duncan and Janet Sorensen, eds., 
Scotland and the B orders o f  Romanticism  (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 20-37. His 
reliance on Priestley’s criticism is discussed in Jane Stabler, ‘Space for Speculation: Coleridge, Barbauld, 
and the Poetics o f  Priestley’, N icholas Roe, ed., Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Sciences o f  Life (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 174-204.
Angela Esterhammer identifies ‘philosophical criticism’ as one o f  Coleridge’s critical legacies; what I 
am emphasising now is that it was also an inheritance; see Esterhammer, ‘The Critic’, in L. Newlyn (ed.). 
The Cam bridge Companion to Coleridge  (Cambridge: CUP, 2002, 142-155), 153-4.
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Till this why is w ell answered, all is darkness; and our admiration, like that o f  the vulgar, 
founded upon ignorance.'®
The philosophical critic, then, starts by registering the emotional effects of a given 
literary text, and proceeds by establishing the laws of nature which explain such 
reactions, and to which the text supposedly conforms. Based on natural laws, he 
formulates critical ‘principles’, in order to interpret what he regards as the data of 
literary experience. Even though Harris’s view of the mind was essentially Platonist, his 
general definition of philosophical criticism was also accepted by thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, who had a rather different philosophical outlook. Alexander 
Fraser Tytler in his Memoirs o f  Kames (1807) quotes Harris’s definition approvingly, 
even if he argues that the true ‘inventor of [that] science’ was Kames himself, Kames 
having been the first ‘to trace the rules of criticism to their true principles in the 
constitution of the human mind, and the nature of the passions and affections’.T y t l e r  
argues that the new ‘science’ of philosophical criticism was further developed by writers 
such as George Campbell, James Beattie, and William Richardson.
These critics, together with others not mentioned by Tytler, formed 
something like a recognisable critical school by the later eighteenth century Vicesimus 
Knox in an essay ‘On Philosophical Criticism’ finds the ‘philosophical’ approach 
‘particularly prevalent among our thoughtful neighbours in North Britain’, that is, 
among thinkers o f the Scottish Enlightenment. Looking for a representative critic among 
them, he cites Kames as one who ‘has penetrated deeply to discern the cause of those 
emotions, which literary compositions are found to produce’, even if, as he argues, such
'® Reprinted in V icesim us Knox, ed.. Elegant Extracts in Prose, Selected fo r  the Im provement o f  Young 
Person, Tenth edition (London: 1816), p. 419.
Tytler, M em oirs o f  the Life and Writings o f  the Honourable Henry Home o f  Kames; Containing 
Sketches o f  the Progress o f  Literature and G eneral Improvement in Scotland during the G reater Part o f  
the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Creech; London. T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1807), 1: 
273. See also his assertion that philosophical criticism ‘consists in founding the rules o f  judgment in the 
fine arts upon the principles o f  human nature’, and thus it is ‘that which draws its rules, not from authority, 
and the practice o f  eminent writers, but from its native and primary source, the structure o f  the human 
mind and the nature o f  the passions’ (1: 277; 281).
According to Andrew Hem ingway, the Scottish Enlightenment ‘initiated philosophical criticism as a 
form o f  systematic inquiry’. Hemingway, ‘The “Sociology” o f  Taste in the Scottish Enlightenment’, The 
O xford A rt Journal Vol 12, N o 2 (1989), 3-35, p. 11.
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speculations have no practical value for w riters/' Philosophical criticism, then, is based 
on the analysis o f feelings, but it has its own limitations. In another essay ‘On Modern 
Criticism’, Knox goes further in criticising these critics, claiming that in their pursuit of 
‘science’ they have intruded on the territory o f ‘polite and classical scholars’, behaving 
like ‘anatomists’ who must ‘examine the internal conformation’, instead of simply 
appreciating beauty.
These remarks reveal Knox’s anxiety over what should count as criticism 
and who should be entitled to practice it. ‘Philosophical criticism’, seen in this light, 
played an important role not only in the evolution of certain key critical ideas, but also in 
the reconfiguration of disciplines that took place during the long eighteenth century, in 
which Coleridge’s lectures still occupy a transitional place. According to a number of 
recent studies, this transformation, which ultimately led to the establishment of ‘English 
Literature’ as a university subject, started with the introduction o f ‘Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres’ at the Scottish universities.^^ The works of the Scottish critics had repercussions 
all over Britain, and not only through the influence of the Scottish reviewers. Knox, for 
instance, who chastised the ‘philosophical critics’ for undue specialisation, nevertheless 
reprinted a considerable portion of Hugh Blair’s ‘Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres’ in his Elegant Extracts, with the explicit aim of making the ‘current coin’ of 
criticism available to a wider English audience, and primarily to students whose 
education had been focused on the ‘golden medals of antiquity’ Clearly, this meant 
that ‘polite and classical’ scholarship was no longer sufficient for modern critical 
‘exchange’.
Knox, ‘On Philosophical Criticism, and on the little assistance it gives to genius’, in Essays M oral and  
Literary, A N ew  Edition in Two Volumes (London: Charles D illy, 1782), 2: 10-14, p. 10.
‘On Modern Criticism’, in E ssays M oral and Literary, 1; 128-132, pp. 129-130. See also Martin Kallich, 
The Association o f  Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century England: A H istory o f  a  
P sychological M ethod in English Criticism  (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1970), p. 220. On ‘anatomy’ as a 
metaphor used by Hume for his own project, see Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language o f  
F eeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford; Clarendon, 1988), p. 32.
22 See N eil Rliodes, ‘From Rhetoric to Criticism’, in The Scottish Invention o f  English Literature, ed. 
Robert Crawford (Cambridge: CUP, 1998) 22-36, and also the other essays in this collection. See also 
Clifford Siskin’s argument about the ‘disciplinary displacement o f  Scottish philosophy by English 
Literature’ in The Work o f  Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain 1700-1830  (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), esp. p. 81.
2'* Elegant Extracts: or, useful and  entertaining P assages in Prose, Selected  fo r  the Improvement o f  Young 
Persons: being sim ilar in D esign to Elegant Extracts in Poetry, 2 vois. (London, 1797), 1: ii.
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Coleridge and Wordsworth were among the vast number o f young people 
in England who read Knox’s volumes, although a note by Coleridge suggests that he 
probably saw them as promoting a mildly amusing sort o f classicism/^ The cutting edge 
of eighteenth-century ‘philosophical criticism’, however, was defined by its difference 
from classical authorities. As James Engell writes, these critics ‘invoke Aristotle, 
Dionysius o f Halicarnassus, Longinus, Cicero, and Quintilian, but they wish primarily to 
establish the “radical principles” of language and literature’ In other words, they 
advocate the enlightened attitude of ‘judging for oneself, as Tytler and others are glad 
to assert.^^ Interestingly, however, Tytler himself does not refrain from criticising 
Kames on this very ground: ‘By teaching, that every judgment pronounced on any of the 
productions o f the fine arts must rest on certain fixed principles of human nature,’ 
philosophical criticism, he argues, ‘has a tendency to substitute reason and argument in 
the room of f e e l i n g . T h i s  suggests that the idea of criticism as a specialized field of 
study could be disconcerting, not only to its opponents like Knox, but also to its own 
advocates. It seems that around the turn of the century several writers were afraid that in 
the pursuit o f critical systems, the ‘feeling’ for poetry would be lost.^^ Ironically, literary 
‘feeling’ was the very subject matter these ‘scientific’ critics dealt with, so the fear of a 
possible loss of feeling was perhaps an offshoot of their own specialised attention.^'' 
Characteristically, Coleridge in his 1814 letter to Murray referred to his own ‘long habits 
of meditation on Language’ and the connections between thoughts, words, and feelings, 
in order to explain why he had given up writing poetry. However, the achievement of his
In November 1799 Coleridge copies a passage from the Elegant Extracts [ . . . ]  in Prose  (1784), and 
writes: ‘Spence, Blackwall & Blair, the Damon, Mopsus, & Menalcus o f  Criticism - Master Knox’ etc. 
(C N  531, 532). The reference to V irgil’s shepherds may have to do with these critics’ interest in the 
‘primitive’ origins o f  poetry.
^^ ‘The N ew  Rlietoric and Romantic Poetics’, p. 218.
Writing o f  Elem ents o f  Criticism, he states, ‘But o f  the truth or rectitude o f  the theoretical principles, we 
have no other test than individual consciousness: every reader must judge by making the appeal to his own  
feelings, an appeal which indeed is the ultimate criterion o f  the truth or falsehood o f  all metaphysical 
opinions [ . . .]  It is the quality o f  a work o f  this nature, to make the reader judge for him self on every 
subject handled by the author’. Tytler, Memoirs, 1: 315.
Tytler, M em oirs, 1:317.
David Simpson discusses the strong anti-theoretical bias o f  the age, but he does not refer to the Scottish 
‘philosophical critics’. See his Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt against Theory (Chicago and 
London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1993).
Cf. George Campbell on effects o f ’w it’: ‘there is a risk, that when w e are most disposed to inquire into 
the cause, w e are least capable o f  feeling the effect; as it is certain, that when the effect hath its full 
influence on us, w e have little inclination for investigating the cause’ (The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 2 vols 
[London and Edinburgh, 1776], 1: 48).
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lectures was exactly to combine analysis with ‘poetic feeling’ -  in other words, his 
unique lecturing style can be understood as responding to the very threats posed by the 
‘scientific’ nature o f his approach/'
Perhaps no other book could have afforded more ground for fears about 
the effects of rigorous philosophical inquiry than Joseph Priestley’s Course o f  Lectures 
on Oratory and Criticism (1777), consisting of the lectures he delivered at the 
Warrington Academy from 1762 onwards. Priestley ‘dissects’ literary compositions 
precisely in the manner that Knox found so alarming; in fact, he uses metaphors of 
anatomy to describe his own work.^^ Priestley is recognized by James Engell and W. S. 
Howell as an important figure in the development of the new rhetoric; his arguments 
often rely on Kames and Alexander Gerard, while they also show some similarities with 
those of George Campbell. As Vincent M. Bevilacqua explains, both Priestley and 
Campbell based their respective critical systems on a hierarchy of the mental faculties, 
studying what devices of style affect the passions, judgment, and imagination.^^ 
However, the principal aim of Priestley’s lectures was not to establish a new 
‘philosophy’ o f rhetoric, but to offer an illustration of the philosophy he adhered to, that 
is, to Hartley’s associationism. He himself looked back on what he called his 'Lectures 
on Philosophical Criticism' by obseiwing that ‘the subjects of criticism admit of the 
happiest illustration from Dr. Hartley’s principles’, and that was why he finally decided 
to publish them.^"' Here, then, was a book of ‘scientific’ criticism written by a “Natural 
Philosopher”, who carried Kames’s approach to its logical conclusion. But whereas the 
theory o f mind proposed by Kames had never quite amounted to a complete system, 
Priestley writes with a philosophy in mind that had already found its finished 
formulation.
By doing so, he resolves a productive tension between criticism and 
philosophy that had characterised most of the writings of earlier philosophical critics.
Cf. Julie Ellison on ‘romantic anxieties against critical aggression’ and Coleridge’s response to them in 
D elicate Subjects, p. 103.
‘W e have hitherto examined what w e may call the bones, muscles, and nerves o f  a composition; w e now  
com e to the covering o f  this body, to describe the external lineaments, the colour, the complexion, and 
graceful attitude o f  it.’ Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures on O ratory and Criticism , ed. Vincent M. 
Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 72.
See the editors’ introduction to Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, esp. pp. xxvi; xxxviiii.
®''Priestley, An Examination o f  Dr. R e id ’s  Inquiry into the Human M ind  (London: J. Johnson, 1774), p. xii. 
See also Kallich, The A ssociation o f  Ideas, p. 224.
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Kames, Gerard, and William Richardson make use of literature in more than one way: as 
illustration of philosophical doctrine, as material to be criticised, and -  most 
remarkably -  as a heuristic tool in the pursuit of philosophical truth. In Elements o f  
Criticism Kames asserts that ‘[t]he principles of the fine arts, appear in this view to open 
a direct avenue to the heart of man’ -  the heart of man being the ‘black box’ that 
philosophers like him ultimately wished to study.^^ Similarly, George Campbell 
regarded rhetoric as ‘perhaps the surest and the shortest, as well as the pleasantest way 
of arriving at the science o f the human mind’.^  ^Such assertions show that for these 
authors literary texts (or, for Campbell, even non-literary ones) fulfilled a very important 
role: they made possible the ‘experiment’, which was thought to be essential for any
‘scientific’ investigation.
Kames in his Introduction states that he wishes ‘to ascend gradually to 
principles, from facts and experiments; instead of beginning with the former, handled 
abstractedly, and descending to the latter’ As it turns out, he means by ‘experiments’ 
passages o f poetry, or rather, examples o f the interaction between text and mind, which 
can be examined not only by the critic, but also by his reader. The reader s sympathetic 
response, his sense of pleasure or revulsion when reading a particular text, thus provides 
the data and the pledge for ‘scientific’ inquiry. The ‘experiment’ can be repeated and the 
results explained on the basis of general laws. But, as it sometimes happens in science, 
an experiment might also yield some unexpected result, which could only be explained 
by refining the original principles. In ‘philosophical criticism too, the analysis of certain 
texts could lead to new ‘discoveries’. Reading the works of some philosophical critics, 
most notably Kames and William Richardson, one cannot avoid thinking that the mental 
‘laws’ they described in connection with a given literary passage were in fact deduced 
from their reading o f that very passage, instead of having been conceived previously. 
Literary criticism, then, did not simply illustrate philosophy (as Priestley intended), but 
generated philosophy. This is the reason why Kames’s project could not be completed in 
a systematic manner: the ‘laws’ of passion he identified were almost as numerous as the 
passages he looked at.
Kames, Elements o f  Criticism  (1762), 2 vols (London: Routledge / Thoemmes Press, 1993), 1: 33. 
The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 1: 16; see also Engell, ‘The N ew  Rhetoric’, p. 220.il s  f  t r 
Elements o f  Criticism, 1: 13.
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Treating literature in this heuristic way lent a unique status to certain 
literary texts. While various works could be criticised on the basis o f general principles, 
it was necessary to acknowledge that a few were beyond censure, since they were used 
as the source o f general principles, in relation to which all other works could be 
criticised. It is hardly surprising that the author who offered most such passages was 
Shakespeare, whose reputation for representing ‘human nature’ was already well 
established. For the philosophical critics Shakespeare thus became the ‘philosophical’ 
poet, whose instinctive knowledge o f the most hidden springs of human behaviour found 
embodiment in his plays. In other words, Shakespeare’s writings were viewed as the 
crucial experiments in ‘scientific’ inquiry. To cite only one interesting example, 
Alexander Gerard in his Essay on Genius, wishing to study the influence of passion on 
association, writes:
It may perhaps be thought most proper to draw these from our own experience in real life. But to 
be able to select examples from real life, and to set them in a striking light, would require no 
small degree o f  one o f  the highest and rarest kinds o f  poetical genius. It w ill therefore be both the 
fastest and the best way, to take our examples from such representations o f  the passions in poetry, 
as are confessedly natural to the taste o f  the reader. Such examples have as great authority as 
instances which a person h im self observes in ordinary life. Shakespear alone w ill almost supply 
us with as many as are necessary.
One o f Gerard’s arguments in this book is that devising scientific experiments is no less 
an act of genius than writing poetry. Here he ingeniously turns the tables on poetry, as it 
were prompting Shakespeare to stand in for a scientist, at least as regards the staging of 
experiments. This critical sleight-of-hand was not unique to Gerard, but one of the 
hallmarks of philosophical criticism in general. Kames’s work, for instance, became 
widely influential precisely because of his extensive reliance on Shakespeare: even if his 
particular explanations were discarded by later critics, his illustrations were cited again 
and again to support other theories. In other words, philosophical criticism was both a
' An E ssay on Genius (London: W. Strathan, T. Cadell; Edinburgh: W. Creech, 1774), p. 150.
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cause and a symptom o f the ‘Shakespeare idolatry’ that -  as R. W. Babcock 
demonstrated -  Romantic critics inherited from their eighteenth-century predecessors.^^
This, finally, explains why I have decided to study the role of feeling 
specifically in Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare, instead of looking at his literary 
criticism in general. It is in these lectures that he is closest to and most readily 
comparable with earlier philosophical critics, and consequently it is here that his 
differences from his predecessors in the critical uses o f ‘feeling’ are clearly discernible. 
Like his predecessors, he relies on Shakespeare’s authority to introduce principles of 
criticism and treats some o f Shakespeare’s characters as revealing elementary laws of 
the human mind. Hamlet, for instance, manifests for him ‘Shakespeare’s deep and 
accurate science in mental philosophy’; it is therefore ‘essential to the understanding of 
Hamlet’s character, that we should reflect on the constitution of our own minds’ (LL 1: 
543). Kames and his followers relied on introspection in criticism in a very similar 
way."^° With the other philosophical critics, Coleridge asserts that criticism should be 
based on the analysis o f the mind: works o f art ‘must of necessity be referred to some 
known faculty or passion o f our common hu Nature which they have pleased or 
satisfied’ {LL 1: 126); this, he declares, is the only strictly ‘scientific’ method {LL 2: 47). 
However, his analysis is never quite complete; compared to Priestley, he gives relatively 
less attention to the finished system and more to the individual ‘experiment’. 
Shakespeare’s works, which are introduced by both Coleridge and the earlier critics as 
‘illustrations’ of critical principles, have a tendency to become, in his lectures, the main 
subject matter that needs explanation, while his tentative principles often merely hover 
in the background, although they are capable of moving centre stage at any moment.
All in all, there is a flexibility and even playfulness that distinguishes 
Coleridge’s critical style from his predecessors, which, I think, follows from his tactical 
renunciation (or, perhaps, postponement) in his lectures o f arriving at a fully coherent
See Babcock, The G enesis o f  Shakespeare Idolatry, 1766-1799: A study in English criticism o f  the late 
eighteenth century (N ew  York: Russell & Russell, 1964 (1931)).
See B. I, M anolescu , ‘Traditions o f  Rhetoric, Criticism, and Argument in K am es’s Elements o f  
C riticism ’, Rhetoric Review , 22 (2003), 225-242.
For the importance o f  the ‘experiment’ in Coleridge’s poetics see Jane Stabler, ‘Space for Speculation’; 
N oel B. Jackson, ‘Critical Conditions; Coleridge, “Common Sense”, and the Literature o f  Self- 
Experiment’, m E L H , 70: 1 (Spring 2003), 117-149.
17
philosophy, either of criticism or of the human mind. At the same time he uses every 
opportunity to draw sketches of such philosophies and, in turn, to test his own theories in 
the ‘here and now’ of the lecture theatre. This means that even when he records his own 
feelings in response to a particular text, he is never simply impressionistic: impressions, 
for him, are data to be explained, the results of experiments. The uniqueness of this 
stance becomes clearer if it is compared with the views of some of Coleridge’s 
contemporaries. The Blackwood’s critic John Wilson, for instance, in his 1818 ‘Letter’ 
on the character o f Hamlet, refers to the tradition o f making use of literature for the 
purposes o f philosophy only to define his own criticism in opposition to it:
w e cannot endure any long, regular, and continued criticism upon [Hamlet], for w e know that 
there is an attitude o f  his soul which cannot be taken, and a depth that may not be fathomed. We 
w ish rather to have som e flashings o f  thought -  some sudden streams o f  light thrown over partial 
regions o f  the mental sceneiy, -  the veil o f  clouds here and there uplifted, -  and the sound o f  the 
cataract to be unexpectedly brought upon the silence. We ask not for a picture o f  the whole 
landscape o f  the soul, nor for a guide who shall be able to point out all its wonders. But we are 
glad to listen to every one who has travelled through the kingdoms o f  Shakespeare.'*^
The discourse of philosophical criticism originated in the wish to possess a ‘picture of 
the whole landscape o f the soul’, which Wilson here rejects. Philosophical critics 
conducted an analysis of language and poetry -  especially of Shakespeare -  in order to 
supply the missing details of such a map. Coleridge’s notes can be rhapsodic, like 
Wilson’s paragraph here, but he never renounces the ambition of constructing maps of 
the mind through literature -  even though he seems to be more aware than any of his 
predecessors of the inevitable connection between such maps and works of fiction.
By engaging with questions of self-knowledge through a discussion of 
poetry, Coleridge participates in the larger epistemological debate that has been 
reconstructed by Adela Pinch in Strange Fits o f  Passion: Epistemologies o f  Emotion, 
Hume to Austen (1996). My work is greatly indebted to this brilliant study, which has 
investigated vital continuities between ‘Romanticism’ and the ‘Age of Sensibility’, 
demonstrating that a particular ‘concern with the vagrancy of emotions persists from the
‘T .C.’, ‘Letters on Shakespeare. N o. I -  On Hamlet’, B lackw ood’s Edinburgh M agazine, II (February 
1818), 504-12, pp. 504-5.
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eighteenth century through the romantic period’/^  Pinch introduces the central problems 
of that debate via a reading o f Hume’s Treatise, and proceeds by analysing a number of 
literary works in order to show ‘how questions about our knowledge of feelings and the 
forms they take structure both literary and philosophical texts’ Although one of her 
chapters deals with Wordsworth, she is curiously silent about Coleridge, who could have 
been doubly relevant to her argument, both as a poet and a critic-philosopher.
Coleridge’s concerns overlap with the problems studied by Pinch in a number of ways. 
She shows, for instance, how feelings in the philosophy and literature o f the long 
eighteenth century often appear to be impersonal and transsubjective, quite frequently 
being represented as the feeling o f an ‘other’. I think that Coleridge’s reflections on 
feeling as bound up with language and rhetoric brings this problem into especially sharp 
focus, while his speculations on how Shakespeare’s drama mediates the reader’s feelings 
to him- or herself is probably the most ingenious working-through of these matters. 
Moreover, Pinch’s double point that ‘a fascination with knowing feelings is closely 
coupled with a sense of their difficulty’, and that in this period ‘it becomes productive to 
see feelings as difficult to measure’, is exemplified not only by Coleridge’s careful 
distinctions between feelings within and beyond the scope of language, but also by the 
inherent contradictions o f philosophical criticism itself, which again and again provoked 
the question o f what might be lost, and what might be gained, by getting to know one’s 
feelings."^^
Apart from Pinch, a number of critics have established connections 
between sensibility and romanticism, most influentially perhaps Jerome McCann in The 
Poetics o f  Sensibility.^^ A resurgent interest in affect has led a number of Romantic new 
historicists to study issues related to ‘feeling’ on the grounds that conceptions of affect 
are especially sensitive to historical and social change. John Morillo describes critical 
engagement with feeling in the long eighteenth century as manifesting the ‘half- 
articulate relationship of writers and readers to their own thoughts and prejudices, a
Pinch, Strange Fits o f  Passion: Epistem ologies o f  Emotion, Hume to Austen  (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1996), p. 11.
Strange Fits o f  Passion, p. 8 
Strange Fits o f  Passion, p. 164.
McGann, The P oetics o f  Sensibility: A Revolution in L iterary Style (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
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silent conversation best described as ideology’. The thrust of his argument is that the 
diseourse on passion was in this period a veiled discourse on class. Coleridge’s criticism 
would offer ample opportunities for studying class and gender relations configured in 
terms o f feeling; however, I have decided to bracket the ideological subtext for the sake 
o f reconstructing Coleridge’s theoretical contributions to the ‘philosophical’ criticism of 
f e e l i n g . A  number of other critics have dealt with the representation of feeling as an 
important subject for historical inquiry, amongst them Andrew M. Stauffer in Anger, 
Revolution, and Romanticism and Thomas Pfau in his monumental Romantic Moods 
Jon Mee in his recent book focuses on ‘enthusiasm’ as a concept that ‘serves to highlight 
the entangled historicity of affect’, discussing Coleridge as representative of the 
Romantics’ ambivalent attitude towards enthusiasm (a force to be checked as well as
harnessed for poetic production)
Critical interest in feeling has also been triggered by the careful attention 
to theoretical and cultural aspects of the age of sensibility in a number of recent studies. 
John Mullan’s Sentiment and Sociability has been especially relevant to my work, in 
tracing how the body and its ‘natural’ signs were interpreted in the eighteenth century as 
manifesting a ‘language of feeling’, forming the -  rather ambivalent -  basis of concepts 
of sympathy and sociability.^' Since then, other critics such as Paul Goring have 
investigated this ‘natural’ rhetoric, while several studies have been devoted to the role of 
the body and feeling in the science and literature of Sensibility.^ In Coleridge studies, 
sensibility, feeling and the body have always been important topics, not least because of
John Morillo, Uneasy Feelings: Literature, the Passions, and Class from  N eoclassicism  to Romanticism  
(N ew  York: AM S Press, 2001), p. 3.
For gender implications, see Julie Ellison, D elicate Subjects.
49 Andrew M. Stauffer, Revolution, and Romanticism  (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); Thomas Pfau,
Romantic M oods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005).
Jon M ee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation: P oetics and the P olicing o f  Culture in the 
Romantic Penoc/(O xford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 3. See also M ee, ‘M opping Up Spilt 
Religion: The Problem o f  Enthusiasm’, Romanticism On the Net, 25 (February 2002), 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat0385/25mee.html
John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language o f  Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1988).
Goring, The Rhetoric o f  Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); Veronica 
K elly and Dorothea E. Von Mücke eds.. B ody an d Text in the Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1994); Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age o f  Reason  (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2003); Barbara M. Stafford, 
B ody criticism: imagining the unseen in Enlightenment art and medicine (Cambridge, Mass., and London. 
MIT Press, 1991); Ann Jessie Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The senses in 
socia l context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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Coleridge’s interest in his own symptoms, which he always regarded as matter for 
theoretical speculation. This aspect o f Coleridge has been given fresh attention by Neil 
Vickers, who in his study Coleridge and the Doctors reconstructs Coleridge’s 
knowledge o f ‘philosophical medicine’ (the works of John Brown and Thomas Beddoes, 
among others), and by Martin Wallen, who finds traces of a Brunonian ‘embodied’ 
imagination in Coleridge’s critical thought.^^ Similarly, Alan Richardson has argued that 
an organic or ‘embodied’ concept of the mind is traceable in Coleridge’s speculations.^'' 
Issues of contemporary medicine have also featured in Jennifer Ford’s Coleridge on 
Dreaming, while Coleridge’s psychological thought has been discussed by David 
Vallins in his comprehensive Coleridge and the Psychology o f  Romanticism.^^
As Vallins asserts, a fascination with psychology dominates Coleridge’s 
writings ‘in diverse genres and on superficially unrelated topics’, and therefore he looks 
at a number of different texts in order to identify the main patterns of his ‘psychological’ 
thought across the genres.^*’ Much of Vallins’s work is relevant to my concerns. He 
demonstrates, for instance, that the ‘view that thought must satisfy an emotional 
condition, and that meaning consists in an expressive purpose rather than mere logical 
relations was among Coleridge’s most enduring opinions’ -  something that my reading 
of his lectures confirms through and through.^^ But the scope of my thesis is 
considerably narrower: I am going to look at the role o f feeling exclusively in 
Coleridge’s lectures on Shakespeare, and turn to other disciplines (for example, 
medicine) only in so far as they are evoked in them. My intention to situate Coleridge in 
the discourse o f ‘philosophical criticism’ is a further difference: instead of tracing 
general patterns in his thought, I am going to select a few issues concerning ‘feeling’
Vickers, Coleridge and the D octors 1795-1806  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Wallen, City o f  Health, 
F ields o f  Disease: Revolutions in the Poetry, Medicine, and  Philosophy o f  Romanticism  (Aldershot, 
Hampshire and Burlington, VT; Ashgate, 2004); see also G. S. Rousseau and David Boyd Haycock, 
‘Framing Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Gut: Genius, Digestion, Hypochondria’, in G. S. Rousseau ed.. 
Framing and Im agining D isease in Cultural H istory  (Basingstoke and N ew  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003)231-265 .
Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science o f  the M ind  (Cambridge: CUP, 2001)
Ford, Coleridge on Dreaming: Romanticism, D ream s and the M edical Im agination  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Vallins, Coleridge and the Psychology o f  Romanticism: Feeling and  
Thought (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, N ew  York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
Vallins, p. 1.
”  Vallins, p. 34.
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and language in connection with which he seems to have developed, modified, or 
questioned the views of his predecessors.
By focusing on the British tradition, I am not implying that German ideas 
were not equally important for Coleridge’s critical thought. However, I do think that the 
emphases are sometimes misplaced, and that British ‘philosophical criticism’ is rarely 
taken seriously enough in discussions of Coleridge.^^ René Wellek in A History o f  
Modern Criticism regards Coleridge’s ‘emotionalism’ as a vestige o f the British tradition, 
to which he clung for irrational (probably sentimental) reasons, and contrasts it with his 
more advanced ‘German’ ideas concerning the symbol and the organic form.^^ This 
opposition, or something close to it, has been persistent in studies of Coleridge’s 
criticism; however, it is based on rather too neat categories. On the one hand, German 
critics did not lack an interest in the emotional aspects of poetry, as recent studies on 
Schiller have made abundantly clear.^'' When Coleridge refers to A. W. Schlegel in his 
‘Treatise on Method’ as a great foreign critic, he cites a remark by him that is perfectly 
in line with the concerns of British philosophical critics, discussing as it does the 
representation of the passions (ZM31). This might be regarded as a parallel interest in 
the two traditions, especially if we add that German criticism had not been heimetically 
sealed off from Britain. Kames’s work, for instance, was translated and became popular 
in Germany, exerting a considerable influence. When Coleridge in his ‘Essay on 
Method’ quotes Mistress Quickly as the example of immethodical discourse, his direct
There are a number o f  exceptions, however, such as Paul Hamilton’s C oleridge’s Poetics (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983) and Jerome Christensen’s C oleridge's B lessed Machine o f  Language. N oel B. Jackson 
has recently argued that ‘the emphasis on kinesthetic as w ell as affective feeling suggests a critical 
distinction between Kantian and British Romantic aesthetics -  even among those British writers, such as 
Coleridge, most obviously influenced by Kant’s thought. In fact, this distinction has just begun to be 
asserted by a number o f  critics investigating the embodied basis o f  imagination in British Romanticism. 
N oel B. Jackson, ‘Critical Conditions’, p. 123.
9^ ‘On the one hand w e have his holistic arguments about structure and his sym bolist view  o f  the poet 
embodying “ideas,” and on the other his pleasure principle and his emotionalism, which he tries to 
preserve in spite o f  everything.’ A H istory o f  M odern Criticism: 1750-1950, V ol 2: The Romantic Age 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 185. M. M. Badawi also argues that Coleridge used two sets o f  
principles, one Hartelyan and one Kantian, which prevented him from reaching a synthesis, see his 
Coleridge: Critic o f  Shakespeare  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
60 Lore M etzger, ‘The R ole o f  Feeling in the Formation o f  Romantic Ideology: The Poetics o f  Schiller and 
Wordsworth’, in Sensibility in Transformation: Creative Resistance to Sentiment from  the Augustans to 
the Romantics. E ssays in H onor o f  Jean H. Hagstrum, ed. by Syndy M cM illen Conger (Rutherford, 
Madison, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson UP; London and Toronto; Associated University Presses, 1990), 
172-194; see also M ichael John Kooy, Coleridge, Schiller, and Aesthetic Education  (2002).
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source is probably the German Johann Jakob Engel, but indirectly he is indebted to 
Kames, who used the same illustration in making a very similar point.^'
On the other hand, although the principal interest o f British criticism lay 
in the ‘reality’ represented in literature, it was also sensitive to matters of form, while it 
was also explicitly ‘philosophical’. The new rhetoric investigated the passions through 
the study o f figures of speech; moreover, Kames described dramatic illusion as a 
‘waking dream’ (that is, as not continuous with the ordinary experience of reality), and 
Adam Smith argued that artistic imitation united difference with similarity. Having said 
that, there is a certain usefulness in bearing in mind Wellek’s opposition, especially if it 
is not associated too strictly with ‘Germany’ and ‘Britain’. I think we should not imagine 
that Coleridge entertained two separate sets of critical opinions, one focusing on 
‘content’, the other on ‘form’, one ‘emotional’, the other ‘objective’, one ‘practical’, the 
other ‘philosophical’. But tensions between a more ‘formal’ and a more ‘psychological’ 
approach do appear in his writings, as they are also implicit, in different ways, in both 
German and British philosophical criticism. Their contradictions are most fully 
articulated in Coleridge because of his tendency to think precisely in the tensions 
between contrasting positions. As Seamus Perry has argued, Coleridge’s Shakespearean 
criticism is ‘double-minded’ in this sense, fractured by oppositions, but also capitalizing 
on them, setting up divisions that he in turn seeks to reconcile.^^ In studying Coleridge’s 
dialogue with British ‘philosophical criticism’, I am going to look at this complex 
structure from only one possible angle. I hope, however, that a view from this partial 
perspective can still add something to Coleridge’s critical profile, showing the ways in 
which he redirects previous lines of thought, giving them the characteristic Coleridgean 
bent.
Studying Coleridge’s lectures is not an unproblematic enterprise, to put it 
mildly. R. A. Foakes’s critical edition, which made such a study really viable for the first
For Coleridge’s borrowing from E ngel’s Anfangsgriinde einer Theorie der Dichtungsarten, see F 1: 
370n; F 2 \  45 In. The relevant section o f  Engel’s work is reprinted in Johann Jakob Engel, Liber Handlung, 
G esprach tm dE rzahhm g, ed. Ernst Theodor Voss (Stuttgart: J.B. M etzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1964), pp. 150-151. Kames discusses Mistress Quickly in Elements, 1: 20-21; Jonathan Bate points out the 
recurrence o f  K am es’s example in Shakespearean criticism in Shakespeare and  the English Romantic 
Imagination  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 17.
Perry, C oleridge and the Uses o f  D ivision  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 209-246.
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time, has also made it clear that Coleridge’s notes and the miscellaneous reports of his 
lectures do not amount to an authentic or even representative body o f ‘lecture’ texts. A 
reconstruction based on such material cannot be objective in any sense -  one simply 
needs to supply missing links much more often than in the case of more complete or 
finished texts. In what follows, I will inevitably ‘idealise’ the lectures by bracketing 
some o f their important differences. Most importantly, I am not going to focus on the 
chronological development of Coleridge’s ideas, but regard what is available of the 
lecture material as representing a more or less continuous (although not homogenous) 
process of thinking, roughly corresponding to Coleridge’s ‘middle years’. However, I 
am not going to disregard the lecturing scene in which these ideas evolved, nor the fact 
that my readings will be necessarily based on incomplete notes. In fact, I believe that the 
‘theatrical’ medium o f lecturing, defined as it was by its difference from print 
publication, was an essential component of what Coleridge’s criticism was about. Julie 
Carlson in her study o f Coleridge and the drama suggests that Coleridge’s middle period 
might be thought of as ‘the stage of theatre, the period in which he theorizes drama and 
theatre and mounts his one successful play’.^  ^While Carlson shows how theatre is 
connected with issues of nationalism and gender in Coleridge’s criticism, my analysis 
will often return to a theoretical link, apparent in Coleridge’s writings, between theatre 
and feeling. As I will argue, ‘feeling’ was related to concepts of performance and 
theatricality throughout Coleridge’s criticism, and therefore I shall start by taking a 
closer look at the ambiguous theatricality of the lectures themselves.
Carlson, In the Theatre o f  Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), p.
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Chapter One
The performance of criticism
‘The vanity o f  criticism, like all other vanities, except that o f  dress, 
(which so far has an involuntary philosophy in it) is always forgetting 
that w e are at least half made up o f  body.’ ’
‘O heaven! — words are wasted to those that feel and to those who do 
not feel the exquisite judgement o f  Sh[akespeare] (LL 2; 295)
For anyone wanting to collect evidence for Coleridge’s anti-theatrical 
sentiment, his lectures on Shakespeare would be a good place to start. According to the 
Bristol Gazette, for instance, he asserted that ‘he never saw any o f Shakespeare’s plays 
performed, but with a degree of pain, disgust, and indignation {LL 1. 563). Coleridge 
went on to list external causes that he thought responsible for his discontent, such as the 
enormous size and monopoly of the theatres’ which produced ‘many bad and but few 
good actors’. On another occasion, he ‘in the warmest language, censured those who had 
attempted to alter the works of Shakespeare, in order to accommodate him to modern 
ears’ {LL 1: 254). The staging of adaptations was only the most obvious way of losing 
touch with the ‘real’ Shakespeare; similarly harmful was the practice of neglecting 
inferior characters, ‘thro’ which our poet shone no less conspicuously & brightly’ {LL 1 : 
254), while concentrating wholly on the protagonists. According to Julie Carlson, the 
star system which was behind this phenomenon was especially disconcerting for 
Coleridge because it could lead to a few star actors and actresses outshining Shakespeare, 
their bodily presence becoming more emphatic than the text that was supposed to sustain
’ Leigh Hunt, L ord Byron an d Some o f  His Contem poraries (London, 1828); cited in Ralph Pite, ed.. Lives 
o f  the G reat Romantics, vo l 2: C oleridge  (London: Picketing & Chatto, 1997), p. 55.
them.^ Coleridge ruefully remarked that ‘those who went to the Theatre in our own day, 
when any of our poet’s works were represented, went to see Mr Kemble in Macbeth, - or 
Mrs Siddons ’ Isabel" or, even worse, ‘to hear speeches usurped by fellows who owed 
their very elevation to dexterity in snuffling candles’ (LL 1: 254). In such circumstances 
Coleridge considered it fortunate that Shakespeare was not performed more often, for 
thus he could ‘find his proper place, in the heart and in the closet’ (LL 1: 563).
It is not difficult to recognise in such remarks a more general aversion to 
the predominance of what is public and external in matters poetical.^ According to 
Coleridge, Shakespeare relied ‘on his own imagination’ when he created his characters, 
and spoke ‘not to the senses as was now done, but to the mind. He found the stage as 
near as possible a closet, & in the closet only could it be fully & completely enjoyed.’ 
(LL 1: 254) References to the private space o f the ‘closet’, the inner recesses of the 
‘heart’ and ‘mind’, coupled with the possessive tone of such utterances, seem to suggest 
that Coleridge, like other critics of his age, privileged a more or less stable and 
privatised Shakespeare, over a mutable or even mutilated public one. The ‘private’ 
Shakespeare found its proper embodiment in the book that one could own and read in 
solitude.'' However, to adapt two terms used by Michael Fried in his study of eighteenth- 
century aesthetics, romantic ‘absorption’ was inseparable from certain forms of 
‘theatricality’.^  Other critics have recently pointed out that Coleridge gave his most 
influential cues for ‘closet’ reading in situations that were recognisably theatrical.^ His 
lectures were public performances of Shakespeare interpretation given by (as one
 ^Carlson argues that this was especially problematic in the case o f  actresses: ‘Bardolators’ desire to closet 
Shakespeare saves him from psychological appropriation by wom en, even from his incarnation in the 
“incomparable,” but undeniably fem ale, Sarah Siddons.’ In the Theatre o f  Romanticism: Coleridge, 
Nationalism, Women (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), p. 20.
 ^ The complexities o f  Coleridge’s stance towards inwardness and externality are teased out in William H. 
Galperin, The Return o f  the Visible in British Romanticism  (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1993), pp. 156-204 (‘Coleridge’s Antitheatricality: The Quest for Community’).
For a recent discussion o f  this romantic attitude see Younglim Han, Romantic Shakespeare: From Stage 
to Page (Madison, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, London: Associated University Presses, 
2001).
 ^ See Fried, A bsorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the A ge o f  D idero t (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University o f  California Press, 1980). Cf. Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite, ‘Introducing Romantic 
Sociability’, in Russell and Tuite, eds.. Romantic Sociability: Social Networks an d  L iterary Culture in 
Britain 1770-1840  (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 1-23, pp. 6-9.
® See Peter J. Manning, ‘Manufacturing the Romantic image: Hazlitt and Coleridge lecturing’, in James 
Chandler and Kevin Gilmartin eds.. Romantic M etropolis: The Urban Scene o f  British Culture, 1780-1840  
(Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 227-245; Gillian Russell, ‘Spouters or washerwomen: the sociability o f  
Romantic lecturing’, in Romantic Sociability, 123-144.
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contemporary put it) ‘the celebrated Mr. Coleridge’ whose ‘intellectual exhibition’ was 
‘altogether matchless’ (IR 117) -  even if the element of theatricality seems to have been 
obscured by its very success. In what follows, I am going to take a look at the 
ambiguous theatricality of Coleridge’s lectures, by focusing on a few aspects which, I 
would contend, also have a bearing on elements of his critical approach. A recurrent 
theme will be the role of affective rhetoric in both the construction o f his lecturing 
scenario and in the fashioning of his task as a critic of Shakespeare.
1
‘A Theatre, in its widest sense is the general Term for all places of 
amusement thro’ the Eye or Ear, when people assemble in order to be entertained by 
others, all at the same time, & in common.’ {LL I, 129) Coleridge’s lectures seem to 
meet his own criteria with minor qualifications. In the lecture theatre, there is only one 
entertainer, himself, who demonstrates the intellectual pleasures o f poetry in front of his 
audience. In other words, the entertainment is also, and primarily, a means of instruction. 
A newspaper report of his lecture on Romeo and Juliet emphasises this double purpose, 
suggesting that for some listeners entertainment might have come first: ‘Mr. C. hence 
drew a moral equally salutary to our youths, and honourable to our maidens, were they 
but as ready to profit by his lessons as to enjoy the eloquence by which they are 
inculcated’ {LL 1: 320). Reports and reminiscences suggest that audiences attended 
Coleridge’s lectures as much for the sake of sociable entertainment as for the sake of 
self-improvement. Characteristically, commentators often divided teaching and 
delighting between male and female audiences. ‘If the female part of his audience be 
sometimes disappointed’, a reporter remarked, ‘they are sometimes agreeably surprised. 
For a cross wind and current o f thought and feeling, will frequently drive the lecturer 
from the most rugged and masculine philosophy, into the calm and captivating confines 
of the circle of the affections, and the influences of the heart.’ {IR 153) As this passage 
suggests, a casual drifting between ‘feeling’ and ‘philosophy’ was one of the appeals of 
Coleridge’s lectures, which -  like most public lectures at the time -  were designed to 
attract women as much as men.
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In her essay on romantic lecturing Gillian Russell has argued that in 
private institutions like the Royal, the Philosophical and the Surrey, which had a mostly 
professional middle-class membership, the presence of women guaranteed the polite and 
quasi-domestic sociability that the proprietors sought to m aintain/ For Coleridge, 
female auditors and the connection they represented between lecturing and the domestic 
sphere seem to have been especially important. His 1818 Prospectus declares that one of 
the aims of his course is to contribute ‘to the entertainment of the social board, and the 
amusement of the circle at the fire-side’ by offering ‘rules and principles of sound 
judgement’ in taste {LL 2: 39-40). This may sound more like a promise addressed to 
male audiences who wished to converse on literary topics in ‘mixed society’, as the 
Prospectus put it. But at other times Coleridge directly appealed to women’s sensibilities. 
Henry Crabb Robinson recounts, for instance, how during a lecture on the origin of the 
fine arts he ‘atoned for his metaphysics by his gallantry: he declared that the passion for 
dress in females has been the cause of the civilization of mankind’ {LL 1: 114). 
Considering that women had been thought of, however controversially, as civilising 
agents by a number o f Enlightenment philosophers (including Hume), it is possible that 
Coleridge’s ‘gallantry’ might have had philosophical foundations.^ But, as Robinson 
makes clear, such remarks were also sound social tactics. If Coleridge was to make a 
living as a lecturer, one o f the first things he had to learn was to find a way to address 
women in the audience.
Katherine Thomson records an interesting example of the negotiations 
this involved. At the Royal Institution in 1808, Coleridge ‘turned towards the fair and
’ Russell, ‘Spouters or washerwom en’, esp. pp. 137-8; see also David Hadley, ‘Public Lectures and 
Private Societies: Expounding Literature and the Arts in Romantic London’, in Donald Schoonniaker and 
John A. Alford, eds,, English Romanticism: Preludes and Postludes (Essays in Honour o f  Edwin Graves 
Wilson) (East Lansing, Mich.: Colleagues Press, 1993), 43-70.
® The role o f  women in Scottish Enlightenment thinking is discussed in Hem ingway, ‘The “Sociology” o f  
Taste’, p. 14, Hume in ‘O f Essay W riting’ advocates polite conversation (dominated by the ‘fair sex’) 
because “ ‘men o f  letters” need to be engaged with society, and polite culture needs to be provided with 
serious materials for discussion’. This stance might be comparable to Coleridge’s 1818 Prospectus. See 
also Leland E. Warren, ‘The Conscious Speakers: Sensibility and the Art o f  Conversation Considered’, in 
Syndy M cM illen Conger, ed.. Sensibility in Transformation: C reative Resistance to Sentiment from  the 
Augustans to the Romantics. Essays in Honor o f  Jean H. Hagstrum  (Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck: 
Fairleigh Dickinson UP; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1990), 25-42. A lso, Marina 
Frasca-Spada, ‘The Science and Conversation o f  Human Nature’, in W illiam Clark, Jan Golinski, and 
Simon Shaffer, eds.. The Sciences in Enlightened Europe (Chicago and London: The University o f  
Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 218-245.
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noble heads’ in the lecture-room (‘there were some hundreds of ladies present’) to 
apologize for his previous lecture, adding ‘that the Muses would not have been old 
maids, except for want of dowry.’ As Thomson recalls, the ‘witticism was received with 
as much applause as a refined audience could decorously manifest, and the harangue 
proceeded’ {IR 120). In other words, Coleridge on this occasion managed to get away 
with some impertinence (and even to make a reference to the commercial side of his 
venture), thereby establishing a bond of implicit understanding between himself and his 
listeners. The anecdote, however, also calls attentions to the risks necessarily incurred in 
using this kind of familiar tone in front of a public that was not homogenous, either 
socially or in terms o f gender and education. As Lucy Newlyn has argued, the strategy 
Coleridge developed to deal with this problem involved re-inventing his audience as a 
circle of friends, who were allowed a glimpse into his private thoughts because they 
were somehow already favourably predisposed towards him. Newlyn quotes Coleridge 
on his 1813 Clifton series -  ‘I have made Friends of them all’ {LL 2: 3) -  stating that 
‘ [s]ympathy and friendship were expected as part o f the intimate bonding between 
speaker and listener which he wished to establish’.^  But, as she also observes, 
Coleridge’s notes attest to a constant struggle between a sought-for intimacy and the 
dread o f self-exposure.
In a note written for the 1808 series at the Royal Institution, he addresses 
his (imaginary) listeners as ‘affectionate Guardians’ who ‘see without disgust the 
awkwardness, and witness with sympathy the growing pains, o f a youthful Endeavor’ 
{LL 1; 75). In another, he scripts a long apology that is far less self-assured than the one 
recalled by Thomson, that includes a philosophical discussion of remorse and regret, and 
ending on a note of pathos:
These reflections occurred to me from the exceeding depression, which I felt this morning 
previous to my appearing before [you], accompanied with [a] painful sense o f  self-dissatisfaction  
bordering on self-reproach. I could not but be conscious to how severe a Trial I had put your 
patience &  candour in my last Lecture -  and tho’ it was thro’ severe & still lingering bodily 
Indisposition [ . . . . ] -  yet I could not drive away the despondence o f  self-condemnation -  and 
when during the time I have now been addressing you, my mind gradually regained its buoyancy,
 ^Lucy Newlyn, Reading, Writing, and Romanticism: The Anxiety o f  Reception  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 87.
29
I felt an increasing Impulse, which I have thus yielded to, to attempt to remove from your feelings 
the disappointment from the Past by hopes o f  something less unworthy o f  your attention in my 
future Lectures. {LL 1: 65)
This is a dramatic monologue: a public confession to be spoken at the coming lecture in 
full earnest, envisioning and also conjuring for himself a moment o f relief and 
inspiration.'^ Such notes strongly suggest that Coleridge’s lectures ought to be thought 
of as performances which he sometimes rehearsed in writing, but which acquired their 
full significance only in the lecture theatre (hence their connection with performative 
genres such as the confession). The entire passage both enacts and theorises the 
emotional ‘drama’ o f remorse, and is in this sense related to Coleridge’s plays, Osorio 
and Remorse; analysis of feeling through self-dramatisation -  with the possibility of 
spiritual renewal -  is an important feature of both the plays and the lecture notes. This 
highlights the inherent theatricality o f the Coleridgean lecture: a theatricality that 
depended on its pretensions to not being theatre at all.
Coleridge the lecturer was author, character and actor at the same time, 
even if he managed to convince most of his listeners to regard this composite being as 
Coleridge ‘h im se lf."  To a large extent, his success depended on the air o f spontaneous 
thinking and sincere self-expression, and he performed this so convincingly that his roles 
as ‘author’ and ‘actor’ went mostly unnoticed, while he established himself as one of the 
most important literary characters in London (a ‘character’ that lent itself for literary 
treatment remarkably well).'^ Henry Crabb Robison tellingly writes that, on one 
occasion, he was ‘very eloquent and popular on the general character of Shakespeare: he 
is recovering lost character among the Saints.’ {LL 1: 496) The repetition o f ‘character’ 
here suggests how much Coleridge’s public image depended on his interpretation of 
Shakespeare; audiences were as eager to draw Coleridge’s portrait, as the critic who was
Cf. with N ewlyn, Reading, Writing, and Romanticism, p. 87.
" Cf. with Richard H olm es’s account: ‘Coleridge only slow ly realized he needed to be much more 
innovative and intimate -  to be much more himself. [ . ..]  He needed in effect to create a new style o f  
lecturing, dramatic and largely extempore, which took risks, changed moods, digressed and doubled back, 
and played with his own eccentricities. He needed, above all, to enact the imaginative process o f  the poet 
in his own person, to demonstrate a poet at work in the laboratory o f  his ideas.’ Coleridge: D arker 
Reflections (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), p. 118.
Gillian Russell argues that in The Blues Byron portrays Coleridge as lecturer (‘Spouters or 
W asherwomen’, pp. 134-138); other portrayals include those by D e Quincey and Henry Crabb Robinson.
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sketching that o f Shakespeare. Or, as Peter J. Manning writes, ‘[i]f readers saw 
Shakespeare through Coleridge, they also watched Coleridge create an image of himself: 
to lecture on the genius o f Shakespeare, under these particular conditions, was an 
occasion for the performance of contemporary genius."^
The rhetorical blending of the functions of author, actor and character can 
be witnessed in Chapter 10 o f Biographia Literaria, where the lectures play a crucial 
role in a complicated apology for Coleridge’s literary life. Wishing to prove that books 
are not ‘the only channel through which the stream of intellectual usefulness can flow’ 
{BL 1:220), Coleridge gives a memorable description of the opening night o f Remorse, 
when he observed ‘that the pit and the boxes were crowded with faces familiar to [him]’ 
from his lectures {BL 1:221). By stating this, he tactically subordinates his status as an 
author to that of a lecturer, resulting in a series of mirroring effects: members of the 
audience are recognised by the author who, in turn, had been watched by them as a 
lecturer, and whose play is to be watched by both. Through these bonds of watching and 
familiarity, Coleridge’s public success at the theatre is turned into private pleasure; ‘the 
complete success of the R e m o r s e  on the first night o f its representation’, he claims, did 
not give him ‘as great or as heart-felt a pleasure’ as his discovery o f the familiar faces 
{BL 1:221). Timothy Webb has noted that Coleridge obscures the distinction between 
theatre and lecture theatre in his private writing as w ell," reporting to his wife:
I concluded my Lectures last night most triumphantly, with loud, long, & enthusiastic applauses 
at my Entrance, & ditto in yet fuller Chorus as and for som e minutes after, I had retired. It was 
lucky, that (as I never once thought o f  the Lecture, till I had entered the Lecture Box) the two last 
were the most impressive, and really the best. I suppose that no dramatic Author ever had so large 
a number o f  unsolicited, unknown, yet predetermimdV\<vx6\io\'s in the Theatre, as I had on 
Saturday Night. One o f  the malignant Papers asserted, that I had collected all the Saints from 
M ile End Turnpike to Tyburn Bar. With so many warm Friends it is im possible in the present 
state o f  human Nature, that I should not have many unprovoked & unknown Enemies. -  You will
Manning, ‘Manufacturing the Romantic im age’, p. 236. See also Klancher, ‘Transmission Failure’, in 
David Perkins, ed.. Theoretical Issues in L iterary H istory  (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 173-195.
'4 Webb, ‘The Romantic Poet and the Stage: A Short, Sad History’, in Richard Allen Cave, ed.. The 
Romantic Theatre: An International Symposium  (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, Totowa: Barnes and 
N oble Books, 1986), p. 19.
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have heard, that on my entering the B ox on Saturday Night I was discovered by the Pit -  & that 
they all turned their faces towards our Box, & gave a treble chear o f  Claps. {CL 3: 430-1)
Coleridge here juxtaposes images o f himself as a lecturer and as the author of Remorse. 
Both figures are spectators as well as spectacles, being watched and applauded, while 
both keep their authorial isolation by staying in their respectable ‘boxes’. Indeed, what is 
most spectacular in them is the privacy they exhibit in public: Coleridge improvising in 
front of an audience (the ‘Saints’ or Dissenters of the Surrey Institution) as if he were 
not lecturing at all but talking to his friends or thinking in private (‘I never once thought 
of the Lecture’), and Coleridge the author having to be discovered in his private box. 
This passage also shows why Coleridge is so keen on blending the role of the author 
with that o f the lecturer. Thanks to the work done by the lectures, the unknown and 
heterogeneous public can be represented as a community o f ‘warm Friends’, in defiance 
o f those proponents of anonymity, the ‘malignant Papers’. Unavoidably, however, these 
are friends with faces but without names, for they are known to Coleridge from a more 
intimate, but similarly theatrical venue, that is, from the lecture theatre. Coleridge’s 
lectures are thus presented here as bridging the gap between the public and the private 
spheres, offering a middle-ground which enables him to come forward as an author with 
(relative) self-assurance. As Lucy Newlyn has amply demonstrated, authorship posed 
especially strong challenges for Coleridge." Even if lecturing was not without its own 
strains and tensions, the literary lecture, perhaps more than any other genre, seems to 
have offered him a way to successfully negotiate authorship in public. One of the 
reasons for this was that in the lecture theatre he could stage himself, emphatically, not 
as an author but as the person closest to him: the sympathetic reader-critic.
2
Philosophical criticism for Coleridge and for his eighteenth-century 
predecessors began with reflection on the reading experience. In a lecture note from 
1808, Coleridge mentions the critical error of ‘Judging of Books by books, instead of 
referring what we read to our own Experience or making it a motive for Observation -
N ewlyn, Reading, Writing, and Romanticism, pp. 50-90.
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one great use of Books’ {LL 1: 86). In a later note, he contrasts relying on ‘former 
notions and experience’ to the immediate process of reading, suggesting that the true 
critic should disregard the former and concentrate on the latter: ‘It is much easier to find 
fault with a writer merely by reference to former notions & experience than to sit down 
& read him and to connect the one feeling with the other & to judge o f words & phrases 
in proportion as they convey those feelings together.’ {LL 1: 367) Criticism, in other 
words, should be self-reflexive reading; as such it might reveal important truths not only 
about the text being read, but also about the mind reading. The question repeatedly 
asked by Coleridge in his lectures is what mental faculties and passions are activated by 
a given text. In 1811, for instance, he calls on his audience to determine
whether it is one o f  those which tho’ permanent in itself is perpetually varying the Objects that 
gratify it -  such as Curiosity or which turns with the disgust o f  Satiety from the last N ovel or 
Romance to hurry thro? devour a new one; destined like the former to pass from a dainty into a 
nuisance -  or a base passion, such as w e ought, in that shape at least, to exterminate from our 
heart -  such as Envy & its Mask, Scorn -  or whether they are indeed the worthy & constituent 
Powers o f  our nobler Nature, not only permanent in themselves but always & solely to be 
gratified by the same outward excellencies, the same in essence, tho’ infinitely varying in form, 
subject, and degree -  Such are our Imagination, our Delight from the clear Perception o f  Truth, 
and our moral Sense {LL 1:185)
This is close to Joseph Priestley’s mapping of the task of criticism in his Course o f  
Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, but with a characteristic difference. According to 
Priestley, criticism is meant to establish ‘Whatever it be, in the sentiment or ideas, that 
makes a discourse to be read with pleasure, must either be interesting, by exciting those 
gross and more sensible feelings we call passions, or must awaken those more delicate 
sensations, which are generally called the pleasures o f  the imagination."^^ It is important 
that Coleridge makes this more specific, adding to the list the ‘moral Sense’ and the 
‘Delight from the clear Perception of Truth’. For Priestley, who did not think that truth 
could be intuited through literature, it was enough to refer to the passions and the 
imagination. Coleridge was evidently o f a different opinion, although he generally
'6 Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures on O ratory and Criticism, ed. Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard 
Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 72.
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maintained with Priestley and other eighteenth-century critics that the direct aim of 
poetry is ‘pleasure’ -  hence, perhaps, his reference to ‘delight’ in connection with the 
perception of truth. The similarities of the two critical stances, however, are no less 
important; for both critics, answering questions about the effects of reading leads to the 
understanding and right evaluation of a given text, while it also reveals certain features 
of the mind, including features o f one’s own.
One avowed aim of Coleridge’s lectures was to cure harmful reading 
habits -  especially the ‘appetite’ for novels -  through critical reflection. The right way of 
reading (fostered by Shakespeare’s plays, above all) is contrasted to what he calls a ‘sort 
of beggarly Day-dreaming’, when ‘the mind furnishes for itself only laziness and a little 
mawkish sensibility, while the whole Stu ff and Furniture of the Doze is supplied ab extra 
by a sort o f Spiritual Camera Obscura’ {LL 1:124). In other words, he particularly 
resents the lack o f conscious intellectual exertion in reading; his metaphor of the Camera 
Obscura might be understood as a parody of Locke’s description of the understanding as 
a dark cham ber." This may sound like one o f Coleridge’s attacks on empiricism. 
However, he was not alone in entertaining such worries at the time; the harmful effect of 
novel reading -  especially on susceptible female minds -  had been a much-discussed 
topic of criticism throughout the long eighteenth century. Richard Payne Knight, for 
instance, whose Analytical Inquiry was the main target of Coleridge s first lectures in 
1808, states that novels promote a ‘passive and solitary dissipation’, ‘vitiate and 
enervate’ the public taste, and ‘debase and destroy the intellect’. "  As Neil Vickers has 
pointed out, Thomas Beddoes called attention to the same problem in his medical 
treatise on nervous disorders." While in a general sense Coleridge might be understood 
as participating in this larger debate, it is worth comparing his attacks on novels to those
See Locke, Essay, II, xi, 17: T or, methinks, the Understanding  is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut 
from light, with only som e little openings left, to let in external visible Resemblances, or Ideas o f  things 
without; would the Picture coming into such a dark Room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found 
upon occasion, it would very much resemble the Understanding o f  a Man, in reference to all Objects o f  
sight, and t h e o f  them .’
Richard Payne Knight, review o f  J. Northcote’s Life o f  S ir Joshua Reynolds, in the Edinburgh Review, 
vol. XXIII, no. XLVI (Sept 1814), p. 263. Quoted in Hemingway, ‘The Sociology o f  “Taste”’, p. 23.
9^ N eil Vickers, C oleridge and the D octors 1795-1806  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 70-1. 
Coleridge often adapts a neuro-physiological vocabulary in speaking about reading habits; the 1818 
Prospectus for instance mentions ‘the actual m ischief o f  unconnected and promiscuous reading, and that it 
is sure, in a greater or less degree, to enervate even where it does not likewise inflate {LL 2: 40).
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of Joseph Priestley in particular. Priestley, like Coleridge, advocates an active kind of 
reading, repudiating authors who ‘have left nothing to the exercise of the active faculties 
of his readers’. ‘[I]n mere reading o f this kind,’ he writes, ‘we are little more than 
passive. Trains of ideas pass before our minds, but no active powers of the soul are 
exerted.’^ '' The ‘trains of ideas’ mentioned here correspond to what Coleridge, writing 
about novels, calls ‘the moving phantasms of one man’s Delirium’ which ‘people the 
barrenness of a hundred other trains’ {LL 1:124). However, Priestley argues that not only 
novels, but to some extent all imaginative literature encourages passivity: ‘Poetry and 
works of fiction make a high entertainment, when they are made nothing more of; but 
they make a very poor and insipid employment." Intellectual activity in a strict sense 
belongs to philosophy and science alone, which Priestley contrasts with ‘sleeping over 
history, romances, poetry, and plays’. '^ Coleridge, for his part, concurs with Priestley on 
novels, while he re-fashions the reading of Shakespeare (and a few other poets) as an 
activity equal in worth to Priestley’s two ideals, the active pursuit o f science and 
philosophy.
In one o f his lectures Coleridge distinguishes between two kinds of 
readers of Shakespeare, ‘Those who read with feeling and understanding’ and ‘Those 
who with<out> affecting to understand or criticize merely feel and are the recipients of 
the poet’s power’ {LL 1: 351-2). While the activity of those placed in the second 
category is similar to lazy novel reading (albeit probably not as harmful), the first kind 
unites passive and active components, combining affective response or ‘feeling’ with 
understanding. In other words, Coleridge here -  as, I think, elsewhere -  incorporates the 
philosophical or ‘scientific’ perspective of critics like Priestley and Kames into the 
reading experience itself. That is, while earlier philosophical criticism drew a clear 
distinction between the reader who feels and the critic who understands (in particular, 
who understands the reader’s response), Coleridge tends to combine the two: his ideal 
reader is philosophical, and his ideal critic is sympathetic.
In the opening lecture of the 1811-12 series, Coleridge surveyed the 
‘ Causes of false criticism’, relying on a number o f terms related to affect. He writes here
Course o f  Lectures, p. 141; 144. 
Course o f  Lectures, p. 144.
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of the ‘enormous stimulant power of Events making the desire to be strongly stimulated 
almost an appetite" -  an ‘appetite’ being a passion which precedes its object, and, 
consequently, is in constant need of new objects/^ He also mentions that recent 
(political) events and ‘the unexampled Influence of Opinion’ ‘have made us a World of 
Readers’: all men are ^anxious to know what is going on in the world’ (LL 1: 186, my 
italics). These are the radical effects of the emergence of print culture; Coleridge’s 
language suggests how the ‘World of Readers’ is reading a new world into existence, 
importantly, driven by another passion, the anxiety to know. He also (ironically, for a 
lecturer) mentions the ‘passion of public Speaking’, and makes his habitual reference to 
novels and their dangers. All in all, it seems that ‘false criticism’ is describable, at least 
in part, as a confusion or dysfunction of affect. But apart from the so-called ‘accidental’ 
causes, he also mentions permanent ones, one of which is described as follows: ‘The 
effort & at first the very painful Effort of really thinking -  really referring to our own 
inward experiences — & the ease with which we accept as a substitute for this, which can 
alone operate a true conviction, the opinions of those about us — which we have heard or 
been accustomed to take for granted &c’ (LL 1: 187).
Now, ‘thinking for oneself had been the main injunction of philosophical 
criticism for about fifty years. Anticipating Coleridge, the primary aim of Kames’s 
critical project was to establish a new kind of criticism based on experience rather than 
authority. Kames, therefore, writes in the introduction to his Elements o f  Criticism:
In later times, happily, reason hath obtained the ascendant: men now assert their native privilege 
o f  thinking for themselves; and disdain to be ranked in any sect, whatever be the science. I am 
forc’d to except criticism, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be no less slavish in its 
principles nor less subm issive to authority, than it was originally.23
While endorsing the Enlightenment injunction, sapere aude, Kames here admits that 
criticism had resisted the burden of freedom, and continued to be ‘slavish’ and
“  At least according to Kames: ‘And there is a material difference between appetites and passions [...]: 
the latter have no existence till a proper object be presented; whereas the former exist first, and then are 
directed to an object: a passion com es after its object; an appetite goes before it, which is obvious in the 
appetites o f  hunger, thirst, and animal love, and is the same in the other appetites above mentioned.’ Home, 
Henry (Lord Kames), Elements o f  Criticism, 2 vols (London: Routledge /  Thoemmes Press, 1993), 1: 44.
Elements o f  Criticism , 1 :12 .
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‘submissive’, at least before his own project. I think what he terms here a mysterious 
‘fatality’ (the obscurity in criticism that resists Enlightenment) is what Coleridge 
identifies as a permanent cause o f ‘False Criticism’, that has its origin, paradoxically, in 
criticism itself. I take Coleridge to say that criticism as an activity may be a ‘painful 
Effort’, but criticism as a body o f received knowledge (which would spare the pain) can 
be even worse: unreliable, misleading, or, quite simply, false. Fie implies that this is so 
not only because previous critics happened to make the wrong kinds o f judgements, but 
because criticism conceived as the institution of making judgements on behalf of 
someone, o f pre-empting the reader’s effort at understanding his or her own response, is 
fundamentally misguided.
In his lectures, Coleridge fashions a criticism that approximates reading 
itself, but a reading that is inherently self-reflective and philosophically informed; a 
reading that appears to spill over effortlessly into ‘philosophy’. That is to say, his 
criticism is also a hermeneutic -  it is an ‘art’ o f reading. He does not present a finished 
system, although his lectures are full of hints that might lead to one; his philosophical 
reflections are often derived from the passages he discusses (something that earlier 
philosophical critics tried to conceal). It is hardly accidental that Coleridge tends to 
introduce himself to his audiences as something like a professional reader rather than as 
a critic or author, stating in 1808, for instance, that he had ‘never had any strong 
ambition o f publishing, as or being known as an author’ : ‘I have passed the far greater 
part of my life and employed almost all the powers which Providence has entrusted to
125). Importantly, his self-definition as a reader and talker does not mean that he 
positions himself on the same level as any other ‘reader’ in the lecture-room. If anything, 
Coleridge was a professional reader, not only because of the institutional backing he 
relied on (which was not very stable), but because of his professed ‘employment’ in life. 
His task in the lectures was to exhibit the art o f reading for those willing to learn. His 
1818 Prospectus stresses this point, stating that ‘any important part of these Lectures 
could not be derived from books’, or rather, ‘the same information could not be so surely 
or conveniently acquired from such books as are o f commonest occurrence, or with that
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quantity of time and attention which can be reasonably expected, or even wisely desired, 
of men engaged in business and the active duties of the world’ {LL 2: 39-40).
As this suggests, Coleridge not only ‘thinks for him self but offers his 
audience to think for them too. Although this implies that his listeners were inevitably 
passive compared to him, we might add that they were also called on to engage in 
reading of various kinds. In spite of the Prospectus’s promises, that is, Coleridge’s 
lectures did not present a compendium of ‘information’ which men of business could 
simply take home and use at leisure. The model of his lectures was not the book but the 
performance. This meant that in order to understand his reading o f Shakespeare, 
audiences had to make sense o f Coleridge’s enactment of the process o f reading and 
thinking. In 1812, he wrote another profile of himself emphasising that interrelatedness:
O when I think o f  the inexhaustible Mine o f  virgin Treasure in our Shakespear, that I have been 
<almost> daily reading him since I was ten years old -  that in the 30 intervening years have been 
not fruitlessly & intermittingly employed in the study o f  the Greek, Latin, <English,> Italian, 
Spanish & German Po ets  Bellettrists, & for the last 15 years even far more intensely to the 
analysis o f  the Laws o f  rational Life & Reason as they exist in man [...] and know that at every 
new accession o f  knowledge, after every Successful exercise o f  meditation, every fresh 
presentation o f  experience, I have unfailingly discovered a proportional increase o f  wisdom & 
intuition in Shakespeare {LL 1: 430)
Here Coleridge is presented as a reader with a vengeance; he has an intimate knowledge 
not only o f ‘our’ poet but of both Classical and European literature.^'' As a philosophical 
analyst o f the laws o f ‘Life and Reason’, he is also supremely qualified to ‘think for 
h im se lf. His philosophy informs his reading and his reading feeds into his philosophy. 
These qualifications might be extraordinary, but the task he devises for himself requires 
nothing short o f that: he endeavours to measure the depths of poetry (or at least those of 
Shakespeare) in continuous interplay with his own mind. Coleridge, in other words, 
claims to explicate Shakespeare through the perspective of his own changing, growing 
intellectual life, or even, as his own intellectual life. In this sense, the lectures are public
Taking up Clifford Siskin’s suggestion that Wordsworth’s Prelude might be read as a résumé in 
question form ( ‘Was it for this..?’), reviewing ‘what had qualified him for such employment’, this note 
might be read as Coleridge’s professional Curriculum Vitae in the form o f  an adverbial meditation ( ‘O 
when I think of...’). See Siskin, The Work o f  Writing, 112.
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rehearsals for the Biographia Literaria, displaying all the tentativeness and excitement 
of discovery that rehearsals share with scientific experiments/^
3
A criticism that depended so heavily on the immediacy of the reading 
experience and on spontaneous thought had to be performed and not delivered as a set of 
propositions. What the editor William Jerdan wrote of Coleridge’s ‘little stories’ must be 
relevant to his lectures as well: ‘no idea can be formed’ of them, ‘divorced from the 
accessories of person, emphasis, and playful action’. T h e  unforeseeable turns of 
Coleridge’s discourse -  that prevented the shorthand-writer Gurney from writing it down, 
since ‘the conclusion of every one of Coleridge’s sentences was a surprise upon him’
{LL 1: Ixxxiii) -  promised his listeners an unexpected insight into Shakespeare’s genius 
or into the laws of the mind in any moment of the lectures. Meanwhile, such turns 
allowed glimpses into the mind that was meant to mediate between them, that is, into the 
mind o f Coleridge himself. Records of the lectures suggest that the complex personality 
he ‘performed’ through various verbal and non-verbal means was centre-stage for many 
listeners. In 1812, for instance. The Rifleman reported that during one lecture 
‘Shakespeare himself disappeared in the ocean of human nature. But all these things are 
rather a proof of Mr. Coleridge’s powers o f mind than any thing else’ {IR 153). The poet 
and dramatist Edward Jerningham was more critical, stating that Coleridge ‘too often 
Interwove Himself into the Texture of his lecture’ {IR 121). In other words, Coleridge as 
a lecturer was liable to the very charge he himself brought up against star-actors: his 
presence sometimes overshadowed the Shakespearean text he was meant to interpret.
At the same time, his words and expressive gestures were perceived as 
signifiers for an essence beyond them. A recurrent theme in accounts of his lectures is
Coleridge som etim es juxtaposes his lectures with D avy’s chemical demonstrations; e.g.: T gave them at 
the Royal Institution, before from six to seven hundred Auditors o f  rank and eminence, in the spring o f  the 
same year in which Sir H. Davy, a fellow-1 ecturer, made his great revolutionary Discoveries in 
Chemistry.’ {LL 2: 293-4) He writes this in connection with the debate on his originality as a critic; I think 
he mentions D avy to imply that in the sphere o f  criticism he made an analogous ‘great revolutionary 
D iscovery’, which he demonstrated in public -  a procedure that might be equivalent to publishing his 
findings {LL 2: 293-4).
Pite, Lives o f  the G reat Romantics, p. 346.
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that his speech somehow could not be written down. But failure to do so generally 
strengthened the wish for a written version. A remark made in a newspaper report is 
symptomatic: ‘Many of his positions, though striking, and probably just, were of so 
novel a cast that they were rather more fit for contemplation in the closet, than to afford 
matter for a report on a cursory hearing in a public assembly.’ {LL 1: 431) This suggests 
that Coleridge’s thought, like Shakespeare’s work, is best contemplated in book form -  
in the private space o f the closet (opposed to the newspaper report and the lecture-room) 
that would allow patient reflection on its ‘striking’ originality. But, paradoxically, it was 
Coleridge’s reliance on devices known from the theatre and from public oratory that 
generated such a wish for a ‘closet’ version of his speech -  that is, for a volume he never 
published.
By the late eighteenth century, the task of the orator had come to be 
regarded as in some ways similar to that of the actor. Both were required to move the 
passions by displaying them in a ‘natural’ manner. Elocutionists, like actors, gave 
detailed instructions as to how this could be done. But passions played an important role 
in other areas of rhetoric too. George Campbell in The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric writes: ‘If 
it is fancy which bestows brilliancy on our ideas, if it is memory which gives them 
stability, passion doth more, it animates them. Hence they derive spirit and e n e r g y . H e  
states, in particular, that if one’s aim is persuasion, the ‘affecting lineaments’ of pathetic 
discourse must be ‘interwoven with our argument’, which results in a quality he calls the 
‘vehement’ or ‘impassioned’.^^ If an orator knows how to command the passions 
through verbal means, he becomes all-powerful:
Thus w e have seen in what manner passion to an absent object may be excited by eloquence, 
which, by enlivening and invigorating the ideas o f  imagination, makes them resemble the 
impressions o f  sense and the traces o f  memory; and in this respect hath an effect on the mind 
similar to that produced by a telescope on the sight: things remote are brought near, things 
obscure rendered conspicuous. W e have seen also in what manner a passion already excited may
Accounts o f  Coleridge’s speech as unrecordable and sublime are discussed in Perry, ‘The talker’, pp. 
105-107.
Campbell, The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 2 vols (London and Edinburgh, 1776), 1: 199.
Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 1: 36.
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be calmed; how by the oratorical magic, as by inverting the telescope, the object may be again 
removed and diminished/"^
Campbell’s metaphor of the telescope points towards the ‘scientific’ grounding he 
sought to give to the art of rhetoric. His reference to ‘magic’, however, acknowledges 
his awareness of a more risky aspect of its manipulative power. James Mulvihill in his 
study o f romantic rhetoric shows that Coleridge was deeply suspicious o f the new 
rhetorical appeal to the passions, seeing in it ‘a real possibility of regression to 
conditioned response.’"  This is particularly noticeable in his reactions to political 
oratory (a genre inseparably linked to the French Revolution). But, as I would argue, 
Coleridge’s own early successes as a preacher and orator, and later as a literary lecturer, 
depended to a large extent on his skill at manipulating Campbell’s ‘telescope’."
As a sympathetic critic, Coleridge is eager to engage his listeners’ 
passions on behalf of Shakespeare through various explicit and implicit means. This, as 
he himself suggests, contributes to the overall effect: that of making Shakespeare 
‘present’ in the lecture-room. Sometimes he even uses optical metaphors comparable to 
Campbell’s ‘telescope’. According to Charles Tomalin’s report, he once stated that ‘tho’ 
too much love for an author was like a mist which magnified unduly, it brought forward 
objects that would otherwise have passed unnoticed’ {LL 1: 268). Coleridge here claims 
to devise a mode of reading that relies on the magnifying power of affection, rather than 
on the belittling perspective o f modern criticism. This is related to his philosophical 
views on love and its role in understanding and aesthetic appreciation.^^ But it also
Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 1: 237-8.
M ulvihill, Upstart Talents: Rhetoric and the Career o f  Reason in English Romantic Discourse, 1790- 
1820 (Newark: University o f  Delaware Press, 2004), p. 29. See also David Sebberson, ‘Practical 
Reasoning, Rlietoric, and Wordsworth’s “Preface” ’, in G. A. Rosso and Daniel Watkins eds.. Spirits o f  
Fire: English Romantic Writers and Contem porary H istorical Methods (Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1990), 95-111.
I agree with Rex L. Veedler that ‘throughout his works, [Coleridge] not only demonstrates a substantial 
understanding o f  the history o f  rhetoric but also includes well-known principles o f  rhetoric in his method’. 
Rex L. Veeder, ‘Romantic Rhetoric and the Rlietorical Tradition’, in Rhetoric Review, Vol. 15, N o. 2 
(Spring 1997), 300-320, p. 300. Cf. also Douglas Kneale’s point that ‘the “other” that Romanticism at 
once turns to and away from is what I designate as the classical rhetorical tradition’, in Romantic Aversion: 
Aftermaths o f  C lassicism in Wordsworth and Coleridge  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), p.
4.
See David S. M iall, ‘The Aesthetics o f  Love in Coleridge’, British Journal o f  Aesthetics, 23 (1983), 18- 
24; Anthony John Harding, Coleridge and the Idea o f  Love: A spects o f  Relationship in Coleridge's 
Thought and Writing (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
41
serves the purpose o f rhetorical persuasion. He tends to rely on the rhetoric of feeling 
especially in encomia, when he speaks of Shakespeare in near-religious terms: ‘That 
such a mind evolved itself in the narrow bounds of a human form is a Problem indeed -  
Powers tenfold greater than mine would be incommensurate to its Solution, which in its 
nearest and most adventurous Approach must still leave a wide chasm which our Love 
and Admiration alone can fill up.’ (LL 2: 114) However, he displays an opposite 
tendency as well, a tendency to ‘humanise’ Shakespeare by bringing him nearer to his 
audience. The Bristol Gazette reports one such instance:
If  a man speak injuriously o f  a friend, our vindication o f  him is naturally warm; Shakespear had 
been accused o f  profaneness, he (Mr. C.) from the perusal o f  him, had acquired a habit o f  looking 
into his own heart, and perceived the goings on o f  his nature, and confident he was, Shakespear 
was a writer o f  all others the most calculated to make his readers better as w ell as wiser. {LL 1 : 
522)
Coleridge here appears to ‘defend’ Shakespeare as he would take responsibility for a 
friend. He claims to know him from experience: in fact, he knows him as he knows 
himself, for he had studied his works in conjunction with the ‘goings on of his [own?] 
nature’ and each half o f this knowledge validates the other. ‘His own heart’ is offered as 
a testimony for Shakespeare’s power to make readers ‘better as well as wiser’.
As this suggests, Coleridge first had to engage audiences on his own 
behalf, if he was to move their passions in Shakespeare’s favour. In classical terms, a 
discourse had to be validated by the moral and intellectual ‘character’ of the orator; in 
terms of the new rhetoric, this meant that the speaker had to convince his listeners of his 
sincerity. Accounts of his first series at the Royal Institution (where he was required to 
read out a written manuscript) suggest that he was not always successful. ‘There was but 
little animation’, J. C. Hall remembered o f one lecture, ‘his theme did not seem to stir 
him into life; the ordinary repose of his countenance was rarely broken up; he used little 
or no action; and his voice, though mellifluous, was monotonous. He lacked, indeed, the 
earnestness without which no man is truly eloquent’ {IR 123) This suggests (if Hall’s 
memory is correct) that Coleridge needed to learn how to use the devices of oratory in 
the lecture theatre; he had to use ‘action’ and facial expression, or any other rhetorical
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device that conveyed ‘earnestness’. The best method of all was to speak extempore. 
Hugh Blair and a number of eighteenth-century rhetoricians recommended this (or at 
least the appearance o f it), most of all to preachers.^"^ For these writers, extempore 
speech stood for true enthusiasm or inspiration; moreover, it afforded ample 
opportunities to express feelings, and this was the surest way of engaging hearers’ 
passions. Joseph Priestley states that whatever has ‘the appearance of present thought, 
and extempore unprepared address, contributes not a little to make a person seem to be 
in earnest. He then seems to speak from his real feelings, without having recourse to 
artificial helps.’ His chief example is St. Paul, whose epistles approximate live speech:
they have not the least appearance o f  design  in them, they show that he wrote from his heart, and 
dictated his real thoughts and sentiments at the time o f  their composition. They likewise throw 
considerable light upon the natural tem per o f  that great apostle. W e see that he was a warm man, 
o f  a quick apprehension, o f  great ardour and vehemence in whatever he engaged in, and that he 
was inclined to be hasty.
He also mentions the early Christians, the first Protestants, the Methodists and the 
Quakers as examples o f the power o f extemporaneous speech. Apart from the sincerity 
conveyed by this mode of speaking, it also evokes ‘a continued wonder^ in the audience, 
which naturally works towards persuasion.^^
Jane Stabler has recently called attention to Coleridge’s indebtedness to 
Priestley’s rhetorical theory, arguing that the ‘elements of “fancy” and playfulness in 
Coleridge’s speculation are related to Priestley’s advocacy of extempore speech and 
possible contradiction as valuable intellectual stimuli’. I f  Coleridge knew that 
improvisation was commendable in science, as a Unitarian preacher he must have been
See Scott Harshbarger, ‘Robert Lowth’s S acred Hebrew P oetry  and the Oral Dim ension o f  Romantic 
Rlietoric’, in R hetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature, ed. by Don H. Bialostosky and 
Lawrence D . Needham (Bloom ington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995) pp.199-214;
Fiona Stafford, ‘Hugh Blair’s Ossian, Romanticism and the teaching o f  Literature’, in Robert Crawford, 
ed. The Scottish Invention o f  English Literature (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 68-88; R ex L. Veeder,
‘Romantic Rlietoric and the Rhetorical Tradition’; Timothy Clark, The Theory o f  Inspiration: Composition  
as a Crisis o f  Subjectivity in Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997), pp. 76-83.
Priestley, Course o f  Lectures, p. I l l ;  p. 112.
Jane Stabler, ‘Space for Speculation: Coleridge, Barbauld, and the Poetics o f  Priestley’, in Nicholas Roe, 
ed., Samuel Taylor C oleridge an d  the Sciences o f  Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 174-204,
p. 181.
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aware of its uses in pulpit oratory as well. It is arguable that even in writing -  namely in 
the Biographia -  he relies on the effects o f spontaneity and ‘presence’ that Priestley 
identified in St. Paul. But in the lectures extempore speech was Coleridge’s hallmark, 
distinguishing him from other popular lecturers of the day. It is important to note that 
this does not mean that he always spoke without the aid of notes or preparation. James 
Gillman’s account o f an 1818 performance is revealing: ‘He lectured from notes, which 
he had carefully made; yet it was obvious, that his audience was more delighted when, 
putting his notes aside, he spoke extempore [...] In his lectures he was brilliant, fluent, 
and rapid; his words seemed to flow as from a person repeating with grace and energy 
some delightful poem’.^  ^This suggests that the notes provided a firm basis for 
Coleridge’s lecture, but they acquired their full significance only when they were 
brushed aside -  a gesture often recorded by his listeners. At that point, writing gave way 
to ‘poetry’, reflection to inspiration.
Coleridge, o f course, was fully aware of the importance o f that gesture; in 
1818 he wrote confidently to H. C. Robinson: ‘I shall have written every Lecture, just as 
if I h[ad intend]ed to [read the]m; but shall deliver them without book -  which plan will,
I trust, answer all purposes -  that of order in the matter, and of animation in the manner.’ 
{CL IV, 812) Sometimes he called attention to his own mode o f delivery in the lecture- 
room as well. In 1812, for instance, he confessed to his (imaginary) audience the failure 
of his first written lectures in 1808, and his subsequent decision
not to elaborate my materials, not to consider too nicely the expressions I should employ, but to 
trust mainly to the extemporaneous ebullition o f  my thoughts. In this conviction I have ventured 
to com e before you here; and may I add a hope, that what I offer w ill be received in a similar 
spirit? It is true that my matter may not be so aceurately arranged: it may not dovetail and fit at all 
times as nicely as could be wished; but you shall have my thoughts warm from my heart, and 
fresh from my understanding. (Raysor 2:82)
Just as Priestley had said, extempore speech guarantees that thoughts come ‘warm from 
[the] heart’ and ‘fresh from [the] understanding’, and therefore it is bound to be met with
Richard W. Armour and Raymond F. Howes, eds., Coleridge the Talker: a  series o f  contem porary  
descriptions and comm ents (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; London: H, Milford, Oxford 
University Press, 1940), p. 420.
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sympathy. His very inconsistencies, Coleridge suggests, are to be counted in his favour. 
As Jane Stabler has shown, Priestley had also recommended retracting one’s own 
arguments, staging debates with oneself and formulating propositions in different 
versions, in order to involve audiences in the process of thinking. It might be said that 
Coleridge was over-zealous in following this advice when, for instance, he offered so 
many versions o f his definition of poetry that audiences were at a loss to determine 
whether any one o f them was meant to be definitive.
While he might have had to convince his listeners to accept such apparent 
faults as his virtues, there was an aspect of improvisation on which he could not possibly 
reflect: the expressive language of gesture and voice. In eighteenth-century new rhetoric 
and elocutionary theory these provided the key to effective speaking; however, while 
several hints were given as to the right use of rhetorical ‘action’, the consensus was that 
these features could not be feigned. As Priestley writes,
The external expressions o f  passion, with all their variations, corresponding to the different 
degrees o f  their emotions, are too com plex for any person in the circumstances o f  a public 
speaker to be able to attend to them. Or, were it possible, the difference between genuine 
autom atic and a voluntary  motion, is sufficiently apparent. All motions that are automatic have a 
quickness and vigour which are lost when they become voluntary.^®
Coleridge could not call attention to his own inspired gestures, because they were 
supposedly beyond his conscious will. But reminiscences suggest that audiences did not 
need to be reminded of that -  they were sufficiently aware o f the meaning of body 
language to interpret Coleridge’s performance. Unable to record his inspired discourse, 
they tried to record the bodily signs of inspiration. Their ears recognised the melody of 
Coleridge’s speech; their eyes saw the outward traces of absorption. J. P. Collier, with 
his near-idolatry of the lecturer, provides a fine, detailed, example:
I always thought his mouth beautiful: the lips were full, and a little drawn down at the corners, 
and when he was speaking the attention (at least my attention) was quite as much directed to his 
mouth as to his eyes, the expression o f  it was so eloquent. In the energy o f  talking, ‘the rose- 
leaves’ were at times ‘a little bedew ed,’ but his words seemed to flow  the easier for the additional
''A Course o f  Lectures, p. 115.
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Gillian Russell points out that after the 1790s, enthusiastic oratory was politically suspect; see ‘Spouters 
and W asherwomen’, p, 124. The romantic stance towards enthusiasm is discussed in Jon Mee, 
Romanticism, Enthusiasm, and Regulation: Poetics and the Policing o f  Culture in the Romantic Period  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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lubricity. I did not especially admire Coleridge’s Targe grey eyes,’ for, now and then, they 
assumed a dead, dull look, almost as i f  he were not seeing out o f  them; and I doubt i f  external 
objects made much impression upon his sight, when he was animated in discourse, {IR 144)
Here, the whole iconography o f Coleridge the Lecturer can be followed. Focusing on the 
(sensual) mouth, Collier emphasises inspired and seductive speech. The ‘blindness’ of 
the eyes, however disconcerting, is a figure for the ‘inner light’, which at the same time 
blinds him to the external world. Concentrating on the ideal ‘ inner world’ of Coleridge’s 
lectures can easily make one blind to such emphatically bodily aspects. But the 
effectiveness of the lecture scene depended on the interplay o f the two, just as in the case 
of reciting a poem, ‘in which the enkindling Reciter, by perpetual comment of looks and 
tones, lends his own will and apprehensive faculty to his Auditors’ {BL ii. 239-40).
A description by Joseph Farrington shows how masterfully Coleridge
t
staged his own ‘drama’ o f thought: j
When Coleridge came into the Box there were several Books laying. He opened two or three o f  |
them silently and shut them again after a short inspection. He then paused and leaned His head on ;
His hand, and at last said. He had been thinking for a word to express the distinct character o f  
Milton as a Poet, but not finding one that wd. express it. He should make one ^Ideality". He spoke 
extempore. {IR, 122) j
Coleridge’s distracted, Hamlet-like meditation, together with the immediacy of his 
address, form an eloquent interpretation o f the theme of his lecture on Milton. The ‘stage 
business’ stresses the private and reflexive nature of Coleridge’s inspiration; he 
generally seems to have preferred devices that contradicted the appearance of oratory. -
His tone was conversational and meditative, which made audiences feel that they had |
been admitted to his private circle of friends. His flights o f enthusiasm were checked by ;
r e f l ec t i on . A remark made to Mrs. Morgan on one of his improvised lectures is telling: 
it was ‘quite in my fire-side way, & pleased more than any’ {CL III 457). This kind of j
quasi-domestic ‘fire-side’ lecture might well have been Coleridge’s own invention;
however, it conforms to a general movement in rhetoric towards effects o f intimacy, as 
opposed to ‘ranting’ oratory. John Walker in his Elements o f  Elocution, for instance, 
writes that it is more important to learn how to lower the voice than how to raise it, 
adding that ‘Nothing will so powerfully work on the voice, as supposing ourselves 
conversing at different intervals with different parts of the auditory.’ He also 
recommends the theatrical practice of the ‘aside’, for it gives ‘the idea o f [actors] 
speaking to themselves in such a manner as not to be heard by the person with them on 
the stage, and yet must necessarily be heard by the whole theatre.
Asides, together with their extended version, the digression, are not 
simply characteristic of Coleridge’s lectures; they are as good as their organising 
principle. Accompanied by other devices, such as the abrupt break and the weighty 
silence, they constitute the verbal equivalents of expressive body language.'^' Priestley 
also recommends speakers to make parentheses in sentences, and to digress from the 
principal subject or argument, and return to it again’ -  advice that Coleridge followed 
assiduously."^^ There is a specific kind of Coleridgean digression, however, which is not 
aimed at providing intellectual stimulation, but is directly identified as a symptom of 
feeling. This kind, I would argue, is crucial to his lectures. After referring to Davy’s 
illness, for instance, he reflects: ‘I have been seduced into a Digression -  a digression 
indeed of the Head only; for with me while I stand here, it must needs be in the strait 
road of the Heart’ {LL 1: 64). Similar passages can be found everywhere in the lecture 
notes and even in reports like the following: ‘He trusted that what he had thus said in the 
ardour of his feelings would not be entirely lost, but would awaken in his audience those 
sympathies without which it was vain to proceed in his criticism o f Shakespeare. {LL 1: 
278) Digressions like these are important, I think, because they are meant to manifest the
John Walker, Elem ents o f  Elocution. Being the Substance o f  a Course o f  Lectures on the Art o f  Reading; 
D elivered  at severa l Colleges in the University o f  Oxford, 2 vols. (London, 1781), 2: 234; 248-9.
Cf. Lucy Newlyn: ‘Just as the body was an expressive signifier o f  feelings -  a “supplement” to the 
speaking voice -  so it was in the gaps and fissures o f  spoken discourse that genuine eloquence was to be 
found. This is why extempore utterance was thought to be more appropriate to the communication o f  
powerful feeling than finished prose; and why there was a long-established association in the eighteenth 
century between extemporality, eloquence, and enthusiasm.’ Reading, Writing, and Romanticism, p. 348. 
Newlyn opposes the valorisation o f  body language by Priestley and Hazlitt to Coleridge’s preference for 
musicality; however, I think the opposition is not as categorical as she asserts.
A Course o f  Lectures, p. 111.
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surplus of emotion which sustains Coleridge’s ‘philosophical’ analysis o f Shakespeare/^ 
His proneness to be ‘seduced’ into digression, in other words, clearly indicates that his 
criticism is not a mere ‘anatomy’, but one that is grounded in, and perpetually generates, 
feeling.
Coleridge wrote the prototype of all such digressions in a lecture note for 
his 1808 course, which also displays an element of conscious theatricality:
As the main Object, for which I have undertaken these Lectures, is to enforce at various times & 
by various arguments & instances the close and reciprocal connections o f  Just Taste with pure 
Morality, I cannot permit m yself to consider this as a Digression; especially, as without that 
acquaintance with the heart o f  man, or that docility & childlike gladness to be acquainted with it, 
which those only can have, who dare look at their own <hearts,> <that (N.b. in a low quiet 
voice)>  with a steadiness which Religion only has the power o f  reconciling with sincere 
Humility - 1  am deeply convinced, that no man, however w ide his Erudition, however patient his 
antiquarian researches, can possibly understand, or be worthy o f  understanding, the writings o f  
Shakespeare- {LL 1: 78)
The staged intimacy o f this passage (to be spoken, Coleridge reminds himself, ‘in a low 
quiet voice'), leaves no doubt about the public function o f his criticism. The lectures 
were meant to educate his audiences’ feelings, as much as their intellect; their 
ambiguous theatricality is subservient to this purpose. In eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, the theatre had been an important metaphor for moral education, something 
that is also traceable in romantic drama."*"^  For Coleridge, the state of the theatres was an
See also The Sun in N ov 1811 : ‘The occasional digressions concerning modern Education, and the true 
view s o f  Poetry, as implying in man an instinct after perfection unattainable in this life, but which yet, like 
all other instincts o f  nature, must somewhere, and at some period, meet their appropriate object, were 
exceedingly beautiful, and evidently dictated by the feeling o f  the mom ent.’ {LL 1: 196)
See John Dwyer, ‘Enlightened Spectators and Classical Moralists: Sympathetic Relations in Eighteenth- 
Century Scotland’, in John Dwyer and Richard B. Sher, eds.. Sociability and Society in Eighteenth- 
Century Scotland  (Edinburgh, 1993), pp. 96-118; also Diane Long Hoeveler, “‘Humanizing the Heart,” or 
Romantic Drama and the Civilizing Process’, European Romantic Review , Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 1-5; Gillian 
Russell and Clara Tulte, ‘Introducing Romantic Sociability’, p. 6.
48
index o f the nation’s moral health/^ He explains this in detail in a long note written for 
the opening lecture o f one o f his 1812 series, discussing the decline of tragedy and the 
tragic theatre, listing ‘forms of disease most preclusive of tragic worth’ {LL 1: 427).
These boil down to what he calls the ‘dead Palsy of the public mind’ {LL 1: 429). His 
diagnosis resembles what Wordsworth says in his 1800 ‘Preface’ about the ‘almost 
savage torpor’ to which the modern mind is reduced, however, while Wordsworth only 
mentions the theatre in passing, Coleridge in this note contemplates it not only as a site 
of the ‘epidemic’, but also as a possible remedy."*^
It is very likely that at the time of writing this note, Coleridge was already 
involved with the theatre, or was at least starting to pay close attention to theatrical 
matters {Remorse premiered in January 1813 at Drury Lane, and Coleridge fully 
participated in the rehearsals). At any rate, the example he gives to illustrate the 
‘diseased sensibility’ of the audience is taken from his own play."*  ^The expression 
‘hanging woods’ in Remorse (4.3.1) is intended to refer to ‘Trees rising above each other, 
as the Spectators in an ancient Theatre’ -  Coleridge, it seems, would have liked to 
produce the effect of theatre within the theatre. However, he proceeds, the owner of a 
real or imaginary ‘slang voice’ in the audience (the notes are rather garbled here) might 
think o f associating the phrase with ‘the Gallows’, and ‘a peal of Laughter would damn 
the Play’ {LL 1: 428). This sounds like a scenario furnished either by experience or by a 
stage manager’s expertise. Coleridge complains that such an attitude in the audience 
fosters a climate of mediocrity, in which ‘so many dull pieces’ have a ‘decent run, only 
because nothing unusual above, or absurd below mediocrity furnished an occasion, a 
spark for the explosive materials collected behind the orchestra’ {LL 1: 428).
He also draws out the political implications behind what he defines as 
‘the necessary growth of a sense & love of the Ludicrous’ {LL 1: 427). He refers to the 
recent ‘History of Paris & of the French (i.e.) Parisian Literature’ {LL 1: 428). The
Cf. Carlson, In the Theatre o f  Romanticism, p. 33ff. Her discussion overlaps with mine in the following  
paragraphs.
Wordsworth and Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, ed. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones, second edition (London 
and N ew  York: Routledge, 1991), p. 249.
This suggests that Coleridge’s note was perhaps not written for the opening lecture (in May) o f  the first 
1812 series at W illis’s Room, as Foakes proposes, but for the second series starting in November 1812 at 
the Surrey Institution. The opening lecture o f  this latter course was, according to H. C. Robinson, ‘a 
repetition o f  former lectures, and dull’ {LL 1; 487), and there are no notes or reports relating to it.
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disease o f ‘the public & national Mind’, manifested in France and to some extent in 
England, is related to changes in ‘domestic life & individual Deportment’, and together 
they have an overwhelming effect ‘upon the whole moral, intellectual, & even physical 
character of a People’ (JLL 1; 428). Coleridge does not offer a more comprehensive 
anatomy o f this change; the deeper causes are merely suggested by his metaphor, 
‘inflammation from cold & weakness’, although we might recall here an observation he 
makes elsewhere, that a turn to the ‘Ludicrous’ is very often a natural reaction to 
‘Terror’ (LL 1: 541).
Coleridge also mentions a more beneficial change, which delights ‘the 
Philanthropist & Philosopher’ and disappoints only ‘Poets, Painters, Statuaryies’, 
namely, ‘the security, comparative equability, and ever-increasing sameness of human 
Life’ {LL 1: 428). As a result of growing security, people’s capacity to experience strong 
passions diminishes, together with their ability to appreciate tragedy. Coleridge here 
seems to say that theatre might still be able to arouse a slumbering understanding of 
tragic passion. Towards the end of his note, he raises the possibility, or rather, indulges 
in the fancy, of what would happen if Shakespeare’s knowledge of human nature could 
be made accessible to people through theatrical performance:
by a conceivable too & possible tho’ hardly to be expected, arrangement o f  the British Theatres 
to so large -  not all indeed -  but so large a proportion o f  this indefinite A ll (which no 
Comprehension has yet drawn the line o f  circumscription so as to say to itself, I have seen the 
w hole,) might be sent into the very Heads & Hearts, into the very souls, o f  the Mass o f  Mankind 
to whom except by this living Comment & Interpretation it must remain for ever a sealed up 
Book Volum e, a deep W ell without a Wheel or windlace -  I-mey-be-pardonedT ff it seems to me 
a pardonable enthusiasm to steal away from sober prebaMtity Likelihood to-share and even-in-a 
dre am-ef -honest Enthusiasm-at-sueh-s e -share so rich a feast in the faery-world o f  Possibility! {LL 
1:430)
Theatre’s ‘living Comment & Interpretation’, its very bodily and sensuous nature, might 
make it possible to bring home Shakespeare’s spiritual wisdom to the ‘souls’ of the 
‘Mass of Mankind’. The implication is, of course, that the ‘Mass of Mankind’ are 
dependent on their senses, and theatre could mitigate this dependence paradoxically 
through its own reliance on the sensory. This is hardly the straightforwardly
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‘antitheatricaT position with which Coleridge is sometimes credited, but it still 
establishes the empirical as a lower, though necessary, order, to which the theatre of the 
mind is superior. Moreover, Coleridge’s fantasy about staging Shakespeare for the 
people is admittedly no more than that, a fantasy, and he continues to assert that the 
unfathomable ^whole' o f Shakespeare could not be presented in any theatre.
Even if  theatrical production is, ultimately, discredited, one possibility 
still remains, namely the possibility of lecturing. I think it is hardly accidental that 
Coleridge wrote this note as a preamble for an opening lecture, for it implies a 
justification for the very genre in which he is engaged. The lecturer, who has presented 
himself as something like a professional reader of Shakespeare, takes over the task of 
providing ‘living Comment & Interpretation’ in both literal and  figurative sense in the 
lecture theatre, and thereby conveys Shakespeare’s knowledge to the ‘Heads and Hearts’ 
o f his listeners. Importantly, he is performing before a select audience, so there is no 
need to fear that any ‘slang voice’ might ‘call out “the Gallows’” in this theatre. And 
finally, the desultory, rambling nature o f Coleridge’s lectures almost flaunts his inability 
to cover "AW of Shakespeare, while he never stops suggesting Shakespeare’s 
unreachable totality. The lecturer’s task is impossible and therefore interminable.
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Chapter Two
The impassioned text:
The rhetoric of feeling and Coleridge’s reading oiKing Lear
‘Look at Lear, look at Richard, look in short at every Moral picture o f  
this mighty Moralist! Whoso does not rise from their attentive perusal 
‘a sadder and a wiser man’ -  let him never dream that he knows 
anything o f  Philosophical M ethod.’ {TM  33)
‘A certain quantity o f  laudanum would poison me, a less degree cure 
me o f  pain.’* (C M 3:410 )
1
One o f Coleridge’s most frequently cited theoretical discussions on 
language was written as part o f a lecture note for his 1812 course on European drama. 
Although he does not engage here with any particular Shakespearean text, he does 
mention King Lear as an example of the ‘language of nature’, one o f the central 
concepts o f his criticism. The note encapsulates virtually all the main threads of 
Coleridge’s thinking on poetic language, and makes explicit connections between theatre, 
language and civilisation, which are otherwise often merely implied in his shorter and 
often disconnected remarks. It is therefore worth considering at length:
Men are now so seldom thrown into wild ex circumstances, & violences o f  excitement, that the 
language o f  such states, the laws o f  association o f  Feeling with Thought, the starts & strange far- 
flights o f  the assimilative power on the slightest & least obvious likenesses presented by 
Thoughts, Words, & Objects, & even by this very power the after as strange but always certain
* Marginal note in Wordsworth’s hand to Richard Payne Knight’s observation that the sublime was 
incompatible with fear (made in his Analytical Inquiry into the Principles o f  Taste).
return to the dominant Idea -  these are judged o f  by authority, not by actual experience -  What 
they have been accustomed to regard as symbols o f  this state, not the natural symbols -  i.e. the 
self-manifestations o f  it -  (Even so in the language o f  man & that o f  nature). The-t The sound.
Sun, or the figures S U N ,  are purely arbitrary [modes of] recalling the Object, & for visual mere 
objects not [only sufficienjt, but have infinite advantages from their [very nothingnjess per se; 
but the Language o f  Nature is a subordinate Logos, that was in the beginning, and was with the 
Thing, <it> represented, & it was the Thing represented. -  N ow  the language o f  Shakespear (in 
his Lear, for instance) is a something intermediate, or rather it is the former blended with the 
latter, the arbitrary not merely recalling the cold notion o f  the Thing but expressing the reality o f  
it, & as arbitrary Language is an Helr-loom o f  <the> Human Raee, being itself a part o f  that 
which it manifests./ -  What shall I deduce from this? Even from this the appropriate, the never- 
to-be-valued advantage o f  the Theatre, if  only the Actors were what, w e know, they have been -  a 
delightful yet most effectual Remedy for this Dead Palsy o f  the public mind -  What would appear 
mad or ludicrous in a book, presented to the senses under the form o f  reality & with the truth o f  
Nature, supplies a species o f  actual Experience -  This indeed is the grand Privilege o f  a great 
Actor above a great Poet -  N o part was ever played in perfection, but that Nature justified herself 
in the hearts o f  all her Children, in whatever State they were, short o f  States absolute moral 
Exhaustion or downright Stupidity -  /  There is no time given to ask questions, or pass judgements. 
H e takes us by storm, & tho’ <, in the histrionic ait> many a clum sy Counterfeit by caricature 
exaggeration o f  one or two Features may gain applause, as a fine Likeness, yet never dM was the 
very Thing rejected as a Counterfeit. {LL 1: 428-9)
This text is so dense, and reaches out in so many directions, that the present chapter is 
best understood as a running commentary on it. In what follows I will focus on 
Coleridge’s discussion of the ‘embodied’ aspects o f Shakespearean language, including 
gestural and sound patters as well as figures of speech. The last section is going to deal 
with his habitual turn to King Lear (above all, to Lear’s ‘apostrophe to the elements’) at 
crucial points in his lectures and in the Biographia, in order to illustrate his theory of 
how passion works in poetry. I will end with reflections on the question of theatrical 
representation, which Lear raised with particular urgency. However, before embarking 
on these matters, I would like to show in what sense passion and ‘embodiment’ are 
relevant to Coleridge’s theory of poetry. In order to do this, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the above text and its possible theoretical contexts.
At the beginning of the note, Coleridge suggests that in order to truly 
appreciate Shakespeare -  one might say, ‘philosophically’, in the sense of ‘judging for
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oneself -  one must know how the mind works in ‘wild circumstances, & violences of 
excitement’. He describes such states using the vocabulary of associationist psychology, 
although he refers to the ‘laws of association of Feeling with Thought’, instead of 
speaking merely of the association of ideas. Before going any further it is worth 
remarking that, as a number o f critics have demonstrated, Coleridge in literary criticism 
never quite abandoned the vocabulary of associationism, but usually inflected it towards 
emphasising the role of feeling, which, however, was not unheard o f in the writings of 
more dogmatic associationists.^ Hume himself discussed the association of emotions in 
his ‘Dissertation on the Passions’, arguing that it resembled music made by a string 
instrument, ‘where, after each stroke, the vibrations still retain some sound, which 
gradually and insensibly decays’.^  For philosophers after Hume, emotions offered an 
alternative model of mental functioning which was free from the atomism that 
characterised the ‘classical’ doctrine of the association of ideas and allowed a more 
creative role to the mind in the construction of experience; as Adela Pinch has argued, in 
the second half o f the eighteenth century ‘the passions both extend and demarcate the 
limits of empiricism’."^
One of the features of emotions that had become crucial for eighteenth- 
century philosophers was their unique temporality, which Hume expressed by the 
metaphor of music made by a string instrument. Ideas were generally thought of as 
either present or absent in the consciousness, but feelings -  as this metaphor suggests -  
could also be somewhere in between, neither quite present, nor quite absent, with a 
temporal orientation o f their own. Such an understanding of emotions allowed post- 
Flumean ‘philosophical critics’, for example Karnes, to discuss blendings and gradual
 ^Cf. David M iall’s view  that Coleridge’s theory o f  the imagination was indebted to Hartley’s 
associationism, especially because o f  the latter’s emphasis on feeling, in “T See It Feelingly” Coleridge’s 
Debt to Hartley’, in C oleridge's Visionary Languages: Essays in Honour o f  J  B. Beer, ed. Tim Fulford 
and Morton D. Paley (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993), 151-163. N eil Vickers shows that Thomas 
Beddoes also believed that association was governed by feeling in Coleridge and the D octors 1795-1806  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 151-2. The point that Coleridge had not quite ‘overthrown’ 
associationism by 1803 has also been made by Jerome Christensen, in C oleridge's B lessed Machine o f  
Language (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1981), pp. 82-3.
® Hume, ‘A Dissertation on the Passions’, in The Philosophical Works o f  D a v id  Hume, 4 vols (Boston: 
Little Brown and Company, Edinburgh; Adam and Charles Black, 1854), 1: 189-226, p. 191.
 ^Pinch, Strange Fits o f  Passion: Epistem ologies o f  Emotion, Hume to Austen  (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1996), p. 164. A similar point is made by Paul Hamilton when he states that Hum e’s psychology ‘is used 
by succeeding aestheticians in a way that suggests alternatives to, rather than extensions of, his basic 
empiricism’, in C oleridge's P oetics  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 30.
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fadings o f feelings in particular literary texts, and quite frequently to assume that slower 
undercurrents of emotion governed the quick association of ideas that took place on the 
‘surface’ /  This mode of thinking about feeling as something like a deep structure, 
informing the conscious workings o f the mind, is still traceable in Coleridge; in fact, it 
appears in some of his best-known statements on association. We might recall, for 
instance, that when in 1803 he questioned the validity of Hartley’s system, his argument 
against it was that ‘association depends in a much greater degree on the recurrence of 
resembling states of Feeling, than on Trains of Idea’ {CL 2: 961). This suggests that he 
did not quite reject associationism at this point, but rather carried on the exploration of 
the role o f feeling in association that had been studied from various angles in the 
writings o f a number o f earlier critics and philosophers. As his lecture notes reveal, even 
in his middle period he paid considerable attention to the manifold associations between 
words, thoughts and feelings that characterise poetic texts, while at the same time he 
firmly rejected the belief that association explained all mental phenomena. His 
‘Preliminary Essay’ on the ‘Principles of Genial Criticism’ (1814) is instructive on this 
point. ‘Association in philosophy’, Coleridge writes, ‘is like the term stimulus in 
medicine; explaining every thing it explains nothing; and above all, leaves itself 
unexplained.’ {SW&F 1: 359-60)
The comparison between association and stimulation seems to be dropped 
here more or less casually, but it is worth pursuing slightly further. In particular, it might 
be developed into a fuller analogy if one assumed -  as John Brown did -  that passion 
itself was a kind of stimulant.^ I admit that this way of thinking about passion is 
somewhat perplexing, almost as if one were claiming that the feeling o f being stimulated 
is a stimulant. However, it is only one o f the more unusual versions o f that late- 
eighteenth-century mode o f thinking about the passions which perceived them as alien 
forces -  in Joanna Baillie’s words, ‘unquiet inmates’, expressing themselves in
 ^ Since Karnes’s Elem ents o f  Criticism , a discussion o f  how passion modifies association had been one o f  
the set pieces o f  philosophical criticism. To cite one example, Alexander Gerard specifies habit and 
passion as connectives in the process o f  association: ‘habit, or a present passion, often suggests trains o f  
ideas which derive their connexion, not from their relation to one another, but chiefly from their congruity 
to the habit or the passion’, vnAn E ssay on Genius (London, Edinburgh: 1774), p. 126.
® In Thomas B eddoes’s summary o f  Brown’s system, ‘Exciting powers may be referred to two classes. 1. 
External, as heat, food, w ine, poisons, contagions, the blood, secreted fluids, and air. 2. Internal, as the 
functions o f  the body itself, muscular exertion, thinking, emotion and passion.’ Tim Fulford, ed.. 
Romanticism and Science Î 773-1853, 5 vols (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 2002), 1: 82.
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unforeseeable ways, possessing a degree of independence and externality to the se lf/ 
Brown’s system emphasises the physical dimension of the passions, mentioning them 
(and ‘thinking’) in the same category of stimulants as ‘the functions o f the body itself. 
Importantly, writers who did not share Brown’s strict materialism also established a 
strong connection between passion and the body, describing ways in which the former 
might lead to reactions o f the latter. Brown’s translator Thomas Beddoes -  whom Neil 
Vickers has called a ‘medical mentalisf -  thought it necessary to set up ‘a safe set of 
rules, for the medicinal employment o f the passions’.^  Coleridge too writes about the 
passions as offering a link between body and mind, or as expressing their inherent 
unity.*’ In poetry, passion connects the ‘body’ of writing with the reading or creative 
mind. In this context, it occupies a similar position to the one occupied by ‘spirit’ in 
Coleridge’s religious writings: it appears in the ‘letter’, without being quite reducible to 
it. But as opposed to ‘spirit’, ‘passion’ might have nothing to do with spiritual insight; 
indeed, at times it might be more similar to ‘spirit’ in the sense o f ‘alcohol’. ‘Passion’ is 
strongly associated with the body and the material world: it is most observable in 
involuntary bodily symptoms o f ‘agitation’. As opposed to the higher faculty of reason, 
it is characterised by an irreducible moral ambivalence, which also links it to the 
irrational body.
I think that the analogy between passions and stimulants offers a good 
point of entry into this area of Coleridge’s thinking precisely because it signals the 
inherent tensions of his attitude. The analogy itself can be traced in a number of his
 ^ Joanna Baillie, A Selection o f  P lays and Poem s, ed. Amanda Gilroy and Keith Hanley (London:
Pickering and Chatto, 2002) p. 35. Adela Finch offers an extensive account o f  eighteenth-century 
perceptions o f  the passions as ‘alien’ forces in Strange Fits o f  Passion.
® Beddoes, Hygeia: or, Essays M oral and  M edical on the Cases Affecting the P ersonal State o f  our 
M iddling and Affluent C lasses, 3 vols. (Bristol: J. M ills, 1802-3), vol 3, p. 15. Quoted and discussed in 
N eil Vickers, Coleridge and the D octors, p. 146.
He gives a ‘m entalisf explanation o f  the connection in the following lecture note: ‘our hearts leap with 
joy, on hearing o f  the victories o f  our country, or the rescue o f  the unhappy from the hands o f  an oppressor, 
or when a parent was transported at the restoration o f  a beloved child from /a deadly/ sickness; when the 
heart beat and the pulse quickened, do we therefore pretend, because the body in terprets the emotions o f  
the mind &  as far as it can still strives to maintain its claim to sympathy, that therefore joy is not mental? 
or that joy  is not moral? D o w e say that it was ow ing to a particular degree o f  fullness o f  blood that our 
heart leaped & our pulse beat? or do w e not rather say that the regent the m ind being glad, its slave the 
body, its w illing slave obeyed it. -  Or i f  w e are operated upon by a feeling o f  having done wrong or by a 
sense o f  having had a wrong done to us, & it excites the blush o f  shame, or the glow  o f  anger on our cheek 
do we pretend to say that by som e accident the blood suffused itself into veins unusually small & therefore 
the guilty seem ed ashamed or the indignant patriot recoiled from a charge against his honour.’ (JLL 1 ; 331, 
italics added)
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writings, for instance, in a note from 1808 stating that ‘Strong Passions commend 
figurative Language & act as stimulants’ {LL 1: 86). A similar idea might be lurking in 
his 1812 lecture note as well. This note asserts that in ‘violences o f excitement’ (the 
latter term had been important for both Brunonians and for associationists), the 
‘assimilative power’ is capable of ‘starts & strange far-flights’, which culminate in ‘the 
after as strange but always certain return to the dominant Idea’.^ ® Coleridge was deeply 
interested in the pathological effects of strong feeling (as much as in those of stimulants), 
and here he offers an early version of his diagnosis of ‘mania’, which in the Biographia 
would have an important role in establishing the distinction between fancy and the 
imagination, and which is here already associated with King L e a r What interests me 
most, however, is that in this note he is discussing the psychological condition with 
reference to language. The central point in the first movement of the text is that ‘the 
language of such states’ is no longer readily understood by the public, and Coleridge 
suggests that the reasons for this might lie in the progress of civilisation, that is, in the 
fact that such ‘wild circumstances’ and the accompanying ‘violences’ have become 
increasingly rare. The often-cited linguistic theory of the second movement is 
developed from this proposition, via a distinction between two different modes of 
interpretation: interpreting a text as a succession o f ‘symbols’, or alternatively, as 
composed o f ‘natural symbols’, where the first term denotes arbitrary signs, while the 
second implies, I think, something closer to our notion of symptoms, the ‘self­
manifestations’ of a psychological state. Evidently, the two approaches produce 
markedly different readings; the first cannot work without the support of critical 
authority, while readings of the second kind might lead, Coleridge supposes, to the 
reader’s recognition of an inevitable connection between the signs and the underlying 
passionate ‘state’.
On the Brunonian meaning o f ‘excitem ent’ see Martin Wallen, ‘A Secret Excitement: Coleridge, John 
Brown, and the Chance for a Physical Imagination’, in C ity o f  Health, F ields o f  D isease: Revolutions in 
the Poetry, M edicine, and Philosophy o f  Romanticism  (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2004), 102-119. See also N eil Vickers, ‘Coleridge, Thomas Beddoes, and Brunonian M edicine’, 
European Romantic Review  8 (1997), 47-94.
”  The significance o f  mania in Coleridge’s criticism is discussed by M cKusick in C oleridge’s  Philosophy 
o f  Language (N ew  Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 103-5. Miall observes that in 
1803 Coleridge read Thomas B eddoes’s H ygeia  (London, 1802-3) which included an essay on mania; see 
his “‘I see it feelingly’”, p. 158.
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Read from this vantage point, his subsequent discussion o f the three kinds 
of language becomes less cryptic than when taken in isolation. Previous commentaries 
on Coleridge’s linguistic theories have all pointed out that, according to this passage, 
ordinary human language -  ‘the language o f man’ -  is essentially arbitrary. Neither the 
phonetic shape of a word, nor its graphic notation, has the slightest ‘natural’ or 
necessary connection with the thing (or idea) denoted. It is worth remarking that here 
Coleridge does not find arbitrariness a problem, and even notes the ‘advantages’ of the 
‘very nothingness’ o f the sign, anticipating his later comparisons between the linguistic 
sign and symbolic m o n e y .S o  far, he is firmly in the tradition o f Locke and Condillac 
on language. What he describes as the second and third types of language, however, 
seems hard to reconcile with this general picture. As opposed to ‘the language of man’, 
he refers to what he calls the ‘Language o f Nature’ in Biblical terms, as original (‘was in 
the beginning’) and non-arbitrary (‘was with the Thing, <it> represented, & it was the 
Thing represented’). However, this language is clearly not identical with the divine 
Word to which he (perhaps even playfully) alludes: it is a ‘subordinate Logos’, one that 
is natural and not supernatural. According to James C. McKusick, it is nature perceived 
as language; in other words, Coleridge is apparently evoking Berkeley’s notion of the 
‘divine visual language’, although with an important difference: whereas Berkeley 
considered even this language as necessarily arbitrary (precisely because it is language), 
Coleridge insists on its ‘natural’ q u a litie s .T h e  context, however, suggests another 
possible interpretation, one that takes into account Coleridge’s speculations on the 
natural symbols o f passion in the previous and subsequent lines. According to this 
reading, the ‘Language of Nature’ would be a language that is supposed to have 
preceded artificial human speech, and that has ever since continued to be the expression 
of passion. In other words, it might as well refer to the ‘subordinate Logos’ of facial 
expression, gesture and tone of voice, which had also been called the ‘language of
Cf. Coleridge on John Taylor’s An E ssay on M oney (1830): ‘The perfection o f  M oney is ideality -  or 
where the Medium, the circulating Word, is in itself, like the Air o f  which the Word m aterially  consists, 
below any calculable value.’ (CM IV: 687) M oney and words are also compared in the Biographia {BL 
2:122).
‘But the language o f  nature, manifested in the perception o f  external objects, is not, pace  Berkeley, 
composed o f  arbitrary signs; our perception o f  an object conveys its real properties to us. This is 
Coleridge’s “true and original realism” {BL 1:262), which appeals to the concept o f  natural language in 
order to refute Kant’s skeptical objections to the possibility o f  our knowing the D ing an Sich." McKusick, 
C oleridge's Philosophy o f  Language (N ew  Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 110.
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nature’ by eighteenth-century theorists, and which had been regarded as human language 
‘in the beginning’ by some o f them/"^
McKusick notes that one important proponent of this latter theory in the 
second half of the eighteenth century was Thomas Reid -  a philosopher whose influence 
on Coleridge in other respects has been discussed by Paul Hamilton and Noel B. Jackson, 
among others/^ According to Reid, the "natural language o f  mankind',^^ which involves 
modulation of tone, gesture, and facial expression, has four main characteristics; 1) it is 
non-arbitrary, and therefore instinctively understood by everyone 2) it is more ancient 
than arbitrary language, and was in fact a condition of its development 3) civilization 
and the ‘perfection of language’ has corrupted and obscured it 4) its expressive power 
can be regained through art. Three of these points are summarised in a chapter ‘Of 
Passions’ in Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers o f  Man (1788) as follows:
The involuntary signs o f  the passions and dispositions o f  the mind, in the voice, features, and 
action, are a part o f  the human constitution, which deserves admiration. The signification o f  those 
signs is known to all men by nature, and previous to all experience.
They are so many openings into the souls o f  our fellow-m en, by which their sentiments 
become visible to the eye. They are a natural language common to mankind, without which it 
would have been im possible to have invented any artificial language.
It is from the natural signs o f  the passions and dispositions o f  the mind that the human 
form derives its beauty; that painting, poetry and music derive their expression-, that eloquence 
derives its greatest force, and conversation its greatest charm.
14 The two interpretations do not necessarily exclude each other, for Coleridge often wrote o f  the quasi- 
Berkeley an ‘language o f  nature’ by referring to a divine face. E.g.: ‘To the philanthropic Physiognomist a 
Face is beautiful because its Features are the symbols and visible signs o f  the inward Benevolence or 
Wisdom -  to the pious man all Nature is thus beautiful because its every Feature is the Symbol and all its 
Parts the written Language o f  infinite Goodness and all powerful Intelligence.’ {LPR, p. 158)
N oel B. Jackson, ‘Critical Conditions: Coleridge, “Common Sense”, and the Literature o f  Self- 
Experiment’, in ELH, V ol 70, N o 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 117-149. Paul Hamilton, C oleridge's Poetics, pp. 
35-41. Reid on language is also discussed by Alan Richardson, in British Romanticism and the Science o f  
the M ind  (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp. 75-6.
Quoted in M cKusick, C oleridge's Philosophy o f  Language, p. 11. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the 
Human Mind, ed. Timothy Duggan (Chicago; University o f  Chicago Press, 1970), ch. 5, sec. 3, p. 65.
Quoted and discussed in Roger D. Gallic, Thomas Reid: Ethics, A esthetics an d  the Anatomy o f  the S e lf  
(Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 174. The Works o f  Thomas Reid, D. 
D., Seventh edition, ed. by Sir W illiam Hamilton (Edinburgh: McLachlan and Stewart, London: Longman, 
Green, Roberts and Green, 1872), p. 574b.
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The fourth point about the effects o f civilization and the development o f language leads 
to a characteristic paradox which is also found in Coleridge: due to this development, 
‘natural’ language has become difficult to understand, and must be learnt anew through 
the exercise o f taste. According to Reid, the arts of the musician, the painter, the actor, 
and the orator
are natural as far as they are expressive; although the knowledge o f  them requires in us a delicate 
taste, a nice judgement, and much study and practice; yet they are nothing else but the language 
o f  nature, which w e brought into the world with us, but have unlearnt by disuse, and so find the 
greatest difficulty in recovering it.
Coleridge in his note on the ‘Language of Nature’ also alludes to this process of 
‘unlearning’ when he claims that the natural expressions of passion ‘are judged of by 
authority, not by actual experience’, a fact that, in his view, has led to the decline of 
drama. Theatre, however, might still make up for the lack o f experience, and by teaching 
the audience the ‘language’ they have forgotten, might also teach them, at least in theory, 
to recognise its movements even as they are recreated in the more subtle medium of the 
written text (‘the one worsted, the other silk’ {CN2: 2274], to adapt a phrase from an
earlier notebook entry).
This form of theatrical representation would be Coleridge’s remedy for 
the ‘Dead Palsy o f the public mind’: a cure by controlled stimulation. Echoing Lear’s 
words to Edgar -  ‘thou art the thing itself (3.4.104) -  Coleridge claims that theatre is 
capable of presenting ‘the very Thing' to the spectators. Ironies apply in both cases: 
Edgar wears his near-nakedness as a disguise, while theatre creates a sense of reality in 
the medium of fiction. However, should this exclude the possibility that the play-acting 
Edgar, or the actor playing him, is in some sense the ‘thing itse lf?  Coleridge seems to 
think that it shouldn’t. ‘What would appear mad or ludicrous in a book,’ he writes, 
‘presented to the senses under the form o f reality & with the truth o f Nature, supplies a 
species o f actual Experience’. Good theatre is thus capable of teaching spectators what is 
‘real’ or ‘natural’ despite its artificial medium, because its effects are validated by each
Quoted in M cKusick, C oleridge‘s  Philosophy o f  Language, pp. 11-12; from Reid, Inquiry, ch. 4, sec. 2, 
p. 57.
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spectator’s instinctive response (a form of recognition Reid had called ‘reminiscence’). 
This response occurs regardless of the fictitious nature of theatrical representation. ‘No 
part was ever played in perfection,’ writes Coleridge, ‘but that Nature justified herself in 
the hearts of all her Children’.
This appears to be a universally applicable, not to say democratic, 
conception of the theatre, although Coleridge immediately makes exception for people 
‘of absolute moral Exhaustion or downright Stupidity’. With respect to plays read, 
however, he is even less optimistic, echoing doubts voiced in earlier philosophical 
criticism. In a discussion o f Hamlet’s ‘apostrophe’ (‘My father!... Methinks I see my 
father’), William Richardson had asked: ‘Are we confident, if there was exhibited to us a 
genuine representation o f human passions and manners, conveyed in artless unaffected 
language, that we would comply with the admonitions of nature, and applaud as our 
feelings d ic ta te ? C o le r id g e , it seems, thinks that ‘we’ would not; that is, readers in 
general would be unable to recognise Shakespeare’s language for what it is, ‘the very 
Thing' itself. In his note, he identifies in this ‘the grand Privilege of a great Actor above 
a great P o e f, suggesting that the language of passion aided by gesture, facial expression 
and voice has a stronger and more immediate effect on the audience than poetic 
language on its own. For most people, passion in writing is less immediately persuasive 
than passion on stage -  as we shall see, some of the strengths Coleridge attributes to 
poetry follow precisely from this initial weakness.
That the bodily expressions of passion were ‘natural’ and universally 
understood was a basic assumption of most eighteenth-century philosophical critics.
Lord Kames (who was influenced by Reid) wrote that ‘The natural signs of emotion, 
voluntary and involuntary, being nearly the same in all men, form an universal language; 
which no difference o f place, no difference of tribe, no diversity o f tongue, can darken
See also a marginal note to Richard Payne Knight, in which Coleridge (or possibly Wordsworth) argues 
that the sense o f  disparity between what is represented on stage and the means o f  representing it, e.g. in 
the case o f  a storm, prevents ‘delusion’ in adult spectators. ‘But by in the looks the gestures, and tones o f  a 
genuine actor, aided by the knowledge o f  Nature displayed <in the words> by the Poet, there is no such 
disproportion or unfitness; and the representation I confess appears to me not only to approach to reality 
but often for a short while to be w holly merged or lost in it.’ (CM 3: 406) See also Frederick B um ick, 
Illusion and the Drama: C ritical Theory o f  the Enlightenment and Romantic Era  (University Park, Penn.: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 203-4.
William Richardson, A P hilosophical Analysis and Illustration o f  Some o f  Shakespeare’s  Remarkable 
Characters (y,A\nhnv^\, 1774), p. 115.
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or render d o u b t f u l . I t  followed that poetry, as far as it aimed at the expression of 
feeling, also had to aspire to the immediacy of the ‘language of nature’. But how exactly 
this could be achieved had still to be worked out. It seems that in Coleridge’s view, 
poetry -  at least, Shakespearean poetry -  was able to evoke effects o f ‘recognition’ 
analogous to those produced by bodily signs of passion, but through more complicated 
means. That is, poetry had to combine the non-arbitrary features of the ‘language of 
nature’ with the arbitrary signs of ordinary human language -  this is why in his 1812 
note he defines Shakespearean language as ‘something intermediate’ between the two. It 
is slightly confusing that he sometimes refers to poetic language also as the ‘language of 
nature’, but it is clear that in this context he means a secondary naturalness, achieved 
through a blending of arbitrary and ‘natural’ expression. The nature of this ‘blending’ is 
not easy to define; however, what I would like to suggest is that Coleridge’s speculations 
on the multiple modes of association (between words, thoughts, and feelings) might give 
us a clue here. In my view, that is, he implies the existence of a ‘deeper’ level o f mental 
functioning, which in certain states (in extreme suffering, for instance) structures -  or 
shows through, we might say -  arbitrary speech. Thus, even if the words themselves are 
arbitrary, the movement of words -  the ‘starts and strange far-flights of the assimilative 
power’ -  may be regarded as fundamentally natural.
Needless to say, this ‘natural’ language is not identical with the ‘language 
really used by men’, for, as we have seen, Coleridge regarded ordinary human language 
as by definition arbitrary. Tomalin reports him saying in a lecture that he ‘never dreamed 
that Lear could think what he said according to Shakespeare -  but it was the language of 
nature, & such language that while we wept it mingled wisdom with our tears’ {LL 1 : 
227). Lear’s speech, in other words, could never be mistaken for the language of a real 
person, but it could nevertheless be recognised and understood through its emotional
Henry Home (Lord Kames), Elements o f  Criticism  (1762), 2 vols (London: Routledge /  Thoemmes 
Press, 1993), 1; 434. Priestley was the only new rhetorician who did not subscribe to this innatism, 
arguing that the expressive force o f  gestures and facial expressions was due to early associations. See 
Priestley, An Examination o f  Dr. R e id ’s  Inquiry into the Human Mind (London: J. Johnson, 1774), pp. 89- 
92. However, he also affirmed that ‘The tone o f  voice, the gesture, and a variety o f  other circumstances, 
may sufficiently indicate a man's real meaning, without regard to words’, in A Course o f  Lectures on 
O ratory and Criticism , ed. Vincent M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1965), p. 218.
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impact as ‘natural’ in the sense I have been delineating/^ Paradoxically, the highly 
artificial language of poetry might in this sense be closer to ‘nature’ than the real 
language o f everyday communication. The tears and understanding (‘wisdom’) that 
Coleridge attributes to readers of the play are the proof of Lear’s grasp of their 
imagination; his words hold them fast like the eyes of the Ancient Mariner, making them 
sadder and wiser. In the sphere of the theatre or the scene of recital, such imaginative 
‘grasp’ is aided, or even enabled, by the eyes and the voice of the reciter. How exactly 
the same effect is achieved in poetry, when the actor is not physically present, is one of 
the main questions Coleridge tries to answer in his literary criticism. In this chapter I 
would like to show that the rhetorical concept of the ‘language o f passion’ as expounded 
by earlier philosophical critics, most notably Kames and Joseph Priestley, provided 
some of the most important starting-points for Coleridge in this investigation. These 
critics habitually illustrated ‘passionate’ language with Lear’s speeches on the heath, 
returning again and again to the same examples that Coleridge himself adduced not only 
in his discussion o f mania, but whenever he tried to define what made poetic language 
uniquely effective.
The idea of passionate language we find in Reid had its antecedents in the 
wide-ranging discourse o f Enlightenment linguistics. As Hans Aarsleff has shown, the 
theory o f a ‘natural’ (non-arbitrary) proto-language had been most influentially proposed 
in the middle o f the eighteenth century by Condillac, who was also an important 
exponent of linguistic arbitrariness. In his Essai sur l ’origine des connoissances 
humaines (1746; English translation 1756), Condillac states that gestures and natural 
cries ‘form the only “language” that is natural to man; it is the immediate expression of 
the passions’. T h i s  language is not the specifically human language that is the product 
of reflection and the faculty of reason: ‘natural language’ consists mainly of involuntary 
bodily reactions, and therefore it is possessed by animals as well as humans. Condillac
Coleridge frequently reiterated this in his lectures, for example: ‘Each speech is what eveiy man feels to 
be latent in his nature -  what he would have said in that situation if  he had had the ability & readiness to 
do it -  and these are multiplied and individualized with the most extraordinary minuteness & truth {LL 
2 : 122)
”  Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study o f  Language and Intellectual H istory  (London: 
Athlone, 1982), p. 163.
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assumes that these involuntary gestures suggested to man the possibility of voluntary 
signs; these signs, on the one hand, ‘insensibly enlarged and improved the operations of 
the mind, and on the other hand these [operations] having acquired such improvement, 
perfected the signs, and rendered the use of them more familiar’/"^  Reflection and the 
use of signs, thus mutually aiding each other, resulted in the most unique human creation, 
language. This account influenced virtually all subsequent discussions o f the origin of 
language, from Rousseau to Michaëlis (whose legacy was very much alive in Gottingen 
at the time of Coleridge’s visit) and Herder (whose Über den Ursprung der Sprache 
Coleridge probably read in Germany).^^ Condillac also exerted a strong influence in 
England and Scotland, all the more so because he was himself indebted to Warbuiton’s 
Divine Legation o f  Moses (1737-41) -  a work also known to the young Coleridge -  for 
the doctrine o f the ‘language o f action’ (that is, gesture) and its connection with 
hieroglyphics. According to Aarsleff, the debates generated by Condillac reached 
Scotland and England in the works of Adam Smith (‘Considerations concerning the first 
Formation of Languages’, 1761), Lord Monboddo {Of the Origin and Progress o f  
Language, 1773), and Joseph Priestley {Course o f  Lectures on the Theory o f  Language, 
and Universal Grammar,1162)?^ Among other related works, Aarsleff lists Robert 
Lowth’s De sacra poesi Hebraeorum (1753), a text of primary significance for the ‘new 
rhetoric’ developed in the late eighteenth century, and certainly known to Coleridge.^^ 
Influences and cross-influences on the theme of natural language formed a close web 
indeed; a good example is the English edition of Lowth’s Lectures (1787), published 
with the scholarly notes o f Michaëlis and of the translator George Gregory, who at a 
crucial point cites Priestley’s discussion of the figures of passion, which, in turn, owed 
its philosophical underpinnings to Hartley’s associationism. The significance of all these 
thinkers in the formation of Coleridge’s philosophical thought is well established, and it 
is virtually impossible that the discussion on ‘natural language’ in which they all 
participated in one way or another could have been unfamiliar to him.
Condillac, An Essay On the Origin o f  Human Knowledge, Being a Supplement to Mr. L ocke’s Essay on 
the Human Understanding, trans. Thomas Nugent (London, 1756), pp. 173-4 (11.1.1).
McKusick, C oleridge’s  Philosophy o f  Language, p. 56. McKusick discusses M ichaëlis as the ‘most 
important influence’ on Coleridge at the time; see pp. 58-60.
Aarsleff, p. 148.
James Engel 1, ‘Robert Lowth, Unacknowledged Legislator’, in The C om m itted Word: Literature and  
Public Values (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State UP, 1999), 119-140, p. 137.
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Given this state of affairs, there is not much point in assigning a specific 
origin to Coleridge’s concept of the ‘language of nature’. One of its formulations, 
however, is worth considering more closely, for it brings into relief a basic tension also 
inherent in Coleridge’s thinking about ‘passion’ in poetry. William Godwin, to whom he 
addressed some o f his early letters on linguistic theory, gave a summary account of the 
origin o f language in Book I, Chapter VIII of the Enquiry Concerning PoliticalJustice 
(1793), roughly along the lines set by Condillac:
Its beginning was probably from those involuntary cries, which infants, for example, are found to 
utter in the earliest stages o f  their existence, and which, previously to the idea o f  exciting pity or 
procuring assistance, spontaneously arise from the operation o f  pain upon our animal frame. 
These cries, when actually uttered, become a subject o f  perception to him by whom they are 
uttered; and being observed to be constantly associated with certain antecedent impressions and 
to excite the idea o f  those impressions in the hearer, may afterwards be repeated from reflection 
and the desire o f  relief. Eager desire to communicate any information to another will also prompt 
us to utter som e simple sound for the purpose o f  exciting attention: this sound will probably 
frequently recur to organs unpractised to variety, and will at length stand as it were by convention 
for the information intended to be conveyed. But the distance is extreme from those simple 
modes o f  communication, which w e possess in common with som e o f  the inferior animals, to all 
the analysis, and abstraction which languages require.^®
Godwin’s discussion ends with his insistence on the central role of abstraction ‘which 
was necessary to the first existence of language, [and] is again assisted in its operations 
by language’.A b s trac tio n , the primary activity of human reason, is ‘in some sort 
coeval with and inseparable from the existence of mind’ -  in other words, it closely 
resembles Condillac’s notion of reflection, which distinguishes man from animals, and 
which is responsible for the development of language. For Godwin, language is 
inherently abstract, just like ideas themselves (as he states in a note, ‘the human mind is 
perhaps incapable of entertaining any but general ideas’) .A c c o rd in g  to him, then, 
abstract words supplant natural signs arising from passion or sensation (primarily, from
Godwin, Enquiry Concerning P olitica l Justice and its Influence on M orals and Happiness (facsim ile o f  
the third edition), 3 vols, ed. by F. E. L. Priestley (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1946), 1: 112. 
For Rousseau, Tooke, Monboddo and Smith as parallels to Godwin’s account, see 3: 119-20.
Godwin, 1: 115.
Godwin, 1; 112 ,113 .
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pain), and substitute for their immediate affective content abstract ‘information intended 
to be conveyed’.
Theories of the origin o f language usually imply value judgments about 
the relative worth o f the mental faculties involved. In Godwin’s case, the theory 
highlights his preference for the rational as opposed to the sense-driven and the 
passionate.^’ That Coleridge understood — or, perhaps, guessed — the thrust of Godwin’s 
argument in more or less these terms is suggested by his enthusiastic sonnet ‘To William 
Godwin, author o f PoliticalJustice' ‘Passion’ is one o f the keywords of this poem. In 
line 8, it is evoked through a quotation from Collins’s ode, The Passions, while in the 
last stanza it becomes part of the central image, the storm of passion dispersed by a 
glorious abstraction:
Nor w ill I not thy holy guidance bless,
And hymn thee, G o d w in ! with an ardent Lay;
For that thy voice, in Passion’s stormy day.
W hen wild I roam’d the bleak Heath o f  Distress,
B ade the bright form o f  JUSTICE m eet m y w ay
And told me that her name was HAPPINESS. { PWI A:  166)
The poet who has roamed in ‘Passion’s stormy day’, on the ‘heath’ of distress, is rescued 
by the figure o f Godwinian ‘Justice’ -  in stark contrast with the play that the poem 
evokes. In King Lear, what is painfully lacking is exactly justice, from Lear’s first 
offence against Cordelia, to the ‘houseless poverty’ that pervades the country, and the 
conclusion, which brings no poetical justice (so much so that Doctor Johnson was 
famously unable to read it, while theatre audiences enjoyed Nahum Tate’s version with a 
happy ending).
Coleridge’s sonnet expresses a hope that Godwin’s benevolent reason 
might be able to relieve social injustice and the consequent suffering. However, he soon 
became suspicious o f Godwin’s system, as well as of all other systems based on the
From 1798 onwards, Godwin allowed a more significant role to the affections; for this and his general 
stance towards the passions, see F. E. L. Priestley’s editorial remarks in P olitica l Justice, 3; 12 (ii34); 3: 
87-92.
Coleridge later claimed to have written the poem at Southey’s recommendation, before actually reading 
Godwin’s work. See P W \:  166 and CL III: 315 where Coleridge admits this to Godwin himself.
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superiority o f abstraction.^^ In ‘Fears in Solitude’, he characteristically linked 
‘abstraction’ with the ‘empty sounds’ o f language, and opposed it to feeling: ‘Like mere 
abstractions, empty sounds to which / We join no feeling and attach no form! / As if the 
soldier died without a wound’ (PILL 1:473). Abstract words have no connection with the 
pain they denote and which they might even help bring about. Coleridge seems to 
suggest that, because o f this, such language may be used especially effectively for 
purposes of war. Perhaps it was the same fear of the destructive power of abstraction 
that made him urge Godwin in a famous letter to ‘write a book on the power of words, 
and the processes by which human feelings form affinities with them’ {CL 1:625-6). A 
book offering such a theory would be invaluable, for it could account for the capacity of 
words to evoke feelings, that is, for their capacity immediately to affect the mind.
By the time of the lectures, Coleridge seems to have realised that what he 
had proposed to Godwin was a theory of poetry, more than anything else. Through the 
complex web o f associations between words, thoughts, and feelings, the effect of poetry 
was to ‘mingle wisdom with our tears’, in other words, it enabled readers to experience, 
and at the same time to reflect upon, states o f strong feeling. Seen in this light, the study 
of literature could become a crucial element in the ‘culture of the heart’, which -  as 
Godwin later conceded -  was ‘the true school of h u m a n i t y B u t  whereas Godwin was 
gradually persuaded to regard feeling and fiction as central to mankind’s improvement, 
Coleridge, in spite of his alleged ‘emotionalism’, was far from unambivalent towards 
(fictitious) feeling. It might even be argued that in his literary criticism he replicated 
something of the basic tensions inherent in the Enlightenment stance towards passion 
and feeling in general. As we have seen, the school of Condillac affirmed that language 
could not have been invented without ‘natural signs’ of passion, but also that it was 
invented precisely at the moment when they ceased to be natural -  when cries of pain, 
for instance, were repeated by someone actually not in pain. In other words, these 
thinkers accorded passion an originating role in the development of language only to 
show that it was immediately supplanted by reason and abstraction. Coleridge seems to
It has to be added that Coleridge later recanted his animosity against Godwin, and explained it as an 
error caused by his own proneness to abstract thinking: ‘my unfelt and harmless B low s [were] aimed at an 
abstraction, I had christen’d with your name’ {CL  III: 315).
Godwin writes this in the preface to St. Leon  (1798), see Political Justice, 3: 89.
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have repeated this structure of thought when he defined poetry in terms of an artificially 
re-created and controlled passion. But whereas in ordinary speech the passionate origins 
of language were all but erased/^ poetry could be characterised as a somewhat unstable 
mode: a reflexive language energised by the pre-rational or passionate, which could 
reveal itself at any moment, thereby both securing and threatening the ideal poetic effect.
2
Affinities between words and feelings are discussed by Coleridge 
throughout his lectures, but instead of presenting a full-fledged philosophical account of 
the subject, he tended to study it through individual examples: he analysed passages in 
which language seemed to move beyond abstraction and become ‘simple, sensuous, and 
passionate’ {LL 1:515). This transformation in poetic language could occur through the 
interplay o f a number of different elements, but the ones most resembling an original 
‘natural language’ were the extra-semantic or pre-symbolic features, which Coleridge 
found foregrounded in poetic texts. He spent considerable time in his lectures studying 
how such features were interwoven in Shakespeare’s language; he observed, for instance, 
that bodily gestures were lurking even in the early narrative poems. When Shakespeare 
wrote Venus and Adonis and The Rape o f  Lucrece, Coleridge argued, the dramatic 
instinct was already ‘secretly working in him’, and prompted him
to provide a substitute for that visual language, that constant interruption & running Comment by 
Tone, Look, and Gesture which in his Dramatic Works he had expected to derive from the 
Actors. -  His Venus and Adonis seem at once the characters them selves, and the whole 
representation o f  those Characters by the most consummate Actors. You seem to be to ld  nothing; 
but to see & hear every thing. {LL 1: 242)
See Coleridge’s discussion o f  this, as recorded by Tomalin: Tt was known that all deviations from 
ordinary language (by which the Lecturer meant, such language as is used, by a man speaking without 
emotion, to express anything simply -  not that he was quite correct in using the last phrase, because all 
language arose out o f  passion) the only difference was in the figure that was employed, old or new; -  
thus -  w e said, the tops o f  trees, or the heads o f  mountains, which expressions, with innumerable others in 
common use, were figurative, and originally used in a state o f  emotion -  but they were now worn out. 
Passion was the true parent o f  every word in existence in every language.’ {LL 1: 271)
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This means that Shakespeare from the start managed to recreate the effects of bodily 
eloquence in the medium of language. When speaking about the plays, Coleridge often 
made explicit suggestions for how a particular passage should be delivered, claiming 
that Shakespeare’s text contained ‘involved instructions to the actors how to pronounce 
the line’.^ ® A telling instance is one of his marginal comments on Twelfth Night, the 
scene in which the Duke asks Viola/Cesario about her/his ‘sister’: ‘And what’s her 
history?’. The reply is: ‘A blank, my lord. She never told her love, / But let concealment 
like a worm i’ th ’ bud / Feed on her damask cheek..,’ (2.4.106-8).^^ Coleridge in his note 
comments: ‘After the first line (of which the last 5 words should be spoken with & drop 
down in, a deep sigh) the Speaker should make a pause & then start afresh, from the 
activity of thought born o f suppressed Feelings, which thoughts had accumulated during 
the brief interval, as vital Heat under the skin during a dip in cold water’ (CM4:704). 
Coleridge here gives precise instructions to the actress, based on a quasi-scientific 
analysis o f the influence of suppressed passion on the mind and on the body. This is 
especially important in a passage like this, which is itself about concealment o f passion, 
so the actress playing Viola playing Cesario enacts, but also subtly counteracts, what she 
is saying, through the ‘Comment by Tone, Look, and Gesture’. The ‘blank’ in the 
history of the fictitious sister (and of the true Viola) is analogous to the paleness o f ‘her’ 
‘damask cheek’ and to Viola’s ‘sigh’ and ‘pause’. The subsequent conceit, however, 
signals a surplus activity of her mind, as Coleridge argues, brought about by suppressed 
passion, which, like a blush, betrays Viola’s true feelings for the Duke -  at least to the 
perceptive reader or spectator. The ‘nothingness’ of arbitrary language is thus able to 
reveal the ‘true’ nature o f passion, so that readers as well as spectators ‘seem to be told 
nothing’, but ‘hear and see every thing’.
In such remarks, Coleridge comes very close to contemporary theatre 
critics such as Hazlitt and Leigh Hunt, who painstakingly recorded gestures and 
modulations o f tone on the stage which could be interpreted as elements of a ‘language’,
He quotes Prospero’s ‘Twelve years since, Miranda! twelve years since’ {Tem pest 1.2.53) as an example 
{LL 2: 284).
William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night Or What You Will, ed. by Elizabeth Story Donno, The N ew  
Cambridge Shakespeare, gen. ed. Philip Brockbank (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1985, 2003), 
pp. 97-8.
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that is, as meaningful and ‘natural’ signs of passion.^^ Indeed, in the above-cited case 
Coleridge’s apparent prescription for actors is in fact more a description o f a real 
theatrical event: according to the editors’ note in the Marginalia, he is recalling Dora 
Jordan’s performance. On the back of an admission ticket for one o f his own 1812 
lectures, he wrote: ‘Never can I forget Mrs Jordan’s recitation of [her] lines [as] Viola -  
She never told her Love. -  It was absolute perfection - & during that speech you might 
literally have heard a pin drop in the Theatre -  their very breathing was suspended’ 
(SW&F 290). This note represents almost with symbolic density the strong ties between 
Coleridge’s lecturing and the world of the theatre; moreover, it reveals his fondness of, 
or even nostalgia for, the stage, while it also attests to his keen eye for observation. 
Characteristically, he notices how the audience responds to ‘perfect’ acting immediately 
and instinctively, by repeating the pregnant ‘pause’ of the actress. This observation was 
useful not only for the lecturer and the theorist (‘No part was ever played in perfection, 
but that Nature justified herself in the hearts of all her Children’), but also for the 
playwright, who in this period carefully followed the staging process o f his own play 
Remorse. His ‘instructions’ for the actors are, in this sense, given by the insider. 
Theatrical scripts o f the age often recorded symptoms of passion appropriate to each 
passage; sequences o f stage action had been handed down with especial care from one 
production of Shakespeare to the next.^^ But, as Jane Moody has shown, ‘natural’ signs 
of passion achieved their greatest importance in the so-called ‘illegitimate theatre’, 
where, due to the monopoly of the two patent theatres, speech was limited or completely 
displaced by music and spectacle.'^^
The assumption behind ‘illegitimate’ productions was something very 
close to the theory of ‘natural language’ formulated by eighteenth-century philosophers.
See Joel Haefner, ‘“The Soul Speaking in the Face”: Hazlitt's Concept o f  Character’, Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900, 24  (1984), 655-670  
See George Taylor, “‘The Just Delineation o f  the Passions”: Theories o f  Acting in the A ge o f  Garrick’, 
Kenneth Richards and Peter Thomson eds.. Essays on the Eighteenth-Century Stage  (London: Methuen, 
1972), pp. 51-72.
With regard to Coleridge Jane M oody argues that even though he participated in the ‘Romantic 
disavowal o f  illegitimate theatre’, this ‘jars uneasily against [his] own dramatic practice, not to mention 
his desire to produce a number o f  illegitimate plays, including “Laugh till you lose him” (a dramatic 
romance), an oriental entertainment, a speaking ballet, and a pantomime based on the Tartarian tales. {CL 
IV: 606).’ Jane M oody, Illegitim ate Theatre in London, 1770-1840  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 61.
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According to both, movement, facial expression and modulation o f voice constituted a 
language readily understandable for everyone. While philosophers habitually rewrote the 
conjectural history o f how early men invented language, illegitimate productions were 
particularly fond o f stories about monsters, savages or idiots who were unable to speak, 
but expressed feelings through music and dance. ‘Legitimate’ playwrights like Joanna 
Baillie also shared a belief in the ‘universal language’ of passion. In her ‘Introductory 
Discourse’ (1798) to the Plays on the Passions Baillie referred to ‘the language of the 
agitated soul, which every age and nation understand’."^  ^ According to her, this 
‘language’, or rather our wish to observe it, formed the basis of a number of social 
phenomena, including the theatre. ‘No man wishes to see the Ghost him self, she argues, 
‘but every man wishes to see one who believes that he sees it, in all the agitation and 
wildness o f that species of terror’ -  hence our interest in ghost-scenes like the one in 
Hamlet As this example suggests, a crucial attraction o f the ‘language o f passion’ 
resided in the fact that it could not be codified or observed in itself -  it was only 
accessible through fictitious constructions, like poetry and the theatre.'^^ It was in this 
sense an enabling fiction, which generated much writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.
Among others, the elusive content of bodily gestures produced a large 
amount of work by elocutionists, aimed at codifying what by definition eluded 
codification. The most important representative o f this movement, Thomas Sheridan (a 
former actor) argued that Locke’s account of language was flawed because it focused 
solely on the arbitrary ‘language of ideas’. As opposed to this, the ‘language of 
emotions’ was natural, and universally understood: ‘there is not an act o f the mind, an 
exertion of the fancy, or emotion of the heart, which have not annexed to them their 
peculiar tone and notes o f the voice, by which they are to be expressed; and which, when 
properly used, excite in the minds of others, tuned invariably by the hand of nature in
Joanna Baillie, A Selection o f  P lays and Poems, ed. by Amanda Gilroy and Keith Hanley (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 2002), p. 13.
A Selection o f  P lays an d  Poem s, p. 12.
Compare this with Coleridge’s account o f  his use o f  the supernatural in the ‘Ancient Mariner’: ‘the 
excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting o f  the affections by the dramatic truth o f  such 
emotions, as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real’ {BL 1997, p. 179).
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unison of those notes, analogous em o tio n s .S h erid an  proceeds by arguing that with the 
progress of civilization and especially with the invention of writing and the spread of 
literacy (more specifically, ‘the very defective and erroneous method in which all are 
trained in the art o f reading’), the ‘expressive language of nature’ has been corrupted."^^ 
We might recall Reid’s analogous trope o f ‘unlearning’ at this point. While Reid thought 
that ‘unlearning’ might be counteracted by the arts in general (including oratory), 
Sheridan proposes to remedy it by teaching a method of public reading and delivery, 
based on the theatrical practice of expressing emotions. This might be regarded as a 
prominent case o f what Timothy Clark, following Walter J. Ong, calls ‘residual orality’, 
the survival o f oral models of communication in a culture that is immersed in writing."^^ 
Clark writes about this in connection with concepts of inspiration and enthusiasm, and 
also notes problems ‘of translating an oral model of composition into a written one’ in 
Hugh Blair’s rhetoric.'*^ However, Sheridan’s success should remind us that these were 
very often productive difficulties, precisely because they allowed so much room for 
performative ‘interpretation’. The rules laid down by Sheridan in his publications could, 
by definition, only roughly correspond to the ‘real’ language o f the passions -  hence the 
great success of his lecturing tours, where such a language could be directly displayed 
and observed.
Gesture, voice and facial expression were thus habitually perceived as 
constituting a ‘natural language’, both inside and outside the theatre, and Coleridge was 
keen to find the counterparts of such signs in Shakespeare’s plays. But he devoted far 
more attention to another component of the ‘natural’ language o f passion: to rhythm, the 
sine qua non o f poetry. That rhythm was closely connected with passion was another
Thomas Sheridan, A R hetorical Grammar o f  the English Language. C alculated so lely  fo r  the Purpose o f  
Teaching Propriety o f  Pronunciation, and Justness o f  Delivery, in that Tongue, by the Organs o f  Speech  
(Dublin, 1781), p. 101. Cf. G. P. Mohrniann, ‘The Language o f  Nature and Elocutionary Theory’, 
Q uarterly Journal o f  Speech 52 (April 1966), pp. 116-24.
Sheridan, z( Rhetorical G ramm ar 101.
Timothy Clark, The Theory o f  Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis o f  Subjectivity in Romantic and  
Post-Rom antic ID fVmg (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 10.
Clark, p. 80.
Coleridge’s ideas on passion and metre are discussed in Emerson R. Marks, C oleridge on the Language 
o f  Verse (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981) pp. 79-89; Paul Hamilton, C oleridge's Poetics, pp. 146-156. See 
also M. H. Abrams, The M irror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the C ritical Tradition (New York: 
Norton, 1958 (1953)), pp. 120-123.
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leading assumption o f eighteenth-century criticism, but different critics voiced different 
opinions about the exact nature of their relationship. For some, strong passions were 
manifested in the irregularities of rhythm, that is, through divergence from ordinary 
metre. Others, like Adam Smith, thought that certain passions, which he called ‘musical’, 
naturally expressed themselves in regular cadences, so passion was conveyed not 
through a divergence from regular rhythm, but through measured verse itself."^  ^An 
extension of this theory held that passions in general led to rhythmical expression -  a 
view most memorably expressed in Robert Lowth’s Lectures on the Sacred Poetry o f  the 
Hebrews. Finally, Lowth and several others also asserted that rhythm was born together 
with song and dance, and that poetry had its origins in this elemental, strongly physical
expression o f passion.
Coleridge in his lecture notes evokes practically all these theories in one 
version or another, backing them up with the careful rhythmical analyses that make his 
contribution truly unique. His overall opinion seems to have coincided with the 
‘extended’ theory that argued for a causal link between passion and rhythm in general:
Physicians asserted that each passion has its proper pulse -  So it was with metre when rightly 
used. A  state o f  excitement produced is, in truth, an analogy o f  the language o f  strong passion -  
not that strong passion always speaks in metre, but it has a language more measured than is 
employed in common speaking. {LL 1: 222)
This passage claims that some kind of rhythm (if not regular metre) is a natural 
consequence of heightened emotional states. Rhythm here appears as almost identical 
with bodily symptoms of passion which can be scientifically ascertained. However, 
Coleridge also makes a subtle distinction between ‘strong passion’ and ‘excitement’, in
Musical passions ‘naturally express them selves in a language which is distinguished by pauses at 
regular, and almost equal, intervals; and which, upon that account, can more easily be adapted to the 
regular returns o f  the correspondent periods o f  a tune’. (Adam Smith, O f the Im itative Arts, in Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects, ed. by W. P. D . Wightman and J. C. Bryce, The Glasgow Edition o f  the Works 
and Correspondence o f  Adam Smith, Vol III, gen. ed. D. D . Raphael and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: 
Liberty P resstU beA y C lassics, 1982), 176-213, p. 192) In his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 
Smith again distinguishes between passions which lend themselves to ‘uniform and regular cadence’ in 
writing (like joy  or grief) and those that preclude regularity (like anger and indignation). Adam Smith, 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. by J. C. Bryce, The Glasgow Edition o f  the Works and 
Correspondence o f  Adam Smith, Vol IV, gen. ed. A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty P/ ea^/Liberty 
C lassics, 1985), p. 22.
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which the latter seems to be identical with a voluntarily-induced ‘poetic feeling’, while 
the former implies unasked-for and directly personal emotion. This is an important 
difference, pointing towards the crucial dividing line between poetic imitation and the 
immediate personal experience of feeling that Coleridge wanted to maintain at all 
costs.^^ While ‘strong passion’ naturally produces ‘more measured’ expression, poetic 
‘excitement’ is something like artificial stimulation, leading to analogous results. This 
also works the other way round: metre in a particular text may also be regarded as a sort 
of stimulant, capable o f inducing ‘excitement’ -  this is why Coleridge likened its effects 
to those of wine, and (perhaps recalling his own experiments with nitrous oxide) to ‘a 
medicated atmosphere’ {BL 2: 66).
In his lectures, Coleridge discussed the ‘pulse’ o f passion in a context that 
clearly indicated the provenance of the idea. He made his ‘scientific’ point through 
evoking the Old Testament, that is, the text in which the interplay o f rhythm and passion 
had been so influentially demonstrated by Robert Lowth. The kind of rhythm Coleridge 
identified in these passages, however, was not that o f parallelism or repetition, as Lowth 
had suggested, but something closer to classical verse. Coleridge states that ‘taking the 
first chapter o f Isaiah, without more than four or five transpositions & no alteration of 
words, he had reduced it to complete Hexameters -  so true it is that wherever passion 
was, the language became a sort of metre’ {LL 1: 223). O f course, he is writing here of 
the King James Bible and not the Hebrew original; the ‘passion’ o f the translator, and 
not of the author. The way he develops this connection is also different from Lowth, 
who had merely stated that religious passion or ‘enthusiasm’ informed the poetry o f the 
Old Testament. Coleridge, by contrast, also wished to prove his points experimentally. It 
is because of this quasi-scientific ambition that he registers the effects of certain 
passages on the reader, which (supposedly) call attention to ‘hidden’ rhythmical patterns 
in the prose text. As Tomalin reported,
he found that in almost every passage brought before him, as having produced a particular effect,
there was metre & very often poetry -  not indeed, regular -  not such as could be scanned on the
This difference with respect to metre is discussed by Paul Hamilton, C oleridge's Poetics, p. 137. See 
also p. 148: ‘The poetic passion is different from ordinary passion in the way that poetic language 
engineers an artificially finished unity, “a severer keeping”, within the open-ended and still growing 
medium o f  language.’
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fingers -  but in some cases fragments o f  hexameter verses, not like the line o f  Pope but
regularly, o f  daetyls, spondees, forming sometimes a complete Hexameter verse -  e.g.
_ /
God went up with a shout, our
-  "  /  “  “  /  _ _
Lord with the sound o f  the trumpet 
forming a line exactly similar with the first o f  Homer & Virgil, {LL 1: 223)^*
The form of this argument highlights one of the most interesting and characteristic 
features of Coleridge’s criticism: the fact that he tends to deal with poetic production 
and reception simultaneously. In this case he provides an explanation not so much for 
the origins of metrical composition, as for the readers’ response to the (translated) text. 
His careful attention to the process o f reading can also be witnessed in comments like 
the following: ‘The very assumption that we are reading the works of a Poet supposes 
that he is in a continuous state of excitement and thereby arises a language, in prose 
unnatural but in poetry natural {LL 1: 206). This suggests that poetic ‘excitement’ can 
also be thought of as an ‘assumption’ on the reader’s part, which may be verified when it 
turns out to be ‘reality’, that is, when the reader recognises its signs in the language of 
the poem. This shows, I think, that the historical accuracy of the link between passion 
and metre is ultimately less important in Coleridge’s criticism than the reader’s self- 
realising assumption about it. The point seems to be that such an assumption should be 
borne out by the reading experience — it is needless to ascertain from any other source 
what the poet had felt while composing the text. For this reason, translations might be 
studied in the same way as original compositions.
Apart from the general connection between passion and metre, Coleridge 
as a reader seems to have ‘assumed’ other things as well. For instance, he adapted 
something like the divergence theory in order to account for the idiosyncrasies of metre 
in dramatic speeches. Karnes had formulated this theory as follows: ‘As no passion hath 
any long uninterrupted existence, nor beats always with an equal pulse, the language 
suggested by passion is not only unequal but frequently interrupted’.^  ^Passion,
See also SW & F 21)2, 206; CL VI 945; CM V 690. 
Elements, 1: 496.
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according to this, is manifested not so much in poetic metre as in the irregularities of 
actual rhythm (‘we are only disposed to express the strongest pulses of passion, 
especially when it returns with impetuosity after interruption’, writes Kames).^^ 
Interestingly, Lowth had endorsed this view as well, arguing that ‘the most violent 
affections o f the heart’, to which the origin of poetry ‘must be attributed’, are expressed 
through sudden changes in rhythm and pace: ‘they burst forth in sentences pointed, 
earnest, rapid, and tremulous; in some degree the style as well as the modulation is 
adapted to the emotions and habits of the mind.’ Paradoxically, passionate language thus 
appears to be self-interrupting -  ‘these affections break and interrupt the enunciation of 
their impetuosity’ -  which means that the relationship between passion and its 
expression is inherently dynamic, where passion both triggers and interrupts its own 
‘enunciation’.^ "^
The subtlety o f this argument anticipates Coleridge, who describes the 
dynamism of verse with great accuracy, keenly aware of instances when irregularity may 
be seen as regular, and vice versa. In one o f his marginalia, for instance, he discusses 
how the plays o f Massinger ‘might be reduced to a rich yet regular metre’, if the reader 
observed ‘Accent, then 2" '^  ^emphasis, and lastly, retardation & acceleration of the 
Times of Syllables according to the meaning of the words, the passion that accompanies 
them, and even the Character of the Person that uses them’ (CM  1: 337). This, of course, 
is no easy task, and requires the kind of creative reading which is ready to grant certain 
assumptions about what the author was capable of, even before starting to read the text. 
Admittedly, Coleridge was not always as charitable as that, but with regard to 
Shakespeare he entertained no doubts. The general rule with Shakespeare seems to have 
been an ‘involution of metre natural to the expression of passion’ (LL 2: 122). 
‘Impetuosity of thought’ is another key term, denoting a Shakespearean effect which 
Coleridge usually associates with enjambment:
To distinguish what is legitim ate in Shakespeare from what does not belong to him, we must observe 
his varied images sym bolical o f  moral truth, thrusting by and seeming to trip up each other, from an 
impetuosity o f  thought, producing a metre which is always flowing from one verse into the other, and
”  Elements, 1: 496.
Lowth, Lectures, 30.
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seldom closing with the tenth syllable o f  the line -  an instance o f  which may be found in the play o f  
Pericles, written a centuiy before, but which Shakespeare altered, and where his alteration may be 
recognized even to half a line; this was the case not merely in his later plays, but in his early dramas, 
such as L o v e ’s  Labour Lost, the same perfection in the flowing continuity o f  interchangeable metrical 
pauses is constantly perceptible. {LL 1: 521)
While enjambment remains Shakespeare’s signature way o f conveying passion, the lack 
of it (what Coleridge calls ‘intercurrent verse’), can also indicate certain states of 
feelings. Of Richard II, for instance, he observes:
The six opening Lines o f  this Play, each closing at the tenth syllable, to be compared with the 
rhythmless Metre o f  the verse in Henry 6'*' and Titus Andronicus [...] Here the weight o f  each w ord  
supplies all the relief afforded by intercurrent verse: while the whole represents the M ood. {LL 2:284)
In each play, the rhythm of the opening lines foreshadows the emotional tone of the 
whole. Similarly, each speaker’s state of mind is revealed in the rhythm of his or her 
speech, as when the ‘very rhythm expresses the conscious over-much in Lady 
M[acbeth]’s Answer to the King’ {LL 2: 309), or in the ‘impassioned continuity’ of 
Hamlet’s words, ‘instantly directed to the Ghost’ {LL 2:299). Coleridge’s analysis of 
rhythm thus involves much more than metrical feet; it includes enjambments, breaks, 
caesuras, the distribution o f words in lines, the interplay o f all these, and more.^^ His 
discussions of transpositions, moreover, are closely related to the metrical analyses.^^ 
The basic assumption behind all these investigations is that subtle features of rhythm 
convey passion, and that in this respect they are analogous to involuntary gestures of the
One attempt to give a comprehensive account from the notebooks: ‘To understand fully the mechanism 
in order fully to feel the incomparable Excellence o f  M ilton’s Metre, w e must make four Tables, or a 
fourfold Compartment: the first for the Feet, single & composite, for which the whole 26 feet o f  the 
Ancients w ill be found neeessary; the second, to note the construction o f  the Feet, whether from different 
or from single words [...]. -  The Third, o f  the strength and position, the concentration or diffusion o f  the 
Emphasis. Fourth, the Length and Position o f  the Pauses. -  Then compare his Narrative with the 
Harangues. - 1 have not noticed the Ellipses, because they either do not affect the Rliythm, or are not 
Ellipses but comprehended in the Feet.’ (CAIII: 4190)
See for instance his critique o f  Scott’s The Lady o f  the Lake: ‘the original ground o f  the metathesis o f  
words is passion  suggesting one idea before others [ -  ] in Greek and Latin where there are cases, mere 
logic is sufficient [ -  ] but with us where there are no cases (i.e. in all instances but pronouns) there must 
be a passion  ! and in such phrases passion must be supposed to have place for this purpose -  because if  
there be any passion, it is that very passion which brought to the mind the trivial instead o f  a thought- 
created sentence -  thus Othello -  [“]N ot a Jot! N ot a Jot![”] ’ {NS: 118).
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body. Lady Macbeth may be able to mislead the king, but the rhythm o f her speech 
betrays her play-acting, like Viola’s ‘pause’ or her subsequent ‘conceit’.
3
A connection between figures of speech and natural bodily gestures was 
suggested by the term ‘figure’ itself, a name ‘to be applied to certain attitudes, or I might 
say gestures of language’, as Quintilian put it.^  ^But this connection became especially 
important for critics after Condillac who argued, on new philosophical grounds, that 
figures in poetry retained something of the immediacy of the bodily expressions of 
passion. This ‘affective’ rhetoric -  as Tzvetan Todorov has called it -  had its British 
counterpart in the new rhetoric o f Kames and his followers, who assumed that passions 
‘justified’ figurative language.^^ A closely analogous stance is also traceable in 
Coleridge, for instance in the following discussion from 1811, reported by Tomalin:
all deviations from ordinary language must be justified by som e passion which renders it natural. 
How ridiculous w** it seem in a state o f  comparative insensibility to employ a figure used only by 
a person, only under the highest emotion -  Such as the impersonation o f  an abstract being, and an 
apostrophe to it as it were not only in existence, but actually present {LL 1:271)
Following the Longinian tradition, Lowth and the new rhetoricians associated 
personification and the apostrophe with the highest states of passion. Apostrophe 
especially was the figure of enthusiasm and the sublime, often treated as the pledge of 
authentic passion, which was somehow beyond human capacity to imitate (at least in a 
convincing way). Joseph Priestley in his Course o f  Lectures wrote:
Let no person venture to exclaim and apostrophize, unless the importance, as well as the 
goodness o f  his cause w ill justify it. These strong natural emotions are not to be counterfeited. To 
these arcana o f  nature it is hardly possible that artifice should have access; and if  the 
circumstances and occasions o f  the address w ill not justify such vehem ence o f  style, a man makes 
him self ridiculous by attempting the imposition. Besides, direct exclamations and apostrophes to
Institutio O ratoria  IX, i, 13. See Todorov, Theories o f  the Symbol, pp. 66ff.
Theories o f  the Symbol, p. 108. M. H. Abrams discusses the eighteenth-century connection between 
figures and passion in The M irror and the Lamp, pp. 72-78.
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persons not present, or to things inanimate, though ever so just, ought to be used very sparingly; 
since, if  they produce their natural and full effect, they raise the attention to such a degree as 
cannot be kept up long/^
Priestley here, like Coleridge in 1811, appeals to a notion o f ‘justification’ by passion, 
which legitimises the use o f figurative language, identifying the apostrophe as a key 
rhetorical figure. His admonitions against using it without such justification, or in order 
to support morally questionable causes, are made in the context of pulpit oratory. 
Interestingly enough, Coleridge evokes the same context when he continues the 1811 
lecture by mentioning a Methodist minister who ‘in his prayer, at a loss for an idea, & 
when there seemed to be no natural connection, [...] would unite his thoughts by a new 
string of epithets applied to the Supreme Being -  thus degrading the highest exertion of 
the human faculties to a mere art to give a pretence o f connection where none exists {LL 
1:272).
In other writings too Coleridge refers to the use of apostrophe as a test 
case forjudging poetic language, as in the Biographia, where he opposes John Donne’s 
apostrophe to the Sun (‘the legitimate language of poetic fervor self-impassioned’) to the 
‘startling hysteric o f weakness over-exerting itself [...] in sundry odes and apostrophes 
to abstract terms’ {BL 1997, pp. 232-3). In an earlier note o f Wordsworth, written 
possibly in joint preparation for Coleridge’s first lecture series, we find a discussion of 
apostrophe in response to Hugh Blair, that is, to the most widely-read representative of 
the Scottish new rhetoric. Blair is quoted by Richard Payne Knight in his Analytical 
Inquiry, criticising a couplet from Pope’s ‘Eloisa to Abelard’ (‘O write it not, my hand -  
the name appears / Already written -  wash it out my tears’). According to Blair, this is 
‘forced and unnatural’: ‘a personified hand is low, and not in the style of true passion; 
and the figure becomes still worse when, in the last place, she exhorts her tears to wash 
out what her hand had written’. Wordsworth (and/or possibly Coleridge) responds 
fiercely, condemning the ‘stupid Scotch Doctor’ who does not know that a hand might 
be ‘apostrophized with dignity and genuine passion’. The argument from decorum 
(which would exclude ‘lowness’) is thus discarded. However, the rest of the note
Lectures, p. 113.
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expresses an opinion of Pope’s lines quite close to that of Blair, not only in its judgment 
but also in the grounds on which it is made:
The meanness o f  the passage lies in this that the <several> apostrophes are arise not from the 
impulse o f  passion; <they are not> abrupt, inten upted and revolutionary but formal, and 
mechanically accumulated. -  The versification is also wretched in the Extreme, the pauses being 
exactly in the middle o f  the lines, utterly unsuited to the perturbed state o f  feeling intended to be 
express’d, and producing a see saw or balance o f  sound which could not have existed if  the 
Author had written from genuine feeling passion, but which w ell accords with the adulterate 
spurious stud here substituted for it.’ (C M 3: 404)
If  anything, this comment expands and refines the critical theory that underlay Blair’s 
remark. The annotator claims that passion may justify any kind of apostrophe, if only it 
is supported by other ‘passionate’ features of the text, above all, by its rhythm. It seems 
as if Blair’s opponents here were pulling together numerous threads of eighteenth- 
century criticism, in order to produce a fuller and more coherent account of passion’s 
poetic embodiment.
The example from Pope’s ‘Eloisa’ is interesting because the text itself 
deals with bodily signs o f passion, staging an extreme version of involuntariness where 
the body becomes as good as independent of the mind, while the mind still registers its 
movements. What is more, writing is claimed to be one of the involuntary activities 
(something that Coleridge might have found problematic), while the stylistic properties 
of the ‘letter’ itself display all the signs of voluntary control. In other words, the poem 
performs something other than what it states. It is typical o f philosophical critics and of 
Coleridge in particular to spot such contradictions. As I have been suggesting, these 
critics were capable of dealing with ‘performativity’ through metaphors of bodily action; 
for them, it was perfectly intelligible to say that a certain text ‘did’ something, while it 
might have ‘said’ something else. What enabled them to do so was their assumption that 
the ‘natural’ movements of passion could be translated to the realm o f arbitrary 
language. As Priestley stated, figurative speech indicated a person’s state of mind
not by means o f  the words it consists of, considered as signs o f  separate ideas, and interpreted 
according to their common acceptation; but as circumstances naturally attending those feelings
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which com pose any state o f  mind. Those figurative expressions, therefore, are scarce considered 
and attended to as w ords, but are viewed in the same light as attitudes, gestures, and looks, which 
are infinitely more expressive o f  sentiments and feelings  than words can possibly be/"
I think it is safe enough to say that Coleridge advocated the ‘naturalness’ of figures in 
much the same manner as Priestley, stating that even the seemingly trivial figure of 
wordplay should be ‘justified’ by
that Law o f  Passion which inducing in the mind an unusual activity seeks for means to waste its 
superfluity -  in the highest & most lyric kind, in passionate repetition o f  a sublime Tautology (as 
in the Song o f  Debora) -  and in lower degrees, in making the words them selves the subjects & 
materials o f  that surplus action, the same cause that agitates our very limbs & makes our very 
gestures tempestuous in states o f  high excitement/ {LL I: 267).
This passage describes repetition (or tautology) and the pun as strictly analogous to 
bodily gestures expressive of passion. Coleridge’s choice of example is again telling; as 
James Engell has pointed out, the new rhetorician Thomas Gibbon cited Deborah in a 
similar context, inspired by Robert Lowth’s account of Biblical poetry According to 
Lowth, Hebrew poetry originated in the strong passions, above all, in religious 
enthusiasm, which led to such verbal effects as ‘sudden exclamations, frequent 
interrogations, apostrophes even to inanimate objects; for, to those who are violently 
agitated themselves, the universal nature of things seems under a necessity of being 
affected by similar emotions’. But passion also led to simultaneous bodily effects; for, 
according to Lowth, every ‘impulse of the mind’ has ‘a certain tone of voice, and a 
certain gesture o f the body adapted to if . For this reason, passion produces song and 
dance, as well as poetry: ‘we may possibly be indebted to them [to song and dance] for 
the accurately admeasured verses and feet, to the end that the modulation of the 
language might accord with the music of the voice and the motion o f the body’.'’^
In other words, poetry in its ‘original’ form might be considered as the 
‘natural’ -  and in part bodily -  enactment of passion. Something like this is implied in 
Coleridge’s remark on Deborah, in which he draws a parallel between bodily agitation
Lectures, p. 77.
‘The N ew  Rhetoric and Romantic Poetics’, p. 224.
62 50-1.
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and poetic figures. However, he is also keen to distinguish ‘modern’ poetry from its 
hypothetical ancient origins. While ancient poetry could be traced back to involuntary 
bodily action, modern poetry could, at most, be analogous to the self-conscious imitation 
of such action, for instance to the conventionalised body-language of the ballet or the 
pantomime. This might have been considered as a loss by some critics, but for Coleridge, 
it was a very important gain, because it loosened the ties between poetry and direct 
personal experience.
Coleridge’s tendency to distinguish ‘poetic Passion’ from the immediate 
expression of feeling is most observable in passages where he is closest to his 
Enlightenment predecessors, that is, when he engages in conjectural history. He does not 
do so very often, but it is always significant when he does, as in the following passage 
from 1818:
The (so called) M usic o f  Savage Tribes as little deserves the name o f  Art to the Understanding, as 
the Ear warrants it for M usic -  . Its lowest step is a mere expression o f  Passion by the sounds, 
which the Passion itself necessitates -  its highest, a voluntaiy re-production o f  those Sounds, in 
the absence o f  the occasioning Causes, so as to give the pleasure o f  Contrast -  ex. gr. the various 
outcries o f  Battle in the song o f  Triumph, & Security.
Poetry likewise is purely human -  all its materials are from  the mind, and all the 
products are/o/' the mind. It is the Apotheosis o f  the former state -  viz. Order and Passion -  N.b. 
how by excitement o f  the Associative Power Passion itself imitates Order, and the order resulting 
produces a pleasurable Passion  (whence Metre) and thus elevates the Mind by making its feelings 
the Objects o f  its reflection/ and how recalling the Sights and Sounds that had accompanied the 
occasions o f  the original passion it impregnates them with an interest not their own by means o f  
the Passions, yet tempers the passion by the calming power which all distinct images exert on the 
human soul. {LL 2: 217-8)
Coleridge here takes for granted that ‘savage music’ and poetry were both born of the 
‘expression of Passion’; however, he also argues that the involuntary sounds of passion 
were superseded by their conscious re-production. It is woiTh noting the similarities of 
this account with Condillac, Herder, and even Godwin on language. According to them, 
arbitrary language evolved from the conscious, self-reflexive repetition of involuntary 
expressions of passion; in other words, man created signs out of mere symptoms. In 
Coleridge’s opinion, savage poetry and music also repeat an original expression of
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passion, ‘in the absence o f the occasioning Causes’, and thus offer an opportunity for 
conscious reflection on it. But the gain secured by this transition is not merely 
intellectual. Passion, according to Coleridge, itse lf‘imitates Order’, and ‘by excitement 
of the Associative Power’ (note the Brunonian and/or associationist vocabulary) 
produces metre, which, in turn, results in ‘a pleasurable Passion', In other words, what 
he describes is not the gradual disappearance of passion, but a ‘calming’ and ‘tempering’ 
of it through poetry and music: a modulation from the strongly personal towards the less 
personal, from the potentially painful towards the pleasurable.
It is clear from another note that Coleridge regarded Deborah’s song as an 
example of the earlier ‘savage’ kind of poetry: ‘There are men who can write most 
eloquently, and passages of deepest pathos & even Sublimity, on circumstances personal 
& deeply exciting their own passions; but not therefore poets -  Mothers -  Deborah’s 
Song -  Nature is the Poet here’ {LL 1: 69). As this suggests, Coleridge’s ultimate ideal 
of a poet is one who is not personally affected, but can still imagine the passions arising 
in deeply moving circumstances, and thus imaginatively recreate the ‘language of 
nature’. In 1812, he contrasted Shakespeare who ‘became Othello and spoke as Othello 
would have spoken’ with Deborah, whose song
was poetry in the highest sense; but he had no reason to suppose that if  she had not been agitated 
by the same passion she e e  would have been able to talk in the same way -  or that if  she were had 
been placed under different circumstances, which she was not likely to be placed in she would 
still have spoken the language o f  truth. {LL 1 :310)
It is highly probable that Coleridge here is tacitly correcting Wordsworth, who cited 
Deborah’s song in his note on ‘The Thorn’ -  a lyrical ballad in which, as Alan Be well 
has demonstrated, he uses ‘Hebrew poetry as a model for writing an experimental 
primitive ballad aimed at dramatizing the primitive origins o f p o e t r y ‘Poetry is 
passion’, Wordsworth wrote in the note, and it is as if Coleridge were eager to qualify 
this claim.^"  ^According to him, a poet must create a distance between him- or herself and
Alan Bew ell, W ordsworth and the Enlightenment: Nature, Man, and Society in the Experimental Poetry  
(N ew  Haven and London: Yale UP, 1989), p. 171.
He might also have w ished to complement Wordsworth’s account in the 1802 Appendix to the Preface:
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the feelings represented -  that is, poets must recreate the passion of an imagined ‘other’ 
(or of themselves, ‘othered by time’). It is interesting, however, that while Coleridge 
denied Deborah the name o f a poet, he was ready to call her song ‘poetry in the highest 
sense’, and to cite it again at the end of Chapter 17 of the Biographia as such. If this is 
not a simple instance o f Coleridge changing his mind, we might conclude that, according 
to him, the historical Deborah was ultimately irrelevant to the reader whose aim was the 
appreciation of poetry, or rather, that she was relevant only in so far as her feelings 
could be imaginatively recreated from the text. The song was poetry, even if she was not 
a poet.^^ Some time around 1799 Coleridge himself had translated passages from 
Deborah’s song, and it is intriguing to imagine that he might have considered translation 
in this case as a more truly ‘poetic’ -  because more imaginative -  activity than original 
composition.^^
4
The fault-lines and continuities that Coleridge established between 
passion and the self-conscious poetic imagination are nowhere so clearly discernible as 
in his comments on King Lear, Like a number of romantic critics, he evoked Lear 
repeatedly at crucial points of his literary criticism in order to illustrate the power of the 
imagination.^^ As James C. McKusick has noted, both in the lectures and in the 
Biographia, ‘Coleridge’s touchstone of imaginative discourse’ is a passage from the
‘The earliest poets o f  all nations generally wrote from passion exeited by real events ... feeling powerfully 
as they did, their language was daring, and figurative. In succeeding times, Poets ... perceiving the 
influence o f  such language, and desirous o f  producing the same effect without being animated by the same 
passion, set them selves to the mechanical adoption o f  these figures o f  sp eech ...’ The Prose Works, ed, by 
W. J.B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford; Clarendon, 1974), 1; 160.
I suspect that this paradox follow ed from Coleridge’s tendency to read the Bible both as literature and as 
a collection o f  inspired texts. For the second mode o f  reading, it was necessary to assume that the books 
recorded the spiritual experiences o f  flesh and blood people, according to their different characters, the 
conventions o f  their age and their social positions. At least this is what he argues for in the Confessions o f  
an Inquiring Spirit.
On the translation see MeKusick, ‘A new poem by Samuel Taylor Coleridge’, in Modern Philology,
84:4 (May 1987), 407-415.
For an account o f  Hazlitt’s interpretation o f  the play and a survey o f  other romantic critics, see W. P. 
Albrecht, ‘Hazlitt, Passion, and K in gL eaC , Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 18: 4 (Autumn, 
1978), 611-624. Lamb’s response to Lear is discussed in relation to the ideology o f  the sublime by 
Jonathan Arac in ‘The M edia o f  Sublimity: Johnson and Lamb on K ing Lear', SiR, 26: 2 (1987), 209-220.
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play.^^ In the latter, he cites the second storm scene -  ‘What! have his daughters brought 
him to this pass?’ -  as well as Lear’s ‘preceding apostrophe to the elements’, in the 
context of his discussion of the two binary pairs of imagination/fancy, mania/delirium 
{BL I 84-85). In a lecture note of 1808, the first storm scene of Lear had already 
exemplified Imagination:
the power by which one image or feeling is made to modify many others, & by a sort o ffusion to 
fo rce  many into one -  that which after shewed itself in such might and energy in Lear, where the 
deep anguish o f  a Father spreads the feeling o f  Ingratitude & Cruelty over the very Elements o f  
Heaven -  . {LL 181)
Read carefully, this passage offers more than a general assertion of imagination’s 
blending power. In the sentence, power is distributed between two agents: imagination, 
which ‘modifies’ and ‘forces many into one’, and Lear’s ‘anguish’, which ‘spreads’ 
human feeling onto natural phenomena. Similarly, it is either an ‘image’, or a ‘feeling’ 
which modifies all others, and in the case o f Lear, it is -  at least, directly -  the latter that 
brings about the fusion. It seems that Coleridge is using two, vaguely parallel 
terminologies: imagination -  feeling, images -  feelings. In a lecture note of 1811, he 
writes of Passion in conjunction with Imagination, and mentions Lear once again:
I have said before that Images th e’ taken immediately from Nature & most accurately represented 
in words, do yet not characterize the Poet. -  In order to do this, they must either be blended with 
or merged in, other images, the offering o f  the Poet’s Imagination, by the Passion, by the specific 
modification o f  pleasurable Feelings which the contemplation o f  the Image had awakened in the 
Poet h im se lf -  [quotes from Sonnet 33] or by blending it with som e deeper emotion, arising out 
o f  and consonant with the state or circumstances o f  the Person describing it -  an effect which 
how true it is to Nature, Shakespeare h im self has finely enforced in the instance o f  Love (113 
Sonnet) -  and o f  which w e shall hereafter so many occasions to point out in his Lear &c, or at 
least with the poetic feeling itself, so that the pleasure o f  the Reader as w ell as the vividness o f  
the Description is in part derived from the force and fervor o f  the Deseriber. {LL I: 243)
James C. McKusick, C oleridge’s  Philosophy o f  Language, p. 103.
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Imagination, here, has a complicated function that is evidently related to Passion, and to 
affect in general. Coleridge seems to say that the various natural images are blended 
either by the ‘pleasurable Feelings’ o f the Poet himself, or by ‘some deeper emotion’ of 
the speaker, or ‘at least’ by ‘the poetic feeling itself. Paul Hamilton and others have 
rightly stressed the importance of the ‘poetic feeling’, that is, the fundamentally 
autonomous, ‘self-impassioned’ nature of poetry, so often asserted in Coleridge’s 
c ritic ism .U n like  Deborah’s passion, the ‘poetic feeling’ is ‘pleasure’ or ‘excitement’ 
that has no object or cause other than poetry itself; in this respect it resembles Kant’s 
disinterested experience o f beauty. However, in the lecture note Coleridge calls this 
‘latter excellence’, taken by itself, ‘the lowest indeed of a great Poet, but yet an 
excellence, characteristic & indispensible’ {LL 1 ; 243). He rates those instances higher 
in which the feeling belongs to a speaker in the text who is either the poetic persona, or 
one of his characters. In other words, Coleridge in this note privileges a dramatic mode 
of representation, in which the general ‘poetic feeling’ is turned to the expression of a 
particular (albeit fictitious) ‘passion’.
Coleridge’s claim that ‘the vividness of the Description’ derives, in part, 
‘from the force and fervor o f the Deseriber’ resonates with much eighteenth-century 
philosophical writing. Specifically, it is close to Priestley, who had developed a critical 
theory with Hartley’s associationism in mind.™ His lectures establish a strong 
connection between vividness and passion, stating that our passions ‘are engaged, and 
we feel ourselves interested, in proportion to the vividness o f  our ideas of those objects 
and circumstances which contribute to excite them’.^’ From this he concludes that poets 
who would like to affect their readers should supply as many particulars as possible, for 
passions, being ‘blind and mechanical principles, [...] can only be connected with the 
view of suitable circumstances; so that, whenever these are presented, whether the 
passion would, in fact, be useful or not, it cannot fail to be excited, and to rise to its
Writing o f  the Biographia, Hamilton states: ‘Poetry lets us feel the extent o f  our resources, but only 
gives us an ideal, imagined sense o f  these powers: what Kant describes as an aesthetic idea. [ ...]  Poetry 
preserves its own identity, its own self, in its imagined integrity, distinct from nature, science or anything 
else .’ Paul Hamilton, C oleridge's Poetics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 62.
David M iall connects Coleridge’s concept o f  ‘vividness’ to Hartley (mentor o f  Priestley as w ell as 
Coleridge), in “‘I see it feelingly’” , pp. 159-60. He quotes Coleridge’s note to Hartley: ‘Ideas may 
become ... as vivid & distinct, & the feelings accompanying them as vivid, as original Impressions -  And 
this may finally make a man independent o f  his Senses. -  one use o f  poetry’. (C M 2: 959)
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 79.
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usual height’.™ Moreover, this connection works in both ways: on the one hand, vivid 
descriptions lead to a reality effect, which is necessary to excite the passions, and on the 
other, strong passions ‘generate belief in the reality of the related circumstances. ''Vivid 
ideas and strong emotions, therefore, having been, through life, associated with reality, 
it is easy to imagine that, upon the perception of the proper feelings, the associated idea 
of reality will likewise recur’.™
Priestley emphasises the ‘realistic’ implications of this twofold 
connection: the necessity of supplying particular circumstances in order to evoke feeling. 
Coleridge in the above note stresses the other side of the equation: the way the 
describe!’’s ‘force and fervor’ contributes to ‘vividness’. The two nevertheless agree that 
‘poetic fervour’ or passion does not merely enliven the described scene; its more 
important function is to transform the disparate elements and unite them in a newly 
coherent whole. This, o f course, has been widely recognised as a key aspect of 
Coleridge’s definitions of the imagination. It is perhaps less well-known that Priestley 
and other critics had described similar ‘shaping’ and ‘blending’ effects when they 
discussed how passion modified perception or cognition. In my view Coleridge’s 
awareness of this tradition is unmistakeable. His example in the above quoted note is the 
passion of love, illustrated with Shakespeare’s Sonnet 113:
Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind.
And that which governs me to go about 
Doth part his function and is partly blind.
Seems seeing, but effectually is out;
[...]
For if  It see the rud’st or gentlest sight,
The most sweet favor or deformed'st creature.
The mountain or the sea, the day or night,
The crow or dove, it shapes them to your feature.^'*
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 80. 
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 89.
W illiam Shakespeare, The Sonnets, ed. by Stephen Orgel (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 
116.
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Coleridge’s reference to these Shakespearean lines as illustrating a law of ‘Nature’ -  the 
‘shaping’ power o f passion, which the poem itself is a reflection on -  is akin to 
Priestley’s reference to ‘the captivated lover’, whose eyes transform the outside world. 
He mentions this after a philosophical description of the perceptual and cognitive errors 
caused by passion:
This connexion o f  vivid ideas and emotions with reality, w ill easily furnish the mind with 
pretences for justifying the extravagance o f  such passions as love, gratitude, anger, revenge, and 
envy. I f  these passions be raised, though ever so unreasonably, they are often able, by this means, 
to adjust the object to their gratification. Besides, since, in consequence o f  almost constant joint 
impressions, all ideas are associated with other ideas similar to them selves, these passions, while 
the mind is under their influence, and as It were wholly occupied by them, w ill excite, in 
abundance, all such ideas as conspire with them selves, and preclude all attention to objects and 
circumstances connected with, and which would tend to introduce, an opposite state o f  mind.’^
This argument is twofold: first, Priestley claims that strong passions are able to ‘adjust 
the object to their gratification’, in other words, they distort perception. Second, they 
‘excite’ the kind of associations that support their tendency, and make the mind virtually 
blind to anything that would contradict it.
After having referred to what he calls the ‘everyday fact o f love’ (which 
Coleridge found so worthy of examination in his private notebooks), Priestley, with a 
gesture characteristic of philosophical criticism, turns to literary examples, mostly from 
Shakespeare. One of his important illustrations is King Lear in the storm scenes. This is 
hardly surprising considering that in the discourse of philosophical criticism, Lear had 
been one of the most frequently discussed literary ‘cases’, which was thought to offer a 
rare insight into the workings of the mind. The storm scenes had been cited in Karnes’s 
Elements o f  Criticism to illustrate passion’s irrational influence on thinking.™
Following him, Alexander Gerard quotes Lear to show that ‘under the influence of any 
passion, the difficulty is not to recollect the objects closely connected with it, but to
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 92.
‘Shakespear exhibits beautiful examples o f  the irregular influence o f  the passion in making us believe 
things to be otherwise than they are. King Lear, in his distress, personifies the rain, wind, and thunder; and 
in order to justify his resentment, believes them to be taking part with his daughters’. {Elements o f  
Criticism, 1: 160) In a later chapter ‘On Sentiments’, Lear 3.5 is ‘the first example [...] o f  sentiments 
dictated by a violent and perturbed passion’. {Elements o f  Criticism, 1: 456-7)
prevent their haunting him continually’ -  a close-enough description of what Coleridge 
calls mania/^ James Beattie also evoked one of the storm scenes in order to show how 
ideas could be connected by a predominant feeling, claiming that Lear ‘naturally breaks 
forth’ into a ‘violent exclamation against the crimes of mankind, in which almost every 
word is figurative’
Hugh Blair evokes Lear in his Critical Dissertation on the Poems o f  
Ossian (1765) with a similar rhetorical interest in mind. Discussing personifications and 
apostrophes in the poems (figures that ‘have been, in all ages, the language of passion’), 
he notes a resemblance between an address to the moon and Lear’s words to Edgar. He 
explains it by observing that the ‘mind under the dominion of any strong passion, 
tinctures with its own disposition, every object which it beholds’.™ Thus, instead of 
suggesting conscious imitation by Macpherson, he regards the analogy between the two 
passages as a proof o f the ‘naturalness’ -  and implicitly, o f the authenticity -  of Ossian. 
Indeed, Lear is a perfect example for the ‘primitivist’ Blair, set in a less civilised age or, 
in Doctor Johnson’s words, an age of ‘barbarity and ignorance’, and based on a story 
which ‘would be yet credible, if told o f a petty prince of Guinea or Madagascar’.™ Like 
Johnson, a number of eighteenth-century critics thought that the world o f King Lear was 
dominated by primitive fears and superstitions.^* For Blair, this meant that the play
'''’ An E ssay on Genius, p. 151. See also p. 154: ‘When any passion prevails in the soul, ideas strictly 
connected with that passion are in a continual readiness to rush into the thoughts on even the slightest 
occasion. Hence it is comm only observed that the most distant hint is sufficient to direct the imagination 
to an object which is congruous to the present disposition o f  the mind. W e have a very natural and strong 
representation o f  this in Lear’s grief and indignation on account o f  the unkindness o f  his daughters.’
‘The fancy o f  a very angry man, for example, presents to his view  a train o f  disagreeable ideas 
connected with the passion o f  anger, and tending to encourage it; and i f  he speak without restraint during 
the paroxysm o f  his rage, those ideas w ill force themselves upon him, and compel him to give them 
utterance. [...] Lear, driven out o f  doors by his unnatural daughters, in the midst o f  darkness, thunder, 
tempest, naturally breaks forth (for his indignation is raised to the very highest pitch) into the following  
violent exclamation against the crimes o f  mankind, In which almost every word is figurative.’ James 
Beattie, Essays: On P oetry  an d  M usic (1779), (London: Routledge /  Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 245-6. 
^ I^n James Macpherson, The Poem s o f  Ossian and R ela ted  Works, ed. by Howard Gaskill (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 1996), 345-408, p. 393.
Johnson’s comment was reprinted in Isaac R eed’s variorum edition o f  the play which Coleridge used for 
his 1811-12 series. The P lays o f  William Shakespeare, ed. Isaac Reed, 21 vols (London, 1813), vol 17, p. 
61 In.
®^Reed’s edition cites Warburton’s extensive notes on Gloucester’s superstition ( ‘The persons in the drama 
are all Pagans ... [Shakespeare] with great judgement, makes these Pagans fatalists’) and the arguments for 
and against Edmund’s ‘atheism’. (Reed, vol 17, pp. 343-4n; 332n, 334n) Coleridge takes up the latter 
issue in his notes on Lear, arguing that ‘Both individuals and Nations may be free from superstitions by 
being below it as w ell as by rising above it.’ {LL 2: 329)
89
offered (fictitious) evidence o f a state of mind prior to the development of civilisation, 
displaying a language that abounded in figures, and especially in apostrophes, the 
figures o f the most elemental passions.
Priestley does not associate Lear with pre-history; however, he does note 
that the irrational transfer of passions to inanimate objects is characteristic of young 
children, that is, of the savages of a civilised society.™ Lear, ‘exposed to a violent 
tempest, with his mind full of the ingratitude of his daughters, to justify his vexation and 
impatience, conceives [the elements] to have taken part with his daughters’. H i s  
ridding himself of the ‘lendings’ of civilisation might thus be perceived as a regression 
to childhood, and certainly as a loss of rational control. Priestley is quick to point out the 
rhetorical consequences attending on such delusion, that is, the use of personification, 
which, in this case, is no artificial ornament but a symptom: ‘This [speech] is perfectly 
natural, provided we can suppose his mind to have been so violently agitated as to 
personify, and feel real indignation against things inanimate, which [...] is perhaps 
oftener the real case than is commonly i m a g i n e d . I n  his next lecture, he returns to 
King Lear to illustrate how passion can lead to faulty reasoning:
It is a direct consequence o f  the association o f  ideas, that, when a person hath suffered greatly on 
any account, he connects the idea o f  the same cause with any great distress. This shews with what 
propriety Shakespeare makes King Lear, w hose sufferings were ow ing to his daughters, speak o f  
Edgar, disguised like a lunatic, in the following manner:
What, have his daughters brought him to this pass?
Could’st thou save nothing? D id ’st thou give them all?®^
Coleridge in the Biographia quotes the same passage to illustrate mania, the pathological 
state in which the mind connects all its perceptions with one obsessive thought.
Course o f  Lectures, p. 96. Cf. this with Wordsworth’s note in Payne’s A nalytical Inquiry: ‘What means 
all this parade about the Savage, when the deduction as far as just made may be made at our own fire sides, 
from the sounds words gesticulations looks &c which a child makes use o f  when learning to talk. But a 
Scotch Professor cannot write three minutes together upon the Nature o f  Man, but he must be dabbling 
with his savage state with his agricultural state, his Hunter state &c & c.’ (C M 3: 402-3)
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 93.
Priestley, X Course o f  Lectures, p. 93-4.
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 103.
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Finally, Priestley returns once more to Lear when he discusses rhetorical 
devices that give the greatest pleasure to readers. As he explains, people are most 
interested in Kuman sentiments, human passions, and human actions', therefore he 
recommends authors to personify inanimate objects as often as possible. Personification, 
here, is discussed in the domain of the imagination and not in that o f passion, that is, in 
the realm of art and not in that of nature — a distinction of consequence for Priestley. He 
argues that ‘the relish for this figure must depend upon the liveliness of the imagination, 
which is extremely various in different persons, and indeed very variable in the same 
person’. From this he concludes that there are no precise rules as to the use of 
personifications; ‘All that can be done is to note, by a regard to the general state and 
feelings o f the human mind, the circumstances in which we imagine they will be 
generally judged proper or improper.’™ The writer, then, should imagine the 
circumstances o f proper use, which involves, above all, imagining the psychological 
assumptions of the reader. This suggests an intricate interplay between imagination and 
feeling or passion, which, however, turns into rivalry when Priestley once again cites 
King Lear for illustration;
One observation, I think, is pretty obvious, that a long-continued personification is more natural 
when it is supposed to be the work o f  a lively imagination, than the mechanical effect o f  a strong 
and serious passion; and that it is o f  importance to preserve a distinction between these two kinds 
o f  personification. To some it may, perhaps, appear hardly probable, that a man who preserves 
the use o f  his senses should be really angry with a tem pest so long, as was necessary to make the 
follow ing speech, which Shakespeare hath put into the mouth o f  King Lear upon that occasion:
Rumble thy belly-full; spit fire, spout rain;
Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire, are my daughters.
I tax you not, you elements, with unkindness,
I never gave you kingdoms, call’d you children;
You ow e me no subscription. Then let fall 
Your horrible pleasure. -  Here I stand your brave,
A poor, infirm, weak, and despised old man.
But yet I call you servile ministers,
That have with two pernicious daughters jo in ’d
Together with previous quotation: Priestley, Course o f  Lectures, p. 251.
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Your high-engendered battles ‘gainst a head 
So old and white as this. Oh! Oh! ‘tis foul.
Act II. Scene 3.
It lessens the improbability ( i f  there be any) o f  a man’s being serious all the while, that the 
tempest, and consequently the provocation, was continued through the w hole o f  it.®’
The windings o f Priestley’s thought here point to a basic uncertainty at the heart of his 
reading o f the play. I think that what he wants to say is that Lear’s series of addresses to 
the elements are figures of passion (‘mechanical’ and ‘blind’), rather than figures o f the 
‘lively’ imagination. The distinction is important for him, because it is meant to sustain 
the difference between voluntary and involuntary features of style, where the 
involuntary features are also dubbed as necessarily ‘sincere’. Lear’s personifications are 
figures of passion, in other words, they are unpremeditated, ‘natural’ consequences of 
his mental agitation. However, as Priestley argues, the rhetorical elaboration of 
passionate figures should not be carried on for too long, otherwise the whole speech 
would become mad, which would mean that the distinction between what is literal and 
what is figurai would be irrecoverable. It seems that he does not want to allow this, 
which is why he insists that Lear’s passionate apostrophes are to be read as a series of 
distinct reactions to repeated stimuli, during which Lear supposedly ‘preserves the use of 
his senses’. Priestley’s tone, however, betrays hesitation; I suspect that he cannot decide 
how far Lear actually has gone into delusion at this point of the drama, and therefore 
concludes that the interpretation depends on the reader’s sense of probability.^^
As this example reveals, in the discourse of philosophical criticism 
feeling or passion is in a characteristic double-bind. On the one hand, it is considered 
essential for poetry as it ‘justifies’ the use of figures, which otherwise would be deemed 
mere affectation. On the other, there is a constant sense that passion in poetry should be 
held in check by the conscious faculties, otherwise it might fail to excite sympathy and, 
by upsetting the distinction between literal and figurative language, might even threaten
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, pp. 251-2.
An Encyclopaedia Britannica  article on ‘Passion’ also discusses the problem o f  delusion with respect to 
angry reactions, also quoting Lear in the storm (via Karnes). See E ncyclopaedia Britannica; or, a 
D ictionary o f  Arts, Sciences, and  M iscellaneous Literature (Edinburgh, 1797), vol XIV, pp. 2-3 and 9-10.
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representation as such.^^ The strong distinction between figures of passion and of 
imagination was Priestley’s way of safeguarding the territory of passion (spontaneous, 
sincere) from that o f the imagination (playful, self-conscious), and -  on another level -  
the realm of sense and sanity from that of potential derangement. The Lear of the storm- 
scene, ‘on the point of distraction’, as Blair put it, is a figure marking out the boundary 
between those territories, while he also remains the most powerful, albeit paradoxical, 
figure of passion in this tradition. For Coleridge, Lear is ‘the open and ample Play-Room 
QÏNature's Passions’ {LL 2:330), exhibiting a Mariner-like lack of individual agency, 
while his speech is also a paradigmatic example of the conscious and voluntary power of 
poetic imagination.
This already suggests why Coleridge offers Lear as the chief example at 
once of pathological excess and of the imagination. Throughout his lectures, he refers to 
passion as the cause o f figurative language (especially apostrophe) and o f poetic metre, 
but it is not therefore the sufficient cause of poetry. As we have seen, his general view is 
that poetry recreates the effects of passion in the realm of the imagination. Lear’s 
apostrophe is therefore neither simply a figure of passion, nor simply a figure of the 
imagination, but both at once: a figure of imagined passion. In other words, what 
Coleridge calls passions’s ‘stimulant’ is used self-consciously by Shakespeare; its blind 
mechanism is harnessed for the purposes of art, and made obseiwable as poetry. Since 
Lear represents for Coleridge the ultimate depths of passion, it must also represent the 
ultimate heights of the poetic imagination, which can both recreate and control passion’s 
excess. Priestley could not arrive at this conclusion because he did not renounce his 
requirement of ‘real’ feeling, which alone could justify the use o f the most sublime 
figures. He regarded the self-conscious reliance on ‘fictitious’ passion as essentially
Cf. Horace W alpole’s comments on Lear, reprinted in R eed’s Variorum edition: ‘When madness has 
taken possession o f  a person, such character ceases to be fit for the stage, or at least should appear there 
but for a short time; it being the business o f  the theatre to exhibit passions, not distempers. The finest 
picture ever drawn, o f  a head discomposed by misfortune, is that o f  King Lear. His thoughts dwell on the 
ingratitude o f  his daughters, and every sentence that falls from his wildness excites reflection and pity. 
Had frenzy entirely seized him, our compassion would abate: w e should conclude that he no longer felt 
unhappiness.’ Quoted in Reed, vol 17, p. 477n. The same extract contains a comparison between Otway 
and Shakespeare, which, I think, was the direct source o f  Coleridge’s examples o f  delirium and mania. 
W alpole writes that when ‘B elvidera  talks o f  “Lutes, laurels, seas o f  milk, and ships o f  A m b er'’ she is not 
mad, but light-headed’, which shows that ‘Shakespeare wrote as a philosopher, Otway as a poet’ (ibid). 
See W alpole, The Castle o f  Otranto: A gothic story  and The M ysterious Mother: A tragedy, ed. Frederick 
S. Frank (Broadview Press, 2003), p. 254.
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inauthentic: ‘The effect of a real personification is a real passion; but an ideal, or 
rhetorical personification, presents only the ideas of thought, sense, and passion; which 
can never reach the heart. Those emotions can hardly be called real passions, which a 
person works himself into by the force of his own imagination.’ ®^ Coleridge’s insistence 
that poetry should be ‘self-impassioned’ flies in the face of this assertion, establishing 
the fluid continuity, and not the separation, of the realms of passion and o f the 
imagination. However, even as he develops the notion of poetry as founded on imagined 
passion, he is not oblivious to the disturbing implications of this. In an early notebook 
entry he wrote, ‘Poetry -  excites us to artificial feelings -  makes us callous to real ones.’ 
{CN I: 87) From his comments on Lear, we might reconstruct another complication, 
namely that the effects of artificial ‘stimulants’ were not confined to the well-maintained 
realm of art, but had a tendency to become a threatening reality. In one sense, fictitious 
passion was also ‘real’, at least for Coleridge’s reader of great sensibility, even though it 
had little to do with everyday life and experience.
A sense that fictitious passion might lead to actual fear or pain is written 
all over Coleridge’s comments on Lear, suggesting that the distinction between 
‘artificial’ and ‘real’ feeling might prove a tenuous one, after all. This might be seen as 
the result of a conscious rhetorical strategy on Coleridge’s part to recreate the effects of 
the terrible sublime, which by definition threatened to erase the distinction between 
‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ effects. But he also went a long way towards showing that he 
considered the threat serious enough. In one of his letters he referred to his lecture on 
King Lear in words that left no doubt about its importance: ‘On Thursday the L e a r ,  the 
Aeivoxriç, La Terrihilità of Shakespeare’s tragic Might -  ! / Lie, great Tragedian, 
Shakespeare! lie alone.’ {CL 4: 915) This is a strange advertisement for a lecture, 
performing as it does a gesture of laying the ghost of Shakespeare, rather than invoking 
it. The lecture it advertised, however, had to be postponed due to Coleridge’s illness, 
which he called (in a letter to Southey) ‘a sort of ague-fif {CL 4: 916). The phrase must 
have been recognised by both Coleridge and Southey as a conscious echo from the same 
play of which Coleridge did not lecture, as if he had caught the disease in order to prove
Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures, p. 254.
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Lear’s dictum about not being ‘ague-proof (4.6.105).®* This reference might well have 
been made with a hint of irony (although Coleridge’s self-irony could also produce 
sublime effects), but there are other instances o f his manoeuvring that single out King 
Lear as somehow beyond what a critic might hope to deal with. It is telling, for instance, 
that while he often returned to the play as a great example o f Shakespeare’s imaginative 
power, he never devoted an entire lecture to it except once, after which he declared that 
it was ‘not a good subject for a whole lecture, in my style' {CL 4: 925). To my mind this 
suggests that Lear was best confronted in glimpses, that is, in a way that was most 
appropriate to the sublime.
In this sense, Coleridge’s turning to the play was symptomatic of his 
lectures in general, which Peter J. Manning has associated with the effects of the 
sublime due to their famed intensity, but also to their breakdowns and fragment-like 
qualities.®^ It is perhaps inevitable that the most sublime play had to be, in Coleridge’s 
reading, uneven and fragmentary. In a review o f The Monk, written in 1796, he had 
asserted that poetry should ‘trace the nice boundaries’, as if from the inside, ‘beyond 
which terror and sympathy are deserted by the pleasurable emotions’ {SW&F 1: 59). In 
the ‘Treatise on Method’, he still maintained that Poetical Method ‘requires above all 
things the preponderance of pleasurable feeling’, and therefore it should overrule 
‘Psychological Method’ wherever ‘the interest of the events and characters and passions 
is too strong to be continuous without becoming painful’ {TM  32). In the lectures, he had 
plenty o f opportunity to emphasise that the origin and object of poetry was ‘Pleasurable 
excitement’, and therefore ‘pleasure formed the magic circle out o f which the Poet never 
dare attempt to tread’ {LL 1: 207). But in the case o f Lear, he suspected Shakespeare 
himself of breaking the rule. As he parenthetically remarked, in connection with 
Gloucester’s sufferings: ‘(for I will not disguise my conviction, that in this one point the 
Tragic has been urged beyond the outermost Mark and Ne plus Ultra o f the Dramatic)’ 
{LL 2: 327) -  an effect of tragedy loosened on the audience ‘at large’, leaving behind the
W illiam Shakespeare, K ing Lear, ed. by Kenneth Muir, The Arden Shakespeare, general editors 
Howard Jenkins and Brian Morris (London: Methuen & Co, 1972), p. 164.
Manning, ‘Manufacturing the Romantic image: Hazlitt and Coleridge lecturing’, in James Chandler and 
Kevin Gilmartin eds.. Romantic M etropolis: The Urban Scene o f  British Culture, 1780-1840  (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2005), 227-245, pp. 238-9. See also Seamus P eny, ‘The Talker’, in Lucy N ew lyn, ed.. The 
Cam bridge Companion to S. T  C oleridge  (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 103-25, p. 107.
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bounds o f the dramatic form. More specifically, Coleridge wrote of the blinding scene: 
‘What can I say o f this scene? My reluctance to think Sh. wrong -  and yet -  necessary to 
harmonise their cruelty to their father’ {LL 2: 333). Coleridge again and again tried to 
justify this episode, but his revulsion was hard to silence.®^ He even stated that the 
excess of feeling to which the blinding scene contributed influenced the play’s overall 
structure, in a manner that was not entirely to its advantage: ‘In the three first acts 
[Shakespeare] carried human feelings to the utmost height; therefore, in the 2 following 
they seem to sink and become feeble: As after the bursting o f the storm we behold the 
scattered clouds dispersed over the heavens.’ {LL 2: 118) As if  to counter this imbalance, 
Coleridge pays generally more attention to the second plotline (especially to Edmund’s 
character) and to the distancing qualities of the play: the ways in which Lear’s suffering 
is dispersed through repetitions and imitations in ‘Edgar’s false Madness’, which takes 
off ‘part o f the Shock from the true, as well as displaying the profound difference’ {LL 
2:332), or ‘the mimicry o f the fool’ {LL 1:212), which, however, both distracts from, and 
exacerbates, Lear’s suffering (‘as vinegar poured upon wounds’ [LL 1:520]).
In all this we can recognise a strategy to draw a frame, as carefully as 
possible, in which to view the storm scenes, considered, no doubt, as the centre of the 
play. Characteristically, even when Coleridge writes directly o f one o f these scenes 
(Lear’s encounter with Gloucester and Edgar on the heath), he still retains a distancing 
‘frame’, by describing it as a picture or, generally, as a work o f art. The effect of this 
strategy is that o f infinite depths opening up within the play:
What a W orld’s Convention  o f  Agonies -  surely, never was such a scene conceived before or 
since -  Take it but as a picture, for the eye only, it Is more terrific than any a Michael Angelo  
inspired by a Dante could have conceived, and which none but a Michael Angelo could have 
executed -  Or let it have been uttered to the Blind, the bowlings o f  <convulsed> Nature would 
seem concerted in the voice o f  conscious Humanity -  {LL 2: 333)
The ‘language o f nature’ which lurks behind so much of Coleridge’s criticism, emerges 
here at its most elemental: literally, as the ‘cries of pain’ which Condillac (or Godwin,
In an early note he has no doubts: ‘N ot to bring too horrid things like Gloucester’s eyes on the stage [-]  
reprobate this notion -  hysterical Humanité’ {NS, p. 3); but later he considers ‘the trampling out o f  
Gloster’s eyes’ a scene ‘o f  insupportable atrocity’ {LL 1: 527-8).
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for that matter) conceived as the source of all human language. What makes the scene 
especially ‘terrific’, that is, terrible, is its evocation of inarticulate, animal-like 
‘bowlings’ (to be compared with Lear’s later ‘Howl, howl, howl, howl!’ [5.3.256], but 
also with his ‘kill, kill, kill, kill, kill, kill’ [4.6.185] and ‘Never, never, never, never, 
never’ [5,3. 307]).®"* Through these effects ‘Nature’ itself seems to speak in the play, in a 
language that harks back to the unaccommodated and the pre-verbal, although its voice 
is ‘concerted’ into the language of consciousness -  a metaphor that collects all the main 
threads o f Coleridge’s speculations on passionate language in poetry.®^ I find it highly 
suggestive that the poem Coleridge seems to have associated with Lear — the Ancient 
Mariner -  works with comparable effects of repetition (‘Alone, alone, all all alone / 
Alone on a wide wide Sea’), and even with sheer ‘noise’ (‘It crack’d and growl’d, and 
roar’d and howl’d’) to recreate what he called the ‘dramatic truth’ of emotions evoked 
by the terrible sublime.®®
O f course, one of the things the ‘Rime’ is famous for is its structure of 
frames. In the present context this structure can be understood as an example of 
Coleridge’s characteristic treatment of the sublime, which is both intensified and 
circumscribed or regulated by the use of distancing devices. It is hardly accidental that 
one o f his most suggestive comments on Lear as a sublime drama appears in a lecture 
note focusing on another play {Troilus and Cressida), in comparison with a third one 
{Timon o f  Athens). At this double remove, he offers a description of the play’s effects 
wholly in the negative:
But where shall w e class the Tlmon o f  Athens? Immediately, below Lear. It is a Lear o f  the
satirical Drama, a Lear o f  domestic or ordinary Life -  a local Eddy o f  Passion on the High Road
Shakespeare, K ing Lear, p. 202; p. 170; p. 205.
As a strange instance o f  textual instability, the word ‘concerted’ is reprinted in the M arginalia  as 
‘concentered’ (CM  IV 824), whereas in Raysor’s old edition o f  the lectures w e find ‘converted’ {ShC 
[I960] I 59). What is even stranger is that all three readings might be supported from Coleridge’s 
speculations, even though all o f  them have distinctly different implications. W hile ‘converted’ would 
point towards the process by which the language o f  passion is superseded by conscious repetition and 
turned into articulate speech, ‘concentered’ hints at the concentration that is essential to this process. 
‘Concerted’, which I find most convincing, suggests that the sounds o f  passion are not eliminated from the 
language o f  the play, nor are they ‘translated’ into articulate speech without something left behind.
This point was suggested to me by Andrew Bennett’s description o f  the ways ‘in which his poetry 
works against itself to privilege the very noise (that which cannot survive in writing) o f  a poetic vo ice’; 
see his Romantic P oets and the Culture o f  P osterity  (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1999), p. 117.
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o f  Society w hile all around is the week-day Goings on o f  Wind and Weather -  a Lear therefore 
without its soul-scorching flashes, its ear-cleaving Thunder Claps, its meteoric splendors, without 
the contagion & fearful sympathies o f  Nature, the Fates, the Furies the frenzied Elements dance 
in and out, now breaking thro’ and scattering, now hand in hand, with the fierce or fantastic group 
o f  Human Passions, Crimes and Anguishes, reeling <on the unsteady ground> in a wild harmony 
to the Swell and Sink o f  the Earthquake. {LL 2: 376)
The long sentence which makes up most of this passage loses its way in a 
quintessentially sublime manner, overstepping the boundaries of the neat comparison it 
seems to establish. Through this remarkable rhetorical performance Coleridge manages 
to solve what appears as his own private paradox: a need to speak o f King Lear while 
also somehow remaining silent about it. His solution is to turn to Lear by turning away 
from his declared subject matter, in a manner that is analogous to Lear’s own apostrophe, 
the sublime instance of language born of passion. If Coleridge did perform this text (or 
something resembling its ‘wild harmony’) in front o f an audience, he probably managed 
to convey the ultimate effect the rhetoric of passion was capable of: the illusion that it 
was not Coleridge the critic, but ‘passion’ itself that spoke to the audience. Charles 
Lamb asserted that of all Shakespeare’s plays, Lear above all should not be performed 
on stage. In the twilight zone of the lecture theatre, in between the stage and the page, 
Coleridge might have found the only way to perform it in a way that Lamb himself 
might have found acceptable.
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Chapter Three
Interrogating the rhetoric of passion:
Personification and the pun in Coleridge and the ‘new rhetoricians’
T1 y a encore une certaine dignité manierée dans le geste et dans le 
propos, qui ne permet jamais à la passion de parler exactement son 
language, ni à l ’auteur de revetir son personage, et de se transporter au 
lieu de la scene; mais le tient toujours enchainé sur le théâtre, et sous 
les yeaux des spectateurs.’
(Rousseau)’
Both the new rhetoricians and Coleridge grounded their criticism of 
Shakespeare’s style in the assumption that there is some kind of correspondence 
between states of passion and figures of speech. But what exactly is the nature of this 
connection? The longer one looks at it, the more complicated it gets. Surely, there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between figures and feelings, since neither rhetoric nor the 
matrix of feelings is an unambiguous system. In what sense can we say that passions are 
the ‘cause’ of rhetorical figures, and how far are they rather the effects of them? And, 
supposing that we accepted that passion is in some way constituted by language, what 
becomes o f the model of expression, which so straightforwardly claims that there is a 
pre-existing passion on the one hand, and its manifestation in language on the other? 
What becomes of the notion of expression if it has to accommodate that of suppression 
and concealment as well? These are some of the major concerns that Coleridge’s 
reworking of the criticism of the new rhetoricians makes us consider. In 1802, he echoed 
their fundamental assumption when in a letter he wrote that ‘every metaphor, every
' Quoted in Karnes, Elem ents o f  Criticism, 2; 386n. ‘Further, there is a certain affected dignity in gesture 
and diction, which never allows passion to speak exactly its language, nor the author to enter his character 
and transport h im self to the scene o f  action, but keeps him ever in chains on the stage and under the eyes 
o f  the Spectators.’ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Julie, or, The new H eloise, transi. Philip Stewart and Jean 
Vaché (Hanover, NH: University Press o f  N ew  England, 1997), p. 208.
personification, should have its justifying cause in some passion either o f the Poef s 
mind, or of the Characters described by the poet.’ {CL II 812) In his lectures on 
Shakespeare, he teases out some of the implications of this thesis, and arrives at 
conclusions quite different from his predecessors.
In the present chapter I am going to focus on these differences; I would 
like to trace how and why Coleridge transformed the new rhetoricians’ notions of 
rhetoric and passion, and how he built his own philosophical criticism from what he 
found and what he could not find in their work. In this process o f transformation, 
Coleridge calls into question many of their conclusions, especially when it comes to the 
criticism of a given passage in Shakespeare, while still retaining the main assumption of 
correspondence between figures and passion. His attempt is not to challenge the system 
of new rhetoric from without, but to make it more coherent, more true to the 
Shakespearean text and to ‘human nature’. However, his proposed method of 
sympathetic reading, which judges of a given text according to the reader’s ‘actual 
experience’ and not according to pre-established rules of rhetoric or the passions, led to 
an overall re-working o f the previous system, which resulted not only in the elimination 
of contradictions, but also (somewhat more radically) in the overturning o f pre-existing 
rhetorical categories. Clearly, Coleridge had something new to say about both rhetoric 
and passion; the chapter is intended to show how his insights into these two areas are 
related to each other, and what follows from their connectedness in his reading of 
Shakespeare.
In a lecture of 1811, Coleridge expressed his ‘intention not to pass any of 
the important conceits in Shakespeare’ {LL 1: 312). In the work o f Kames and other new 
rhetoricians, we find a treatment of the most important rhetorical figures one by one 
(metaphor, simile, etc.), defining the conditions of their appropriate use, and discussing 
examples of each — very often from Shakespeare. Coleridge generally does the reverse: 
he discusses a play, and stops in order to call attention to a characteristic rhetorical 
figure, and to ‘philosophize’ it. But sometimes a particular figure is associated by him 
not only with a state o f passion, but also with a figure in the sense of ‘character’. 
Moreover, it seems as if these figures (like Lear and apostrophe) were ‘figuring’ some 
fundamental questions or dilemmas related to what he thought of as the language of
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passion. Such figures therefore offer a way to tackle the questions concerning passion 
and expression I have mentioned above. In what follows, I am going to focus on two of 
these, each of which marks out a limit of the new rhetorical concept of passionate 
language. The first is the figure of Grief represented by Constance in Shakespeare’s 
King John -  the rhetorical figure related to her is personification, which has a special 
relevance to any discussion of the passions. The question posed by her speech for the 
new rhetoricians as well as for Coleridge concerns the limits of expression; are there 
passions beyond expression? The second figure is the pun, a side-issue for former critics, 
but central for Coleridge. It is most of all associated with Hamlet (although, as Coleridge 
is quick to point out, it is ubiquitous in Shakespeare) and the passions related to it are 
mixed and various: sometimes it is the sign, quite simply, o f suppressed passion. The 
question raised by the pun concerns the limits of passion. In earlier criticism this figure 
had been treated as an anomaly, something like expression without feeling, but 
Coleridge reads it rather as the paradigmatic figure of passionate language, capable of 
accounting for feeling suppressed or even concealed by its linguistic sign.
Importantly, both personification and the pun are figures connoting 
materiality and embodiment, a feature that is crucial to the way they are perceived and 
theorized by Coleridge. In this respect, they bring into relief the capacity of language to 
give an ‘outness’ to thought, while at the same time still remaining its vital ‘organ’. 
Throughout the lectures, Coleridge works from a conviction that ‘words are the living 
products of the living mind’ {LL 1: 273), and therefore they are inextricably linked with 
all mental operations, including passions and emotions. ‘The word was not to convey 
merely what a certain thing is, but the very passion & all the circumstances which were 
conceived as constituting the perception of a thing by the person who used the word’ {LL 
1: 273) -  he asserts, adapting a classical rhetorical formula (‘passion’ and 
‘circumstances’) to the ends of his psychological concept of language.^ In this context,
 ^As Klaus Dockhorn states, Aristotle couples itaOi] and rjOii ‘as the two means through which the speaker 
does not convince by reason but touches and moves the emotions’. This formula was translated and 
interpreted as ‘passion’ and ‘mores’, ‘characters’ or ‘manners’, among others. ‘Circumstances’ is a 
technical term related to the elusive ?/0oç, and -  as Dockhorn persuasively argues -  is evoked together 
w ith  passion  in Wordsworth’s The Borderers among others. Cf. Klaus Dockhorn, ‘Wordsworth and the 
Rlietorical Tradition in England’ (1944), transi. Heidi I. Saur-Stull, in Don H. Bialostosky and Lawrence 
C. Needham, eds.. Rhetorical Traditions and British Romantic Literature (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
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rhetoric may be viewed in two distinct ways: on the one hand, as a system of 
conventional expression, which is external to the ‘real’ movements of thought, but on 
the other, as a producer o f figures that are ‘natural’ to the mind, giving form to those 
very movements in speech. Both views are present in Coleridge’s criticism: he makes 
references to conventional forms of expression (for instance, to the fashionable use of 
conceits in Shakespeare’s time), but he is also very alert to the ‘naturalness’, in some 
cases even the ‘inevitability’, of rhetorical embodiment. Figures o f rhetoric, passion, and 
the body, will be the main concepts of this chapter, therefore I begin by introducing the 
relationship between them as it emerges in Coleridge’s criticism.
1
In his lectures, Coleridge simultaneously paid tribute to Shakespeare and 
criticised modern poetry on grounds very similar to those of Kames and other new 
rhetoricians. As he asserted in 1811, ‘all deviations from ordinary language must be 
justified by some passion which renders it natural’ (JLL 1: 271). Modern poets cannot 
achieve naturalness because they fail to observe this rule, whereas the earlier English 
authors were well aware of it. Apart from Shakespeare, Milton too managed to 
naturalize ‘deviations’ of rhetoric into fine poetry, since he was willing to observe the 
‘law o f passion’. This latter phrase of Coleridge’s has scientific connotations, some of 
which were already spelt out by earlier critics who treated the principle of association 
(underlying the mechanism of passionate language) as corresponding to the ‘laws of 
nature’ and likened it to gravitation. At the same time, phrases like ‘justification’ and the 
observing o f ‘laws’, so prominent in the new rhetoricians, also evoke a legal discourse.
In Coleridge, this can be detected almost everywhere, from his early remark to Sotheby 
to his 1812 lecture on Milton. Milton, he said,
subjected his style to the passions ~  bending and accommodating itself alternately from the slow  
thinking and reflecting movement, to the hurrying step o f  revenge, the stately proclamation o f  
pride, and the equal course o f  immovable courage {LL 1: 402).
Indiana UP, 1995) 265-280, p. 267; 270. In the lines quoted above, Coleridge seem s to use ‘passion’ and 
‘circumstances’ as complementary aspects o f  emotional perception.
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Here, the passions are represented as law-givers to which Milton’s style is ‘subjected’, 
but interestingly, this process also produces the ‘subjects’ of Milton’s poem. These 
poetical subjects, in turn, are reinterpreted by Coleridge as the passions themselves: 
‘revenge’ and ‘pride’ and ‘courage’. Passions, then, both govern Milton’s style, his 
rhetoric, and evolve from it as agents represented in his poetry. Indeed, the two are hard 
to disentangle; Milton’s style is subjected to its subject: passion. Coleridge himself 
participates in the rhetorical ‘figuring’ o f passions when he refers to their physical 
attributes (‘hurrying step’, ‘stately proclamation’, etc.), with recourse to personification. 
This technique, which makes passion the subject o f poetry, while also making it a 
‘subject’ by personifying it, is familiar from the eighteenth-century poetic tradition, and 
is the master trope o f poems like Collins’s ode ‘The Passions’.^  What can be witnessed 
in both Collins and Coleridge is the intention of depicting inner psychological processes, 
together with the necessity of having recourse to images o f the body, of movement and 
of rhythm, while doing so. Passion is as strongly bound up with the body, as it is with 
rhetoric.
The conjunction between passion and embodiment can also be detected in 
Milton’s famous dictum that poetry is ‘simple, sensuous, and passionate’, a phrase 
which in Coleridge’s hands was turned into a prescription and a touchstone whenever he 
spoke of good and bad poetry. In the above-quoted tribute to Milton, for instance, he 
clearly applied these very criteria to the poetry of their inventor: he emphasised both the 
‘passionate’ and the ‘sensuous’ -  what I simply call the ‘embodied’ -  aspect of Milton’s 
style. On other occasions, he glossed the three adjectives more extensively.'* In 1813, the 
Bristol Gazette reported the following:
® ‘The Passions oft; to hear her shell, /  Throng’d around her magic cell, /  Exulting, trembling, raging, 
fainting /  Possest beyond the M use’s painting’. (Collins: ‘The Passions: An Ode to M usic’, 3-6) The 
poem is very important for Coleridge, as can be seen from the echoes o f  it in ‘Kubla Khan’,
 ^M ilton’s phrase was cited in lectures o f  1808, 1811-12, 1813 and in the 1814 essay ‘On the Principles o f  
Genial Criticism’. A  note from 1808 highlights its importance: ‘Speaking o f  Poetry, he [Milton] says (as 
in a parenthesis) which is -  “simple, sensuous, passionate.” -  how awful is the power o f  Words! -  fearful 
often in their consequences when merely felt not understood! but most aweful when both felt and 
understood! Had these three words only been properly understood, and present in the minds o f  general 
Readers, not only almost a Library o f  false Poetry would have been either precluded or still-born, but what 
is o f  more consequence, works truly excellent, and capable o f  enlarging the understanding, warming & 
purifying the heart, and placing in the centre o f  the whole Being the Germs o f  noble & manlike Actions, 
would have been the common Diet o f  the Intellect instead.’ {LL 1: 139)
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To judge with fairness o f  an Author’s works, w e must observe firstly, what is essential, and 
secondly, what arises from circumstances. -  It is essential, as Milton defines it, that poetiy be 
simple, sensuous, and im passionate -  Simple, that it may appeal to the elements and the primai-y 
laws o f  our nature: sensuous, since it is only by sensuous images that w e can elicit truth as at a 
flash: im passionate, since images must be vivid, in order to move our passions and awaken our 
affections. {LL 1:515)
Coleridge here uses an entirely psychological framework to define criticism, focusing on 
the psyche o f the reader. The aim o f poetry is to make readers perceive truth ‘as at a 
flash’ (i.e. not analytically) and to ‘move our passions and awaken our affections.’ Both 
can be achieved by an appeal to the senses, to the passive and receptive in human nature 
(in the Biogmphia, the ‘sensuous’ is associated with passivity).® Sensuous ‘vivid 
images’ awaken passions, and themselves may be the products o f passion, as eighteenth- 
century moral philosophy asserted, eighteenth-century new rhetoricians like Priestley, in 
turn, claimed that the power of creating ‘vivid images’ in language belongs to rhetoric. 
Their stance, however, had its own ambivalence, since their endeavour sprang from a 
need to move beyond traditional rules and concepts o f rhetoric.
As noted by literary historians, the work of the new rhetoricians fits into a 
larger pattern of moving away from rhetoric towards poetics, even in their very attempt 
to ‘justify’ rhetorical figures on a psychological basis.® Coleridge’s criticism takes one 
step further in this direction, but he does not efface rhetoric altogether. His attitude 
might be described in the words of J. Douglas Kneale as that of ‘romantic aversion’: a 
simultaneous turning away from and turning towards rhetoric, in order to make it work 
in new ways.^ Coleridge’s extensive reliance on Milton’s three words from ‘Of 
Education’ is significant in this context too: in the treatise, Milton proposes poetry to be 
the final, crowning achievement o f education, preceded only by the study of rhetoric (the
 ^ See Coleridge’s discussion o f ‘sensuous’ as opposed to ‘sensual’, ‘sensitive’, and ‘sensible’ In BL 1: 
171-2.
 ^Ian Thomson diagnoses ‘a confusion between rhetoric and poetic’ in their work, see his ‘Rhetoric and the 
Passions, 1760-1800’, in Rhetoric Revalued: P apers from  the International Society fo r  the H istory o f  
Rhetoric, ed. by Brian Vickers (Binghamton, N ew  York: Center for M edieval and Early Renaissance 
Studies, 1982), 143-148, p. 145. Cf. also N eil Rliodes, ‘From Rhetoric to Criticism’, The Scottish  
Invention o f  English Literature, ed. Robert Crawford (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 22-36.
 ^ See Douglas Kneale, Romantic Aversion: Aftermaths o f  Classicism in W ordsworth and Coleridge 
(Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 1999), p. 4.
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easier subject o f the two), ‘[t]o which Poetry would be made subsequent, or indeed 
rather precedent, as being lesse suttle and fine, but more simple, sensuous and 
passionate’.^  On the one hand, Milton here clearly establishes the worth of poetry by 
comparison with the ‘suttle and fine’ (i.e., thin) rhetoric: poetry is of a higher value 
because it is fuller, one might say, more embodied. On the other hand, however, he 
asserts that its teaching must rely on a previous familiarity with rhetoric, hence the 
hesitation between ‘subsequent’ and ‘precedent’. As I would like to show, Coleridge 
inherits from Milton not only the privileging of poetry but also the reliance on rhetoric in 
his lectures. He transforms or even displaces rhetorical conventions, but their traces are 
preserved throughout his criticism.
‘Strong Passions commend figurative Language & act as stimulants’ {LL 
1: 86), Coleridge wrote in 1808. At this point in his notes, we find a series of 
epigrammatic statements about criticism and poetic language, all of which will be 
developed later on in the lectures. Following the quoted remark, there is a reminder: 
‘German bad Tragedies ridiculed -  in which the Dramatist becomes a Novellist in his 
directions to the actors, & degrades Tragedy to Pantomime.’ {LL 1: 86) The link with 
the preceding note is, very probably, that in bad tragedies (e.g. in Kotzebue), the strong 
passions are not expressed through adequate figurative language, the dramatist instead -  
in the manner of the sentimental novelist -  ‘tells’ the actor how (s)he is supposed to feel, 
so the actors, through lack of any other means, convey the feeling through movements. 
These are the plays Coleridge ridicules in 1811, which are ‘so well acted & so ill written 
that if the auditor could have produced an artificial deafness he would have been much 
pleased with the performance as a pantomime.’ {LL 1: 351) This is clearly sarcastic, but 
remarks made elsewhere reveal that Coleridge accepted the possibility that movement — 
and especially dance -  can produce the highest pleasure and move the spectator (to echo 
a rhetorical term, movere). Discussing different degrees of stage illusion, he mentions 
the ‘mere dance at an Opera which is yet capable of giving us the highest pleasure, & 
which, with music & harmonious motions of the body, can, by thus explaining some 
tale, deeply affect and delight an audience’ {LL 1: 227). In this respect Coleridge goes
® Milton, ‘O f Education’ in Ernest Sirluck, ed., Complete Prose Works o f  John Milton, Vol 2 (1643-1648), 
(New Haven: Y ale UP, London; OUP, 1959), 362-415, p. 403.
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along with the spirit o f the age in which such non-verbal forms as the pantomime, the 
ballet, or the melodrama (initially, musical drama with little or no speech) rose to 
prominence in the theatres.® Nevertheless, he believed that the artistry of the poet 
requires that he be able to re-create such ‘movements’ in language, through the dance of 
figures of speech. The rules of the figures are provided by the ‘strong Passions’, which 
are here (as elsewhere) regarded as a cause of sorts, though not necessarily a sufficient 
cause: they merely ‘commend’ the use of figurative language. The nature of this 
causation is made even more problematic by Coleridge’s other word, ‘stimulants’, which 
-  as I have attempted to show in the previous chapter -  was linked in his thinking to 
both an involuntary, visceral reaction and to the possibility of conscious artistic control.
2
In his opening lecture of 1811, Coleridge returned to the theme of modern 
drama and its emphasis on movement, and contrasted it with Shakespeare’s figurative 
language. In his notes for the lecture, he mentions a specific example: ‘Shakespeare’s 
Constance/ & a Mother in real life -  yet how many have declared the first unnatural - & 
admired the remote Silence of a German Tragedy, consisting o f directions to the actors -  
’ {LL 1: 187). From these few lines, it is not quite clear why Coleridge refers to the 
character in King John, or indeed why this has anything to do with rhetoric, but luckily 
the full argument is recorded in Collier’s report o f the lecture. Speaking o f the ‘Causes 
of False Criticism’, Coleridge mentioned readers who ‘did not exert their own abilities’ 
but ‘took for granted the opinions of others’, and told the following anecdote:
This had been the case with a friend o f  his who observed to-him that he did not think Shakespeare 
had made Constance in King John speak the language o f  nature where she said on the loss o f  
Prince Arthur
Grief fills the room [up] o f  my absent child 
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me 
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words
^Jane M oody, Illegitim ate Theatre in London, 1770-1840  (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) pp. 79-80.
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Remembers me o f  all his gracious parts 
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form;
Then have I reason to be fond o f  grief?
Within three months after he had made this remark the friend died. Coleridge went to see 
his mother an ignorant tho’ amiable woman who had scarcely heard the name o f  Shakespeare 
much less read him. Coleridge like King Philip in the Play alluded to, attempted to Console her & 
in reply in the bitter anguish o f  her grief she uttered almost a parody on the language o f  
Shakespeare employing the same thoughts & a little varied in the phrazeology. {LL 1: 192-3)
Coleridge here translates a critical debate into the private sphere o f friendship and 
domesticity, as he often does when he wishes to project himself as a ‘critic of feeling’. 
But this does not diminish the theoretical importance of his comment, for Constance’s 
speech {King John, 3.4.93ff) had been a matter of critical discussion for decades. 
Coleridge, in fact, might have assumed that some members of his audience were aware 
of this. In his Elements o f  Criticism, Lord Kames cites the same passage from King John 
as especially artificial, unnatural -  and therefore faulty. Like another speech in Richard 
III (4.4.9ff), it was ‘undoubtedly in a bad taste’. This was so not simply because of the 
rhetorical devices used by Shakespeare, but because of the discrepancy between his 
rhetoric and the passion that was to be conveyed. For Kames, in both o f these texts,
‘ [ijmagery and figurative expression are discordant, in the highest degree, with the
agony of a mother’; the characters employ ‘language too light or airy for a severe
, 10 passion .
Coleridge’s ‘friend’, then, might be imagined as having read some 
Kames. But he might as well have read any of a number of critics influenced by Kames, 
including the author o f the article on ‘Passion’ in the 1797 edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, who quoted Kames’s opinion in full.** As we have seen, Joseph Priestley 
reiterated several of Kames’s points in his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, and he 
repeated this example too. As for Kames, Priestley’s main criterion of judgement is the 
correspondence between passion and style. Writers who do not really feel the passions
Henry Hom e (Lord Kames), Elements o f  Criticism, 2 vols (London: Routledge, Thoemmes Press, 1993) 
1; 513-4 (Chapter XVII on the ‘Language o f  Passion’).
Encyclopaedia Britannica-, or, a Dictionary o f  Arts, Sciences, and M iscellaneous Literature (Edinburgh, 
1797), vol XIV, 13 B. Cf. S W & F l:  145 In.
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they describe, cannot be ‘masters of the natural expression of them’, so they often make 
characters ‘under the influence of a strong emotion or passion, speak in a manner that is 
very unsuitable to it.’*^  Sometimes, instead of expressing a passion, they seem rather to 
be describing it. This ‘impropriety’, as Priestley calls it, is most characteristic of French 
dramatists. Yet,
Even our Shakespeare himself, though no writer whatever hath succeeded so well in the language 
o f  the passions, is som etim es deserving o f  censure in this respect; as when Constance, in King 
John, says to the messenger that brought her a piece o f  disagreeable news,
Fellow, be gone, I cannot brook thy sight:
This news hath made thee a most ugly man.
The sentiment and expression in the former line is perfectly natural, but that in the latter 
resembles too much the comment o f  a cool observer. O f the same kind, but much more 
extravagant, is the follow ing passage, which is part o f  the speech o f  Constance, giving her 
reasons w hy she indulged her grief for the loss o f  her son.'®
And Priestley goes on to quote the same lines as Kames, and as Coleridge in his lecture.
Coleridge, then, could be thinking of Priestley, Kames, or some other 
critic influenced by them, when he offered the anecdote. But he repudiated their critical 
mistake in an odd manner. Did he expect his audience to really believe his story? Or was 
it a cautionary fable, devised to illustrate the fate of ‘false criticism’ which involved 
nothing less than the death o f its practitioner? At any rate, it offers a rhetorical solution 
to a theoretical problem; Coleridge strengthens his point by telling a story, supposedly 
from real life, with a strong emotional impact. He offers thereby something like 
experimental proof of his theoretical thesis, a gesture that may be seen as emphasising 
the strong link he forges between reading and lived experience. Like other philosophical 
critics’, however, Coleridge’s ‘experiment’ consists o f a fictitious narrative. It is notable, 
moreover, that he usually resorts to such solutions, and especially to stories about some 
‘friend’, when he has reasoned himself into a paradoxical position. The most famous
Lecture XIV ( ‘O f the Influence o f  the Passions on each other, and other Circumstances relating to 
strong Emotions o f  M ind’), Joseph Priestley, A Course o f  Lectures on O ratory and Criticism, ed. Vincent 
M. Bevilacqua and Richard Murphy (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1965), p. 103. 
Priestley, Lectures, p. 104.
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example is the letter in Chapter 13 o f the Biogmphia, but there are other instances as 
well.*'* In this early case too, the ‘friend’ is a figure covering but also calling attention to 
contradictory tendencies in Coleridge’s critical discourse. The general question he 
addresses here is, on what authority the reader can decide whether a specific passage is 
the ‘true’ language of passion or not. His answer involves the rejection of previous 
critical authority, more specifically, that of Kames and Priestley. But what he proposes 
instead is not without its own contradictions.
In Elements o f  Criticism, Karnes’s method was first to define the main 
characteristics of the passions (through introspection), followed by the main features of 
each major rhetorical figure, and then to compare the two in a given passage to see 
whether they coincide or not.*® As opposed to this, Coleridge suggests a more direct 
method in the same lecture: readers should be ‘really thinking -  tosiWy referring to [their] 
own inward experiences’ {LL 1: 187). This approach is much more flexible: it enables 
the reader to differentiate between infinitely subtle shades of feeling, while Kames’s 
method required him to focus on a few major types of passion (grief, terror, etc.). 
Coleridge also manages to eliminate a fundamental circularity in Kames’s critical 
practice: his reader had to identify first the ‘passion’ expressed in a certain text from the 
evidence o f the text itself, and then (s)he had to judge whether or not the text is an 
adequate expression o f the passion. Coleridge shortcuts this by recasting the reader not 
only as a critic who ‘understands’ but also as someone who ‘experiences’. If readers 
refer the text directly to their ‘own inward experience’, then the passage evokes a 
subjective response simultaneously with the unfolding of its verbal structure. This makes 
the question of critical judgement so straightforward that it becomes almost superfluous; 
this is why ‘sympathetic criticism’ in Coleridge supplants the ‘beauties and faults’ 
approach of Kames and his colleagues.
In the Confessions o f  an Inquiring Spirit, for instance, there are more ‘friends’ representing different 
critical stances to the Bible, which are all important for Coleridge, but from all o f  which he wants to 
distance himself.
B. I. Manolescu argues that the ‘practice o f  criticism in Elements, in contrast, involves making 
arguments based upon so-called universal principles o f  human nature [...]; these principles validate critical 
judgement. One would only need an acquaintance with the principles o f  human nature to practice this 
criticism. Given that for Kames these principles are discovered primarily through introspection, one may 
need not go far to acquire the requisite knowledge.’ Manolescu, ‘Traditions o f  Rlietoric, Criticism, and 
Argument in Kam es’s Elem ents o f  Criticism ', Rhetoric Review, Vol 22, N o 3 (2003), 225-242, p. 236.
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So far, Coleridge’s critical strategy appears to be straightforward and 
consistent. However, problems begin if we consider how direct ‘inward experience’ can 
be used in making public critical judgements, for instance, in the lecture theatre. In the 
very passage where Coleridge recommends grounding criticism in interiority, he offers 
as evidence an anecdote which is nothing if not external. Instead o f referring to his own 
inward experience, he provides a story of a supposedly real mother in real grief, who 
repeats Constance’s words. Through this fiction, Coleridge revives Constance as the 
dead friend’s mother, in order to make her bear witness to Shakespeare’s mastery, as if 
in an imagined courtroom. My argument is that this rhetorical ‘trick’ is inevitable. It is 
the same strategy that we have witnessed in Coleridge’s praise for Milton: in order to 
speak of passion as a principle that governs language, he needs to personify it, to clothe 
it in flesh and blood, which is the work o f rhetoric. The moment Constance is effaced 
and substituted by an impersonal force behind language, a second ‘Constance’ must 
appear to utter her words. ‘Passion is speaking’ : this prosopopeia -  so powerful in the 
case of Coleridge’s King Lear -  lurks everywhere in the criticism of the new 
rhetoricians, making it (to use a term revived by recent criticism), a pathopoeia}^ 
Through the example o f Constance I would like to show that Coleridge acknowledges 
the voice of passion even where earlier critics had considered it to be silent. This means 
that even though he might appear at times to collapse rhetoric into the notion of 
sympathetic reading, what he does in fact is to expand the scope o f the ‘rhetoric of 
passion’ beyond the rules of the new rhetoric.
Kames’s system contained an inherent contradiction, characteristic of 
late-eighteenth-century rhetoric in general. It is summed up conveniently by Ian 
Thomson in his article ‘Rhetoric and the Passions, 1760-1800’: ‘rhetoric is, according to 
one major definition, the art o f persuasion, and one o f its resources is to move its 
audience, and figurative speech assists this end: on the other hand, genuine passion is
The term has been used by Adam Potkay in connection with Hum e’s personification o f  the passions in 
the Natural H istory o f  Religion. See Potkay, The Fate o f  Eloquence in the A ge o f  Hume (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 174.
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supposed not to resort to figures, which are now seen as artifice’.*^  This contradiction -  
which will haunt Romantic thinking as well -  appears in Karnes’s criticism in the form 
of a characteristic asymmetry. He believes that there are basically two kinds of passion: 
those that are favourable to (figurative) expression, and those that are not. In other 
words, there is a natural rule or limit determining what feelings can and what feelings 
cannot be expressed. The terrain of inexpressible emotion is reigned over by grief: ‘A 
man immoderately grieved seeks to afflict himself, rejecting all consolation: immoderate 
grief accordingly is mute’.*^  But there are other mute feelings too: ‘Surprise and terror 
are silent passions for a different reason: they agitate the mind so violently as for a time 
to suspend the exercise of its faculties, and among others the faculty o f speech’. After 
all, it seems that Kames considers all excessive feeling as tongue-tied: ‘Love and 
revenge, when immoderate, are not more loquacious than immoderate grief.*® But not 
quite. The dividing-line is drawn according to the strength o f the passion, but also 
according to its general tendency, whether it is a positive or a negative feeling. The two 
criteria are not entirely separate, for excessively strong passions are bound to be 
unpleasant. Therefore, ‘figures are not equally the language of every passion: pleasant 
emotions, which elevate or swell the mind, vent themselves in strong epithets and 
figurative expression; but humbling and dispiriting passions affect to speak plain’. And 
again, figurative language ‘cannot be the language of anguish and distress’.^ ®
The division between figuratively expressible and mute feeling had been 
established by earlier rhetoricians and moral philosophers. Seventy years before Kames, 
in 1692, John Dennis had claimed that ‘no sort of imagery can be the language of 
G rief .^ * As Martin Kallich explains, Dennis believed that ‘[gjrief constricts the mind 
and fixes it upon a single object; therefore figures of speech would be entirely unnatural
Thomson, ‘Rhetoric and the Passions, 1760-1800’, in Brian Vickers, ed., Rhetoric Revalued: Papers 
from  the International Society fo r  the H istory o f  Rhetoric (Binghamton, N ew  York: Center for Medieval 
and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), p. 144.
Elem ents o f  Criticism, 1: 494.
Elements o f  Criticism , 1: 495.
Elements o f  Criticism , 1: 497; 498.
The C ritical Works o f  John Dennis, ed. E. N. Hooker (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1939-43), 1: 424. Quoted in Martin Kallich, The Association o f  Ideas and C ritical Theory in Eighteenth- 
Century England: A H istory o f  a P sychological M ethod in English Criticism  (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 
1970), p. 38.
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because they show the mind in motion’ Hobbes in his ‘Preface to the Passion o f  
Byblis' rejects, more specifically, simile as the natural expression of distress (Kallich 
suggests that Dennis borrowed the idea from him). Kames and Priestley still consider 
simile, like allegory, unnatural in the highest states of passion, for the same reasons 
outlined by Hobbes. That is,
allegories, in common with comparisons, imply a considerable excursion o f  the mind from the 
principal object o f  its thoughts; and therefore, though a man in the greatest agitation o f  mind 
would not refuse a metaphor, he may easily be supposed to have his thoughts so much engaged as 
not to be at liberty to attend so particularly to a foreign object, as is necessary in order to note 
many po in ts o f  resem blance, and make an allegory. A llegories, therefore, as well as comparisons, 
are the language o f  men tolerably composed, or only moderately elevated.^®
Priestley here is more generous than Dennis, allowing metaphor to ‘slip by’ as natural to 
states o f the highest passions. The new rhetoric, after all, was based on the notion that 
the natural language o f passion was figurative. But we can also see why Constance’s 
speech on her Grief was doomed to be considered a ‘blemish’ even by the new 
rhetoricians.
The speech contains an extended metaphor, that is, an allegory, in which 
‘many points o f resemblance’ are indeed established between Grief and Constance’s 
absent son. Grief first merely ‘fills the room up’, like a formless presence, but soon it 
starts to acquire a human form: it behaves like a human being (‘Lies in his bed’; ‘walks 
up and down’), acquires the face of the son (‘Puts on his pretty looks’), and, completing 
the prosopopeia, it speaks (‘repeats his words’). In the end, Grief is fully ‘embodied’ as 
the absent figure o f the son (‘Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form’). This string 
of rhetorical manoeuvres is based on the representation of Grief as an agent. As we have 
seen, personification of the passions was widespread, if not stale, by the eighteenth 
century; Priestley, for one, saw ‘no difficulty in the personification o f passions, qualities, 
and other things o f an abstract nature’. In fact, he believed that this was inevitable, for 
‘we can hardly select a sentence but a lively imagination might find in it some hint for
Kallich, p. 38. (He also notes that the idea is present in Dryden and Boileau, among others). 
®^ Priestley, Lectures, p. 195.
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personification’.^ '* But these are ‘slight and momentary’ figures; by contrast, a character 
in a state of strong passion (like Lear), can only use ‘serious’ personifications; if the 
figure is to be accepted, he or she should be so deluded as really to believe that (s)he is 
talking about, or addressing, something animate. In other words, personification must be 
meant literally, otherwise it can only occur as ‘the exercise, or rather the play, of a mind 
at ease’.*^® ‘Play’ (and, as we shall see, play on words) is for the new rhetoricians 
incompatible with tragic language. There are a number of reasons, then, why 
Constance’s speech had to be condemned as ‘unnatural’. The figures are extended and 
too elaborate, the main personification is not ‘serious’ but self-consciously figurative. 
Beyond all these reasons, there is the deeply-rooted conviction that grief involves stasis 
in the mind and silence in rhetoric. In those moments, association stops. The true
language o f grief is silence.
When Coleridge proposes that Constance’s speech is ‘natural’, he pushes 
back the limits o f rhetoric and revises earlier psychology at the same time. As for 
rhetoric, he does away with the pre-established classifications and rules of the figures, 
which constricted Kames and Priestley. He no longer views personification (or allegory, 
simile, etc.) as an artifice that can be used only by the tranquil, rational mind -  but as a 
figure that can be recognized as natural even in the most extreme states.^® He is enabled 
to make these changes by a revised concept of criticism, which he perceives no longer as 
an application of rules (even if those rules have been derived from psychological 
speculation), but as progressive ‘reading’: a reflection on the experience of the text. 
Chapter 18 o f Biographia Literaria elaborates on this point from the poet’s perspective:
By what rule that does not leave the reader at the poet’s mercy, and the poet at his own, is the 
latter to distinguish between the language suitable to suppressed, and the language, which is 
characteristic o f  indulged, anger? Or, between that o f  rage and o f  jealousy? Is it obtained by
Priestley, Lectures, p. 249; 250. 
Priestley, Lectures, 254.
In his Treatise on M ethod, he again answers the ‘purblind critics’ who find fault with Shakespeare’s 
expression o f  passion: ‘There are two answers applicable to most o f  such remarks. First, that Shakespeare 
understood the true language and external workings o f  Passion better than his critics. He had a higher, and 
a more Ideal, and consequently a more Methodical sense o f  harmony than they.’ {TM  32) The other 
answer is that Shakespeare follow ed not only the ‘Psychological’ method, but also the ‘Poetical’ one, 
which ‘requires above all things a preponderance o f  pleasurable feeling’ {TM  32). In his comments o f  
Constance this second important consideration does not appear.
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wandering about in search o f  angry or jealous people in uncultivated society, in order to copy 
their words? Or not far rather by the power o f  imagination proceeding upon the ail in each o f  
human nature? By m editation, rather than by observation! And by the latter in consequence o f  
the former? (BL 1997, p. 231)
This is clearly a critique of the new rhetoric, as Coleridge’s reference to ‘uncultivated 
society’, a favourite theme of the Scottish school, also suggests. As a critique of Kames, 
however, it is not entirely just, since Kames also identified the method o f introspection 
(and not observation) as the main process of establishing elementary laws of the mind; 
however, he did attempt to produce a set of critical rules based on these, which might be 
applied to each literary passage that one wished to judge. Coleridge straightforwardly 
rejects that option: ‘Could a rule be given from without, poetry would cease to be poetry, 
and sink into a mechanical art’ {BL 1997, p. 232), It follows that if  the reader threw 
himself ‘at the poet’s mercy’ (as he clearly should, according to Coleridge), reading 
itself would become a non-mechanical form of art, fundamentally dependent on the 
imagination.
As for passion, Coleridge seems no longer to believe that it can result in 
absolute stasis, even if it is at its most excessive. He was perhaps encouraged to make 
these revisions by Wordsworth, who, as a poet, had comparable aims. In the Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth writes that his intention was to trace intense emotions 
like ‘the maternal passion through many of its more subtile windings, as in the poems of 
the I d i o t  B o y  and the M a d  M o t h e r ’ , or ‘the last struggles o f a human being, at the 
approach o f death, cleaving in solitude to life and society, as in the Poem of the 
F o r s a k e n  I n d i a n ’ . Kames would have considered such feelings excessive and too 
painful, and therefore necessarily mute, or at least only appropriately represented in a 
language free from figures. For Coleridge, by contrast, the ‘Mad Mother’ was the best 
modern example o f ‘the blending, power of Imagination and Passion’, 
comparable to King Lear’s manic speeches. Whereas in associationist thought the 
strongest passions were thought to be unable to ‘focus’ on anything external to 
themselves, Coleridge shows that in fact they make everything internal. As he writes
W ordsw orth’s L iterary Criticism , ed. W. J. B. Owen (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1974), p. 72.
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about the ‘Mad Mother’: ‘the alien object to which [the attention] had been so abruptly 
diverted, no longer an alien but an ally and an inmate’ {BL 2: 150-1). In his lecture of 
1812 he quotes a favourite couplet from the same poem (‘The Breeze I see is in yon tree 
/ It comes to cool my babe & me’) with its subtle personification of the wind, and asks, 
perhaps with a final sense of triumph over Kames: ‘This was an instance of that 
abruptness of thought so natural to grief and if it be admired in images can we say that it 
is unnatural in words which are in fact a part of our life and existence?’ {LL 1: 380)
Coleridge, then, by reconsidering the ‘language o f grief in Constance’s 
speech, lifts a ban that had been placed on the figurative expression of states of strong 
passion. Meanwhile, a more general insight can also be discerned from, or rather in, his 
critical discourse. If words are ‘part of our life and existence’, then they are inseparable 
from feelings; as I have argued in the introduction, Coleridge thought of language as ‘the 
medium of all Thoughts to ourselves, of all Feelings to others, & partly to ourselves’ 
(CW3: 4237), implying that a significant part even of one’s own feelings exist through 
language. It makes therefore little sense to speak of a passion without some kind of 
expression. Or rather, ‘expression’ itself has to be reconsidered, not as the utterance of a 
pre-existing feeling, but as something that constitutes or even ‘performs’ feeling.^® If 
passion does not find expression in language, it is ‘performed’ in violent action, as in the 
case of the brooding sailor of Coleridge’s Apologetic Preface to ‘Fire, Famine and 
Slaughter’.^ ® Rlietorical ‘performance’ of feeling, compared to action, might be 
considered a waste of breath, but while it offers a relief from strong passion, it also (like 
other ‘symptoms’) embodies it. An example from Shakespeare might make this point 
clearer.®® In a scene in RichardII, the Queen recounts an inexplicable presentiment, 
representing grief again as a child; not an absent son, as for Constance, but an unborn 
child. She complains: ‘Some unborn sorrow ripe in Fortune’s womb / Is coming towards
This point is close to W illiam M. Reddy’s concept o f  ‘emotional speech acts’ in The Navigation o f  
Feeling: A F ram ework fo r  the H istory o f  Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.
63ff. .
John Barrel! interprets this text in Imagining the K ing's Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies o f  
Reg/cMe /  793-7 7Pd (Oxford, OUP, 2000), pp. 646-51.
On comparable Renaissance view s about the rhetoric o f  passion see Jacqueline T. Miller, ‘The passion 
signified: imitation and the construction o f  emotions in Sidney and Wroth’, Criticism, 43: 4, (Fall 2001), 
407-42. A lso, Brian Vickers, ‘On the Practicalities o f  Renaissance Rlietoric’, in Rhetoric Revalued, 133- 
141.
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me, and my inward soul / With nothing trembles’ (2.2.10-12).®* Bushy replies: ‘’Tis 
nothing but conceit, my gracious lady.’ (2.2.33) In her answer, the Queen takes up the 
themes of grief, figurative language and silence in a way that must have been instructive 
for Coleridge:
‘Tis nothing less: conceit is still deriv’d 
From som e forefather grief; mine is not so,
For nothing hath begot my something grief,
Or something hath the nothing that I grieve -  
‘Tis in reversion that I do possess -  
But what it is that is not yet known what,
I cannot name: ‘tis nameless w oe, I wot. (2. 2. 34-40)®^
The Queen’s grief here is nothing more -  but also nothing less -  than conceit, both in the 
sense that it is a fiction or fancy, and that it is a rhetorical figure. The self-reflexive 
conceit she devises plays on the analogy between ‘conceit’ and ‘conception’; her unborn 
grief is like a child of nothing -  like a figure of speech. As in the case o f Constance’s 
grief, passion appears here through rhetoric; however, this does not mean that it is 
empty, ‘mere words’. Or rather, the very emptiness of the words (their content of 
‘nothing’) functions as a symptom, which both gives expression to, and constitutes, an 
unnameable passion. In his notes to the scene in Richard II, Coleridge wrote: ‘Terra 
incognita of the Human Mind’ {LL 2:287).
In 1828 Coleridge returned to problems of passion and expression in an 
essay ‘On the Passions’, which (among other things) elaborates on the bodily 
symptomatology o f the passions. In the words of Alan Richardson, this fragment ‘works 
towards a physiological psychology that gives primacy to mind and makes the body its 
expression’.®® Though Coleridge uses a much more technical vocabulary in this text (it 
was meant for J.H. Green, surgeon and medical lecturer), it also exhibits remarkable 
connections with his discussions of passion in the lectures. Coleridge’s attention is now 
focused on the body and not on rhetoric: he assigns each appetite and each passion an
W illiam Shakespeare, K ing R ichardII, ed. by Peter Ure, The Arden Shakespeare, gen. ed. Richard 
Proudfoot (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1961, 1983), p. 70.
K ing R ichard II, p. 72.
®® Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science o f  the M ind  (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), p. 43.
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organ appropriate to it, connecting, for instance, the stomach with Grief as well as with 
Hunger. But in spite of its medical and anthropological orientation, the essay ends up 
looking very much like the lectures on literature, especially when it comes to the ‘figure’ 
of Grief:
The wanting, the craving  o f  Grief (Here quote from Shakespeare’s Constance in King John, and 
from the Greek Tragedians in all the passions I purpose to make free use o f  illustration from 
the Poets, especially Dante, Chaucer, Shakespear and Ben Johnson) the characteristic 
Supersession o f  the Appetite o f  Hunger -  the equally characteristic wasting and marasmus o f  
G r ie f-  all these & there are many more, prove Grief to be a Hunger o f  the Soul. {S W & F 2 :l4 5 l)
Grief, here, is literally embodied: it inhabits the body as much as hunger does, which it 
displaces. Nevertheless, it does not cease to be elusive. Alan Richardson emphasises the 
primacy of the mind in this account, that is, the fact that it describes how mental 
processes influence the body, and not the other way round. However, Coleridge starts 
his discussion by stating his wish to move beyond the Cartesian dualism of body and 
mind; the passage on grief makes clear that the ‘mental’ passion is accessible in no other 
way than through a train of symptoms that are both mental and physical, which express 
it in an indirect, metaphorical way.
3
Is there a passion beyond expression? Is there a rhetorical figure that falls 
outside the ‘Law of Passion’? Since Coleridge’s analyses are based on the premise of the 
inseparability o f feeling and language, those two questions are bound up with each other 
throughout his lectures. The passion supposedly beyond the scope o f expression -  
extreme grief -  is, for him, capable of being embodied in poetical language. The figure 
supposedly the least capable of expressing feeling -  the ‘merely verbal’ pun -  becomes a 
central concern, manifesting all the characteristics of the ‘language o f passion’ a
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fortiori?^ Both of these issues were addressed in Coleridge’s twelfth lecture in 1812 
(from which I have already cited a passage), as Collier’s notes attest:
W ho, said Coleridge who knows the state o f  deep passion must know that it approaches to that 
state o f  madness which is not frenzy or delirium, but which models all things to the one reigning 
idea: still to stray in complaining from the main subject o f  complaint and still to return to it again 
by a sort o f  irresistible impulse. The abruptness o f  thought is true to nature -  In a modern poem 
called the Mad Mother she exclaims -
The Breeze I see is in yon tree 
It comes to cool my babe & me.
This w as is an instance o f  that abruptness o f  thought so natural to grief and i f  it be admired in 
images can w e say that it is unnatural in words which are in fact a part o f  our life and existence? 
In the Scriptures them selves these plays upon words were to be found; as well as in the best 
works o f  the ancients and <in> the most beautiful parts o f  Shakespeare and because this 
additional grace had been in some instances converted into a deformity, because it had been used 
in improper places, should w e include it in one general censure? When w e find it disgusts we 
sho."^  enquire whether the it has been rightly or wrongly used: whether it is in its right or wrong 
place: it was necessary in order to form a correct opinion to consider the state o f  passion o f  the 
person using this play upon words: a-p it might be condemned not because it was a play upon 
words but because it was a play in a wrong place. {LL 1:380)
What is most surprising here, is that Coleridge refers to Wordsworth’s ‘The Mad 
Mother’ in the context o f ‘plays upon words’. The connection is not quite clear, but it is 
perhaps not impossible to work out. The language of the Mad Mother manifests the 
‘abruptness of thought so natural to grief (as we have seen, this is a revision of earlier 
notions of grief as static): her thoughts stray ‘from the main subject of complaint’ to 
notice the breeze, but they ‘return to it again by a sort of irresistible impulse’. An object 
of perception is thus turned into a figure of thought -  this is significant because it gives 
an indication o f the mental state of the speaker, and proves the force o f her ‘one reigning 
idea’. Plays upon words manifest a similar movement: whoever uses them, must pay
Emerson P. Marks discusses Coleridge on puns in Coleridge on the Language o f  Verse (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1981), pp. 18-27. See also Tim Fulford, C oleridge’s  Figurative Language (Basingstoke; 
Macmillan, 1991), pp. 117-123.
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attention to ‘external’ features of words (most obviously, to similarity of sound with 
other words), and turn these into an ‘internal’ connection of meaning. For Coleridge, 
such figures are not the exclusive product of self-conscious artifice; or rather, they can 
be, simultaneously, signs of an ‘irresistible impulse’ in the mind, symptomatic o f ‘states 
of deep passion’ approaching the derangement of the Mad Mother.
Coleridge in this lecture quotes the ‘Mad Mother’ in order to throw some 
light on how the pun functions in a specific case, in Old Gaunf s death-bed speech in 
RichardII. As R. A. Foakes notes, Coleridge here relies on A. W, Schlegel, who in A 
Course o f  Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature referred to the same scene in 
connection with puns.^^ Coleridge’s examples of wordplay in the Scriptures and ‘the 
best works o f the ancients’ in the above passage are probably also borrowed from 
Schlegel.H ow ever, there is a characteristic difference between the two critics’ 
approach, which goes beyond the more obvious connections. Schlegel, together with 
Coleridge, emphasises the universality of the play on words in poetry, moreover, his 
defence is embedded in a discussion of passionate language: ‘energetical passions 
electrify the whole of the mental powers,’ he states, ‘and will consequently, in highly 
favoured natures, express themselves in an ingenious and figurative manner’.^  ^But 
Coleridge pays a much closer attention to the particulars of the mental and linguistic 
activity which accompanies punning. His immersion in associationist psychology and its 
connections with rhetoric, as well as his subsequent revisions of it, are unmistakable in 
the way he approaches the figure. Schlegel is content with observing that there is an 
innate desire in man ‘that language should exhibit the object which it denotes in a 
sensible manner by sound’. Coleridge too acknowledges this, but he is more interested in 
the nature of this desire, and in the anatomy o f the forms it takes in special cases. This is 
a ‘pathological’ interest, which he shares with eighteenth-century British moralists. His 
defence of the pun, in other words, is worth considering in the context of the new 
rhetoric, although it also has strong ties with Schlegel’s parallel endeavour. As I would
^^See Foakes's note in LL 1: 379n. But the pun had long been an important issue for Coleridge, as the 
1810 ‘intended Essay in defence o f  Punning’ attests, cf. CVIIE 3762. See also McKusick, C oleridge’s 
Philosophy o f  Language (N ew  Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 42.
A. W. Schlegel, A Course o f  Lectures on D ram atic A rt and Literature, 2 vols, trans. John Black  
(London, Edinburgh, Dublin, 1815), 2: 135-6.
”  Schlegel, 2: 133.
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like to argue, it can be understood as part of Coleridge’s attempt to revise both the 
psychology and the rhetoric o f the new rhetoricians on the basis of his notion of 
sympathetic reading, while still sharing their main assumption of correspondence 
between passions and rhetorical figures.
The unconscious movement of thought Coleridge describes in connection 
with ‘The Mad Mother’ and King Lear is something he returns to again and again; quite 
clearly he sees it as one of the fundamental principles behind the workings of passion in 
poetic language. In 1813, speaking again of Richard II, he defines ‘a natural tendency in 
the human mind, when suffering under some great affliction, to associate everything 
around it with the obtrusive feeling, to connect and absorb all into the predominant 
sensation’ (LL 1: 564). He goes on to quote Gaunf s puns:
‘O! how that name befits my composition!
Old Gaunt, indeed; and Gaunt in being old.
[...]
Gaunt am I for the grave, Gaunt as a grave,’ &c.
Shakespear, as if  he anticipated the hollow sneers o f  critics, makes Richard reply -
‘Can sick men play so nicely with their names?’
To which the answer o f  Gaunt presents a confutation o f  this idle criticism,
‘N o, misery makes sport to mock itself.’ (JLL 1: 564)
Coleridge reads this scene as reflecting on its own language: as if  Gaunt, while 
quarrelling with Richard, were also addressing the ‘idle’ critics to prove, in 
Shakespeare’s name, the propriety o f punning in ‘serious’ scenes. With this gesture, 
Coleridge makes Shakespeare himself refute his adversaries -  another instance of his 
strategy to re-invent criticism as sympathetic reading. It is as if he were asking, do 
critics object to Gaunt’s wordplay? Well, it is not Gaunt himself who ‘plays’, but misery 
‘mocks itse lf: passion, again, is turned into an agent, indeed, an agent which turns 
against itself. The figure suggests that Gaunt does not have full control over his speech; 
his words, like his ‘wounded’ name, are the playthings of forces beyond him. The 
‘ language of passion’ is language beyond conscious command -  this is the ultimate 
meaning of the new rhetoricians’ term, and Coleridge, with his life-long interest in
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unconscious mental operations, is ready to tackle the way rhetorical figures embody and 
give voice to that language. His interest in the pun, therefore, is by no means accidental: 
as we have seen, this figure manifests the same obsessive movement of thought that he 
pointed out in ‘The Mad Mother’. Indeed, it is the very figure of turning the ‘external’, 
material element o f the word into the bearer o f ‘internal’ meaning, which makes it a key 
symptom of strong passion. What is more, the pun had been connected to iriesistible 
impulses’ long before Coleridge’s time.
In order ‘to meet and defeat the popular objections’ against puns {LL 1: 
379), Coleridge quotes Doctor Johnson according to whom ‘Shakespeare loses the world 
for a toy and can no more withstand a pun <or a play upon words> than his Anthony 
could Cleopatra’ {LL 1: 380-1). This well-known remark, though hostile to punning, still 
sets the terms that would recur in other more sympathetic accounts of the figure: the 
inherent playfulness o f puns that Johnson expresses by the metaphor of the ‘toy’, and the 
connection with irresistible passion expressed through the reference to Anthony. The 
Shakespeare Johnson describes here is the ultimate passionate poet who succumbs to the 
temptations of a ‘figure’ instead of minding his more manly business. Seduction, play, 
and the body (the materiality of words) are contrasted with the seriousness of man’s 
duty. As we have seen, the new rhetoricians generally treat figures as expressions of 
passion; however, the pun challenges this general rule and poses a problem for their 
criticism. Quite simply, it is too much of an artifice to be included in their naturalistic 
rhetoric. Kames therefore, similarly to Johnson, opposes wordplay to serious ‘labour’:
This sort o f  w it depends for the most part upon chusing a word that hath different significations; 
by that artifice hocus-pocus tricks are play’d in language, and thoughts plain and simple take on a 
very different appearance. Play is necessary for man, in order to refresh him after labour; and 
accordingly man loves play even so much as to relish a play o f  words, and it is happy for us that 
words can be em ploy’d not only for useful purposes but also for our amusement. This 
amusement, tho’ humble and low, unbends the mind, and is relished by som e at all times and by 
all at som e times.^®
38 Brian Vickers, ed., Shakespeare: The C ritical Heritage, Vol 4, 1753-1765, (London, Boston and Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 473.
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Kames here admits that the labourer’s mind must be ‘unbended’ sometimes. Wordplay is 
a recreational activity o f well-deserved leisure, like playing sports: it is ‘a mark o f a 
mind at ease and disposed to any sort o f amusement’ However, in spite of his 
generally more positive tone, Kames still considers wordplay as a ‘low species of wit’, 
which would mar ‘any serious performance’. It is something additional, legitimated by 
proper ‘labour’, but under no circumstances can it be allowed to take its place. What is 
more, punning -  a marked case of the play upon words -  has a notably dubious pedigree: 
it is a ‘species of bastard wit’, being ‘an assertion that bears a double meaning, one right 
one wrong, but so introduced as to direct us to the wrong meaning’ It is perhaps not 
totally by accident that this misleading figure is again connected to feminine seduction. 
Kames quotes Paris from Troilus and Cressida (3.1.142ft) to illustrate:
Paris. Sweet Helen, I must woo you.
To help unarm our Hector: his stubborn buckles,
With these your white enchanting fingers touch’d,
Shall more obey, than to the edge o f  steel,
Or force o f  Greekish sinews; you shall do more 
Than all the island kings, disarm great Hector.
According to Kames, the pun is in the last line, where ‘disarm’ has two meanings: ‘it 
signifies to take off a man’s armour and also to subdue him in fight’. The pun capitalizes 
on this ambiguity: ‘[w]e are directed to the latter sense by the context, but with regard to 
Helen the word holds only true in the former sense’. O f  course, the point is that 
Helen’s disarming o f Hector in one sense could be the best means of disarming him in a 
more military sense as well. Punning is dangerous and slippery language that purposely 
confuses meanings and inverts hierarchies (that of the feminine and the masculine). It 
ensnares the mind while seducing the body. Since antiquity, Helen had been treated as a 
figure calling attention to the dangers of excessive sensuality as well as of rhe to r i c , so
Vickers, Shakespeare: The C ritical Heritage, Vol 4, p. 475.
Vickers, Shakespeare: The C ritical Heritage, Vol 4, p. 474.
Vickers, Shakespeare: The C ritical Heritage, Vol 4, pp. 474-5.
According to Aristotle, m en’s best interest is to ‘bid pleasure be gone’ as the old Trojans wanted with 
Helen. Nicomachean Ethics, II, 9, 1109a. Gorgias in his Encomium o f  Helen  praises rhetoric as an 
irresistible force: ‘Speech is a powerflil lord, which by means o f  the finest and most invisible body effects 
the divinest works’. Quoted in James L. Kastely, ‘Rhetoric and Emotion’, in Walter Jost and Wendy
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it is only too appropriate that she should be evoked in connection with the pun. Another 
example Kames cites is Shakespeare’s greatest word-player Falstaff, an example that 
again connects word-play with deviousness and the body. Kames quotes two of his puns 
on ‘waste’ and ‘waist’, which refer to Falstaff s own corpulence as well as to his lack of 
control in financial matters.^^
Understandably, Kames wants to keep puns within close confines: ‘A 
thought that turns upon the expression instead of the subject, commonly called a play o f  
words, being low and childish, is unworthy o f any composition, whether gay or serious, 
that pretends to any degree o f elevation’.L e g itim a te  leisure becomes infantile when 
out of place; the ‘elevated’ should not mix with the ‘low’."^  ^Priestley, following Kames, 
is quick to alert his readers whenever the figure occurs illegitimately. Constance in King 
John, for example, is guilty of improper punning, besides her ‘faulty’ personification of 
grief. These faults are both present in her ‘merely verbal’ statement that her grief is so 
heavy ‘[t]hat no support but the huge firm earth / Can bear it up’. ‘Grief is said to be 
supported in a figurative sense, but the earth supports things in a literal sense’, 
comments Priestley, dismissing what the text otherwise suggests, that grief is 
materialized through this very figure of speech."^  ^For Kames, such things are ‘artifice’ 
and ‘hocus pocus’ not worthy of elevated discourse. Priestley claims that punning is an 
"affectation" characteristic of the Roman writers and their followers (presumably the 
French) -  which is the strongest possible charge from a critic who uses passion or affect 
as his main criterion. Punning is empty of real emotion, even when it masquerades as its 
authentic expression. What is more, the unnatural figure knows no national boundaries:
Olmsted, eds, A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism  (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell, 
2004), 221-237, p. 222. (Gorgias, ‘Encomium o f  H elen’, trans. G. Kennedy in R. Sprague ed.. The Older 
Sophists (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 52.)
See Elements o f  Criticism, 1: 396: ’F alstaff My honest lads, I w ill tell you what I am about. Pistol. Two 
yards and more. Falstaff. N o quips now, Pistol: indeed, 1 am in the waste two yards about; but 1 am now  
about no waste; I am about thrift.’ {M erry Wives o f  Windsor, 1.3.36ff)  ^C h ief Justice. Well! the truth is, Sir 
John, you live in great infamy. Falstaff. He that buekles him in my belt cannot live in less. C hief Justice. 
Your means are very slender, and your waste is great. Falstaff. 1 would it were otherwise: 1 would my 
means were greater, and my waste slenderer.’ (2 Henry IV, 1.2.129ft).
Elements o f  Criticism , 1: 514.
Morillo has claimed that throughout the 18“' century the ‘discourse on the passions’ was a way to speak 
about class. The example o f  the pun proves that the discourse on the rhetoric o f  passion is no exception. 
See John D. Morillo, Uneasy Feelings: Literature, the Passions, and Class from  N eoclassicism  to 
Romanticism  (N ew  York: AM S Press, 2001).
Priestley, Course o f  Lectures, p. 194.
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Shakespeare himself, notwithstanding the strong bent o f  his genius to natural propriety, abounds 
with misplaced wit. In some o f  the gravest passages in his works, w e meet with strokes which 
tend to raise a laugh, instead o f  corresponding with the more serious emotions that arise from the 
scene with which he presents us.' ’^
That it is ridiculous in the wrong place is the most often levelled charge against punning. 
But surely, there is something to mitigate Shakespeare’s fault. Priestley like Kames finds 
that ‘this palpably ridiculous extravagance’ was still a respectable figure in 
Shakespeare’s time. Since then, however, it has become as common as literacy itself. In 
the early stages it was a cultural refinement, contributing ‘to the establishment of the 
good taste that seems to prevail at present’, but by now it has lost its natural force, and 
therefore in this ‘pretty advanced state o f literature’, there is no other ‘fault in 
composition which there is so much danger of falling into’."^  ^Kames in a similar analysis 
gives a specific reason for this change: he notes that puns depend on ‘the double 
meaning o f some words’, however, ‘as language ripens and the meaning of words is 
more and more ascertained, words held to be synonymous diminish daily, and when 
those that remain have been more than once employ’d the pleasure vanisheth with the 
novelty.
The progress of language through desynonymisation is an idea familiar 
from Coleridge. In his lectures, he went along with such speculations about the pun, and 
even proposed a lecture to ‘state the history o f conceits & the wise use that had been 
made of them & besides (which he hoped would be received with favour) he would 
attempt a defence of conceits & puns.’ {LL 1: 293) He never quite completed either task.
Priestley, Course o f  Lectures, p. 228.
This and previous quotation: Priestley, Course o f  Lectures, p. 228.
‘It is remarkable that this low species o f  wit has among all nations been a favourite entertainment in a 
certain stage o f  their progress toward refinement o f  taste and manners, and has gradually gone into 
disrepute. As soon as language is formed into a system and the meaning o f  words is ascertained with 
tolerable accuracy, opportunity is afforded for expressions that, by the double meaning o f  some words, 
give a familiar thought the appearance o f  being new; and the penetration o f  the reader or hearer is gratified 
in detecting the true sense disguised under the double meaning. That this sort o f  w it was in England 
deemed a reputable amusement during the reigns o f  Elizabeth and Janies I is vouched by the works o f  
Shakespeare, and even by the writings o f  grave divines, But it cannot have any long endurance: for as 
language ripens and the meaning o f  words is more and more ascertained words held to be synonymous 
diminish daily, and when those that remain have been more than once em ploy’d the pleasure vanisheth 
with the novelty.’ (Vickers, Shakespeare: The C ritical Heritage, Vol 4, p. 474)
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but the main lines are discernible of an argument which, in fact, is a version of the 
account he characteristically offers of the development of the ‘language of passion’, of 
which the pun starts to appear as the representative example. A figure which was 
‘originally’ a natural expression of passion became stale and conventional (this is what 
Kames and Priestley also hypothesised), but that (and here is Coleridge’s own point) 
should not blind us to its natural force when legitimately used. For ‘[w]hat has become 
the reigning fault o f an age must at some time or other have referred to something 
beautiful in the human mind’; and, ‘because this additional grace had been in some 
instances converted into a deformity, because it had been used in improper places, 
should we include it in one general censure?’ {LL 1: 379-380)
Coleridge’s contention is that a good reader is still able to recognise the 
difference between a proper and a ‘disfiguring’ pun that is a mere ‘deformity 
Although his arguments imply that familiarity with the traditions and conventions of 
poetry is essential, what he emphasises even more is the sympathy o f the reader. ‘If 
people could throw themselves several centuries back in idea they would find not only 
that conceits but even Puns were natural.’ {LL 1: 292) Coleridge suggests that the 
sympathetic reader, not blinded by others’ opinion, can still recognize the naturalness, or 
even the inevitability o f the pun, similarly to the way the ‘language of passion’ can be 
recognized as such. Puns, like other conceits, ‘had become ridiculous only in the excess 
-  but great geniuses having used them with the truth of nature & the force of passion, 
have extorted from all mankind praise, or rather won it by their instant sympathy 
[instinctive sympathy?]’ {LL 1: 271).^’ This sympathy, instant or even instinctive, is the 
grounding assumption o f all criticism based on ‘passionate language’; it is an expression
3° Coleridge, in a half-Kamesian remark, admits that puns are ‘sometimes too disfiguring  his 
[Shakespeare’s] graver scenes’ (italics mine). However, he is quick to add: ‘more often doubling the 
natural connection or order o f  <logical> consequence in the thoughts by introducing an artificial & sought 
for resemblance in words’ {LL 1: 267)
3' Here Coleridge first speaks o f  figures in general, and then, specifically, o f  the pun as something like a 
test case. This can be seen from the sentences that follow  that one quoted above: ‘Men afterwards [...] 
have mechanically, and devoid o f  that spirit o f  Life, employed the terms. They enquired what pleased or 
struck us? It was this or that -  and they imitated it without knowing what it was that made them 
excellent -  or, that, excellent as they were, they would be ridiculous in another form. Such was the nature 
o f  metaphors, apostrophes and what were called conceits.
He would venture to say, though it might excite a smile -  Punning. There were states in all 
passions when even punning  is no longer ridiculous -  but is strictly, in a philosophical sense, a natural 
expression o f  natural em otion.’ {LL 1: 271)
125
of a common humanity. These terms are spelt out very clearly by Coleridge (in Collier’s 
notes):
He could point out Puns in Shakespeare where they seemed as it were the first openings o f  the 
mouth o f  nature: where nothing else could properly be said: they were like most other sentences 
in his works; for when you read Shakespeare you not only feel that what he puts into the mouths 
o f  his characters might have been said but must have been said. {LL 1: 293)
Coleridge here again evokes the sympathetic reader who experiences the text directly 
(immediacy is emphasised through references to orality and the ‘mouth’) and who 
becomes convinced o f the truth o f the text by this experience. The by-now familiar 
figure ‘passion is speaking’ is adapted here to describe puns as ‘the first openings of the 
mouth of nature’. According to this, what the reader recognizes as passionate speech is 
beyond the individual’s control: ‘nature’ speaks through the characters and the same 
‘nature’ justifies itself in the reader’s experience. The mystery is how Shakespeare can 
be so much one with nature as to ‘put into the mouths of his characters’ a language 
which is its authentic speech.
‘There were states in all passions when even punning is no longer 
ridiculous -  but it is strictly, in a philosophical sense, a natural expression of natural 
emotion -  ’ {LL 1: 271), Coleridge writes. As we have seen, the ‘duplicitous’ nature of 
puns, as well as their materiality, have been key elements both in earlier objections to 
the figure and in Coleridge’s account of it as central to the ‘language of passion’. The 
disagreement has its source in Coleridge’s concept of sympathetic reading as well as in 
his belief that words are not merely external, but are (or can become) part and parcel of 
the passions themselves. They have a life of their own in the human mind, a life which is 
in many ways beyond the grasp o f reason or the conscious will. Significantly, in a 
‘philosophical sense’ -  that is, in the sense of the philosophy o f the human mind -  what 
guarantees ‘natural expression’ is precisely ‘involuntariness’; the unnatural is, most of 
all, premeditated. At this point it might be useful to take a look at Karnes’s chapter on 
the ‘External Signs o f Emotion and Passion’, where he offers a whole system of 
differences to deal with the problem o f ‘naturalness’. He distinguishes between natural
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and arbitrary signs on the one hand, and voluntary and involuntary signs on the other.
All involuntary signs are natural but not all natural signs are involuntary. Bodily 
expressions of passion can be either voluntary or involuntary, but they are 
overwhelmingly natural: they form ‘a language understood by all, by the young as well 
as the old, by the ignorant as well as the learned’. By contrast, words, i.e. linguistic 
signs, are voluntary and arbitrary, except for a few sounds and ‘unpremeditated tones’ 
Language, therefore, is doomed to be arbitrary. However, as the new rhetoricians started 
to suggest, and as Coleridge was convinced, even arbitrary words can be used in a way 
that is ‘natural’ in a second sense -  it is the connection between the arbitrary signs, then, 
that is felt as true to nature. According to Coleridge, puns are ‘doubling the natural 
connection or order of <logical> consequence in the thoughts by introducing an artificial 
& sought for resemblance in words’ {LL 1: 267) -  that is, the resemblance of ‘artificial’ 
signs starts to signal a ‘natural connection’. Coleridge is here tacitly using an 
associationist framework: connections between ideas and/or feelings that arise inevitably 
due to some inherent features of the mind (for example, but not exclusively, logic) are 
‘natural’. Punning therefore ‘might be the necessary consequence of association’ {LL 1: 
312).
This is how the seemingly gratuitous figure can be ‘a natural expression 
of natural emotion’ in a strictly ‘philosophical sense’. The logic of the whole argument 
(and of Karnes’s system) makes it inevitable that Coleridge should bring punning as 
close to bodily signs as possible (for, as we have seen, these are almost always 
‘natural’), and at the same time emphasise their involuntary nature (which guarantees 
naturalness). In his defence of puns, Coleridge usually stresses both o f these qualities, 
stating in 1818, for instance, that a speech by Bolingbroke in Richard II  exemplifies the 
‘passion that carries off its excess by play on words as naturally and therefore as 
appropriately to drama as by gesticulations, looks or tones. This belonging to human 
nature as human, independent of associations and habits from any particular rank of Life 
or mode o f employment’ {LL 2: 284). Earlier he called the pun ‘a figure which often has 
its force & propriety, as justified by that Law of Passion’ which also operates in ‘the 
sublime Tautology’ o f the Song o f Deborah, making it analogous to gestures ‘of high
Elements o f  Criticism , 1; 427; 428.
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excitement’(XZ 1: 267), This means that the pun has a much wider application than in 
earlier criticism: it is not the exception but much rather the rule of the language of 
passion. It is no wonder that Coleridge returns to it again and again, and even though he 
still associates it with ‘superfluity’, like Kames, he considers it (exactly because it is 
superfluous and ‘additional’) as an essential model for how passion is conveyed in 
language. It follows that he does not rely on metaphors of feminine seduction to describe 
the pun: what used to be peripheral (and therefore often figured as feminine) for earlier 
critics like Johnson or Kames, is central for Coleridge, who is keen on demonstrating 
how Shakespeare’s plays are permeated with punning language. However, there is one 
dramatic figure primarily associated with the pun, Hamlet, who is also perhaps the single 
most important Shakespearean character in Coleridge’s criticism.
‘He begins with that Play of words’, Coleridge says of Hamlet in 1813 
{LL 1: 540), and in more than one sense, Hamlet really ‘begins’ there for Coleridge. His 
intimacy with words is a main characteristic, and fits well into a general diagnosis: ‘the 
aversion to externals, the betrayed Habit of brooding over the world within him, the 
prodigality of beautiful words, which are as it were the half embodyings of Thought, that 
make them more than Thought, give them an outness, a reality sui generis and yet retain 
their correspondence and shadowy approach to the images and movements within -  ’
{LL 1: 540). Puns thrive on this borderland between inside and outside, where words 
‘half embody’ thoughts and ‘movements within’. Kames has a highly resonant sentence 
about puns which comes to full force here: ‘Words are so intimately connected with 
thought that if the subject be really grave it will not appear ludicrous even in that 
fantastic d r e s s . P u n s  are like the melancholy prince in his ‘fantastic dress’; they are 
Hamlet’s fantastic dress, his madness, which is -  according to Coleridge -  ‘but half- 
false’ {LL 1: 541). Puns can appear either as dress, or as body, depending on one’s point 
of view. Coleridge, who tends to read them as symptoms o f ‘movements within’, and 
wants readers ‘to consider the state of passion of the person using this play upon words’ 
{LL 1: 380), often employs physical analogies. Hamlet’s punning corresponds to ‘what is 
highly characteristic of superfluous activity o f mind a sort of playing with a thread or 
watch chain, or snuffbox.’ {LL 1: 540) Such gestures are involuntary -  so much so that
Vickers, Vol. 4., p. 475.
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ordinarily they are taken as signs of absent-mindedness -  and therefore ‘natural’. To 
some extent they indeed resemble the natural bodily signs listed by Kames -  for 
instance, the ‘expressions of the hands’ which ‘by different attitudes and motions, [...] 
express desire, hope, fear; they assist us in promising, in inviting, in keeping one at a 
distance; they are made instruments of threatening, o f supplication, o f praise, and of 
horror; they are employ’d in approving, in refusing, in questioning; in showing our joy, 
our sorrow, our doubts, our regret, our admira t ion .However,  the gestures of absent- 
minded play seem to express nothing, or rather, their expressive force depends on a 
mechanism more oblique than in the case of gestures which, as Kames writes, ‘are what 
a passion suggests in order to its gratification’. Gestures occurring ‘without any view to 
an ultimate gratification’, Kames proceeds, are still highly characteristic of passion, as 
the example of Hamlet attest.^^ But where does their expressive force derive from?
Coleridge very often refers to puns as figures of antagonistic passions; 
most frequently, he associates them with anger, contempt and a sense of injury.
Speaking of Hamlet’s first reply, for instance, he comments: ‘No one can have heard 
quarrels among the vulgar but must have noticed the close connection o f Punning with 
angry contempt’ {LL 1: 540). Interestingly, Coleridge here and elsewhere retains 
Kames’s connection between the pun and the ‘low’ in a social sense; however, this link 
gains a new significance because for him the pun is the ‘natural’ language of feelings 
like anger and contempt, which appear, then, to be more typical o f these orders, or at 
least more ‘naturally’ expressed by them. However, contempt is not the only possible 
meaning of puns. For his 1818 lecture on Hamlet, Coleridge draws up a whole list of 
states and feelings that they can be symptoms of:
A little more than kin yet less than kind -  Play upon words -  either [due] to 1. exuberant activity 
o f  mind, as in Shakespear's higher Comedy. 2. Imitation o f  it as a fashion which has this to say 
for it -  why is not this now better than groaning? -  or 3 contemptuous Exultation in minds 
vulgarized and overset by their success -  M ilton’s D evils -  Or 4 as the language o f  resentment, in 
order to express Contempt -  most common among the lower orders, & origin o f  Nick-names -  or 
lastly as the language o f  suppressed passion, especially o f  hardly smothered dislike. -  3 o f  these
Elements o f  Criticism , 1:430. 
Elements o f  Criticism , 1:43 5n
See e.g. CL I: 292-3; 312.
129
combine in the present instance. -  and doubtless Farmer Is right in supposing the equivocation 
carried on into too much in the Son. {LL 2: 297)
This medley of a list (which contains references to Romeo and Juliet and Paradise Lost, 
apart from H am letf^  indicates that puns can accompany quite different states of 
emotion, possibly more than one at the same time. Indeed, they tend to express a 
‘mingled feeling’ {LL 2: 293) -  as psychoanalysts would say, they are over-determined. 
Hamlet’s pun is taken by Coleridge most probably as a sign of ‘exuberant activity of 
mind’, ‘resentment’, as well as o f ‘suppressed passion’ or ‘hardy-smothered dislike’. It 
is, then, a charged figure, bespeaking inner conflict and high emotional voltage. And it is 
the category added ‘lastly’ by Coleridge -  ‘suppressed passion’ -  that most decisively 
opens the door for all kinds of emotional intensity; all the more so if we note that 
according to a consensus among moral philosophers, passions tend to become stronger 
by encountering opposition. The pun, with its inherent ambivalence, is the very figure of 
such mental conflict. We are far from the earlier view that considered puns as merely 
ridiculous. Even if  they do retain an element of laughter, they are rather like Hamlet’s 
jokes and ‘wild’ language after seeing the ghost (as Coleridge explains it): ‘the 
necessary alternation, when one muscle long strained is relaxed the Antagonist comes 
into Action of itself. Terror closely connected with the Ludicrous, the latter the common 
mode by which the mind tries to emancipate itself from Terror -  The Laugh is rendered 
by nature itself the Language of Extremes -  even as Tears are’ {LL 1: 541). This remark 
looks backwards to Kames on punning (his notion of ‘unbending’ the mind appears here 
as the straining and relaxation of muscles) while it also looks forward anticipating Freud 
on jokes, or even on neurosis.
Coleridge’s suggestion that passion can be conveyed through signs of its 
suppression leads to a remarkable complication of the straightforward expressivist 
model of passionate language advocated by the new rhetoricians. According to 
Coleridge’s account, passion can be expressed in rhetoric in spite o f itself, for the mind’s 
attempt at concealing it gives the passion away, as in the Freudian notion of reaction
As Foakes notes, Coleridge alludes to Mercutio’s remark that wordplay is better than ‘groaning for 
love’ (2.4.88-9), and to the ‘ambiguous words’ o f  Satan and Belial in PL VI 558-629. Cf. LL 2; 297n.
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formation. The figure of speech as ‘symptom’ constitutes the very passion that it is 
supposed to cover; it is like the activities of a neurotic body -  ultimately, both are 
triggered by the patterns of the unconscious, or, in Coleridge’s terms, the ‘law of 
passion’. This structure is not limited to the puns in Coleridge’s criticism: it appears 
whenever he finds that passion and rhetoric are in conflict with each other -  and the 
solution is found in the involuntary motions of the body, or ‘embodied’ language. With 
this in mind, it is perhaps possible to define the relationship between our initial concepts 
-  the body, rhetoric, and passion -  somewhat more accurately than before. I would like 
to illustrate this final point with one of Coleridge’s letters to Allsop, in which he 
famously expressed his reservations about the sincerity o f rhetoric:
The most eminent Tragedians, Garrick for instance, are known to have had their emotions as 
much at command, and almost as much on the surface, as the muscles o f  their countenances; and 
the French, who are all Actors, are proverbially heartless. Is it that it is a false and feverous state 
for the Centre to live in the Circumference? The vital warmth seldom rises to the surface in the 
form o f  sensible Heat, without becoming hectic and inimical to the Life within, the only source o f  
real sensibility. Eloquence itself — I speak o f  it as habitual and at call — too often is, and is always 
like to engender, a species o f  histrionism. (CL V: 1309)
Rhetoric or habitual ‘eloquence’ here is aligned with the surface, theatre, the body and 
acting -  and Coleridge opposes to it the heart and its ‘vital warmth’. How can true 
feeling be expressed, if expression itself makes it appear as inauthentic? Coleridge’s 
solution in this letter is the same as in his lectures, in connection with the pun: the 
passion is conveyed through attempts at its concealment and suppression. As he 
explains, he discovered that strategy incidentally in one of his juvenile poems: ‘Lines on 
a Friend, Who Died of a Frenzy Fever’ (1794): ‘my eloquence was most commonly 
excited by the desire of running away and hiding myself from my personal & inward 
feelings, and not for the expression of them, while doubtless this very effort of feeling 
gave a passion & a glow to my Thoughts and Language on subjects of a general nature, 
that they would not otherwise have had’ {CL V: 1309).
As Coleridge’s poem attest, this resulted in a rhetorical ‘frenzy fever’ 
analogous to that of the friend evoked in the text: the defence mechanism supposed to 
protect against an illness, became itself the surest symptom of it. ‘I fled in a circle, still
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overtaken by the Feelings, from which I was evermore fleeing, with my back turned 
towards them’ {CL V: 1309) -  this compulsion (which Coleridge also describes in The 
Rime o f  the Ancient Mariner) drives the spiralling movement of passionate language. Its 
mechanism depends on the initial denial of the passion, so that it can always appear, like 
an uncanny ghost, from behind ‘my back’. In the poem, such im-proper Feelings abound 
in the form of a series of personifications, like ‘Fear’, ‘Remorse’, ‘Anguish’, and 
‘Frenzy’, which gather around the friends’ grave, but which also threaten to engulf the 
speaker. Finally, the dead friend himself becomes a figure of Feeling, pre-figuring the 
speaker, who echoes the words of Hamlet: ‘Rest, injured Shade!’, only to become more 
aware o f its dangerous influence (‘With introverted Eye I contemplate / Similitude of 
Soul -  perhaps of Fate!’). For Coleridge, such effects o f ‘suppressed passion’ constitute 
a rhetoric that can be authentic and highly theatrical at the same time. It is a telling 
coincidence that around the time when he was re-thinking the rhetorical model of the 
expression of passion, Mrs. Siddons also perfected a new device to create the illusion of 
suppressed feeling on stage: instead of giving full vent to her passion, she dropped her 
voice and spoke ‘in a harsh whisper that could be heard in the last row of the 
auditorium’. I t  seems that the privileging of sentiment and sincerity led to the notion, 
in the romanticism of Coleridge and Siddons, that feeling is best expressed through 
concealment, with an all-important ‘additional’ symptom which gives it away. The 
unexpected drop in Siddons’s voice, the seemingly incongruous tone of Hamlet’s puns, 
or the ghostly personifications in Coleridge’s own poem, create the illusion of a modern 
interiority which is in conflict with itself and with the world around it.
Since puns are understood as symptoms o f ‘suppressed passion’, most 
things Coleridge says about passionate language in general are true of puns a fortiori. 
The ‘play upon words’ is a rhetorical category so loose and flexible that it can function 
as a convenient model for all ‘figures o f passion’. Indeed, in his lectures Coleridge pays 
more explicit attention to the pun than to all the other ‘reputable’ figures taken together. 
What is more, he is ready to subsume other figures under it as sub-categories (we have 
seen the example of repetition and ‘sublime Tautology’ as homologous with puns). With 
Schlegel, he identifies wordplay in the Scriptures, in Shakespeare, and in Homer. If we
Shakespeare, King John, ed. L. A. Beaurline (Cambridge; CUP, 1990), p. 10.
132
read his lectures as a treatise on rhetoric, we might say without hesitation that by making 
the peripheral central, he overturns the hierarchy of previous systems. What is even 
more interesting is that in spite of all the attention he pays to puns, he preserves the 
notion that they are something ‘additional’, ‘superfluous’, related to ‘exuberance’ and 
play. But while Kames saw the playfulness o f the pun as a reason to dismiss it when 
compared to serious discourse, for Coleridge, it is exactly because o f its playfulness, that 
it is to be taken seriously. As a figure of inherent incongruity, it is capable of suggesting 
tensions beneath the surface. This means that the play and ‘work’ o f rhetoric are not 
necessarily opposed to each other, just as theatricality and authenticity are not mutually 
exclusive: both binaries are synthesised in an account of puns as symptoms of 
suppressed passion. The grand and calculatedly theatrical gestures Kames described give 
way, in Coleridge’s critical thought, to the psychological realism of minute, seemingly 
superfluous nervous movements: ‘a sort of playing with a thread or watch chain, or snuff 
box’.
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Chapter Four
Framing Symptoms:
Treatments of Character by Coleridge and William Richardson
‘That celebrated Delphick  Inscription, RECOGNIZE YOUR-SELF, was as much as 
to say D ivide y o u rse lf , or RE TWO. For i f  the D ivision were rightly made, all 
within  would o f  course, they thought be rightly understood, and prudently
managed.’’
1
One o f Coleridge’s preoccupations throughout his lectures, which also 
found its way into the Biographia, was the attempt to draw a character of Shakespeare. 
Scholars had been working on this project for at least a century, with a zeal that had 
become more and more methodical; evidence was sifted, unreliable facts about 
Shakespeare’s life were eliminated, just as texts of questionable origin were brought to 
trial.^ But even as the publication of an ‘authentic’ edition became conceivable, the 
portrait o f the author remained incomplete, a fact that made Francis Gentleman remark 
in 1773: ‘As to his character, it must be fished out of his writings; from whence, though 
abundant outlines offer, it is very critical to ascertain a strict likeness.’  ^ Gentleman, 
perhaps daunted by the difficulties, did not perform the textual ‘fishing’, and suggested 
instead that Shakespeare must have resembled David Garrick, at least in some respects. 
Faced with the same difficulties and as impatient with the scanty historical data as
’ Earl o f  Shaftesbury (A shley Cooper), Characteristics o f  Men, Manners, and Opinions, 3 vols, ed. John 
M. Robertson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 1: 113.
 ^ See Margreta de Grazia, Shakespeare Verbatim : The Reproduction o f  Authenticity and the 1790  
A pparatus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
 ^Bell's Edition o f  Shakespeare’s P lays (9 vols, 1773-4), in Brian Viekers, ed., Shakespeare: The C ritical 
H eritage, Vol 6, 1774-1801 (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 110.
Gentleman, Coleridge refrained from drawing a parallel between Shakespeare and any 
other human being (although he did observe a similarity between his physiognomy and 
that of Cervantes, which he found revea ling )In stead , he again and again surveyed 
Shakespeare’s works in order to draw up an inventory of his ‘characteristics’, paying 
particular attention to what he termed the ‘symptoms’ of his genius, which presented 
themselves in his earliest writings.
It was not by accident that Coleridge spent so much time on Venus and 
Adonis in nearly all his lecture courses, and that he chose to include this material in the 
Biographia. It was for the same reason that he paid particular attention to Love’s 
Labour’s Lost, which he thought to have been Shakespeare’s first drama. As he wrote in 
a later note: ‘how many of S’s characteristic Features might we not discover’ by 
studying this play, ‘tho’ as In a portrait taken of him in his Boyhood’ (CM 4: 783). As 
this remark suggests, Coleridge studied the early works because he wanted to draw 
Shakespeare’s character from them, true to the manner that he believed Shakespeare 
himself had discovered: by tracing the character’s development or ‘philosophical 
history’.^  This approach prevented him from understanding character as something 
‘given’: on the contrary, its essence was in becoming. Moreover, character was not 
visible on the surface: it had to be ‘fished out’ from the depths of texts, by reading signs 
that only the philosophical critic knew how to interpret or even how to notice. In short, 
Coleridge attempted a ‘Philosophical Analysis’ o f Shakespeare’s poetical character, 
following the lead of William Richardson, who published his first book under that title 
in 1774 followed by a number of further volumes of character criticism until the 1812 
collected Essays on Shakespeare's Dramatic Characters.^
 ^ ‘The resemblance in their physiognomies is striking, but with a predominance o f  acuteness in Cervantes, 
and o f  reflection in Shakespeare, which is the specific difference between the Spanish and English 
characters o f  mind.’ {LL 2: 159)
 ^ Cf. the definition o f ‘philosophical history’, which aims at ‘knowing how such a man became acted upon 
by that particular passion’ {LL 1: 304). The point is developed in several ways, e.g. speaking o ï R ichard  
III: ’the character is drawn by the Poet with the greatest fulness and perfection, & he has not only given 
the character but actually shown its source & generation’ {LL I: 377).
“ The connection between Coleridge and Richardson was first pointed out by Richard Babcock, who wrote; 
‘Coleridge’s original lecture prospectus [for the 1811-12 series, V. R.] contained the announcement: “a 
philosophical Analysis and Explanation o f  all the principal Characters o f  our great Dramatist”. Compare 
this with the title o f  Riehardson’s first series o f  essays: A Philosophical A nalysis and Illustration o f  Some 
o f  Shakespeare’s Remarkable C haracters! R. W. Babcock, ‘The Direct Influence o f  Late Eighteenth
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Richardson’s usual procedure was to start by diagnosing a change in the 
given figure’s behaviour, which he then attributed to a change in his or her ‘inner 
constitution’. This could be explained, for instance, as a result o f a change in the 
direction o f the ‘ruling passion’, which affected the operation of faculties like the 
understanding or the imagination, or of the moral sense, so that the character became 
almost a different person. Richardson took great care to detect the earliest symptoms of 
the transformation, in order to explain what happened and why, and usually found the 
most telling signs in the characters’ language. Like Kames, he identified rhetorical 
figures signalling strong passion and noted the syntax of the soliloquies (and especially 
where it broke down). Generally, he practised -  to borrow a term from Paul Ricoeur -  a 
hermeneutics of suspicion: what a character said was not necessarily what he or she 
meant, or, even more importantly, what he or she felt. A familiar example of this is his 
defence of Hamlet’s apparent inconsistencies: his ‘jocularity’, his (real or fake) madness 
and, above all, his ‘inhuman’ response to Claudius’s prayer. Richardson provides an 
explanation for all these by establishing a moral principle crucial to his readings: ‘we 
deceive ourselves’ justifying his consistent strategy of reading character against the 
grain^. In a similar vein, he also deduces that the bloodshed committed by Macbeth after 
killing the king did not attest to his cruelty but -  paradoxically -  to the persistent 
strength o f his conscience or moral sense, which he tried to assuage through the series of 
murders.
Coleridge was an even shrewder character critic than Richardson, as we 
can see not only from his lectures on literature, but also from the comparative analyses 
of The Friend (most importantly, ‘Luther’ and ‘Rousseau’), and from a number of other 
writings. The weight character-drawing carried with respect to his own self-image can 
be estimated from a (probably self-created) legend according to which Napoleon himself 
waited anxiously for the ‘character’ Coleridge announced he would give of him in the
Century Shakespeare Criticism on Hazlitt and Coleridge’, in M odern Language Notes, Vol 45 N o 6 (Jun 
1930), 377-387, p. 383.
’ E ssays on Some o f  Sh akespeare’s D ram atic Characters (London: 1797), p. 132. With this, Richardson 
was probably developing earlier philosophical accounts o f  passion that emphasised its connection with 
‘dissem bling’. See e.g. Kames: ‘It is [ ...]  against the order o f  nature, that passion in any case should take 
the lead in contradiction to reason and conscience: such a state o f  mind is a sort o f  anarchy, which every 
one is ashamed of, and endeavours to hide and dissemble. [ ...]  Hence a capital rule in the representation o f  
immoderate passions, that they ought to be hid or dissembled as much as possible.’ {Elements o f  Criticism, 
1:468)
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Morning Post. Even if  he never produced a finished character of Shakespeare (or, for 
that matter, of Bonaparte), he kept collecting traits that might contribute to one.
In 1808, his first lecture series, he drew up his first list based on Venus 
and Adonis, starting with a general observation: ‘An endless activity o f Thought, in all 
the possible associations of Thought with Thought, Thought with Feelings, or with 
words, or of Feelings with Feelings, & words with words’ {LL 1: 66). As I have been 
arguing, the associations between thought, word and feeling were crucial, in Coleridge’s 
view, for the proper functioning of language as a medium between the subject’s 
interiority and the external world. They also justify Coleridge’s reading of character 
through his or her language: rhetoric, in this view, both conceals and reveals subjectivity. 
In the ‘Character o f Pitt’ (1800), which he meant to accompany that of Napoleon, 
Coleridge argues that Pitt lacks a proper internal character because in his earliest 
childhood he failed to associate feelings with feelings and associated words with 
feelings only in a limited sense; his very dexterity with words bears witness to an 
atrophy o f feeling.^ Coleridge’s Pitt, then, is a ‘man of words’ in the worst possible 
sense, and his very words betray his hollowness. Shakespeare’s first poem, by contrast, 
reveals the poet to be the direct opposite, employing ‘all the possible associations’ and 
thus displays an ‘endlessly active’ intellect.
Coleridge subsequently calls attention to the power o f Shakespeare’s 
Imagination (as something that can ‘produce and reproduce’ the effects of passion and of 
the ‘poetic feeling’), and then lists, with quotations from the poem, a number of other 
traits, like the ‘Sense of Beauty’, ‘Love of natural Objects’, ‘Fancy, or the aggregative 
Power’, ‘Imagination’ (‘modifying one image or feeling by the precedent or following 
one’), and Shakespeare’s capacity to describe ‘natural objects by clothing them 
appropriately with human passions’ {LL 1: 66-8). Most of these are related to the 
affective component in Shakespeare’s art. With the final point, however, Coleridge 
returns to his first observation:
® His ‘premature dexterity in the combination o f  words [ .. .]  obscured his impressions, and deadened his 
genuine feelings’; ‘he associated all the operations o f  his faculties with words, and his pleasures with the 
surprise excited by them ’ {EO T 219), ‘One character pervades his w hole being. Words on words, finely 
arranged, and so dexterously consequent, that the whole bears the semblance o f  argument,. . ’ {EOT  224). 
The ‘Character o f  Pitt’ is discussed in connection with Coleridge’s view s on language in Paul Hamilton, 
C oleridge‘s  Poetics, pp. 109-111.
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8. Energy, depth, and activity o f  Thought without which a man may be a pleasing and affecting 
Poet; but never a great one. Here introduce D ennis’s -  enthuse: & vulgar pass: -  & from the 
excess o f  this in Shakespere be grateful that circumstances probably originating in choice led him 
to the Drama, the subject o f  my next lecture -  {LL 1: 68).
The reference to John Dennis’s criticism is significant here. Dennis, whom Coleridge 
had already cited in the previous lecture, was among the first to base his view of poetry 
on the principle of passion and the association of ideas.^ He also revived Milton’s 
definition of poetry as ‘simple, sensuous, and passionate’ stating that ‘Poetry is Poetry, 
because it is more Passionate and Sensual than Prose.’ As Dennis’s editor E. N.
Hooker pointed out, both Wordsworth and Coleridge were avid readers of Dennis in 
their early years.*' However, while Dennis’s importance for Wordsworth has been 
studied in depth and from various perspectives, the nature o f Coleridge’s reliance on his 
theories has been rarely treated.*^
What did Coleridge mean by referring to Dennis’s distinction between 
the ‘enthusiastic’ and the ‘vulgar’ passions in poetry, and which of the two informed 
Shakespeare’s work according to him? At first sight, the predominance o f the ‘vulgar’ 
seems more likely -  this is indeed what R. A. Foakes suggests in his note {LL 1: 68n) -  
especially because Dennis states that this passion, which is attached to objects in 
ordinary life and to everyday conversation, informs the writing of dramatic dialogues. 
Moreover, Dennis also writes that vulgar passion ‘is preferable [to the enthusiastic].
“ Cf. Martin Kallich, The Association o f  Ideas and C ritical Theory in Eighteenth-Century England: A  
H istory o f  a  Psychological M ethod in English Criticism  (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1970), pp. 35-45. 
Timothy Clark has discussed D ennis’s concept o f  passion and enthusiasm in The Theory o f  Inspiration: 
Composition os a  Crisis o f  Subjectivity in Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing  (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), pp. 67-8.
The Advancem ent and  Reformation o f  M odern P oetry  (1701), in The C ritical Works o f  John Dennis, ed. 
E. N. Hooker, 2 vols (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1939),1: 197-278, p. 215.
”  The C ritical Works o f  John Dennis, 2: Ixxiii.
John D. Morillo has discussed Wordsworth and Dennis on enthusiasm in the context o f  the Ideology o f  
class. See Morillo, Uneasy Feelings: Literature, the Passions, and Class from  N eoclassicism  to 
Romanticism  (N ew  York: AM S Press, 2001), pp. 16-97. Cf. also Jon M ee, ‘Mopping Up Spilt Religion: 
The Problem o f  Enthusiasm’, Romanticism On the Net, 25 (February 2002),
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat0385/25mee.html and Mee, ‘Anxieties o f  Enthusiasm: Coleridge, Prophecy, 
and Popular Politics in the 1790s’, in Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650-1850, Ed. Lawrence 
E. Klein and Anthony J. la Vopa (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1998), 179-203.
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because all Men are capable of being moved by the Vulgar, and a Poet writes to all’.* ^  
The enthusiastic passion, on the other hand, takes pleasure in the indefinite and the half- 
comprehended; it belongs to the higher sphere of religious and moral sentiment.*"* 
However, this is also the passion which Dennis links to thought and meditation, and this 
should give us pause, because meditation is one of the key-words in all versions of 
Coleridge’s account of Shakespeare. Dennis writes: ‘Enthusiastick Passion, or 
Enthusiasm, is a Passion which is moved by Ideas in Contemplation, or the Meditation 
of things that belong not to common Life. Most of our Thoughts in Meditation are 
naturally attended with some sort and some degree of Passion; and this Passion, if it is 
strong, I call Enthusiasm.’*^  Is it possible that Shakespeare’s great ‘activity of thought’ 
in Venus and Adonis betrays his propensity for this more sublime, but also potentially 
dangerous passion?
Coleridge certainly claims that Shakespeare does not participate in the 
‘vulgar’ passion of the lovers which he so masterfully describes in Venus and Adonis,
But if we accept that, according to Coleridge, Shakespeare’s inspiration is enthusiastic in 
its origin (in the sense that it derives from contemplation as opposed to ordinary life), 
then his subsequent turn to the drama must be explained as occurring not because, but in 
spite of, this original tendency. Such a reading is supported by a note Coleridge made for 
his following lecture, where he reiterated Shakespeare’s characteristics:
Lastly, he -  previously to his Drama -  gave proof o f  a most profound, energetic & 
philosophical mind, without which he might have been a very delightful Poet, but not the great 
dramatic Poet/ but this he possessed in so eminent a degree that it is to be feared &c &c -  i f -
But Chance & his powerful Instinct combined to lead him to his proper province -  in the 
conquest o f  which w e are to consider both the difficulties that opposed him, & the advantages 
{LL 1: 82}
What Coleridge suggests is that Shakespeare’s excessively philosophical mind could 
have led him into some danger, although he does not spell out what kind of danger he
'^In The Grounds o f  Criticism  in P oetry  (1704), in The Critical Works o f  John Dennis, 1: 339.
Morillo argues that in the Grounds o f  Criticism  Dennis is keen to disentangle enthusiasm from its 
associations with radical dissent and its great communal appeal by redefining enthusiasm as the privilege 
o f  the few. See Uneasy Feelings, 38-9. Cf. also Timothy Clark, Theories o f  Inspiration, p. 68.
The C ritical Works o f  John Dennis, 1: 338.
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means. We might recall that philosophy (or metaphysics) appears in his own poems as a 
cause for anxiety, as in ‘The Eolian Harp’ or in ‘Dejection’, where the ‘habit’ of abstract 
thinking is presented as potentially deadly. Jon Mee has recently argued that 
‘Enthusiasm in Romantic poetics provided both poison and cure’; in other words, that 
Romantic poetics were defined in contradistinction to enthusiasm (which had been long 
theorised as a form o f mental disease), while retaining some of its key elements.*^ 
Coleridge’s Shakespeare is certainly not enthusiastic in the sense of being driven by a 
religious ardour, with its potentially radical implications. But he might have been 
conceived as enthusiastic due to the predominantly philosophical and meditative passion 
which Coleridge attributes to him. Moreover, Coleridge seems to say that this passion -  
perhaps akin to what he calls the "thinking disease’ in his notebooks (CWIII: 4012) -  in 
itself might have led him astray, had he not found his ‘proper province’ on the stage.
Shakespeare escaped from the consequences of his own original passion 
thanks to ‘chance’ and a ‘powerful instinct’ that made him turn into a new direction.
With the same move, he discovered his own ‘character’ as a dramatist. To translate this 
into Dennis’s terms; Shakespeare’s antidote to his own enthusiasm was precisely the 
artistic cultivation o f ‘vulgar passion’ which is necessary for stagecraft. Coleridge’s 
account of this transformation seems to be related to an argument he made repeatedly, 
according to which an overabundance of ideas ‘naturally’ seeks relief in definite forms. 
As we have seen, Hamlet’s passion for thought leads to his love for words, the ‘half- 
embodyings’ o f ideas which give them ‘outness’. Coleridge seems to have intimated that 
something similar happened, on a larger scale, to Shakespeare, namely that his 
meditative mind turned to the opposite principle of dramatic embodiment as a way of 
averting its own penchant for the indefinite. According to Tomalin’s report of a lecture 
from 1811, Coleridge described the process by which Shakespeare found his ‘proper’ 
self as a kind of psychomachia between the poet and the abstract philosopher:
With regard to his education, it was little more than might be expected from his character. 
Conceive a profound metaphysician & a great poet, intensely occupied in thinking on all subjects, 
on the least as w ell as the greatest — on all the operations o f  nature & o f  man, & feeling the 
importance o f  all the subjects presented to him -  conceive this philosophical part o f  his character
‘M ee, ‘Mopping Up Split R eligion’, Paragraph 1.
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combined with the poetic -  the twofold energy constantly acting; the Poet, and the philosopher 
embracing, but, as it were, in a warm embrace, when if  both had not been equal one or the other 
must have been strangled. [ ...]
His education was the combination o f  the Poet & the Philosopher -  a rapid mind, 
impatient that the means o f  communication were so few and defective compared with what he 
possessed to be communicated.
From this cause his images followed upon each other & if  his genius had not guided him 
to the stage Shakespeare would by them have been rendered a writer rather to be wondered at 
than admired.
Therefore it was, that in all the great characters, it was still Shakespeare, -  now imitating 
this, now imitating that -  now displaying the operations o f  a mind under the influence o f  strong 
intellect - ,  sometimes without, & sometimes against the moral feeling. {LL 1: 230)
This is Coleridge’s myth of the origin of Shakespeare’s character and, 
simultaneously, o f the characters of Shakespeare. Shakespeare’s excessive passion for 
abstract thought could have produced something not quite human: ‘to be wondered at’ 
rather than ‘admired’ (otherworldliness is also suggested by another comment on Venus 
and Adonis', ‘he writes exactly as if of an other planet’ \LL 1: 70]). Shakespeare’s very 
style, the way ‘his images followed upon each other’, betrays a dangerous potential. As 
Coleridge stated earlier:
Even the very diction evidencing a mind that proceeding from som e one great 
conception finds its only difficulty in arranging & disciplining the crowd o f  Thoughts which from 
that Matrix rush in to enlist themselves -  no looking outward by w it or Book-memory -
Characters -  others so characteristic (i.e. psychological portraiture) as to be characterless, 
quoad the Poet -  How wonderfully is Shakespeare the living Balance! (1: 126)
Shakespeare’s characters give embodiment to the poet’s passion for thought; that is why 
they are ‘characteristic’ in themselves and at the same time ‘characteristic’ of the poet. 
This means that even the metrical traits Coleridge observed in their speech -  the 
‘involution of metre’ expressive o f ‘Impetuosity of Thought’ -  are in fact doubly 
motivated: first, by the character’s state o f passion, and secondly, by Shakespeare’s own 
intellectual energy, which is channelled through them. Furthermore, that is why the most 
significant (‘favourite’) characters display ‘the operations of a mind under the influence 
of strong intellect’ -  and the tragedies bear witness to the potentially fatal consequences
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of such excess. But they are also the means by which Shakespeare emancipates his own 
mind from his (supposed) dominant passion. As one by one he ‘assumes’ the different 
characters, he becomes more and more securely preserved from anything that is 
potentially fearful or enthusiastic. His philosophical passion disappears in the perfect 
finish of his characters, and yet it is present in all of them; in their overpowering 
intellectual ism, in the philosophical accuracy of the portraiture, and -  in the case of the 
minor characters -  in their occasional surplus o f brilliance which is ‘not naturally their 
own’,^ ^
According to this narrative (which is submerged, but still traceable 
throughout Coleridge’s criticism) Shakespeare’s plays can be read as connected stages in 
a process of self-healing. Perhaps this is why Coleridge, speaking of them, proposes ‘to 
pursue a psychological, rather than a historical mode of reasoning. He should take them 
as they seemed naturally to flow from the progress & order of his mind.’ {LL 1: 253)
This is not the cool logical ‘order’ of scientific inquiry, although it is in a sense also 
scientific, since, according to Coleridge, Shakespeare performs something like a 
‘philosophical analysis’ of the powers o f the mind through writing his characters. But 
even more fundamentally, it is an order that serves to regulate Shakespeare’s own 
passion, resulting in
the balancing & reconciling o f  opposite or discordant qualities, sameness with difference, a sense 
o f  novelty and freshness with old or customary Objects, a more than usual State o f  Emotion with  
more than usual Order, Self-possession & Judgment with Enthusiasm and vehement Feeling, and 
which w hile it blends and harmonizes the Natural and the Artificial still subordinates Art to 
Nature, the manner to the matter, and our admiration o f  the Poet to our sympathy with the Images, 
Passions, Characters and Incidents o f  the Poem. {LL 1: 245, emphasis added)
Coleridge’s implicit account of how Shakespeare ‘treated’ himself by regulating his 
potentially dangerous passion is comparable to other powerful narratives of imaginative 
self-healing o f the period, most importantly perhaps, to Wordsworth’s Prelude, Recently, 
Martin Wallen has written about the importance of the analysis o f symptoms with
These themes are elaborated throughout the lectures, e.g.: ‘The wonder was how he should thus disguise 
him self & have such miraculous powers o f  conveying the Poet without even raising in us the 
consciousness o f  him .’ {LL 1; 290)
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respect to Coleridge’s self-fashioning as a critic, while G. S. Rousseau and D. B. 
Haycock have provided an overall diagnosis o f Coleridge in which his obsession with 
self-diagnostics plays a central role/^ Writing his own ‘character’ through recording his 
own symptoms is one of the activities Coleridge pursues in his notebooks, with a belief 
that the ‘outness’ gained through the medium of writing might have a healing influence 
on his own precarious mental s ta te .W h a t I am suggesting here is that in Coleridge’s 
criticism, Shakespeare’s works as ‘fragments of his mind’ are perceived as analogous to 
symptoms that both reveal a pathological tendency, and secure the mind’s emancipation 
from it, by giving a distinct shape to something chaotic. The ‘natural flow’ of the plays 
is thus partly understandable as a flow of symptoms, offering a seemingly endless task 
for the critic who interprets them.
2
In this chapter I am going to look at the connections between passion, 
analysis, and imagination as they are elaborated in the character criticism of Coleridge 
and his ‘philosophical critic’ predecessor, William Richardson. Together with Maurice 
Morgann’s Essay on the dramatic character o f  Sir John Falstaff (1777), Richardson’s 
Philosophical Analysis (1774) is usually recognized as the founding text of eighteenth- 
century character criticism. But whereas Morgann’s witty defence of Sir John’s 
‘courage’ is presented more or less as a gentlemanly pastime, Richardson’s aims are 
overtly philosophical: they share the professed aims of moral philosophy as defined in 
the second half of the century. Hume in his seminal essay ‘O f the Delicacy of Taste and 
Passion’ asserts that ‘nothing is so proper to cure us of [...] delicacy of passion, as the
Wallen states that ‘C oleridge’s efforts to cure h im self are [ ...]  synonymous with his creation o f  a public 
role for h im self as an author.’ Martin Wallen, C ity o f  Health, Fields o f  D isease: Revolutions in the Poetry, 
Medicine, and  Philosophy o f  Romanticism  (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), p. 
52. Rousseau and Haycock diagnose Coleridge as a hypochondriac, which involves over-interpretation o f  
his own symptoms. See G. S. Rousseau and David Boyd Haycock, ‘Framing Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
Gut: Genius, Digestion, Flypochondria’, in G. S. Rousseau ed., Framing and Im agining D isease in 
Cultural H istory  (Basingstoke and N ew  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 231-265.
For instance, he writes o f  recording one o f ‘the strangest and most painful Peculiarities’ o f his own 
nature, ‘and my M otive or rather Impulse to do this seems to m yself an effort to eloign and abalienate it 
from the dark Adyt o f  my own Being by a visual Outness -  & not the wish for others to see it -  ’ {CN  III: 
4167) N eil Vickers argues that the therapeutic effect o f  journal-keeping was proposed by Thomas Beddoes, 
see Coleridge and the D octors 1 795-1806  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 159.
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cultivating of that higher and more refined taste, which enables us to judge of the 
characters o f men, of the compositions of genius, and of the productions of the nobler 
arts.’ °^ Criticism, together with the study of character, is construed here as a ‘cure’ for 
excessive passion, or -  in a later paragraph -  as a practice that channels the violent 
passions and diverts them into more amiable ones?^ Lord Kames and the other new 
rhetoricians seem to have accepted this educatory role for criticism, however, they also 
noted a further advantage, which made their critical stance truly ‘rational’ or 
‘philosophical’?^ Kames in his Introduction writes: ‘he will not disown, that all along it 
has been his view, to explain the nature of man, considered as a sensitive being capable 
of pleasure and pain’?^ What is here almost casually acknowledged is a concern that 
unites his efforts with those of Campbell, Smith, Priestley, Richardson -  and Coleridge. 
Namely, that criticism is not only directed to the cultivation of the passions, the 
refinement o f taste and sensibility, and so on, but also to the philosophical analysis of 
these powers. Philosophical criticism thus assumes the role of ‘a kind of applied 
epistemology’, as James Mulvihill writes of Campbell’s work.^"^
Conceived in this way, philosophical criticism produces a useful 
knowledge of exactly those aspects o f the mind that had been regarded as the most 
mysterious, but also the most important to understand in the tradition of moral 
philosophy: the passions and their interaction with the faculties. Hugh Blair gives voice 
to a basic consensus among philosophical critics when he states:
David Hume, E ssays Moral, P olitical and Literary (London: Grant Richards, 1903), p. 5.
‘But perhaps I have gone too far, in saying that a cultivated taste for the polite arts extinguishes the 
passions, and renders us indifferent to those objects which are so fondly pursued by the rest o f  mankind.
On further reflection, I find, that it rather improves our sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions; 
at the same time that it renders the mind incapable o f  the rougher and more boisterous emotions.’ Essays, 
p p .5-6.
See Kames: ‘The science o f  rational criticism tends to improve the heart no less than the understanding. 
It tends, in the first place, to moderate the selfish affections: by sweetening and harmonizing the temper, it 
is a strong antidote to the turbulence o f  passion and violence o f  pursuit’ etc. {Elements, 1: 9) Richardson 
states that examining Shakespeare’s characters is ‘an exercise no less adopted to improve the heart, than to 
inform the understanding.’ {A Philosophical Analysis, p. 42) See also Blair’s second lecture: ‘A cultivated 
taste increases sensibility to all the tender and humane passions, by giving them frequent exercise; while it 
tends to weaken the more violent and fierce emotions.’ (Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and  Belles Lettres 
[London, 1824], p. 802)
Elements, 1: 14.
M ulvihill, Upstart Talents: Rhetoric and  the Career o f  Reason in English Romantic Discourse, 1790- 
1820  (Newark: University o f  Delaware Press, 2004), p. 37.
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taste and sound criticism [ .. .]  improve us not a little in the most valuable part o f  all philosophy, 
the philosophy o f  human nature. For such disquisitions are very intimately connected with the 
knowledge o f  ourselves. They necessarily lead us to reflect on operations o f  the imagination, and 
the movements o f  the heart; and increase our acquaintance with som e o f  the most refined feelings 
which belong to our frame.^^
Blair here implies that, strangely enough, normally we are not ‘acquainted’ with our own 
feelings, and therefore need belles lettres and criticism to assist us. This assumption 
about a hidden self-to-be-revealed is what justifies the project of ‘philosophical 
criticism’, and it is also what makes it such an influential discourse in articulating the 
subject through the long eighteenth century. Analysing the self through criticism is a 
mode o f self-refinement, because it involves a reflection on the most ‘refined feelings’ 
of the self. Or, to put it differently, in order to cure or to channel the passions (as Hume 
had proposed), the reader must first be taught to see and understand them through 
literature. In short, readers must be taught to read passion, and it is the philosophical 
critic who is entitled to teach them how to do this. With the help o f polite writing, Blair 
argues, criticism and belles lettres can ‘bring to light various springs of action, which, 
without their aid, might have passed unobserved; and which, though o f a delicate nature, 
frequently exert a powerful influence on several departments o f human life’.^  ^Criticism, 
therefore, is a quasi-scientific inquiry into the mind which is, at the same time, 
necessarily moral, because it works towards producing a moral subject. Arguably, it is 
this moral surplus which is figured as the ‘pleasantness’ attending on this type of inquiry, 
which is emphasised in the writings of all philosophical critics. George Campbell, for 
instance, states that a philosophical rhetoric ‘leads directly to an acquaintance with 
ourselves; it not only traces the operations of the intellect and imagination, but discloses 
the lurking springs of action in the heart. In this view it is perhaps the surest and the 
shortest, as well as the pleasantest way of arriving at the science o f the human mind.’^^  
Criticism in all these different manifestations -  as ‘rhetoric’, "belles 
lettres' or ‘criticism’ proper -  has mutated from being a beneficial entertainment for
Blair, Lectures, p. 801.
Blair, Lectures, p. 801.
Campbell, The Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 1-2 (London and Edinburgh, 1776), 1: 16. See also Richardson’s 
claim that poets ‘rectify and enlarge the sentiments o f  the philosopher [ ...]  conducting us to the temple o f  
truth, by an easier and more agreeable path than that o f  mere metaphysics’. {Philosophical Analysis, p. 26)
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polite readers into a powerful (though ‘pleasant’) philosophical tool, one that can bring 
to light the most important hidden knowledge, that of ourselves. For Coleridge, too, 
‘know thyself was the crucial critical injunction throughout his lectures. Speaking about 
literature, he consistently relied on images of visibility, of bringing to light; as in 1811, 
when he reportedly said of Shakespeare:
he availed him self o f  his psychological genius to develop all the minutiae o f  the human heart; -  
that he shewing us the thing makes visible what w e should otherwise not have seen: just as after 
looking at distant objects through a Telescope when we behold them afterwards with the naked 
eye only w e see them with greater distinctness than w e should otherwise have done {LL 1: 306)
This is very close to the image of poetry constructed by ‘philosophical criticism’ in the 
preceding decades. Poetry teaches readers to discern things that are hardly visible 
otherwise -  either because they are too distant, or because they are too close to the self. 
The latter is suggested by a number of images about poetry’s power to magnify, and thus 
to make visible, the ‘minutiae’ o f the heart. Richardson, for instance, claims for poetry 
the power to disclose the secrets of other minds, which also means that it can indirectly 
reveal ‘feeble and decaying principles’ in one’s own. Therefore, ‘by considering the 
copy and portrait of minds different from our own, and by reflecting on these latent and 
unexerted principles, augmented and promoted by imagination, we may discover many 
new tints, and uncommon fea tu re s .C o le rid g e ’s much-used metaphor of the Brocken 
spectre is a variation on this theme:
In the plays o f  Shakespeare every man sees him self without knowing that he sees him self as in 
the phenomena o f  nature, in the mist o f  the mountain a traveller beholds his own figure but the 
glory round the head distinguishes it from a mere vulgar copy; or as a man traversing the 
Brocken in the north o f  Germany at sunrise when the glorious beams are shot ascance the 
mountain: he sees before him a figure o f  gigantic proportions; & o f  such elevated dignity, that 
they he only knows it to be him self by the similarity o f  action {LL 1: 352)
The important difference between this view and that of Richardson is that here the 
textual ‘figure’ is projected by the reader, albeit unconsciously, while in Richardson the
Philosophical Analysis, 25.
146
‘augmenting’ imagination is presumably that of the poet. However -  and this is implied 
by both Richardson and Coleridge -  literature as an ‘augmenting’ and distancing 
medium, which renders the self legible, has to be first interpreted by the philosophical 
critic. If he does not establish what to look for, when reading a character, the reader may 
never recognise himself or herself in their own textual image.
In 1811, just before referring to Humphry Davy (‘who had reduced the art 
of Chemistry to a science’) Coleridge described his own critical project as a species of 
enlightenment and thus as comparable to that of Davy. His stance in lecturing ‘was not 
as a man carrying furniture into an empty house but as a man entering a well furnished 
dwelling and exhibiting light -  which enabled a man to see what was in his own mind’ 
{LL 1: 286). Admittedly, what Coleridge wanted his audience to ‘see’ was quite different 
from what previous critics like Kames had suggested, not to mention Locke whose 
image o f the mind as a dark room might ultimately lurk behind Coleridge’s figure. 
However, the strategy o f making use of literature in this way had its origins in moral 
philosophy, or rather in the philosophical criticism which developed from it.^  ^ It is worth 
noting that this was also recognised by members of Coleridge’s audience. In 1811, for 
instance, H. C. Robinson (in The Times, 19 Nov) referred to Coleridge’s lectures as ‘his 
moral philosophy’, claiming that unlike most critics, ‘his great object appears to be to 
exhibit in poetry the principles o f moral wisdom, and the laws of our intellectual nature, 
which form the basis of social existence’ {LL I: 194). In 1813, the Bristol Gazette wrote 
that their aim in publishing a report of one of Coleridge’s lectures was ‘[t]o gain an 
insight into human nature, to enjoy the writings and genius of the first Dramatic poet of 
any age, and above all to obtain that knowledge of ourselves which the lectures of Mr. 
Coleridge, rich in imagery, language, and wisdom, were calculated to produce’ {LL 1 : 
576).
Locke, Essay, II, xi, 17, According to Locke, the ‘furniture’ o f  the mind is acquired gradually through 
empirical experience, whereas Coleridge stresses with Kant that it is the structure o f  the mind which 
enables empirical experience in the first place. But Locke’s enlightenment stance — ‘I pretend not to teach, 
but to enquire’ (ibid.) -  also describes Coleridge’s position in the above passage.
Paul Hamilton observes about Richardson’s Philosophical Analysis: ‘Philosophical method is in this 
case inferior, and must give place to poetical insight. This way o f  thinking presages the Romantic claims 
for the philosophical status o f  the poet, and for the importance o f  the poet’s language as irreplaceable 
philosophical evidence.’ {C o lerid g e’s  Poetics, p. 34) See also Stanley Stewart, ‘“Philosophy” in 
Richardson’s o f  Shakespeare’, Cythara, 43 (2004), 18-34.
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However, the attempt to ‘know ourselves’ -  and specifically, our hidden 
selves -  through literature raises a number of issues that had to be tackled by Coleridge 
as well as by earlier philosophical critics. Even if they all agreed that language provided 
a unique insight into the operations of the mind (since words were understood as bound 
up with feeling no less than with thought), the analysis of figures of passion was neither 
comprehensive, nor scientific enough in itself. That is, there was no theoretical limit 
either to the discrimination o f passions or to that o f rhetorical figures. Adam Smith, who 
was above all interested in the analysis o f ‘mechanisms’ (indeed, he described language 
as one), was famously impatient with lists of figures, as well as with traditional 
catalogues of p a s s io n .A n d  even Lord Kames, who most carefully pursued passions in 
all their shades and variants, could express exasperation. Where did one passion end, 
and where did another begin? Why was a passion with different objects still identified as 
the ‘same’, and at what point did a passion with the same object become different? In the 
section ‘On Emotions and Passions’ -  after about a hundred pages of analysis -  Kames 
admits that the ‘growth and decay of passions and emotions traced through all their 
mazes, is a subject too extensive for an undertaking like the present’, although he goes 
on to give a ‘cursory view’ for almost another hundred pages. As Adela Pinch has 
remarked, Kames’s work could be read by his contemporaries as simply a collection of 
affecting quotations, mostly from Shakespeare, rather than the coherent philosophical 
‘system’ it aspired to be,^^ It is symptomatic, then, that in John Walker’s Elements o f  
Elocution (a work indebted to Kames, among others), we find an inventory of ‘passions’ 
ranging from ‘Delight on viewing a statue’ to ‘Refusing to lend money’, with matching
After describing a few  passions, Smith asserts; ‘The different passions all proceed in like manner from 
different states o f  mind and outward circumstances. But it would be both endless and useless to go through 
all these different affections and passions in this manner.’ Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J. C. 
Bryce, The G lasgow  Edition o f  the Works and Correspondence o f  Adam  Smith, 6 vols, gen. ed. A. S. 
Skinner, vol IV (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985 [originally published by Oxford University Press, 
1983]), p. 69.
Pinch, Strange Fits o f  Passion: E pistem ologies o f  Emotion, Hume to Austen  (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1996), p. 165. But cf. Coleridge’s remark in The F riend  (Dec. 7 1809): ‘How  often are not the Moralist 
and the Metaphysician obliged for the happiest illustrations o f  general truths and the subordinate laws o f  
human thought and action to quotations not only from the tragic characters but equally from the Jacques, 
Falstaff, and even from the Fools and Clowns o f  Shakespeare, or from the Miser, Hypochondriast and 
Hypocrite o f  M oliere.’ (F 2 : 31).
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Shakespearean passages, which Walker supposed to be helpful in inducing, studying, or 
practising the expression of any given passion, as occasion required?^
What one sometimes suspects with Kames is quite clear with Walker: that 
the list and description of the passions is deduced from Shakespeare, without prior 
analysis o f the passions themselves. Could the passions of the mind be distinguished 
from each other without the aid of literature? Interestingly enough, this problem is 
glanced at in one of Coleridge’s remarks on the ‘miracle’ of Shakespeare:
I would try Sliakespear compared with any other writer by this criterion -  Make out 
your amplest Catalogue o f  all the Human Faculties -  as Reason or the Moral Law, the Will, the 
fee lin g  o f  the coincidence o f  the two (a feeling sui generis, & demonstratio demonstrationum) 
called the Conscience, the Understanding or Prudence, Wit, Fancy, Imagination, Judgement/ -  
and then the Objects on which these can be employed, as the Beauties o f  Nature, the terrors or 
seem ing Caprices o f  Nature, the Realities & the Capabilities, i.e. the actual & the Ideal o f  the 
Human Mind, conceived as Individual, or as Social Being -  as in Innocence, or in guilt, in a Play- 
Paradise or a War-Held o f  Temptation/ & then compare with him under each o f  these Heads - 1 
abhor Beauties & Selections in general -  & even here i f  the effect o f  the Poetry were 
considered — but as Proof Positive o f  unrivalled Excellence I should like to see it -  . {LL 1: 127-8)
What Coleridge wishes to see ‘as Proof Positive’ of Shakespeare’s genius is something 
quite similar to what already existed, at least in sections o f works like those of Walker or 
Kames. He proposes a rather loose ‘Catalogue’ of mental faculties (Reason, 
Understanding, Fancy, etc.) and feelings (Conscience), together with their respective 
objects (beauties and terrors of Nature), and o f general dispositions or affective states 
(‘Innocence’, ‘Play-Paradise’, Temptation, etc.). This catalogue, in turn, could be 
furnished with passages from Shakespeare, displaying or addressing the same mental 
phenomena. Clearly, Coleridge’s suggestion is that the two would necessarily match.
But it is a characteristically half-hearted suggestion, and one that Coleridge could never 
have realized, not only because it was impossible (it is hard to imagine how all ‘the 
actual and the Ideal o f the Human M ind’ as ‘Individual or as Social Being’ could be
John Walker, Elem ents o f  Elocution. Being the Substance o f  a Course o f  Lectures on the A rt o f  Reading, 
2 vols (London, 1781). Coleridge was familiar with W alker’s rhyming D ictionary o f  the English 
Language (1775) and he might have seen this work too. On Walker cf. Paul C. Edwards, ‘Elocution and 
Shakespeare: An Episode in the History o f  Literary Taste’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 1984, pp. 305-314.
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turned into a list) but also because the drawing up of such a catalogue was not in accord 
with his most important critical insights and assumptions. The mind, for Coleridge, is a 
system -  and a highly hierarchical one at that -  and this means that the individual 
faculties and feelings cannot be studied independently of all the rest. On an even more 
fundamental level, Coleridge seems to imply that they cannot be studied without relying 
on the ‘outness’ of literature. Throughout his lectures, Shakespeare’s text functions as 
the ‘other’ through which the mind can be grasped, which means, by implication, that 
even the terms of such an imaginary catalogue would be necessarily traceable to literary 
representation in one way or another. Writing o f the philosophy informing Coleridge’s 
character criticism, Elinor S. Shaffer observed that according to Coleridge, the self can 
only be grasped through its representations.^'^ Evidently, he regarded Shakespeare’s 
plays as offering the most sophisticated representations that not only supplemented, but 
enabled philosophical analysis.
Moral philosophy had been manifestly dependent on literature and 
especially on Shakespeare for at least half a century, even if it lacked Coleridge’s insight 
to recognise this as inevitable. After Kames and his followers had analysed the habits of 
passion through a taxonomy of (Shakespeare’s) passionate rhetoric, William Richardson 
proposed ‘character’ as a new primary framework for analysis. ‘Character’ supported a 
more ‘scientific’, and more ‘methodical’ treatment of the passions and their influences, 
in so far as it implied a hierarchical, structural understanding of the mind, foreshadowing 
that of Coleridge. Of course, Richardson at this point had at his disposal a rich discourse 
on ‘character’ that had been evolving in the preceding decades in criticism, philosophy, 
and fiction.^^ Most pertinently, the New Rhetoric adapted from its classical sources a 
number of ways in which ‘character’ could be construed.^^ Adam Smith whose ‘Lectures
‘^^ Elinor S. Shaffer, Tago’s Malignity Motivated: Coleridge’s Unpublished “Opus Magnum”, in 
Shakespeare Q uarterly 19 (1968), 195-203,
Cf. Deidre Lynch, The Econom y o f  Character: Novels, M arket Culture, and the Business o f  Inner 
M eaning (Chicago and London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1998). Lynch shows that the reading for 
‘inner’ character which emerged from the second half o f  the 18*'’ century was a means for acquiring ‘deep’ 
and complex selves for middle-class readers, which had a market value in the new (cultural) economy. A 
historical survey o f  the emergence o f  ‘character’ in dramatic criticism is provided by Joseph W. Donohue 
Jr. in his D ram atic Character in the English Romantic Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
J. C. Bryce points out Smith’s interest in ethologia (a tradition stemming from Quintillian) and 
Character (from Theophrastus to La Bruyère) and notes: ‘It is significant that the first critic to publish a 
series o f  studies o f  Shakespeare’s characters, William Richardson, the Glasgow Professor o f  Humanity 
from 1773, was a student o f  Adam Smith’s ’ (Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, p. 17).
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on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres' Richardson probably attended, drew a strong connection 
between ‘character’ and ‘style’. Thus, instead o f studying individual rhetorical figures, 
he paid more attention to the configuration of rhetorical devices which constituted a 
mode o f expression unique to the given person or the ‘assumed’ character. Keeping 
one’s style thus came to be understood as staying in character, and Smith was 
unforgiving if he detected symptoms o f ‘affectation’, that is, o f feigning character.^^ He 
required, above all, sincerity, but this did not prevent him from dealing with sincerity as 
a rhetorical effect.
Kames also assumed that character appears in language, albeit at some 
remove. He stated, for instance, that ‘Passions receive a tincture from every peculiarity 
of character [...]. Hence the following rule concerning dramatic and epic compositions. 
That a passion be adjusted to the character, the sentiments to the passion, and the 
language to the sentiments.’ ®^ (Compare this with one of Coleridge’s early notes: ‘We 
may divide a dramatic poet’s characteristics [...] into Language, Passion, and 
Character -  always bearing in mind, that these must act and react on each other/ the 
Language inspired by the Passion, the Language & Passion modified & differenced by 
the Character’ [LL 1: 85]). However, Kames took little real interest in the analysis of 
character, apart from observing that the gift o f creating credible ones belonged almost 
exclusively to Shakespeare. Indeed, character drawing required such an intimate 
knowledge of the mind’s hidden operations that it could be compared to the painter’s 
necessary anatomical skills: ‘A painter, in order to represent the various attitudes of the 
body, ought to be intimately acquainted with muscular motion: no less intimately 
acquainted with emotions and characters ought a writer to be, in order to represent 
various attitudes o f the mind’ ( -  compare this with Coleridge’s assertion that in Venus 
and Adonis Shakespeare was ‘at once the Painter & Analyst’ of the passions [LL 1 : 
242]).^’
Cf. Smith’s definition o f  what is agreeable in style: Tt is when all the thoughts are justly and properly 
expressed in such a manner as shews the passion they affected the author with, and so that all seems 
naturall and easy. He never seem s to act out o f  character but speaks in a manner not only suitable to the 
Subject but to the character he naturally inclines to .’ {Lectures, 55)
Elements o f  Criticism  1: 451.
Elements o f  Criticism  1: 1: 451-2.
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Smith’s student, Richardson, also took for granted the importance of 
structure and mechanism with respect to character. At the same time, he opened up a 
new area of investigation, which, he hoped, would prove as useful for moral philosophy 
as for criticism. He started to ‘treat’ Shakespeare’s fictitious characters as analogous to 
medical cases, displaying disorders that could be explained with reference to the 
character’s general ‘constitution’, or to a particular configuration (usually an imbalance) 
in the operation of the faculties, the ruling passion and the moral sense. In short, he 
assumed that literature could provide clues towards an anatomy o f the mind by 
providing, more directly, evidence o f its possible pathologies. Earlier, Kames had stated 
that tragedy displays ‘disorder in the internal constitution’.'^  ^Richardson, for his part, 
turned to disorder to demonstrate order. This is comparable with Coleridge’s well- 
known method of character analysis; the Bristol Gazette'^ report of a lecture in 1813 
highlights all the necessary components:
He has shewn that the intricacies o f  Ham let’s character may be traced to Shakespeare’s deep and 
accurate science in mental philosophy. [ . . .]  He thought it essential to the understanding o f  
H am let’s character, that w e should reflect on the constitution o f  our own minds. [ . . .]  if  there was 
an overbalance in the contemplative faculty, man becomes the creature o f  meditation, and loses 
the power o f  action. {LL 1: 543)
It is possible that members o f the Bristol audience (like the journalist here) recognised 
the philosophical underpinnings of Coleridge’s method more readily than the 
miscellaneous London audience. In London, his habit of discussing character within the 
wider context o f ‘human nature’ was sometimes perceived as utterly idiosyncratic.'^^ 
Nevertheless, around 1819 Coleridge could identify the genesis of his own criticism by 
stating, famously: ‘Hamlet was the Play, or rather Hamlet himself was the Character, in 
the intuition and exposition of which I first made my turn for Philosophical criticism, 
and especially for the insight into the genius of Shakespeare, noticed first among my
Elements o f  Criticism , 2: 380.
Cf. James Amphlett’s description o f  the lecture on Romeo and Juliet: T f he begins on any particular 
passion or principle, he com m only works about, from som e strange and incomprehensible impetus, till he 
involves him self in a mass o f  nebulous matter that is as remote from the text as possible! [ ...]  He pursued 
his mining enquiry till love was lost in the boundless wilds o f  thought; and Shakespeare him self 
disappeared in the ocean o f  human nature.’ {LL 1: 321)
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Acquaintances’ {LL 2: 293). Much has been written about this claim and its significance 
with respect to Coleridge’s critical originality. What I mean to emphasize, however, is 
one of its possible implications, namely that Coleridge’s interpretation o f Hamlet could 
be immediately recognised {"noticed') as ‘Philosophical criticism’ by his friends. If this 
is so, it can only be explained by assuming that philosophical analysis o f character 
(especially of Hamlet, to whom Richardson returned again and again) was a framework 
readily available for members of Coleridge’s circle.'*^
The fact that the characters studied by Richardson and Coleridge were 
fictitious was not a hindrance for the exposition of their moral philosophy, but rather a 
key advantage. They both aimed at knowing the self, and went about it by studying 
imaginary ones. Richardson in his ‘Introduction’ explains that in real life the mind could 
never be so minutely analysed, either through introspection or through observation; 
moreover the analysis itself could never be objective: we are as biased with respect to 
others as with respect to ourselves.'^® Characteristically, Richardson’s account of the 
dilemma o f moral philosophy (the ‘[djifficulty of making just experiments’) intersects 
with the discourse of Romanticism exactly at this point.'*'  ^He acknowledges the need for 
knowing our feelings and at the same time the theoretical impossibility of it in a passage 
strangely reminiscent o f Wordsworth:
Or by what powerful spell can the abstracted philosopher, w hose passions are all chastened and 
subdued, w hose heart never throbs with desire, prevail on the amorous affections to visit the 
ungenial clim e o f  his breast, and submit their features to the rigour o f  his unrelenting scrutiny!
In February 1804, Coleridge wrote to Sir George Beaumont: ‘Thus I shall exhibit the characteristics o f  
the Plays -  & o f  the mind -  o f  Shakespeare -  and o f  every character at greater or less Length a 
philosophical Analysis & Justification, in the spirit o f  that analysis o f  the character o f  Hamlet with which 
you were much p leased .. . ’ {CL  2: 1054) As John Beer argues, this letter supports Coleridge’s claim about 
the origins o f  his criticism. See Beer, ‘Coleridge’s Originality as a Critic o f  Shakespeare’, in Studies in the 
Literary Imagination, 19:2 (Fall 1986), 51-69, p. 58.
‘We can know no more o f  the internal feelings o f  another than he expresses by outward signs or 
language; and consequently he may feel many emotions that w e are unable easily to conceive. Nor can we 
consider human characters and affections as altogether indifferent to us: They are not mere objects o f  
curiosity; they excite love or hatred, approbation or dislike. But, when the mind is influenced by these 
affections, and by others that often attend them, the judgement is apt to be biassed, and the force o f  the 
principle we contemplate is increased or diminished accordingly.’ {Philosophical Analysis, 22)
N oel B. Jackson argues that the problem o f  the experimentum crucis, at the heart o f  18*'*-century moral 
philosophy, is related to the ‘experimental’ projects o f  the early Romantics. Jackson, ‘Critical Conditions: 
Coleridge, “Common Sense”, and the Literature o f  Self-Experiment’, in ELH, 70: 1 (Spring 2003), 117- 
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The philosopher, accustomed to moderate his passions, rather than indulge them, is o f  all men 
least able to provoke their violence; and in order to succeed in his researches, he must recal the 
idea o f  feelings perceived at some former period; or he must seize their impression, and mark 
their operations at the very moment they are accidentally excited^^
As Richardson goes on -  rather eloquently -  to argue, both methods mentioned here are 
strictly speaking impossible. In a state of passion, one cannot observe and analyse the 
passion’s progress, and recollection cannot evoke what had not been registered at the 
time of its first occurrence.'^^ Something rather similar is formulated in Wordsworth’s 
‘Tintern Abbey’, where the ‘chastened and subdued’ mind has no access to its former 
passionate state (‘I cannot paint what then I was’).
One finds Wordsworth trying out different solutions to this dilemma 
throughout his early writings, from observing the se lfs  passion in the other (in the case 
of ‘Tintern Abbey’, in his sister’s eyes), to the paradoxical idea o f emotion ‘recollected 
in tranquillity’. Generally, he seems to have believed that knowing the passions is 
possible only through the imaginative medium o f poetry.'^^ This position is also implicit 
in Joanna Baillie’s ‘experimental’ project, the Plays on the Passions, in which she 
undertakes a quasi-scientific anatomy of the mind through fiction.'^® The concept of 
anatomy also appears in Wordsworth, for instance in Oswald’s exclamation in The 
Borderers: ‘We dissect / The senseless body, and why not the mind?’ The violence 
implied in this proposition conveys Wordsworth’s disapproval of the hybris of moral 
philosophy (and specifically of Godwin) in objectifying the mind. But the play itself is
Philosophical Analysis, 16-7.
‘Seizing’ the passion is impossible: ‘The passions are swift and evanescent: W e cannot arrest their 
celerity, nor suspend them in the mind during pleasure. You are moved by strong affection: Seize the 
opportunity, let none o f  its motions escape you, and observe every sentiment it excites. You cannot. While 
the passion prevails, you have no leisure for speculation; and be assured it hath suffered abatement, if  you 
have time to philosophize.’ (18) Retrospective analysis is also impossible; ‘To be acquainted with the 
nature o f  any passion, w e must know by what combination o f  feelings it is excited; to what temperament it 
is allied; in what proportion it gathers force and swiftness; what propensities, and what associations o f  
ideas either retard or accelerate its impetuosity; and how it may be opposed, weakened, or suppressed. But, 
i f  these circumstances escape the most vigilant and abstracted attention, when the mind is actually agitated, 
how can they be recollected when the passion is entirely quieted?’ (18-9)
Cf. his [Essay on Morals'] and Alan S ew ell’s comments in his W ordsworth and the Enlightenment: 
Nature, Man, and Society in the Experimental P oetry  (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1989), p. 11.
According to Dorothy M cM illan, ‘the dramatic anatomy o f  the human passions formed the foundation 
on which she built her [.•■] plays, her M etrical Legends, 1812, and her Fugitive Verses, 1840’. See her 
‘“Dr” B aillie’, in 1798: The Year o f  the Lyrical Ballads, 68-92, p. 79.
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no less an attempt at ‘dissecting’ minds, even if in a less violent manner, through fiction. 
Wordsworth in his prefatory essay even explicates the diagnosis offered in the play itself, 
by what is clearly a ‘philosophical analysis’ of the character of Rivers/Oswald.'^^ Twenty 
years later, Coleridge praises Shakespeare’s unique method o f constructing character by 
calling him ‘a comparative Anatomist’ {LL 2: 151), but throughout his lectures he bears 
witness to his power of laying bare the se lfs  inner structure through fiction.
In his ‘Introduction’ Richardson justifies the analysis o f fictitious 
characters as a last resort, in the face of the theoretical impossibility o f getting to know 
the passions.^^ For this reason, it is not quite correct to say that he analyzes literary 
characters as if  they were real people; rather, he analyzes them as he would like to 
analyze real people, if he could. He uses imaginative writing as a heuristic tool for 
mapping aspects of the mind, which otherwise would be inaccessible. An important 
advantage o f this method is that Shakespeare’s pathologies are fully drawn; they run 
their full course in the plays, which is never the case when one examines living 
‘patients’. Richardson’s sketches might indeed be compared to a particular type of 
medical case-history, which became popular during the same period.^^ John Haslam, in 
1798, offered a retrospective diagnosis of twenty inmates of the Bethlem Hospital 
(ranging from the melancholy and the manic to the deluded), by analysing their 
respective diseases after their death. As Allan Ingram writes, ‘[i]t is precisely because 
they are dead that he has been able to perform post-mortem examinations on them all, 
opening each skull and describing its contents, searching for abnormalities, finding
Coleridge mentions a plan to publish O sorio  and The Borderers in one volum e, with ‘small prefaces 
containing an analysis o f  our principal characters’ in CL 1; 400.
Richardson signals his turn to literature in the following passage: ‘Were it possible, during the 
continuance o f  a violent passion, to seize a faithful impression o f  its features, and an exact delineation o f  
the images it creates in us, such a valuable copy would guide the philosopher in tracing the perplexed and 
intricate mazes o f  metaphysical inquiry.’ {Philosophical Analysis, 23)
On the appearance o f  the ‘case history’ in Germany in the same period see Andreas Gailus, ‘A Case o f  
Individuality: Karl Philipp Moritz and the Magazine for Empirical Psychology’, N ew German Critique, 79 
(Winter 2000), 67-105. See also Frederick Burwick on the ‘more detailed literary attention to the “case 
history” o f  madness’ which ‘followed a new medical interest in nervous disorders and the rise o f  
psychology as a scientific discipline’, in Poetic M adness and the Romantic Imagination  (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 11. N eil Vickers writes about the importance 
o f  case study in Thomas B eddoes’s ‘Essay on the Nature and Prevention o f  Som e o f  the Disorders 
Commonly Called N ervous’ (in volum e 3 o îH ygeia ), in Coleridge and the D octors, pp. 146-7.
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none.’^^  Richardson was confronted with the same problem of how to observe mental 
events as they are experienced by the living, but tackled it on the plane o f literary 
criticism. He chose to analyse written ‘closed’ cases instead o f real ones. But in spite of 
his dependence on fiction, his all-important critical assumption is that the characters he 
analysed had been drawn, as it were ‘originally’, in strict accordance with the laws of 
nature. Analysing the melancholy of Jacques, for instance, he offers advice about how to 
control an illness which he thought widespread among his contemporaries.^® 
Shakespeare, obviously, fully knew and ‘displayed’ the causes, although it took a moral 
philosopher to read them and thus frame the diagnosis. All in all, by establishing the 
parameters o f his ‘philosophical analysis’, Richardson accomplished a remarkable feat; 
he made criticism appear more ‘scientific’ than before, but at the same time he made the 
science of the mind more fully immersed in fiction than ever.
3
Richardson’s philosophical diagnostics serve a double purpose, in which 
the attempt to ‘read’ the operation of the passions is ultimately subordinated to a higher 
moral end. He believes that to know the passions is essential for regulating them, insofar 
as they are capable of being regulated at all. Understanding their mechanism, seeing 
what he calls ‘the labyrinths of the heart’ as if from above, is the only conceivable way 
to become a free moral agent.^'^ Throughout his interpretations o f Shakespeare’s 
characters we can trace a consistent strategy of inscribing a moral perspective -  that of 
the impartial spectator, to use Adam Smith’s highly relevant terminology -  
simultaneously into Shakespeare’s text, his own readings, and his implied readers’ 
minds. A remarkable instance is when, writing about Hamlet, Richardson identifies 
delicacy of moral sentiment as the character’s ruling impulse, and turns subsequently to 
discuss human nature in general: ‘there is in human nature, a supreme, and, in many
Allan Ingram with M ichelle Faubert, Cultural Constructions o f  M adness in Eighteenth Century Writing 
(Palgrave M acmillan, 2005), p. 6.
Richardson writes: ‘how happens it that a temper disposed to beneficence, and addicted to social 
enjoyment, becom es solitary and morose? Changes o f  this kind are not unfrequent: And, i f  researches into 
the origin or cause o f  a distemper can direct us in the discovery o f  an antidote or o f  a remedy, our present 
inquiry is o f  importance.’ {Philosophical Analysis, p. 156)
Philosophical A nalysis, p. 199
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cases, a powerful principle that pronounces sentence on the conduct of mankind... ’ -  
offering a precise rendering of Smith’s theory of moral judgement.^® This is followed by 
an endorsing use of the first person plural (‘our nature’) and finally, of ‘you’, both as a 
general subject embracing Hamlet, the critic and mankind, and as a specific address, 
almost as an instruction, to the reader; ‘So delicate is your affection, and so refined your 
sense of moral excellence, when the moral faculty is softened into a tender attachment, 
that the sanctity and purity o f the heart you love must appear to you without a stain. 
Richardson is constructing the ‘moral sense’ of Shakespeare in this way, and 
continuously invites his readers to make it their own. According to this scheme, adopting 
the perspective of the moral spectator corresponds to being able to understand and to 
judge the morality o f the other, even if this rehearsal of moral spectatorship is played out 
with imaginary characters, in the theatre of the mind.
Richardson does not make a secret out of the moral intentions of his own 
criticism. On the first pages o f his book, he introduces the significance of ‘knowing 
oneself in a passage that sounds more preacherly than critical:
By reducing it to practice, w e learn the dignity o f  human nature: Our emulation is excited by 
contemplating our divine original: And, by discovering the capacity and extent o f  our faculties, 
w e become desirous o f  higher improvement. Nor would the practice o f  this apophthegm enable 
us merely to elevate and enlarge our desires, but also to purify and refine them; to withstand the 
sollicitations o f  grovelling appetites, and subdue their violence: For improvement in virtue 
consists in duly regulating our inferior appetites, no less than in cultivating the principles o f  
benevolence and magnanimity.^’
To know the self, and especially its hidden and potentially dangerous inclinations, is the 
prerequisite for transcending its imperfections. Knowledge leads to freedom and 
improvement -  this belief informs Richardson’s enquiry. Characteristically, his moral 
subject has a double way of looking ‘inside’: it sees and, by implication, controls what is 
‘inferior’ in itself, and at the same time it ‘discovers’ the power o f its own faculties and 
‘contemplates’ its own future perfection. Coleridge’s lectures are shot through and
Philosophical A nalysis, p. 98. 
Philosophical Analysis, 102.
57 Philosophical Analysis, p. 4.
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through with a very similar conviction about the role of literature in ‘perfecting’ the self. 
Indeed, Richardson’s ambition o f ‘contemplating our divine original’ through an 
analysis o f Shakespeare might very well describe what Coleridge professed to do in his 
lectures. It is symptomatic that this crucial element of his criticism has been rarely 
discussed, and was treated either as empty rhetoric compared to the ‘substance’ of his 
interpretations, or as another burst of Coleridge’s (German) idealism, which required no 
further explanation. But the fact is that a number o f -  Indeed, highly rhetorical -  
passages on moral perfectibility, which are so alien to most readers today, were received, 
by his contemporaries, as the high points of his lectures.^® In 1811, Tomalin reported 
him speaking of poetry to the London Philosophical Society;
W e take the purest parts & combine it with our own minds, with our own hopes, with our own 
inward yearnings after perfection, and being frail & imperfect, w e wish to have a shadow, a sort 
o f  prophetic existence present to us, which tells us what w e are not, but yet, blending in us, much 
that w e are, promises great things o f  what w e may be. It is the Truth (& poetry results from that 
instinct the effort o f  perfecting ourselves) -  the conceiving that which is imperfect to be perfect 
& blending the nobler mind with the meaner object. {LL 1:224)
Coleridge had a far more developed theory than Richardson about how 
the ‘divine original’ could be intuited through studying literature. Engaging with poetry, 
and especially with Shakespeare, exercised the higher faculties of the mind instead of 
the ‘lower appetites’ (which, in literature, he usually associated with novels). Reflecting 
on the activity of the higher faculties in reading could thus serve as something like 
experimental proof o f mankind’s potential for perfection. ‘By the cultivation of our 
highest faculties we are alone superior to everything around us’, he claims, ‘and by the 
power of imagination (of which there was both intellectual and moral) in our present 
imperfect state, are we enabled to anticipate the glories and honors of a future existence; 
without these we are inferior to the beast that perishes.’ {LL 1: 587) In ideal 
circumstances, then, the reading experience was in itself morally educative. At the same
See for instance Collier’s enthusiasm: ‘The Lecturer delivered one o f  the [most] beautiful passages in 
his w hole discourse whether w e consider the matter or the manner, I have not the eloquent words he 
employed but the effect o f  them was to Impress upon the mind that as Poetry might in some sort be 
considered the language o f  Heaven, so the enjoyment o f  it, that exquisite delight w e received from it was a 
sort o f  type or prophecy o f  a future happy & blissful existence.’ {LL 1: 191)
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time, Coleridge also believed that in his characters Shakespeare displayed the inherent 
potentials of the different faculties and passions: ‘He has as it were prophesied what 
each man in his different passions would have produced’ {LL 2: 121). Moral education 
through literature therefore had two components (this is somewhat similar to 
Richardson’s double introspection): on the one had, it was based on reflection on the 
reader’s own mental activity, and on the other, on reflection on the ‘minds’ which 
Shakespeare so truly represented. One of Coleridge’s main critical insights was that 
these two modes of reflection were interdependent. The characters could not be 
interpreted without the active contribution of the reader’s imagination, feeling, and 
understanding. Moreover, they ‘called forth’ the higher faculties precisely because, as 
Coleridge insisted, they were the products of Shakespeare’s imaginative self-analysis.
Coleridge’s much-discussed insistence on Shakespeare’s method of 
meditation as opposed to observation can be viewed in the context o f the 
epistemological dilemma of moral philosophy I have outlined above. As we have seen, 
Richardson’s conclusion was that the mind could not be directly observed, unless 
through fiction. Imagining the mind, Coleridge’s Shakespeare is indeed a moral 
philosopher, an expert in the ‘science of mental philosophy’. Being the results of his 
imaginative ‘analysis’, Shakespeare’s important characters all embody a ‘philosophical 
problem’; they are the products o f intellectual enquiry and, at least theoretically, they 
manifest a fully intelligible inner structure.^^ Thanks to this assumption of underlying 
structure (which he shared with Richardson), Coleridge could regard each character as a 
uniquely configured ‘case’ manifesting, at the same time, universal laws of the mind: 
each character is ‘individualized’ by ‘the different combinations and subordinations’ of 
the mental powers.
^^This is one o f  Coleridge’s grand themes; he states e.g. that Shakespearean meditation ‘looked at every 
character with interest -  only as it contains in it something generally true and such as might be expressed 
in a philosophical Problem’ {LL 1: 289); Mercutio was created by ‘the observation o f  that mind which 
having formed a theory & a system o f  its in its own nature has remarked all things as examples o f  the truth 
and confirming him in that truth and above all enabling him to convey the truths o f  philosophy as mere 
effects derived from the outward watchings o f  life’ {LL 1: 306). In his Critique o f  Bertram, Coleridge 
writes that 'Don Juan  is, from beginning to end, an intelligible character. As much so as the Satan o f  
M ilton.’ {BL 2: 264) Shakespeare’s characters are also prominently ‘intelligible’ in this sense.
‘Sh. had virtually surveyed all the great component powers & Impulses o f  Human Nature -  seen that the 
different combinations and subordinations were the individualizers o f  Men and shared their harmony by 
the effects o f  disproportion, wither o f  excess or deficiency. Scarcely a change w hich he has not exhibited
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However, this structure could not become apparent without the reader’s 
active engagement with the text, an activity that is at once imaginative, intellectual, and 
affective. Shakespeare’s characters ‘have to be inferred by the reader’ {LL 1: 118), from 
the comments of other characters, from the character’s own self-representations (which 
have to be taken with a pinch of salt) and from the design o f the whole play.^^ Moreover, 
characters are ‘representing Passions which no man appropriates to himself & yet 
acknowl[edg]es his share’ {LL 2: 121). This means that through imagining them, the 
reader interprets his or her own feelings, as if from the outside. The main difference 
between Coleridge’s character criticism and that of Richardson is exactly this emphasis 
on imaginative interaction with character. Richardson apparently turns to fiction because 
he cannot find a more direct means of analyzing the mind, and when he concedes that 
characters are partly the products of the reader’s own imagination, he does so only with 
respect to badly drawn or incomplete character s. Coleridge, by contrast, makes full and 
explicit use of the characters’ fictitiousness. According to him, the passions represented 
in the plays have to be imagined by the reader in order to be understood, and since the 
reader contributes with his or her own imagined (but in another sense perfectly real) 
feelings, the passion understood will be in an oblique way his or her own: ‘The reader 
often feels that some ideal trait of our own is caught or some nerve has been touched of 
which we were not before aware and it is proved that it has been touched by the 
vibration that we feel a sort of thrilling which tells us that we know ourselves the better 
for it.’ {LL 1: 352) Reading Shakespeare thus gradually articulates a reading subject that 
had not been known or seen before, one that is born out of the interplay between the text 
and the reader’s own imagination, understanding, and feeling.
It is worth taking a closer look at Coleridge’s metaphor of reading as an 
oblique self-analysis through being ‘touched’. Literature touching the ‘strings’ or ‘cords’ 
of the heart, even causing thrills and ‘vibrations’ in the body, is a recurrent image of the
but in his most impressive and in his own favourite characters the subordination o f  the moral to the 
intellectual B eing’ {LL 1: 574).
‘His mode o f  drawing character, not by any one description; but by such opinions, half right half wrong, 
as the friends enemies, & the man him self would give — & the Reader left to draw the whole -  as in 
Polonius & Coriolanus (512)
‘w e figure ourselves the characters which the poet intends to exhibit; w e take part in their interests, and 
enter into their passions as warmly as i f  they were naturally expressed. Thus it appears, that it is often with 
beings o f  our own formation that w e lament or rejoice, imagining them to be the workmanship o f  another.’ 
{Philosophical Analysis, 36)
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discourse of sensibility, on which an important part of Coleridge’s criticism relies. What 
is remarkable, however, is the way he enlists this trope under the philosophical banner of 
‘know thyself. The inner self, his image suggests, is loosely analogous to the nervous 
system (which David Hartley tackled through experiments with vibrations).^® The mind 
itself, Coleridge seems to say, is a similarly intricate system or structure, in which all the 
elements are interconnected, forming a fine web of sensibility. Moreover, this system is 
not fully known to the conscious self, and it cannot be made known unless it is ‘touched’, 
for instance by literature (‘some nerve has been touched o f which we were not before 
aware’). Analysis ‘by touch’ is Coleridge’s characteristically gentle and at the same time 
clinical figure for the philosophical analysis of the mind, which had been described, 
more violently, as dissection or anatomy. Arguing against the new mode of criticism at 
the end of the eighteenth century, Vicesimus Knox had once referred to the 
‘philosophical critic’ as an anatomist. What he opposed to such ‘scientific’ and thus 
implicitly violent examination was an approach to poetry with feeling (which he 
described as vibrations o f the nervous system).^'^ Coleridge’s description o f the self­
reflexive reading experience as based on being ‘touched’ modulates knowledge and 
feeling into each other, and thus unites the advantages of both these approaches.
Through reading Shakespeare he proposes a ‘philosophical’ anatomy of the mind, but 
one that is grounded in the affective component of literary experience.
Speaking of Shakespeare’s powers of character-drawing, Coleridge again 
refers to the sense o f touch, in order to illustrate Shakespeare’s almost inhuman excess 
of sensibility. His concern here is to show how Capulef s anger in Romeo and Juliet is 
represented in a way that intimates the whole structure of his character:
a worthy noble minded old man o f  high rank with all the impatience o f  character which is likely 
to accompany it. It is delightful to see the sensibilities o f  nature always so exquisitely called forth 
as i f  the Poet had the 100 arms o f  the Polypus, thrown out in all directions to catch the 
predominant feeling. W e might see in Capulet the way in which Anger seizes hold o f  every thing 
that com es in its way as in the lines where Capulet is reproving Tybalt for his fierceness o f  
behaviour [ . . .]
Roy Porter describes how Hartley’s anatomical experiments with nerves complemented his 
philosophical theory, in Porter, Flesh in the A ge o f  Reason  (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2003), p. 350. 
Knox, ‘On Modern Criticism’, E ssays M oral and  L iterary (London, 1782), 1: 129.
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& then seeing the lights bum dimly he Capulet turns his anger ag*. them  the servants: so that no 
one passion is to predominant [sic] but that it always includes all the parts o f  the character so that 
the reader never had a mere abstract o f  the passion as o f  anger or ambition but the whole man 
was presented: the one <predominant> passion acting as the leader o f  the band to the rest. {LL 
1:306)
In this passage Coleridge speaks o f two kinds of feeling. There is the character’s 
‘predominant feeling’, anger, which like an arm ‘seizes hold of everything’ around the 
self (after reproving Tybalt, Capulet vents his anger on the servants because ‘the lights 
burn dimly’). At the same time, he talks about Shakespeare’s exquisite capacity to feel -  
in a sense closer to ‘touch’, as the Polypus image suggests -  the whole structure of the 
character through its minutest manifestations. Capulet’s impatience with his servants 
reveals something about his anger at his son, and how he tries to control it; it also 
betrays his relation to his social status and his family. Thus one passionate figure (a 
‘turn’, literally, to the servants) intimates the whole configuration of feelings, which 
constitutes his character.
This account suggests that Shakespeare presents an analysis of his 
characters through touching -  indeed, irritating -  them at certain points of their 
‘nervous’ system. Coleridge, o f course, used a number of different metaphors to refer to 
Shakespeare’s probing into the mind. Some of the visual ones have already been 
mentioned (the telescope, the dark chamber, etc), and other more conventional ones 
could easily be added (like that of drawing or painting of portraits). But the analysis ‘by 
touch’ seems to be a uniquely Coleridgean development, which is especially important 
as it also features in his discussion o f the reader’s experience of the text. If moral 
philosophers like Richardson or Kames wanted to know the passions (or the feelings, the 
‘hidden’ part of the self, etc.) through an analysis of literature, Coleridge seems to 
suggest that such knowledge o f  feeling is conceivable only as knowledge through 
feeling. As several scholars have argued, knowing and feeling shade into each other in 
the Coleridgean concept o f touch, which he developed in numerous notebook 
speculations.^® In these writings, touch is described as the primary sense of children
Raimonda Modiano, ‘Coleridge’s V iew s on Touch and Other Senses’, Bulletin o f  Research in the 
Humanities, Vol 81 (1978), 28-41; David Miall, “‘I See It Feelingly” : Coleridge’s Debt to Hartley’, in 
C oleridge's Visionary Languages: E ssays in Honour o f  J. B. Beer, ed. by Tim Fulford and Morton D.
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(indeed, of embryos) from which all other senses develop; it is also the sense through 
which we gain our most direct and fundamental knowledge of the self and of the world 
outside. More specifically, John Beer has argued that Coleridge’s theoretical distinction 
between single and double touch — a perplexing one, which for our purposes can be 
reduced to a distinction between a mostly unconscious and a mostly reflexive ‘feeling’ -  
found its way not only into his writings on natural philosophy, but also his criticism of 
Shakespeare.^^ Beer’s point can be confirmed by a number o f tactile images in 
Coleridge’s lecture texts, especially in connection with Shakespeare’s anatomy of the 
mind. These images invariably suggest an interplay between knowing and feeling. The 
most memorable image, however, can be found in an early letter to Sotheby, which sums 
up this dynamism as philosophical ‘tact’:
a great Poet must be, impiicitè if  not explicité, a profound Metaphysician. He may not have it in 
logical coherence, in his Brain & Tongue; but he must have it by Tact /  for all sounds, & forms o f  
human nature he must have the ear o f  a wild Arab listening in the silent Desart, the eye o f  the 
North American Indian tracing the footsteps o f  an Enemy upon the Leaves that strew the Forest 
- ;  the Touch o f  a Blind Man feeling the face o f  a darling Child {CL II: 810)
Like the other passages quoted earlier, feeling has a double significance here. The Blind 
Man ‘feels’ the face of the child in order to get to know it, but at the same time he is 
affectively involved, just like the other figures (a ‘blind Arab’ will reappear in ‘The 
Blossoming of the Solitary Date-Tree’, a version of which was read out by Coleridge in 
a lecture in 1818 \LL 2:78]). As a ‘Metaphysician’, Shakespeare knows ‘human nature’ 
so intimately because he knows it as feeling.
It cannot be accidental that the same kind of ‘tact’ was attributed to 
Coleridge himself ten years later by the very sympathetic Bristol Gazette. As the 
journalist writes, his lecture ‘was marked, characteristically, with that philosophical tact, 
which perceives causes, and traces effects impalpable to the common apprehension. He 
seemed to have been admitted into the closet o f Sliakespear’s mind; to have shared his
Paley (Cambridge: D . S, Brewer, 1993), pp. 151-163. Cf. also Miall, ‘Coleridge on Emotion: Experience 
into Theory’, in The W ordsworth Circle, 22 (1991), 35-39. The most recent account is in N eil Vickers, 
Coleridge and the D octors 1795-1806  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).
John Beer, ‘Coleridge’s Originality as a Critic o f  Shakespeare’, Studies in the L iterary Imagination, 
19:2 (Fall 1986), 51-69, p. 53-4.
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secret thoughts; and been familiarized with his most hidden motives.’ {LL 1: 530-1) This 
seems to be very close to the kind of knowledge earlier philosophical critics had striven 
to attain. Knowing the ‘hidden springs’ (‘motives’) o f another mind, having been 
admitted into its ‘closet’, Coleridge is said to be in possession of a philosophical 
understanding o f it. But the journalist’s reference to ‘philosophical ta c f (with its 
Coleridgean ring) reflects a realization that such knowledge can never be made wholly 
objective. The critic’s knowledge can never be detached from his interaction with the 
text; it cannot be formulated and viewed as if  at a distance. One o f the fundamental traits 
of Coleridge’s philosophical criticism is his renunciation of any attempt at secreting pure 
‘philosophy’ out o f literary texts. The philosophy enunciated in his literary lectures is 
openly dependent on literature, nor does it strive to leave behind the plane of the literary, 
which enables its articulation in the first place. Coleridge as a critic o f Shakespeare does 
not want to produce an objective knowledge either o f philosophical matters or of literary 
texts, but to analyze, ‘by tact’, how the reader’s mind and Shakespeare’s plays are being 
articulated by each other, through the on-going process o f reading. Analysis therefore 
has to take place continuously, and especially in the ‘here and now’ o f the lecture theatre, 
because it is also the means by which other readers too, and not just the critic, undergo 
moral ‘treatment’. In the last section o f this chapter I am going to discuss the example of 
Macbeth, in order to trace how Coleridge and Richardson practise character analysis in 
an attempt to provide moral healing for their respective readers and audiences.
4
Throughout the eighteenth century, Macbeth had been intimately 
connected with the problematic of ‘character’, perhaps due to its own poetic 
investigation of hidden motives, visibility, and self-knowledge.^^ From Duncan’s 
prophetic remark that ‘There’s no art / To find the mind’s construction in the face’
For a detailed account o f  eighteenth-century responses to Macbeth see Donohue, D ram atic Character, 
pp. 189-215. For twentieth-century response to character criticism cf. L. C. Knights’ attack on Bradley: 
‘How many children had Lady Macbeth?’, in his Explorations: Essays in Criticism, M ainly on the 
Literature o f  the Seventeenth Century (London: Chatto & W indus, 1946), 1-39; and Michael D. Bristol, 
‘H ow many children did she have?’, in John J. Joughin, ed., Philosophical Shakespeares (London and 
N ew  York: Routledge, 2000), 18-33.
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(1.4,11-12), to Macbeth’s evocation of darkness (‘Stars, hide your fires! / Let not light 
see my black and deep desires’ [1.4.50-51]) and his disastrous renunciation of self- 
knowledge (‘To know my deed, ‘twere best not know m yself [2.2.72]), this play had a 
very specific appeal to philosophically oriented readers.^® As Joseph Donohue writes, ‘in 
the latter years o f the century, response to Shakespearean character comes to depend on 
the notion that he [Macbeth] is a figure for all men under the influence of passion’. 
Wordsworth and Coleridge betray what amounts to almost an obsession with Macbeth in 
their early writings, including both their dramas. The Rime o f  the Ancient Mariner and 
even the ‘Intimations of Immortality’ ode. The appeal of the play went beyond its 
poetical concern with self-knowledge and hidden passion. In the late 1790s, Wordsworth 
and Coleridge could also find in it a possible way of interpreting the French Revolution 
that suited their needs and provided answers to their most pressing questions about its 
moral effects."^® By 1813, Coleridge developed the analogy by comparing in his lectures 
Macbeth to Bonaparte, expressing the hope that the latter tyrant’s fate would be similar 
to the former’s {LL 1: 545-6). However, the pathology o f the moral ‘revolution’ 
presented in the play was first drawn a few years before the French Revolution, by 
William Richardson in the opening essay o f his Philosophical Analysis (1774).
Richardson’s statement o f critical purpose has an uncanny resonance with 
the later concerns o f Wordsworth and Coleridge. ‘In treating the history of this 
revolution,’ Richardson writes, ‘we shall consider how the usurping principle became so 
powerful; how its powers were exerted in its conflict with opposing principles; and what 
were the consequences of its victory’.^ * True, the tyranny of a ruling passion, which 
overturned the harmony of both the internal and the external ‘constitutions’ reminded 
Richardson of Nero and Herod, rather than of any contemporary rulers. The need for 
curbing specifically ‘jacobin’ feelings would only be expressed by Coleridge. But the 
moral Richardson wishes to impress prefigures in a fundamental way what Coleridge
G8 William Shakespeare, M acbeth, ed. by Kenneth Muir, The Arden Shakespeare, gen. eds Harold F. 
Brooks, Harold Jenkins, Brian Morris (London: Methuen & Co, 1962), p. 23; p. 25; p. 57.
Donohue, D ram atic Character, p. 193.
70 In his Fenwick note Wordsworth referred to his essay on Rivers’s character as an attempt ‘to preserve in 
my distinct remembrance what I had observed o f  transition in character & the reflections I had been led to 
make during the time I was a witness o f  the changes through which the French Revolution passed’ 
(Borderers, 815). Cf. Mary Jacobus, “‘The Great Stage Where Senators Perform”. “Macbeth” and the 
Politics o f  Romantic Theater’, Studies in Romanticism, 22:3 (Fall 1983), 353-387.
Philosophical Analysis, p. 48.
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also implies in his interpretation of Macbeth: the urgency of monitoring and regulating 
the immoral passions by the conscious self, which is essential for the health of the 
individual and o f the political community. Every reader has a personal responsibility, 
for -  as Richardson writes — ‘The formation of our character depends considerably upon 
ourselves
This assertion of individual agency in character formation comes after 
Richardson’s engagement, through Macbeth, with a host of problems that could have 
compromised any such certainty. There is the question of innate disposition (how can 
that be overcome?), more importantly, there is the question of how far the passions can 
be controlled, if they are just as powerful as Richardson -  and the play -  shows them to 
be. And, since control for Richardson depends entirely upon knowledge, there is of 
course the ubiquitous question of how the passions can be made known to the conscious 
self, given their fatal capacity for misleading the higher faculties and turning them into 
their ‘slaves’. For good reasons, Richardson does not try to diminish these problems but 
rather makes them appear initially as intimidating as possible. His first image of the 
mind is that of chaos, with ‘images and ideas continually fluctuating in [it]. We are 
conscious of no power that regulates their motions, restrains their impetuosity, or 
composeth their disorder’. As a rule, we do not know ourselves, especially our passions 
and appetites, which ‘are often blended together, or succeed each other, with a velocity 
which we can neither measure nor conceive’.^ ® This is close to Hume’s sceptical image 
of the mind as a theatre in which impressions and ideas follow upon each other in no 
apparent order, without even the unity of a stage (the mind) or the perspective of an all- 
seeing spectator (the unified consciousness). Through his analysis o f Shakespeare’s 
characters, Richardson proceeds to transform his own initially anarchic view of the mind 
into an image of ideal balance and harmony, by planting a spectator in it who is able to 
understand the apparently chaotic events in terms of cause and effect, and to judge them 
according to the dictates of moral sense. Macbeth’s ‘poor player, / That struts and frets 
his hour upon the stage’ (5.5.24-5) cannot escape being watched and judged; the ‘tale / 
Told by an idiot’ (5.5.26-7) will be analyzed into a case history of moral derangement.^'^
P hilosophical Analysis, p. 85. 
P hilosophical Analysis, p. 11.
Shakespeare, M acbeth, p. 154.
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Richardson starts his investigation by registering a fundamental alteration 
in Macbeth: ‘All the principles in his constitution seem to have undergone a violent and 
total change. Some appear to be altogether reduced or extirpated: others monstrously 
o v e rg ro w n .T h is  structural view o f the self as inner ‘constitution’ is indeed analogous 
to the structural interests of contemporary pathologists.^^ The main concern of his 
analysis is to identify the very first symptoms of the ‘monstrous overgrowth’ that 
overturned the healthy structure; symptoms that must have appeared when Macbeth was 
still virtuous, mild, and healthily ambitious (mildness is attributed to him by Lady 
Macbeth, and Richardson simply accepts this from her). With clinical self-assurance, he 
puts his finger on something that might well have seemed disturbing to his polite 
audience: Macbeth’s disease started as a mere ‘excursion o f the imagination’. He 
imagined what it would be like to become a king (here Richardson’s argument 
foreshadows arguments made in the 1790s, according to which imaginary treason can 
itself be treasonable).^^ In other words, what had appeared at first as a harmless private 
indulgence, led to unforeseeable consequences, destroying the health o f the individual 
and of his country. Imagination, especially when ‘aided by partial gratification’ 
(Macbeth’s rise to Thane of Cawdor), has power ‘to invigorate and inflame our 
passions’. T h e  passion o f ambition thus gains momentum. Macbeth who was at first 
shocked by the idea of seizing the crown, soon ‘can think of [treason] calmly, and 
without abhorrence’. ‘Habituated passions’, indulged by the imagination, wear away his 
inner resistance. Even when he temporarily relinquishes his undertaking ‘symptoms of 
the decay o f virtue are manifest’
In the light o f Macbeth’s irreversible and ‘monstrous’ disease, 
Richardson seems to have every reason to state, ‘there is infinite danger in the 
apparently innocent and imaginary indulgence of a selfish passion. That harmony of the
Philosophical Analysis, p. 47.
Matthew Baillle, for instance, starts his M orbid  Anatom y by distinguishing between diseases that ‘do 
not produce any change in the structure o f  parts’ and diseases ‘where alterations in the structure take place, 
and these become the proper subjects o f  anatomical examination’. Matthew Baillie, The M orbid Anatomy 
o f  Some o f  the M ost Im portant P arts o f  the Human B ody (London, 1797), p. i.; cited in Tim Fulford, ed.. 
Romanticism and Science 1773-1833, 5 vols (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 2002), 1; 99.
See John Barrell, Im agining the King's Death : Figurative Treason, Fantasies o f  Regicide 1793-1796  
(Oxford, GUP, 2000).
Philosophical A nalysis, p. 49.
P hilosophical A nalysis, p. 63; 67.
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internal system is nicely adjusted; and the excessive tension or relaxation of any of the 
parts produces irregular and discordant tones.’ The complicated instrument o f the mind 
in such circumstances starts to fail in its most elementary tasks: ‘when the mind is seized 
and occupied by violent passions, its operations are disturbed, and the notices we receive 
from the senses are disregarded’.D e lu s io n  occurs. In Macbeth’s ‘broken and 
incoherent’ soliloquies Richardson diagnoses a ‘disordered state o f mind’, also 
‘expressed by interrupted gestures, absence of attention, and an agitated demeanour’.^’ 
Before long, his vision of the dagger attest to passion’s ultimate triumph over the senses, 
while ‘reason, beaming at intervals, heightens the horror of his disorder’. What follows 
is murder and precipitous downfall. Macbeth’s ‘fancy’, which used to serve his ruling 
passion, is now ‘haunted with tremendous images and his soul [is] distracted with 
remorse and terror’. With a flickering moral sense still in place, he ‘imagines’ himself 
‘no less abhorred by the spectator, than by the sufferer’, and thus his imagination (and, 
paradoxically, his moral sense) turns him again into a murderer, one who must kill every 
possible witness.^^
The relentless determinism, the way cause and effect inexorably follow 
each other in this account, gives unusual emphasis to Richardson’s call for vigilance and 
self-monitoring: ‘Whoever would cultivate an acquaintance with himself, and would 
know to what passions he is most exposed, should attend to the operations of fancy, and 
by remarking the objects she with greatest pleasure exhibits, he may discern, with 
tolerable accuracy, the nature of his own mind, and the principle most likely to rule 
him.’ '^^  This half-optimistic advice is set against the graver warning implicit in the 
analysis o f Macbeth. Imaginary indulgence of a passion, Richardson suggests, may start 
a chain-reaction that transforms the self beyond recognition. Joseph Donohue in his 
account of Richardson highlights just how drastic that diagnosis is: ‘When a man of 
honourable purpose and human instincts could awake to find himself a murderer o f king 
and fellow subject, no solid island o f virtuous conduct seemed able to stand against the
Philosophical Analysis, p. 70 
Philosophical Analysis, p. 64. 
P hilosophical Analysis, p. 71. 
Philosophical Analysis, p. 76; 78. 
P hilosophical Analysis, pp. 50-51.
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tidal onslaught of passion.’ Donohue sees this as evidence o f the weakening of moral 
certitudes which he traces in Richardson’s writings. However, I think that the 
precariousness of moral health that is implied here is rather Richardson’s method of 
affirming morality in a way that is arguably more effective than stating rules of ‘virtuous 
conduct’, namely by impressing upon his readers’ minds the need for monitoring their 
own imagination. Imagination, he seems to say, can trigger a transformation of the self 
which is beyond conscious explanations or initial motives -  indeed it can change the self 
beyond recognition, effecting what Wordsworth would call a ‘transition in character’. 
This emphasis on the imagination as a transformative principle is another important 
point where Richardson’s concerns intersect with Romantic thought. Viewed from this 
angle, the discourse on the imagination appears as not so much an endorsement of 
spiritual freedom as a mode of articulating and managing subjectivity by constant 
reflection on its own fictions.®^
In his notes on Macbeth, Coleridge too explores the transformative role 
of the imagination with respect to character, and while doing so manages to draw into 
the analysis aspects o f the play that Richardson had left unexamined. For Coleridge, the 
tragedy as a whole is played out in terms of the imagination. He finds the earliest proof 
of this in the opening scene: whereas Hamlet opens with ‘the gradual ascent from the 
simplest forms o f conversation to the language o f impassioned Intellect’, in Macbeth 
‘the invocation is made at once to the Imagination, and the emotions connected 
therewith’ {LL 2:305). The Weird Sisters signal the threshold to the imaginary, but in 
one note Coleridge even suggests the use o f ‘flexible character-masks’ (LL 2: 305) in a
Donohue, D ram atic Character, p. 215.
In his Fenwick note (1843), see Wordsworth, The Borderers, Robert Osborn ed. (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell UP, 1982), p. 815. Cf. Robert Osborn’s Introduction, The Borderers, p. 33.
Cf. Clifford Siskin’s Foucauldian interpretation o f  the Romantic self: ‘The se lf configured by the desire 
for ongoing revision, in other words, is self-disciplinary: by requiring and expecting unlimited 
development, it always opens deeper depths to surveillance and invites more and more specialized 
intervention.’ Siskin, The H istoricity  o f  Romantic D iscourse  (Oxford and N ew  York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), p. 13. See also Terry Castle on the pathological imagination in Alexander Crichton’s Inquiry 
into M ental D erangem ent (1798): ‘Indeed, the compulsive image-making o f  the reverie-prone 
individual -  the constant meditation on imaginary objects and scenes -  resulted directly in the unleashing 
o f  spectres. “The b elief in the reality o f  the phantoms o f  the imagination,” he warned, arose when images 
o f  the mind “acquired such a degree o f  force from frequent repetitions, as to be superior in their effect to 
those derived ah externa."' Castle, The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and  the 
Invention o f  the Uncanny (N ew  York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 183.
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theatrical production, presumably because this would have underlined still more the 
dominant role o f imagination throughout the play.^^
Like Richardson, Coleridge is keen to identify the first symptoms of 
Macbeth’s transformation, and he finds them, characteristically enough, in his initial 
silence at the Witches’ prophecy. Trained to read with suspicion, Coleridge recognizes 
silence as the first sign of suppressed passion (it is not pure coincidence that John Philip 
Kemble, who played a ‘philosophical’ Macbeth at Drury Lane, was understood to excel 
above all in his silences).^^ In his Bristol lecture, Coleridge is reported to have shown 
‘how Macbeth became early a tempter to himself: and contrasted the talkative curiosity 
o f the innocent-minded and open dispositioned Banquo [...] with the silent, absent, and 
brooding melancholy of his partner’ {LL 1: 531). This scene is very important for 
Coleridge for it is an example o f Shakespeare’s method of ‘opening up’ a character to 
inspection through indirect means. Silence is made significant by the proximity of 
speech.^^ Macbeth’s first reaction (or rather, non-reaction), symptomatic of his hidden 
desires, is made apparent through Banquo’s reflection on it:
But O how truly Shakespearean is the opening o f  Macbeth’s character given in the 
tm possessedness o f  Banquo’s mind, wholly present to the present Object -  an unsullied un­
scarified Mirror -  & in strict truth o f  Nature that he and not Macbeth h im self directs our notice to
Both Richardson and Schlegel dismiss the Witches as plain superstition, but Coleridge takes them rather 
seriously: ‘They were awful beings: and blended in themselves the Fates and Furies o f  the ancients with 
the sorceresses o f  Gothic and popular superstition. They were mysterious natures: fatherless, motherless, 
sexless: they com e and disappear: they lead evil minds from evil to evil: and have the power o f  tempting 
those, who have been the tempters o f  them selves.’ {LL 1: 531) Also: ‘the first appearance o f  the Weird 
Sisters, as the Key-note o f  the character o f  the whole Play’ {LL 2: 305).
Cf. James Boaden, M em oirs o f  the Life o f  John Philip Kemble, 2 vols (London, 1825), 1: 175-6: 
K em ble’s style o f  acting is ‘built on a metaphysical search into our nature, and a close attention to all the 
minutiae o f  language. It deals, therefore, in pauses, which were not before made; for the unlearned actor 
cared little about the transition o f  thought. He never examined, o f  the associations o f  our ideas, how much 
in dramatic dialogue is suppressed -  and never dreamt that the rapid junction o f  ideas totally unconnected 
is violent and unmeaning. [ . . .]  In short, what philosophical criticism had discovered to be properties o f  
Shakespeare’s characters, the actor now endeavored to shew. To be a just representative o f  the part, he 
was to become a living commentary on the poet.’ Quoted in Donohue, D ram atic Character, p. 252.
Coleridge discusses an analogous scene in his Apologetic Preface to ‘Fire, Famine and Slaughter’, 
describing a talkative and a silent sailor, o f  whom the silent one is more capable o f  murder; see John 
Barrell, Im agining the K ing's Death, pp. 646-51. Barrell stresses the role Coleridge assigns to imagination 
as an antidote to violent action; based on his reading o f  M acbeth, I would like to add that Coleridge is also 
emphasising the necessity o f  reflection on imagination, which is enabled by verbal expression. Coleridge 
warns that i f  passions do not find their expression in language, they find their alternative language in 
action, even against the conscious will.
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the effect produced on M acbeth’s Mind, rendered temptible by <previous> dalliance o f  the Fancy 
with ambitious Thoughts. {LL 2: 306)
As this passage suggests, Coleridge identifies the sources of Macbeth’s crime in 
‘dalliance o f the Fancy with ambitious Thoughts’; at a later point he will call attention to 
‘the danger o f indulging in fancies’ (LL 2: 308). The illicit imagining o f power is not 
crime itself, but it makes the mind 'temptible very much as Richardson had warned. 
Coleridge finds confirmation ‘o f the remark on the birth-date of guilt’ (LL 2; 307) in 
Macbeth’s subsequent speech, in which imagined crime is described together with its 
effects:
Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings.
M y thought, w hose murther is yet but fantastical.
Shakes so my single state o f  man,
That function is smother’d in surmise,
And nothing is, but what is not. [1.3.137-142]^’
Imagining murder abstracts Macbeth from reality and makes reality appear as unreal -  
this is how indulged passion transforms the perception of the world and consequently the 
character itself. Coleridge calls attention to this effect throughout his comments, stating, 
for instance, that in his fight against conscience Macbeth becomes similar to ‘delirous 
Men, that run away from the Phantoms o f their own Brains, or raised by Terror to Rage 
stab the real object that is within their own Reach’ (LL 1: 529).
One of Coleridge’s important critical moves is to extend the diagnosis to 
Lady Macbeth, a character who had been described by both Richardson and Karnes as 
‘monstrous’, i.e. inexplicable. Coleridge, on the contrary, believes that her most violent 
outbursts still reveal remnants of conscience and femininity, which she tries to disown.®  ^
Criticism has discussed the significance of this unconventional view, matched only by 
the re-interpretation of the figure by Mrs. Siddons.^^ Viewed in the context of
Shakespeare, M acbeth, pp. 20-21.
The B ristol Journal reported at length Coleridge’s rejection o f  ‘the prejudiced idea o f  Lady M acbeth  as 
a Monster: as a being out o f  nature and without conscience’ (LL 1: 532).
Julie A. Carlson discusses why Romantic critics start to analyze female characters in general and the 
role Siddons plays in this transformation in Carlson, In the Theatre o f  Romanticism: Coleridge, 
Nationalism, (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 156-175.
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‘philosophical analysis’, Coleridge’s reading o f the Lady seems to give even clearer 
emphasis to the pathological dimension of the imagination, which both he and 
Richardson have identified in Macbeth. According to Coleridge, Lady Macbeth’s 
disease mirrors that of her husband, for in both cases the transformation is triggered by 
indulging fancies. She is ‘a woman of a visionary and day-dreaming turn of mind: her 
eye fixed on the shadows o f her solitary ambition’ {LL 1: 532). Her ‘unsex me’ speech 
characterises ‘one who had habitually familiarized her Imag[ination] to dreadful 
Conceptions & is now trying to do it still more’ (CM 4:727) -  the analogy with 
Richardson’s ‘Habitually familiarised passion’ is quite evident here. Her exhortations to 
Macbeth are proof o f a ‘Day-dreamer’s valiance’ {LL 2: 308). Even more than Macbeth, 
she lives in an imaginary world of her own creation. While Coleridge often refers to the 
‘fancy’ and ‘delirium’ in connection with Macbeth, he retains ‘imagination’ for the more 
passive Lady, whose mind is ‘accustomed only to the Shadows of the Imagination, vivid 
enough to throw the every day realities into shadows but not yet compared with their 
own correspondent realities.’ {LL 2: 308) Her obsession with imagined power poisons all 
aspects of her life -  she has ‘no personal sense’ (CM4:727), ‘her feelings [are] 
abstracted , through the deep musings of her absorbing passion, from the common-life 
sympathies of flesh and blood’ {LL 1: 532). Her sleepwalking, writes Coleridge, is the 
ultimate proof of her ‘drea[m]-wa[king] & wake-dreaming Character’ (CM4:776).
However, at the ‘very first reality, L. M. shrinks’ {LL 2: 309). She does 
not (or rather cannot) cross the line between imaginary and actual crime. Coleridge’s 
moral interest is therefore focussed on Macbeth, for his development poses the question 
of the accountability of the imagination in the most uncompromising form. In 1808 
Macbeth is described as a ‘Commanding Genius’ (the same category Coleridge used for 
Napoleon), with ‘an active & combining Intellect, and an Imagination of just that degree 
o f vividness which disquiets & impels the Soul to try to realize its Images’ {LL 1: 137). 
Partly because o f his need to analyse his own early radical sympathies, Coleridge was 
deeply interested in tracing how imagination might turn to (criminal) action -  a 
transition that was described as in some sense a debased version o f poetic creation. The 
analogy is implied in several of his comments on Macbeth and the Lady which highlight 
their ‘visionary’ side, but is elaborated most fully in the Biogmphia, where Coleridge
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States that ‘Commanding Geniuses’ ‘must impress their preconceptions on the world 
without’ {BL 1: 32) -  which seems to mean that the ‘Commanding Genius’, who has too 
much imagination to live like ordinary people, but too little to be a poet, is unable to 
read his own mind without, as it were, writing it first into reality. Julie A. Carlson has 
discussed how Coleridge attempted to dissociate himself from his own radical past by 
drawing a line between ‘Commanding’ and ‘Absolute Genius’, and how he negotiated 
their relationship in the medium of the theatre.^"^ I would suggest that Coleridge’s 
method of doing so owed a great deal to Richardson’s ‘stage-tactics’, which set out to 
know the self through dividing it into spectator and spectacle, fictitious ‘patient’ and 
philosophical analyst.
In treating Macbeth, Coleridge perhaps was also treating himself, striving 
to analyse the dangerous tendencies of the imagination in a closed ‘case’. This might be 
seen from the way he adds his annotations, as it were to the margins o f Macbeth. In his 
lecture, for instance, after stating that Macbeth is ‘rendered temptible^ by his own 
imagination {LL 2: 306), he cited Wallenstein’s soliloquy in his own translation: ‘Must 
do the deed, because I thought of it, / And fed this heart here with a dream?’ (4.4. Iff). 
This was an important question for Coleridge, for supposing that action was wholly 
determined by speculation and passion (or even worse, that it was a natural consequence 
of unconscious dreams), meant that it was beyond the individual’s control. This is the 
view endorsed by Ordonio in Coleridge’s own play Remorse, after having complained of 
‘this unutterable dying away -  here -  / This sickness of the heart! ’ (2.1.127-8):
What have I done but that which nature destin’d.
Or the blind elements stirr’d up within me?
If good were meant, why were w e made these Beings?
And if  not m ea n t- [2.1.131-134; PJT1II.2: 1264]
Coleridge here evokes Macbeth’s soliloquy (‘This supernatural soliciting / Cannot be ill; 
cannot be good: -  If ill,’ etc [1.3.130-1]), on which, in preparation for his lectures, he 
wrote the following comment: ‘The First struggl[e] of Conscience[,] his disobedien[ce] 
to which is to destroy him b[y] the very pang[s] of Compuncti[on]. “Remorse {CM 4:
In the Theatre o f  Romanticism, p. 23.
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770) Coleridge thus writes Remorse into Macbeth and Macbeth into Remorse?^ If we 
take up the connection, the note suggests that Ordonio’s guilt involved -  in spite of his 
own self-justification -  an act of ‘disobedience’, a conscious break with the moral order. 
Ordonio has good reasons not to remember this, and it is accordingly missing from the 
analysis he gives of himself in the third person:
He w alk’d alone,
And phantom thoughts unsought for troubled him.
Something within would still be shadowing out 
AH possibilities; and with these shadows 
His mind held dalliance. Once, as so it happen’d,
A fancy cross’d him wilder than the rest:
To this in m oody murmur and low voice 
H e yielded utterance, as som e talk in sleep.
The man who heard him. - [ . . . ]
With his human hand 
He gave substance and reality 
To that wild fancy o f  a possible thing. -
W ell it was done! [4.1.110-125; PIT III.2: 1297-8]
Ordonio here wants to obscure his own moral responsibility by establishing a smooth 
transition from involuntary thoughts to shadows his ‘mind held dalliance’ with, and from 
his ‘yielding utterance’ to a fancy to its realization by a ‘human hand’. This is strongly 
reminiscent o f Macbeth’s separations of ‘hand’ from ‘eye’, to mitigate his sense of guilt 
for the planned m u rd er.O rd o n io ’s speech creates an immaterial phantom world to hide 
the fact that he arranged the assassination of his brother, and that in the very moment in 
the play he is planning to kill his own accomplice. The speech, then, is an example of 
the ‘prudential and selfish Reasonings’ {LL 1: 529) Coleridge identified in Macbeth, and
Jonathan Bate traces more Shakespearean allusions in this speech, which he does not find very effective: 
‘Osorio’s gallimaufry begins in the manner o f  Hamlet, then shifts to the tone o f  Timon, glances at Lear or 
Othello with the repetition o f  ‘foo l!’, and ends with something o f  Macbeth’s equivocation [...]  Though 
there is this similarity in content, there is none in effect. Osorio is only going through the motions o f  
describing passion; Coleridge is unable to imitate the way that Shakespeare expresses  passion by showing 
us the intricate processes o f  his character’s mental operations.’ Shakespeare and the English Romantic 
Imagination  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 52.
See 1. 4. 52-3: ‘The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be / Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see .’ 
Shakespeare, M acbeth, p. 25.
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the use o f the third person singular highlights the self-alienation involved in Ordonio’s 
state and actions.
What Coleridge seems to insist on with respect to both Macbeth and 
Remorse is that a conscious moral choice must have been made by the characters before 
committing the act of crime. The fact that he could read silences and omissions as the 
most telling of symptoms (this seems to be reflected in his own broken line in Remorse, 
‘And if not meant enabled him to make this argument without having to frame the 
characters’ moral choice as text. In the first scenes of Macbeth, the choice is still to be 
made: 'King hereafter was still contingent -  still in Macbeth’s moral will -  tho’ if he 
yielded to the temptation & thus forfeited his free-agency, then the link of cause and 
effect more physico would commence’ {LL 2:306). Even if he cannot point out the 
moment of ‘yielding’ in the text, Coleridge suggests that the ‘natural’ -  and hence 
uncontrollable -  laws o f causality which determine the progress o f a character depend on 
an act of the ‘moral will’. Acts of the imagination, he seems to say, do not materialize 
without one’s consent, however secretly it is given.
Having read this final, invisible symptom into the text, Coleridge can 
‘round up’ Macbeth’s character and present it as a finished product of philosophical 
analysis.^^ What he explains in the Conclusion to the Biographia about the reassuring 
nature of diagnoses could apply to this interpretation as well:
It is within the experience o f  many medical practitioners, that a patient, with strange and unusual 
symptoms o f  disease, has been more distressed in mind, more wretched from the fact o f  being 
unintelligible to h im self and others, than from the pain or danger o f  the disease: nay, that the 
patient has received the most solid comfort, and resumed a genial and enduring cheerfulness, 
from som e new symptom or product, that had at once determined the name and nature o f  his 
complaint, and rendered it an intelligible effect o f  an intelligible cause: even though the 
discovery did at the same moment preclude all hope o f  restoration. {BL 2: 235)
See Coleridge’s note: ‘Under the maske o f  the third Person Osorio relates his own Story, as in the 
delusion o f  self-justification & Pride it appeared to himself, at least as he wished it to appear to him self.’ 
{FWIILI:  160)
The ‘label’ on the case history reads as follows: ‘When once the mind, in despite the remonstrating 
conscience, has abandoned its free power to a haunting impulse or idea, then whatever tends to give depth 
and vividness to this idea, or indefinite imagination increases its despotism, and in the same proportion 
renders the reason and free w ill ineffectual.’ C oleridge’s  M iscellaneous Criticism , ed, T. M, Raysor 
(London: Constable and Co., 1936), p. 293.
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In our case, the roles are assigned in a slightly different fashion: it is framing the 
diagnosis of a fictitious character, which might prove to be liberating for the reader- 
critic. As we have seen, it was clear to Coleridge that in literary ‘case histories’, the 
shape of the interpretation depended to a large extent on the reader’s own imaginative 
self-analysis, which in turn was enabled by the ‘outness’ of the literary text. 
Shakespeare’s characters, it seems, were used by him to obliquely read and manage his 
own passions and imagination, while at the same time he could offer these readings as 
external to himself, and thus fit to be communicated to the public for their own benefit. 
This strategy is in fact the mirror image of Coleridge’s ‘myth’ o f Shakespearean creation, 
according to which Shakespeare’s characters provided the means by which he 
emancipated himself from his own enthusiasm. ‘Poetry a rationalized Dream dealing 
[out?] to manifold Forms our own Feelings, that never perhaps were attached by us 
consciously to our own personal Selves’ {CN 2: 2086) -  in my view, this memorable 
notebook entry simultaneously describes the creation and the reception o f poetry. For the 
reader, as for the poet, it provides a way to analyze (‘rationalize’) feelings, imagined as 
the feelings of an ‘other’. Coleridge’s self-analysis through Hamlet is only the most 
obvious example of how he rationalized and objectified imagined or real ‘diseases’ of 
his own mind through reading Shakespeare, and it is evident that he offered these 
readings as a moral medicine to his audience as well.
His analysis o f Macbeth was introduced as showing ‘that every thing in 
Shakespeare tended to make us not only wiser, but better’ {LL 1: 514). This is not 
because Shakespeare presented in his plays models of ideal human conduct, but because 
through ‘embodying’ the mechanisms of passion he enabled readers to see and 
understand their own potential disorders from the outside. This is the ‘healing influence 
of Light and distinct Beholding’ Coleridge writes about in the Conclusion to the 
Biographia, an effect he compares to ‘the alleviation that results from "opening out our 
griefs:” which are thus presented in distinguishable forms instead of the mist, through 
which whatever is shapeless becomes magnified and (literally) enormous’ {BL 2: 235). 
Interestingly, this image is the exact opposite of that of the Brocken spectre which 
Coleridge had used in connection with how readers see themselves in Shakespeare’s
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characters. There, the reader is a definite figure, while the imagined and magnified 
character is shrouded in mist. Here, the feeling self is experienced as shapeless and 
'enormous', and the self expressed through language gains distinct outlines, becomes 
intelligible and, possibly, the object of sympathy. It seems to me that both metaphors are 
relevant to Coleridge’s treatment of Shakespeare’s characters, and that taken together 
they describe the dynamism of his analyses exceptionally clearly. The imaginative 
reading he proposes ‘dissolves, diffuses, dissipates’ the self, in order to ‘recreate’ it, and 
his philosophical criticism is even capable of reflecting on that continual transformation.
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Chapter Five
Remorse, or the ghost of feeling 
(coda)
‘yet a certain something more than Regret will mingle into 
the regret -  a certain something w ill haunt and sadden the 
heart, which if  not Remorse is however a phantom and 
Counterfeit o f  Remorse’ {LL 1: 64)
‘The sole true Something this in Limbo Den  
It frightens Ghosts as Ghosts here frighten men -  ’
(C #  3: 4073)
1
Affect is the central concept of philosophical criticism, both in Coleridge 
and in the writings o f late-eighteenth-century critics like Kames or Richardson. In their 
circuitous project, they rely on feeling in order to analyse Shakespeare, and rely on 
Shakespeare in order to analyse feeling. However, in Coleridge’s lectures, feeling is 
turned into an even more powerful principle, which governs interpretation as 
performance, thereby making explicit the link between feeling and theatricality that had 
only been implied by his predecessors. In Richardson’s mental theatre, for instance, the 
implied spectator’s moral response (from compassion to abhorrence) forms the 
groundwork of the interpretation. Responsive feeling, attributed to every ‘healthy’ 
subject, is the touchstone validating his philosophical analysis, while at the same time it 
is also the means by which he instructs his readers in how to articulate their own moral 
subjectivity. But in this scheme responsive feeling is ultimately superseded by 
understanding; no readerly response remains unaccounted for, and no passion is left 
unaccommodated in the overall explanatory structure o f ‘character’. For this reason, in
Richardson’s writings metaphors of the theatre are embedded in a larger context of 
quasi-scientific analysis. His aim is to describe and explain the theatre of passion, which 
he locates In Shakespeare and in the reader’s mind -  but, emphatically, not in that of the 
critic. Coleridge, by contrast, offers analysis as process and performance, that is, as 
‘theatre’ in a wider sense. In his practice, interpretation should be attempted again and 
again in front o f every new audience, precisely beeause it can never be complete in itself. 
In his lectures, he not only explains mechanisms of feeling in and through the 
Shakespearean text, but also exhibits feeling, through bodily and verbal gestures that 
point towards something beyond analysis, thus keeping alive the need to analyse. His 
‘performance’ of interpretation is governed by two impulses: first, by the impulse to 
uncover a mental anatomy from Shakespeare’s text, that is, to reveal a philosophical 
knowledge which is supposed to be already ‘in’ it, and second, by the impulse to 
‘embody’ a philosophical anatomy by making it appear in front o f the audience, in the 
form of poetry mediated by the critic’s spectacular, living commentary.
The dialectics of anatomy and embodiment, of feeling and understanding, 
keep Coleridge’s interpretations of Shakespeare in perpetual motion and account for 
their remarkable capacity to develop, even as they return to the same arguments again 
and again. In 1811, he divided the ‘enlightened readers of Shakespeare’ into two classes, 
‘Those who read with feeling and understanding’ and ‘Those who with<out> affecting 
to understand or criticize merely feel and are the recipients of the poet’s power’ {LL 1 : 
351-2). He regarded himself as a representative of the first class, as is clear, among other 
things, from the concept o f ‘analysis by touch’, which he developed immediately after 
the above classification. But it is remarkable that the first class of readers, as it were, 
incorporates the second; all ‘enlightened’ reading is governed by some kind of feeling 
for the text -  a feeling of its ‘power’ -  only the more philosophical reader (the critic) 
also knows what, and presumably why, he feels. Reflection, for this type of reader, has 
become a habit, but it is always a reflection on, a reaction to, some experience of being 
‘touched’. In this sense, Coleridge’s philosophical analysis, in spite of its reliance on the 
concept of a priori knowledge in matters concerning reason, cannot and does not want to 
discard the mode of observation he scornfully attributed to empiricist critics, ‘those 
snails of intellect, who wear their eyes at the tips of their feelers’ {SW&F 1: 3319-220).
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The philosophical critic is someone capable of reflecting on his own inner empiricist, 
and who therefore knows that the ‘sense data’ of feeling encountered through the 
reading process are the result of an intricate interplay between the text and the mind,
Coleridge, adept in self-experimentation as he was, was also aware that 
this kind of reflection generates its own attendant feelings, which in turn can be 
subjected to further analysis. Very early, in 1794, he wrote about this to Southey; ‘I am 
so habituated to philosophizing, that I cannot divest myself of it even when my own 
Wretchedness is the subject. I appear to myself like a sick Physician, feeling the pang 
acutely, yet deriving a wonted pleasure from examining it’s progress and developing it’s 
causes.’ {CL I: 133) Arguably, there is a similar impulse at work behind the anatomies of 
character developed in his lectures. Whereas Richardson seemed to be content with 
arriving at a dispassionate diagnosis of the given ‘case’, Coleridge’s analyses, as partly 
anatomies o f the self, involve personal feelings projected onto the fictitious characters, 
while the critic’s intellectual engagement with the figures leads to what he calls the 
pleasure ‘of distinct beholding’. The ‘wonted pleasure’ derived from philosophical 
examination thus accompanies not only Coleridge’s private habit of self-examination, 
but also his public lectures. The important difference is that in the latter, Shakespeare’s 
text provides a screen through which the critic’s own feeling of ‘Wretchedness’ can 
appear at a remove, manifesting mechanisms inherent in human nature as he understands 
it, while also obliquely contributing to his own self-portrait.
The surplus of feeling keeps Coleridge’s critical enterprise in motion; the 
pleasure he derives from the analysis is multiplied by the pleasure o f his audience, which, 
to make something like a Coleridgean distinction, is not quite the same as the pleasure of 
reading Shakespeare, or o f seeing one of his plays on stage. What Coleridge’s audience 
enjoys is seeing Shakespeare analysed. More precisely, they enjoy seeing analysis 
performed by Coleridge, who not only understands (as an abstract philosopher), but also, 
and primarily, feels (as an embodied being). For this reason, Coleridge the critic always 
appears to feel in exeess, and his audience catches some of this excess by registering 
signs of feeling in his bodily gestures, in the gaps of his speech, or in his passionate 
rhetoric. Reports of the lectures, as well as his own notes, suggest that he was most 
eloquent when he identified an excess o f feeling in Shakespeare himself, in other words.
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when he wished to demonstrate that Shakespeare’s philosophy somehow also made 
manifest what it could not understand. ‘The Poet is not only the man made to solve the 
riddle of the Universe, but he is also the man who feels where it is not solved’ {LL 1 : 
327), he wrote in preparation for a lecture in 1811. Shakespeare’s capacity to feel what 
he could not know distinguishes him from the enlightened philosophes, and their 
counterparts, whom in the critique of Bertram Coleridge calls ‘Jacobinical’ dramatists.^ 
This is another important implication of the philosophical ‘tact’ Coleridge writes about; 
Shakespeare, according to him, has an immediate knowledge of human experience, 
including even those aspects which cannot be conceptualised. For this reason, even 
though his characters are elaborations on philosophical problems, they never should be 
considered as merely abstractions; Shakespeare’s ‘tact’ gives them a substance that goes 
beyond what can be turned into explicit knowledge. Annotating the scene in Richard II  
in which the Queen speaks of her presentiment -  the conceit of her ‘unborn’ grief-  
Coleridge comments; ‘Shakespear’s reverence for whatever arises out of our moral 
nature, even in the guise of superstition -  no contemptuous reasoning away the feelings 
of men - ’ {LL 1; 560). Shakespeare’s feeling o f ‘reverence’, or, inversely, his lack of 
‘contempt’, guarantee that his philosophy does not lead to disembodied knowledge, to 
‘reasoning away’, but to poetic embodiment.^
As I have argued in the previous chapter, Shakespeare’s art originates in 
‘enthusiastic passion’ according to Coleridge; in other words, his poetic ‘feelings’ are 
generated by ideas. In a note ‘On Aesthetic Problems’, written around 1813-14, 
Coleridge also refers to this quality to distinguish between ‘the man of fine & 
susceptible -  i.e. easily excitable -  Taste’, and ‘the Man of Genius’. ‘The former,’ he 
writes, ‘is excitable by the appropriate Image; but in order to the Production of the 
appropriate Image, capable of-ealling-inte-awakening & ealling into actien-an d-Life the 
Life & Mind o f the Spectator, the Artist’s mind must be excitable & thrown into that
' See also the follow ing note on Shakespeare: ‘The regular high Road o f  Human Affections -  it is not the 
Poet’s Business to analyse & criticise the affections & Faiths o f  Men/ but to assure himself, that such & 
such are affections & Faiths grounded in human Nature, not in mere accident o f  Ignorance or Disease - /  
his most important. -  He is the morning Star o f  Philosophy -  the guide & pioneer -  {LL 1: 127)
 ^ See also a note on Massinger, in w hose works ‘the Dramatis Personae were all planned each by itse lf ,  
whereas in Shakespeare ‘the Play is a syngenesia, each has indeed a life o f  its own & is an individuum o f  
itself; but yet an organ to the w hole -  as the Heart & the Brain -  &c/. The Heart &c o f  that particular 
W hole. S. a comparative Anatomist. /  Hence Massinger & all indeed but Sh. take a dislike to their own 
characters, and spite them selves upon them by making them talk like fo o ls  or m onsters.’ {LL 2: 151)
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State, by the Idea (N.b. not the Spectrum or Phantom but the Idea)’ {SW&F 1:348). 
Coleridge here still uses the concept of ‘excitement’ and ‘excitability’, as he did in 1810, 
when he evoked the Brunonian terms to define poetry {CN 3: 3827).^ But in this note 
(perhaps as opposed to the earlier one), these terms do not point towards an aesthetic of 
‘physical imagination’ -  to use Martin Wallen’s phrase -  but towards one that is 
fundamentally idealistic. True, Coleridge’s idealism relies on the concept of feeling, as 
something that leads to embodiment. The above note, however, while exhibiting this 
general feature, also hints at a related insight in Coleridge’s criticism that I have 
neglected so far. Namely, it reveals Coleridge’s awareness that the ‘materialisation’ that 
takes place in language is in fact closer to being a ‘Spectrum or Phantom’ from the 
reader’s point of view. In other words, the ‘bodies’ that are realised in passionate 
language are effects o f language -  fictions within fictions -  inhabiting ‘that lifeless, 
twilight realm of idea, which is the confine, the intermundium, as it were, o f existence 
and non-existence’ {SW&F 1: 337).
2
Most famously, Coleridge used the term ‘intermundium’ in the 
Biographia in order to distinguish between the Commanding and the Absolute Geniuses, 
stating that the latter rests content with creation in the twilight realm o f the imagination, 
while the former needs to realise his imaginings in the real world. However, in the entry 
published in the Omniana (1812) from which I have just quoted, the ‘intermundium’ is 
revealed as having its own degrees of reality. Coleridge here contemplates the difference 
between reading and seeing a play on stage, by distinguishing between different degrees 
of embodiment in the realm of language. Words become more ‘real’ merely by being 
read out loud, because ‘blending with them a sense of outness gives them a sort of 
reality’. Words spoken on the stage, with ‘every contrivance o f scenery, appropriate 
dresses, accordant and auxiliary looks’, are experienced as almost fully real, while in
 ^ Perhaps his reliance in this note on Schelling, who was also influenced by John Brown, might have 
encouraged him to do so. Coleridge’s strategy o f  distancing h im self from Brown is traced in Martin 
Wallen, City o f  Health, F ields o f  D isease: Revolutions in the Poetry, Medicine, and Philosophy o f  
Romanticism  (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 102-118.
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‘mere passive silent reading’ thoughts remain mere thoughts, ‘phantoms with no 
attribute of place, no sense o f appropriation, that flit over the consciousness as shadows 
over the grass or young corn in an April day’ (SW&F 1: 337). What I have described in 
Chapters 2 and 3 as figures of passion are, perhaps, somewhere in between the flitting 
‘shadows’ of passive reading and the embodied thoughts of the theatre. They are 
ultimately closer to the ‘shadows’, however, for, paradoxically, the more real they 
appear to the reader, the more phantom-like they necessarily are.
The Queen’s conceit in Richard //em bodies in language a feeling she 
does not understand, through the figure of a child ‘of nothing’ with whom she is 
pregnant. In King John, Constance speaks o f her grief walking in the room, filling in the 
clothes of a son whom she believes dead. For Macbeth, even to imagine the death of the 
king turns the world into a world of phantoms, in which ‘Nothing is but what is not’, and 
his sense of guilt (disowned, as Coleridge emphasises) visits him in the form of a ghost. 
Discussion o f ghosts is something that necessarily comes up in Shakespearean criticism, 
and, of course, Coleridge had a well-documented interest in them in g e n e ra lB u t  I 
would suggest that the careful attention paid to ghosts and nightmares (their counterparts 
in sleep) throughout his lectures can be understood in a more specific context. That is, it 
can be regarded as directly related to his engagement with questions o f feeling and of 
embodiment in poetic language.
A notebook entry from about 1807-1808 (the time of his first lectures) 
helps to bring this issue into relief. Coleridge starts with the by now familiar problem 
that the self -  or, here, the soul -  cannot be turned into an object o f knowledge, but then 
his argument takes a turn to assert Shakespeare’s uniqueness, followed by a curious 
piece of self-observation:
Hence even in dreams o f  Sleep the soul never is, because it either cannot or dare not be, any
<ONE> THING; but it lives in approaches -  touched by the outgoing pre-existent Ghosts o f  many
Ghosts, dreams and nightmares in Coleridge have been most recently discussed in Jennifer Ford, 
Coleridge on Dreaming: Romanticism, D ream s and the M edical Imagination  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); David Vallins, Coleridge and the Psychology o f  Romanticism: Feeling and  
Thought (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, N ew  York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 42-48; David S. 
Miall and D. Kuiken, eds., ‘Coleridge and Dream s’ , Dreaming, 7:1-2 (1997); David Miall, ‘The Meaning 
o f  Dreams: Coleridge’s Am bivalence’, Studies in Romanticism, 21 (1982), 52-87. For ghosts in romantic 
writing in general and in Coleridge, see Frederick Burwick, ‘Romantic Supernaturalism: The Case Study 
as a Gothic Tale’, The W ordsworth Circle, 34/2 (Spring 2003), 74-81.
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feelings -  It feels for ever as a blind man with his protended Staff, dimly thro’ the medium o f  the 
aet instrument by which it pushes off, & in the act o f  repulsion, O for the eloquence o f  
Shakspeare, who alone could feel & yet know how to embody these conceptions, with as curious 
a felicity as the thoughts are subtle. A s i f  the finger which I saw with eyes Had, as it were, 
another finger invisible -  Touching me with a ghostly touch, even w hile I feared the real Touch 
from it. What i f  in certain cases Touch acted by itself, co-present with vision, yet not coalescing -  
then I should see the finger as at a distance, and yet feel a finger touching which was nothing but 
it & yet was not it /  the two senses cannot co-exist without a sense o f  causation / the touch must 
be the effect o f  that Finger, I see, yet it’s not yet near to me, <and therefore it is not it; & yet it is 
it. W hy,> it is an imaginary preduplication. NB. there is a passage in the second Part o f  
W allenstein, expressing not explaining the same feeling -  The Spirits o f  great Events Stride on 
before the events -  it is in one o f  the last two or 3 Scenes. {CN  2; 3215)
Without attempting to explicate all the connections in this subtle passage, I would like to 
point out a few things that make it relevant to the interpretation o f Coleridge’s lectures I 
have been developing so far. Coleridge here seems to write about dreaming not in order 
to contrast it with the waking state, but to underline a general characteristic of the soul 
which he believes to be present ‘even in dreams’. The soul in sleep ‘lives in approaches'. 
This is fairly close to his description o f the process by which the reader encounters 
aspects of his or her own self, through being ‘touched’ by poetry. It might be noted here 
that a similar understanding o f the reading process can be found in one o f Coleridge’s 
latest works on interpretation. Confessions o f  an Inquiring Spirit (1824), in which he 
writes, 'whatever finds me [...] bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy 
Spirit’ {SW&F 2:1121-2).^ According to the argument developed in that work, the 
weightiest evidence for the authenticity of the Bible is to be found in the reader’s 
experience; but while the text ‘finds’ the soul in its depths, those depths are brought to 
consciousness by the very act of reading, and in this sense exist for the conscious self 
precisely insofar as they are ‘found’.
In the Confessions, the reader is said to be touched by the Holy Spirit 
through the inspired text (‘the words o f the Bible f in d  tne at greater depths of my being’ 
[SW&F 2A\23>\). In the notebook entry, by contrast, it is the ‘Ghosts o f many feelings’ 
that reach the soul, thereby constituting its life during sleep. Are these feelings called
 ^ The notes in SW &F  point out the connection with the German term ‘Empfindung’, o f  which Coleridge 
wrote: ‘A Sensation, a Feeling, is what I f in d  in me as in m e’ {CN3:  4443).
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‘Ghosts’ because they figure in dreams, and therefore have no sufficient cause in the 
waking world? Or can feelings be generally understood as ‘Ghosts’ visiting the self as if 
from the outside? Coleridge sometimes does use metaphors suggesting the latter, 
although he adds that some feelings -  most crucially, love -  are fully ‘real’, without 
anything ghostly about them.^ Importantly, ghosts and nightmares themselves are 
usually explained by him as outward symbols o f feelings; they are shapes the 
imagination gives to ‘pre-existent’ feelings or sensations, most characteristically to the 
bodily sensation that accompanies te rro r/ Therefore, his peculiar expression ‘outgoing 
pre-existent Ghosts of many feelings’ also suggests that the feelings he refers to have a 
necessary imaginary component; the soul ‘feels’ itse lf-  at least in dreams -  through 
embodying the possible causes o f its own feeling in some imaginary form. It takes only 
one step from here to say that feelings experienced in reading are ‘ghosts’ in a very 
similar sense.
Coleridge’s next sentence (‘It feels for ever as a blind m an... ’) seems to 
be about the way the soul knows itself ‘by tact’, without ever being able to perceive 
itself as a whole. The subsequent invocation of Shakespeare is relevant to this theme in 
more than one way: first, because o f Shakespeare’s intimate knowledge o f the mind, 
which Coleridge also referred to as philosophical ‘tact’, and second, because he not only 
‘feels’ but ‘knows how to embody these conceptions’, through his ‘eloquence’ (besides, 
the ‘conception’ itself might owe something to Gloucester’s ‘I see it feelingly’). It is 
curious that immediately after this tribute to Shakespearean embodiment Coleridge turns 
to describing an experience that unites embodiment with disembodiment in a peculiar 
way. What he calls the ‘ghostly touch’ appears to be a sensation of touch caused by the 
mere idea of being touched, anticipating a ‘real’ touch by a finger still at a distance (this 
is what I think is meant by ‘imaginary preduplication’). Is this experience mentioned as 
an example of the subtle truths that Shakespeare knew how to embody? In that case, 
Shakespeare mysteriously embodies a sense o f nearness -  the presence of something not
® ‘Every mere Passion, like Spirits, and Apparitions, have their hour o f  Cock-crow, in which they must 
vanish. But pure Love is therefore no mere Passion; & it is a test o f  its being Love, that no reason can be 
assigned w hy  it should disappear - ’ (CjV3: 4069). Around the time o f  writing this entry (Apr 1811) 
Coleridge in his lectures argued that love involved an act o f  the free w ill, and therefore not a ‘mere’ 
passion.
 ^ Cf. for instance the lectures (1: 131-2; 135-6); C N 2: 2878; C N 3 \ 4046 with note (‘Keats in 1819 
reported Coleridge as defining nightmare as a dream accompanied by a sense o f  touch’).
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quite there, like the ‘Spirits of great events’ in the line from Coleridge’s translation of 
Wallenstein. Or is Coleridge perhaps elaborating, more generally, on the kind of 
‘embodiment’ that takes place in Shakespeare? If this be the case, it is worth recalling 
that in a notebook entry from 1804, Coleridge was already toying with the suggestion 
that words might primarily evoke ideas o f touch, rather than ideas of sight. ‘Do not 
words excite feelings o f Touch (tactual Ideas) more than distinct visual Ideas — i.e. q/" 
Memory?', he asks, adding a reminder that this would explain ‘many o f the popular 
notions concerning Ghosts & apparitions’ {CN2\ 2152). Seen in the context of our 
present entry, this must mean that words, and specifically the words o f Shakespeare, act 
as a kind of ‘ghostly touch’ on the reader’s mind; they stimulate what might be called a 
feeling of nearness (although not of presence), caused by ideas evoked by the text.
The way this notebook entry drifts from ‘ghosts’ o f feeling to 
Shakespearean embodiment, and back to the ‘ghostly touch’, prefigures what often 
happens in Coleridge’s lectures, in which feelings and ideas are continually shown as 
converted into one another through the medium of poetry. The lecturer, who both 
explains and manifests what Shakespeare is ‘about’, turns the interaction between 
feeling and understanding into performance, and thus conveys Shakespeare’s ‘ghostly 
touch’ to his audience, resulting in that uncanny sense of presence which several 
commentators have seen as the chief effect of his lectures. In this final chapter, I am 
going to revisit some o f the most important themes I have discussed so far, but taking 
another angle, looking at their ‘ghostly’ relevance to Coleridge’s own play Remorse.
This play, as I have noted in Chapter 1, was intimately connected in Coleridge’s mind 
with his lectures, and owed its theatrical success at least in part to the success of his 
course at the Surrey Institution in 1813. It also represents his most intense creative 
engagement with Shakespearean drama, reminding us that his work on Shakespeare 
started much earlier than the lectures themselves, with the writing of Osorio. Did 
lecturing offer Coleridge an opportunity to theorise about what he had learned in 
practice, while writing his early play? Or was Osorio already the result of a highly 
‘philosophical’ reading of Shakespeare and other dramatists? At any rate, some remarks 
in his lectures on Shakespeare look for all the world like commentaries on Remorse (as 
some explicitly are), while at times Remorse, and even the substantially different Osorio,
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read like illustrations of what Coleridge said during the lectures/ I choose to focus on 
Remorse rather than Osorio because its staging at Drury Lane coincided with the Surrey 
Institution course, which allows me to study this play as being in a dialogic relationship 
with Coleridge’s other ‘performance’ at the lecture theatre.
3
In a review of the printed version of Remorse, John Taylor Coleridge 
(anonymously) traced back the poetic features o f the Lake School to a specific variant of 
‘philosophical’ reading practised by Coleridge and Wordsworth (and, to a lesser degree, 
Southey). These poets, he argues, arrived at their own ‘system’ by reading Shakespeare, 
Milton, and other early poets;
Analysing by metaphysical aids the principles on which these great men exercised such imperial 
sway over the human heart, they found that it was not so much by operating on the reason as on 
the imagination o f  the reader. W e mean that it was not so much by argument, or description, 
which the reason acknowledged to be true, as by touching som e chord o f  association in the mind, 
which woke the imagination and set it instantly on a creation o f  its own.^
In 1811 Coleridge said o f Shakespeare, ‘You feel him to be a poet inasmuch as, for a 
time, he has made you one -  an active creative being.’ {LL 1: 251) His reviewer seems to 
have had something similar in mind, claiming that philosophical analysis led to the 
poets’ recognition of the main laws of their art (which, for John Taylor Coleridge, were 
associationist), and from there to creative writing. But, as he goes on to argue, 
observation did not stop there; the Lake Poets formed strong ‘habits o f making every 
mental emotion the subject of analysis’ {CH, 177), with sad effects. As a result they
® Frederick Burwick demonstrates the relevance o f  Remorse to Coleridge’s theories on dramatic illusion in 
Illusion and the Dram a: C ritical Theory o f  the Enlightenment and Romantic E ra  (University Park, Penn.: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 267-279. Julie Carlson argues that through its inherent 
ambiguities the play stages Coleridge’s anxieties about ‘action’ (in connection with the French Revolution 
and the theatre), see Carlson, In the Theatre o f  Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1994), pp. 97-114. The conservative politics o f  Remorse are contrasted with the radical Osorio  by J. 
D. Moore in ‘Coleridge and the “Modern Jacobinical Drama”: Osorio, Rem orse, and the Development o f  
Coleridge’s Critique o f  the Stage, 1797-1816’, Bulletin o f  Research in the Humanities, 84 (1982), 443-464. 
In what follow s, I w ill confine my reading o f  the play to the problematic o f  feeling, embodiment and 
analysis, and do not aim for a comprehensive interpretation.
 ^ Q uarterly Review  (Apr 1814, ix, 177-90); CH, p. 176.
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became abnormally ‘susceptible of emotion from slight causes’ which set them apart 
from the generality o f men; ‘yet it is evident that the artist who built his fame entirely 
upon [latent beauties], must resign his claims to genius for the reputation o f mere 
science’ (C/7,178). This is a curious repetition of what Vicesimus Knox had written 
decades earlier about ‘philosophical criticism’, only here it is no longer criticism but 
poetry itself that is chastised for being unduly ‘scientific’. Moreover, this ‘science’ leads 
to false results, because its habit o f minute observation magnifies and even distorts 
natural feelings, which in John Taylor Coleridge’s opinion ‘must be left to play 
unobserved, and without fear of observation’ {CH, 178). It is no wonder, then, that even 
if he recommends Remorse for reading in the closet, he does not express much 
enthusiasm for it on the stage. For him. Remorse is far too philosophical for the theatre -  
but it is not quite clear, whether he thought this a problem because he believed that 
putting philosophy on stage was impossible, or because he was worried that it might be 
possible, after all, but thought that there was something wrong about making the minute 
‘play’ o f feelings publicly observable.'^
Two issues mentioned here -  the question of Shakespearean influence 
and that o f the analysis o f feeling — feature in most reviews of Remorse, either as an 
acted play or as a publication, even if the reviewers express different opinions 
concerning Coleridge’s literary merits. Hazlitt, for instance, in an uncharacteristically 
sympathetic review o f the performance, written anonymously for the Morning Chronicle, 
pointed out that Teresa’s double portrait o f Ordonio and Alvar is a variation on Hamlet’s 
speech to Gertrude (‘to thy mind’s eye present him / As at that moment he rose up 
before thee, / Stately, with beaming look! Place, place beside him / Ordonio’s dark 
perturbed countenance!’ etc. [4.2.66-69; P W lll2 \  1303]). Coleridge, irritated by this, 
wrote to John Rickman: ‘(so help me the Muses) that Passage never once occurred to 
my conscious recollection, however it may, unknown to myself, have been the working 
Idea within me!’ {CL 3: 429) This characteristic defence makes Shakespeare’s influence 
appear as a kind of ghostly visitation in Coleridge’s own text, but lest this sound too
The need for ‘closeting’ Coleridge was also expressed by H, C. Robinson, who wrote o f  the play: 
‘Coleridge’s great fault is that he indulges before the public in those metaphysical and philosophical 
speculations which are becoming only in solitude and with select minds’. {On Books and Their Writers; 
quoted in CH, 138)
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melodramatic, it must be added that the play is haunted by several other works too." 
While there is an overall similarity of plot with Schiller’s Die Rduber, the climactic 
invocation scene was inspired by Schiller’s novella Der Geisterseher {The Ghost-Seer; 
or Apparitionist [London, 1792]), and Coleridge himself acknowledged ‘Thefts from the 
Wallenstein’ in a letter to Southey, together with an unconscious echo in the line ‘The 
obscurest Haunt of all our Mountains’ from Wordsworth’s ‘The Brothers’ (‘I did not 
recognize [it] as Wordsworth till after the Play was all printed’ [CL 3: 435]). But in spite 
of these and several other allusions (including those to Coleridge’s own works), the 
Shakespearean ‘touch’ is strongest of all, and was undoubtedly recognised by the 
audience. Apart from Hamlet (which is most pervasively present), Othello, Macbeth, 
Lear and The Winter’s Tale are evoked at important points of the drama, the last one, for 
instance, in Alvar’s ominous self-definition as ‘He that can bring the dead to life again’ 
(2.1.164; fPLIII.2: 1265).
Teeming with such allusions, the play self-consciously advertised itself as 
reviving the Shakespearean mode. Charles Lamb’s playful, much-criticised Prologue 
evoked Shakespeare for this reason, together with the ghost of Garrick (playing men in 
Elysium, ‘As in his days of flesh he play’d the ghost’ [PWlll.2". 1071]). Coleridge 
shared the triumph o f the opening night with his wife, writing to her, ‘there is a large 
number of Persons in London, who hail with enthusiasm any prospect o f the Stage’s 
being purified & rendered classical’ {CL 3: 430-1). In a letter to Southey, he made more 
explicit what was meant by ‘classical’, contrasting his own play with the popular works 
of Edward Moore and Thomas Southerne: ‘As to the outcry, that the Remorse is not 
pathetic (meaning such pathos, as convulses us in Isabella or the Gamester) the answer is 
easy — True! the Poet never meant that it should be. It is as pathetic as the Hamlet, or the 
Julius Caesar.’ {CL 3: 434) The reference to Hamlet suggests that Coleridge probably 
intended to convey a predominantly intellectual or philosophical kind o f ‘passion’, as
" Jonathan Bate argues that the ‘unconscious allusion’ is a key concept in Romantic poetics; he also 
analyses at length the Shakespearean subtext o f  Remorse and quotes the above letter, in Shakespeare and  
the English Romantic Im agination  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 35-6; 50-57. Peter 
Mortensen discusses Coleridge’s appropriation o f  D ie Rauber, and its conservative ideological 
implications, in ‘The robbers and the police: British romantic drama and the Gothic treacheries o f  
Coleridge’s Rem orse’, in Avril Horner, ed., European Gothic: A sp irited  exchange 1760-1960  
(Manchester and N ew  York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 128-146. The connection with Schiller’s 
Robbers is discussed by Woordring and J. D. Moore, while Carlson relates Remorse to Wallenstein.
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opposed to the sensationalism of modem sentimental plays (of the Gamester he wrote to 
J. P. Collier that ‘there was nothing in it to improve the heart, or enlighten the 
understanding. To be sure, it produced tears, and so would a blunt razor on shaving the 
upper lip’ [qu. CL 3:36 In]). The pathos of Remorse is inseparable from the 
philosophical analysis embodied in it, and Coleridge’s aim in writing and staging it most 
probably coincided with the double achievement he so often attributed to Shakespeare: 
to ‘enlighten’ and ‘improve’ at the same time.
But, as in the case of Hamlet’s juxtaposition of his father’s and 
Claudius’s portrait, the comparison with Shakespeare provoked a judgement that could 
hardly be favourable for Coleridge. In his letter to his wife, he acknowledged ‘the want 
of vulgar Pathos in the Play itself -  nay, there is not enough even o f true dramatic 
Pathos’ {CL 3: 431). Was Coleridge still recalling here Dennis’s distinction between 
vulgar and enthusiastic passion? At any rate, his admission that there is no 'true 
dramatic Pathos’ suggests that, unlike Shakespeare, he did not manage to fully embody 
his philosophical ‘conception’. This is exactly what Hazlitt wrote, even while paying 
Coleridge the tribute of comparing his play to Shakespeare:
It has been observed, that dramatic writers may be divided into two classes, that Shakespeare 
alone gives the substance o f  tragedy, and expresses the very soul o f  the passions, while all other 
writers convey only a general description or shadowy outline o f  them -  that his is the real text o f  
nature, and the rest but paraphrases and commentaries on it, rhetorical, poetical, sentimental. If 
Mr. Coleridge has not been able to break the spell, and to penetrate into the inmost circle o f  the 
heart, he has approached nearer than almost any other writer, and has produced a very beautiful 
representation o f  human nature, which w ill vie with the best and most popular o f  our sentimental 
dramas. {CH, 116)
The problem was that in the presence o f Shakespeare all living authors turned pale.
What both Coleridge and Hazlitt were trying to theorise as Shakespeare’s ‘substance’, 
the embodied, passionate element, was felt missing even from Coleridge’s fairly 
successful tragedy, as he himself later admitted.'^ In an important article on ‘The
For Coleridge’s self-criticism see Table Talk {11 Febr 1833):‘There’s such a divinity doth hedge our 
Shakespeare round, that w e cannot even imitate his style. I tried to imitate his manner in the Remorse, and, 
when I had done, I found I had been tracking Beaumont and Fletcher, and Massinger instead. It is really 
very curious. At first sight, Shakespeare and his contemporary dramatists seem to write in styles much
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Drama’, Hazlitt took back most of the praise he had bestowed on Remorse and made the 
blame more specific, using the same criteria that Coleridge himself applied to 
Shakespeare. The author o f Remorse, he argues, ‘mistakes scholastic speculations for the 
intricate windings o f the passions, and assigns possible reasons instead o f actual motives 
for the excesses o f his characters. He gives us studied special-pleadings for involuntary 
bursts of feeling, and the needless strain of tinkling sentiments for the point-blank 
language of nature.’
What is interesting in this evaluation, and in a number o f others repeating 
its points, is not their accuracy of judgement but the way they describe Coleridge’s 
failure in terms of analysis of feeling, and (lack of) embodiment.'"' I think that this is not 
accidental, nor is it purely a result of shared critical conventions, although it certainly 
reflects a general way of thinking about drama that both Coleridge and Hazlitt adapted 
to their own critical ends. But quite apart from this, it is rather the case that the play 
seems to offer itself for such criticism. Passionate language, the analysis of feelings, and 
even the anatomy o f character are subjects thematised in Remorse, which become more 
or less problematic due to their being displayed on the stage. Therefore, having argued 
earlier for considering Coleridge’s analyses of Shakespeare as a specific kind of 
performance, I would like to end by saying that his ‘Shakespearean’ tragedy can be 
regarded as staging problems addressed in his philosophical analysis of Shakespeare.
4
In his ‘Reply to a Critic’, provoked by a review in the Theatrical 
Inquisitor by ‘H ’ (whom he believed was Hazlitt), Coleridge set out to defend the poetic
alike: nothing so easy as to fall into that o f  Massinger and the others; whilst no one has ever yet produced 
one scene conceived and expressed in the Shakespearean idiom.’ Jonathan Bate quotes this entry and notes 
the reference to H am let’s ‘There’s such divinity doth hedge a king’, in Shakespeare and the English 
R om anticlm agination , p. 50.
‘The Drama: N o. IV ’ (Apr 1820, The London Magazine); The Complete Works o f  William H azlitt, ed., P. 
P. H ow e (London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1930), 18: 309.
Another example from The Times (25 Jan 1813): ‘It can be no common or inferior intelligence, that can 
thus combine in the next degree to creation, embody its loose and fluctuating materials into substantial 
shapeliness, and breathe ‘the breath o f  life into his nostrils’, and bid it com e forth active and animated, 
cloathed with beauty, and instinct with soul.’ {CH, 121)
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language of his own play by rehearsing once more what he had frequent occasion to 
assert about Shakespeare:
W e may take either way, and the result w ill be the same -  If w e say, strong Figures, bold 
Metaphors, and rapid associations o f  distant Images by slight resemblances are appropriate to 
Poetry, yet these being the natural Language o f  the Mind in a state o f  high excitement, Passion 
must be Soul o f  Poetry -  or if  Passion be the soul o f  Poetry, the &c -  (SW &F  1; 345)
The body of passion is figurative language, and therefore -  it follows -  the language of 
drama must be highly figurative. Remorse certainly abounds in what would have been 
regarded as ‘bold’ poetry at the time; Teresa’s speech in the first scene, cited in a 
number of reviews, provides a representative example:
I f  it be wretched 
To watch some bark, and fancy Alvar there,
T o g o  through each minutest circumstance 
O f the blest meeting, and to frame adventures 
M ost terrible and strange, and hear him tell them;
*(As once I knew a crazy Moorish maid.
W ho drest her in her buried lover’s cloaths,
And o ’er the smooth spring in the mountain cleft 
Hung with her lute, and play’d the se lf  same tune 
He used to play, and listened to the shadow  
H erself had made) - if  this be wretchedness,
And if  indeed it be a wretched thing 
To trick out mine own death bed, and imagine 
That I had died, died just ere his return!
To see him listening to my constancy,
Or hover round, as he at midnight oft
Sits on my grave and gazes at the moon (1.2.25-41; P W \ll.2 \  1245-6)
* (Here Valdez bends back, and sm iles at her wildness, which Teresa noticing, checks her 
enthusiasm, and in a soothing half-playful tone and manner, apologizes for her fancy, by the little 
tale in parenthesis).
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I quote this passage at length, with Coleridge’s note that appeared in the printed version, 
because the two kinds o f text together illustrate the dynamics of ‘passionate language’ 
that characterise the play. The figurative kernel of the speech is Teresa’s ‘little tale’, 
exemplifying the work of passion in an image clearly indebted to Shakespeare, among 
other passages, perhaps to Constance on Grief. The ‘Moorish maid’ is said to perform 
what in Constance’s speech is attributed to passion; she fills in the clothes of her dead 
lover, plays, in his place, a song she can listen to, gives an ‘outness’ to the absence she 
feels. The little vignette, in turn, functions in the longer passage as a kind of mirror 
through which Teresa contemplates -  and, importantly, interprets -  her own mental 
processes. Reflection, manifested in the winding syntax of an extraordinarily long 
sentence, thus keeps her safely this side of ‘craziness’. In other words, the figure of the 
maid appears as a defence from what the note calls her ‘wildness’ and ‘enthusiasm’, 
being at the same time symptomatic of it.’^
It was probably because of this ambiguity that Coleridge felt it necessary 
to furnish the explanatory note, even though in his lectures he ridiculed plays that read 
like novels in their instructions for actors. Incidentally, the printed Remorse is full of 
such instructions, which Coleridge claimed were left in the script against his 
intentions.*^ This note, however, reveals that the author’s explanation -  a parenthesis 
upon a parenthesis -  fulfils a necessary function. The ‘living commentary’ of looks and 
tones had to be spelt out in print, if only because the intricate turns of passionate 
language were, he thought, not readily (or no longer) understandable for the general 
reader. That is, instead of making the sense immediately apparent, ‘embodied’ language 
led to ambiguities. Coleridge made another similar comment which also indicates that 
what he understood as the work o f passion in the text needed further interpretation. To 
Teresa’s ‘Nor shall you want my favourable pleading’, he added in handwriting, ‘(then 
a[n half-]pause, & dropping her voice, as hinted by the relaxation o f the metre. “Nor 
shall you &c”) I mention this, because it is one of the Lines, for which Mr Gifford [...]
Burwick emphasizes Teresa’s lack o f  delusion in this speeeh in Illusion and the D ram a, p. 271, while 
Carlson points out the precariousness o f  the distinction between illusion and delusion in her In the Theatre 
o f  Romanticism, pp. 111-12.
See the Preface: ‘From the necessity o f  hastening the Publication I was obliged to send the Manuscript 
intended for the Stage: which is the sole cause o f  the number o f  directions printed in Italics.’ (PW  111.2: 
1069)
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declared me at Murray’s Shop fit to be whipt as an idle School-boy. -  & /, alas! had 
conceited it to be a little beauty! -  ’ {PW  1257n) Coleridge here applies (somewhat 
self-servingly) a principle to his own work which he had applied to Shakespeare. Metre, 
in this view, is an aspect o f the expressive utterance to which the whole human body 
contributes, and therefore it should be understood flexibly and in conjunction with other 
non-verbal aspects o f speech. But whereas Shakespeare, as he argued, was able to imply 
such ‘instructions’ merely through rhythmic patterns, he found himself obliged to make 
them explicit in self-defence.*^
In Coleridge’s writings, passions ‘embodied’ in language almost always 
require further interpretation and analysis. This is evidenced not only by his authorial 
comments, but by the actions and speeches of his characters themselves. Teresa’s ‘wild’ 
fancies, for instance, are eminently self-conscious; they are the fancies of a character, 
who is represented as having been trained to read her own feelings, and who perhaps 
feels them because o f having first encountered them in reading. Coleridge playfully 
alluded to this when in the Epilogue, spoken in the theatre by the actress Miss Smith, he 
described Teresa as a reader of old romances, a kind of female Quixote, and contrasts 
her with the consumers o f modern novels.*® Modern novels, we recall, are pernicious 
according to Coleridge exactly because they encourage feeling without reflection (in the 
Epilogue they are said to ‘spare the blush, and undersap the heart’); it is highly 
significant, then, that he defines his own drama in opposition to them, just as he did with 
Shakespeare. However, this can only serve to reveal that Teresa is not a Shakespearan 
heroine, even if she at times appears to be one who has read Shakespeare. She is adept in 
reading feelings (as, for instance, her ‘pathognomy’ of Ordonio suggests),*^ but because 
of this, feelings said to be her own appear at times as belonging to someone else. Adela 
Pinch in her study on the ‘epistemologies of emotion’ has argued that this problem -  it
Coleridge was generally pleased with the versification o f  Remorse, writing to Southey: ‘The second 
Good quality is, I think, the variety o f  metres, according as the Speeches are merely transitive; or narrative; 
or passionate; or (as in the Incantation) deliberate & formal Poetry. It is true, they are all or most Iambic 
Blank Verse; but under that form there are 5 or 6 perfectly distinct metres.’ {CL  3: 434)
‘Then for reading -  what but huge romances, / With as stiff morals, leaving earth behind ’em, / As the 
brass-clasp’d, brass-corner’d boards that bind ’em. /  Knights, chaste as brave, who strange adventures seek, 
/  And faithful loves o f  Ladies, fair as meek; /  Or saintly hermits’ wonder-raising acts, /  Instead o f -  novels 
foun ded  upon factsV  {PW Ï112: 1133-4)
In 4.2. 46-48, Teresa asks Valdez, ‘saw you his countenance? /  How remorse, and scorn, and stupid fear, 
/  D isplac’d each other with swift interchanges?’ {P W \ll.2 \  1302)
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could be summed up in shorthand as the ‘otherness’ o f feeling -  runs through the 
discourse on feeling from Hume to Wordsworth and beyond/^ Having traced 
Coleridge’s engagement with the philosophical analysis of feeling in his lectures, one 
need not be surprised to find the same problem emerging in Coleridge’s own play. What 
is striking is rather the centrality of this theme to Remorse, displaying as it does the 
Coleridgean tensions between the claims of feeling and the claims o f understanding.
This tension might be made clearer by taking a closer look at Teresa’s 
‘tale’ of the Moorish maid and its Shakespearean provenance. Apart from Constance, the 
tale also evokes Desdemona’s narrative before her death, especially since Teresa has just 
spoken of Othello-like ‘adventures / Most terrible and strange’, told by an imaginary 
Alvar. But Desdemona’s story is in an entirely different register:
M y mother had a maid called Barbary,
She was In love, and he she loved proved mad 
And did forsake her. She had a song o f  ‘w illow ’,
An old thing ’twas, but it expressed her fortune
And she died singing it. That song tonight
W ill not go from my mind. I have much to do
But to go hang my head all at one side
And sing it like poor Barbary [4.3.24-31]^'
Desdemona, like Teresa, recognises herself in the figure o f the maid, who, in turn, 
expresses her ‘fortune’ in the ‘old thing’ of a song. However, what Desdemona does 
next (after ‘unpin me here’), is to sing the maid’s song, which resonates uncannily with 
her comments spoken as ‘herself, regarding her immediate situation (‘Let nobody 
blame him, his scorn I approve, -  / Nay, that’s not next. Hark, who is’t that knocks?’ 
[4.3.51-52]).^^ Narrative in this way is transformed into re-enactment o f feeling through 
lyric and dialogical comment, which also involves a subtle difference between the ‘old’ 
song and the one sung by Desdemona. In Remorse, by contrast, the maid’s story is
Pinch, Adela, Strange F its o f  Passion: Epistem ologies o f  Emotion, Hume to Austen  (Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 1996).
William Shakespeare, Othello, ed. by E. A. J. Honigman, The Arden Shakespeare, gen. eds Richard 
Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, David Scott Kastan (London: Arden Shakespeare, 2004), pp. 290-291. 
Shakespeare, Othello, p. 292.
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evoked by Teresa without repeating the ‘self same tune’ that the maid used to play, and 
the function o f the narrative is to establish an intellectual distance -  signalled in writing 
by the parentheses -  from Teresa’s own ‘enthusiasm’. By the end of her speech, she is 
distanced from herself to the extent that she is described as a ghost, ‘hovering round’ her 
own grave.
Coleridge might have pointed out that the ‘Moorish maid’ in Teresa’s 
speech prepares the audience for the appearance of Alhadra, the Moorish woman. She is 
the kind of female figure he sometimes exemplified as Deborah, whose speech is poetic 
because it is an immediate expression of passion; however, in Remorse even this figure 
is revealed from the start as inhabited by a ghostly feeling. Ending a long speech about 
her imprisonment (also cited by reviewers as beautiful and ‘impassioned’), Alhadra 
interrupts herself, just at the point of her escape: ‘For if I dwell upon that moment, Lady, 
/ A trance comes on which makes me o’er again / All I then was -  my knees hang loose 
and drag, / And my lip falls with such an idiot laugh, / That you would start and 
shudder!’ (1.2.229-233; P W lll2 \  1253) This passage again reveals a dividedness of 
feeling at the heart of Coleridge’s play. Unlike the Ancient Mariner (whom she 
resembles), Alhadra here does not quite enact the moment of sublime transport with all 
its bodily symptoms, but describes herself from an external point o f view, as a being, 
potentially, o f preternatural proportions. What the passage manages to convey by this is 
not the embodiment, but the nearness, o f feeling; the sense of ‘almost there’, which 
Coleridge described as the ghostly touch.
A passage from Alvar’s ‘dream’ -  a counterpart to Alhadra’s speech -  
comes closest in Remorse to invoking Lear-likQ sublimity, while it also exemplifies 
Coleridge’s strategy to keep it at bay. Alvar here recounts an obscure story of a dream 
vision (which may or may not be an account of what really happened to him) of how he 
escaped being murdered. The event, no doubt, is meant to attest to the power of 
passionate language as Coleridge, following late Enlightenment theories, understood it: 
‘But by my looks, and most impassion’d words, / 1 rous’d the virtues that are dead in no 
man, / Even in the assassins’ hearts!’ (1.2.279-81; PW l\\.2\ 1255) Passionate speech, 
with its necessary bodily accompaniments, evokes instinctive sympathy in all mankind.
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But Alvar, curiously, recounts his own transformation immediately after this event, 
which makes him appear similar to Alhadra after her release:
On a rude rock,
A rock, methought, fast by a grove o f  firs,
W hose threaddy leaves to the low-breathing gale 
M ade a soft sound most like the distant ocean,
I stay’d, as though the hour o f  death were pass’d,
And I were sitting in the world o f  spirits -  
For all things seem ’d unreal! [ ...]
A  storm came on, mingling all sounds o f  fear,
That woods, and sky, and mountains, seem ’d one havock.
The second flash o f  lightning shew ’d a tree 
Hard by me, newly scath’d. I rose tumultuous;
My soul work’d high, I bar’d my head to the storm,
And with loud voice and clamorous agony 
Kneeling I pray’d to the great Spirit, that made me.
P ray’d that REMORSE m ight fasten on their hearts.
And cling with poisonous tooth, inextricable
As the gor’d lion’s 6/7e! (1.2. 286-304; PITIIL2: 1255-6)
This passage is about an experience of metamorphosis, through which ‘ail things seem’d 
unreal’, and in this preternatural state, beaten by the storm, bare-headed, Alvar ‘rose’, 
like a ghost, to address the ‘great Spirit’. What he calls a ‘prayer’, however, is in fact a 
‘fearful curse’, as Teresa immediately recognises in her response -  in other words, it is 
the speech-act most characteristic of Lear,
Alvar is careful to relegate the force of this passionate utterance to the 
past, and to the context of a dream (we might recall Coleridge’s strategy in the lectures 
to encounter Lear at one remove). Yet this is a play in which dreams have a strange 
power to influence reality, and in which ‘the Past lives o’er again’. Acknowledging this, 
Reeve Parker in a reading of Osorio even argued that there is no reason to believe that
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Alvar is, in fact, not a ghost?® The speech certainly establishes Alvar’s return as a 
ghostly visitation in a figurative sense, although it never quite becomes that on the level 
of the dramatic plot, and, as Parker observes, Coleridge did eliminate much of this 
ambiguity in his reworking o f Osorio as Remorse. But even in the more fully embodied 
reality o f the staged play, Coleridge’s figurative undermining o f the ‘substance’ of his 
characters leads to a sense of tenuousness, a permeability of the boundaries of 
personhood through language and representation. In the most spectacular and also most 
ambivalent scene of the play, Alvar invokes his own ghost, but ‘if  declines to appear 
(while, o f course, it is there all along ‘embodied’ in his person). He substitutes, instead, 
a painting of his ‘assassination’, which has the power of ‘making the absent present’, 
only to be consumed by flames the next moment. The picture, like Alvar’s ‘dream’, 
offers a representation of a passionate scene, instead of a scene itself, and even though it 
is described as a rendering of Alvar’s own experience, it is nevertheless a picture 
showing him from the outside.^"*
Alvar in the incantation scene is supposed to display the picture of the 
assassination in order to raise once more ‘the virtues that are dead in no man’, and 
thereby to save the guilty Ordonio. But the play reveals a basic uncertainty about 
whether the ‘looks, and most impassion’d words’ have the same power when 
represented through painting, music and poetry, instead of being witnessed in action.^® 
Virtues, in Ordonio, have certainly not been raised by the ‘invocation’; and it seems that 
even the feeling of remorse had to be brought home to him from the outside, almost by 
force. This is most clearly presented in the last scene, in which the living Alvar ‘stands 
in’ for the ghost of remorse that his brother should have been feeling, but failed to
Reeve Parker, ‘Osorio’s Dark Employments: Tricking out Coleridgean Tragedy’, Studies in 
Romanticism, 33/1 (1994), 119-160; my interpretation focuses on several o f  the ambiguities also pointed 
out by Parker.
Coleridge includes this passage from O sorio  in the printed Remorse as an authorial note. To Alhadra’s 
question (‘And then he fram’d this picture, unaided /  By arts unlawful, spell, or talisman?’), Alvar replies: 
‘A potent spell, a mighty talisman! /  The imperishable memory o f  the deed, / Sustain’d by love, and grief, 
and indignation! /  So vivid were the forms within his brain, /  His very eyes, when shut, made pictures o f  
them!’ (PIT 111.2: 1270). The correspondence between passion and vivid images, w hich was so important 
for Priestley (as 1 have argued in Chapter 2), can still be recognised here, w hile the ‘imagination’ is only 
indirectly evoked.
The differences between representation in painting and in theatre, as w ell as the general problem o f  the 
‘semblance’ o f  truth in Remorse are discussed by Sophie Thomas, in ‘Seeing things (“as they are”): 
Coleridge, Schiller, and the play o f  sem blance’, Studies in Romanticism, 43:3 (Winter 2004), 537-555.
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acknowledge. Addressed as ‘Spirit o f the dead’, Alvar as it were reads into his brother 
the signs o f passion appropriate for such an occasion: ‘I fix mine eye upon thee, and 
thou tremblest! / 1 speak, and fear and wonder crush thy rage, / And turn it to a 
motionless distraction’ (5.1.154-6; P W \ll2 \  1316). The problem that this scene 
dramatises is that remorse -  a reflexive feeling, or, in Hume’s terminology, an ‘indirect 
passion’ -  presupposes two selves, one that sees and one that is seen.^^ Ordonio, as 
Coleridge wrote to Southey, suffers from ‘the Self-contradiction introduced into the Soul 
by Guilt’ {CL 3: 433). But since remorse exists in this split between two selves, it cannot 
be expressed as, properly, one’s own. It is the feeling of inner dividedness, which 
approaches the consciousness as a ghost -  a feeling that does not quite belong to the self. 
The aim of Alvar from the start is to ‘raise’ remorse in his brother, and the play as a 
whole dramatises this process of evoking and ‘proving’ feeling. But in realising this 
scheme, Coleridge had to face the problem that remorse could not be made observable in 
an immediately convincing way; it could only be represented as something that visits the 
self from the outside. This is why (as the reviews indicate) members of the audience 
were perplexed whether ‘true’ remorse had ultimately been raised in Ordonio or not.
This problem is relevant not only to the eponymous passion of the play, 
but to all the feelings that its characters continuously reflect upon. Reflexive pathos is 
the predominant mode of Remorse, and it populates the play with ‘ghosts’ of feeling, 
that is, with feelings represented as external to the self.^^ Ordonio is described as 
‘haunted’ by ‘phantom thoughts’, even prior to the scheme of killing his brother; 
moreover, he himself is repeatedly characterised as phantom-like. The same letter which 
discusses Ordonio’s inner ‘Self-contradiction’ indicates that Coleridge thought of him as 
a divided being to the very end, indeed, as two beings:
Spite o f  wretched Acting, the Passage told wonderfully, in which as in a struggle between two
unequal Panathlists or Wrestlers, the weaker had for a moment got uppermost -  & Ordonio with
Indirect passions in Hume ‘have the se lf for their object, that is, they reintroduce the idea o f  the se lf  into 
the mind’ (Jane L. McIntyre, ‘Personal Identity and the Passions’, Journal o f  the H istory o f  Philosophy, 
27/4 [1989], 545-557, 551).
A case might be made for Alhadra as another ‘ghost’, embodying the passion o f  revenge that Alvar does 
not want to acknowledge as his own. Their interview is in this sense analogous to Ordonio’s final meeting 
with Alvar, and the so-called ‘compact’ between them contains the same element o f  compulsive 
‘haunting’ that characterises Alvar and Ordonio’s relationship.
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unfeigned Love & genuine repentance, says - 1 w ill kneel to thee, m y Brother! Forgive me,
Alvar! -  till the Pride, like the Bottom -swell on our Lake, gusts up again in -  Curse me with 
Forgiveness. {CL  3: 434)
This quality of inner dividedness -  something Hazlitt also appreciated in Ordonio -  is 
intimately connected with the theatrical effect of Coleridge’s stage in general?® We 
might even say that his drama originates in the principle of inner division, with all its 
characters, not only Ordonio, inhabited by more than one self, constantly turning away 
from, or analysing, their own feelings.
A passage from the unfinished ‘Opus Magnum’, quoted by E. S. Shaffer 
in connection with Coleridge’s character criticism, exemplifies this general movement 
from reflexive analysis towards a theatre o f ghosts:
Vain Pride o f  Intellect! Mad Narcissus, that in barren Self-Love transformed thyself to Form 
without Substance, Surface without depth, the Object a Shadow, and the Subject the Notion o f  a 
Shadow. W hence did this Nothing acquire a plural number? From the Senses? [ . . . ] &  whence the 
number, and the diversity o f  the Senses, that multiply, or rather transnihilate the absolute 
Something into the Universe o f  Nothings? And what is that inward Mirror, in and for which these 
Nothings have at least a relative reality? Or does thou wait till Pain and Anguish and Remorse 
with moody scorn ask thee: And are we  Nothings?
A scene in which ghosts, instead of being dispelled by the observing intellect, start 
speaking to it, was one o f Coleridge’s worst personal nightmares; it was also one that 
deeply fascinated him.®** Here, as Shaffer has shown, something like that nightmare is 
recounted in an argument against empiricist philosophers (most notoriously Hume) who 
disregard the unifying feeling of conscience and thereby reduce the mind to a
Cf. Hazlitt in the M orning Chronicle: ‘Besides the obvious features, and stronger workings o f  the 
passions in this character [Ordonio], there are many traits o f  a more subtle nature which, we trust, will not 
escape nice observation o f  an enlightened audience, though they may be regarded as too metaphysical for 
tragedy. [...] W e have insisted the longer on this excellence, because o f  its rarity, for except Shakespeare, 
who is every where full o f  these double readings and running accompaniments to the ruling passion, there 
is scarcely any other dramatic writer who has so much as attempted to describe the involuntary, habitual 
reaction o f  the passions and the understanding on each other’ {CH  114-5).
^^This is quoted and discussed in Shaffer, ‘lago’s Malignity Motivated: Coleridge’s Unpublished “Opus 
Magnum”, \n Shakespeare Q uarterly  19 (1968), 195-203; pp. 199-200.
‘Saturday Night, at Mr Butler’s at Ridding - the Nightmair - so near awaking and my saying -  Yes! 
Dreams, or creatures o f  my Dreams, you may make me fee! you as if  you were keeping behind me /  but 
you cannot speak to me -  immediately I heard Impressed on my outward ears, & with a perfect sense o f  
distance  answered -  O yes! but I can -  ’ {CN  3: 3984)
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fragmented, self-involved state. But the scenario described in this passage seems to 
apply equally well to the problematics of Remorse, a play in which the villain is called a 
‘blind self-worshipper’ (5.1.157; P W lll2 \  1316), prefiguring the ‘Mad Narcissus’ of 
this passage, and in which the ‘substance’ of character is continuously ‘transnihilated’ 
by the self-reflexive intellect.
The pattern of a feeling disowned, returning to the self from the outside, 
seems to have a relevance to Coleridge’s thinking that goes beyond the question of 
remorse as a specific passion. It appears, for instance, in what he described as his own 
strategy of composition in his early poems: ‘my eloquence was most commonly excited 
by the desire o f running away and hiding myself from my personal & inward feelings’ 
{CL V: 1309), with the effect that a ‘glow’ of passion returned to his language, 
supposedly against his will. In that letter, as I have argued in Chapter 3, Coleridge was 
referring to this strategy as a way of circumventing the inherent theatricality involved in 
the expression of feeling. However, what he does not note there is that this strategy leads 
to another kind o f theatricality, in which the self encounters its own feeling in the form 
of ghostly visitation.®*
What I have been suggesting through this analysis is that the theatre of 
Remorse is founded on this kind of theatricality, in which feeling is represented by being 
denied (as by Ordonio) or analysed (as by Teresa). In a curious way, then, John Taylor 
Coleridge’s suspicions concerning the too minute observation o f feeling have proved to 
be relevant to Remorse. The play does display the ‘transnihilating’ effects of reflection 
on feeling, while it also pays tribute to Shakespeare’s embodied language, through the 
characters’ evocation of his passages as recording moments o f authentic feeling.
5
As I have argued in the opening section of this chapter, reflexive analysis 
and embodied feeling were also the two key components that kept Coleridge’s
See also The F riend  on a projected work on ‘Dreams, Visions, Ghosts, Witchcraft, & c.’: ‘I might then 
explain in a more satisfactory way the mode in which our thoughts in states o f  morbid slumber, become at 
times perfectly dramatic (for in certain sort o f  dreams the dullest Wight becom es a Shakespeare) and by 
what law the Form  o f  the vision appears to talk to us in its own thoughts in a voice as audible as the shape 
is visible; and this oftentimes in connected trains...’ (F  1:145)
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interpretations o f Shakespeare in motion. In Remorse, reflection on feeling is 
predominant, leading to a sense of ghostliness that (if Hazlitt is to be credited) 
permeated even the staged version of the play. In the ‘intermundium’ of the lectures — 
somewhere in between theatre and meditative reading -  Coleridge’s intense engagement 
with Shakespeare produced a sense of nearness, as if the characters and even 
Shakespeare himself had been informing him in a ghostly way. I have been arguing that 
Coleridge’s interest in questions o f ‘feeling’ played a central role in creating this unique 
effect, and that he inherited this interest, together with a host of philosophical and moral 
issues attached to it, from the British tradition o f philosophical criticism. Thus, while not 
calling into question the importance of German thought with respect to many of 
Coleridge’s critical preoccupations (for example, the symbol and the organic form), I 
have attempted to trace the dialogue he pursued within the British critical tradition.
The idea that human nature could be studied most efficiently through a 
philosophical reading of Shakespeare, as well as the assumption that such an 
investigation is to be carried out by analysing feeling represented in the text and 
experienced by the reader, were crucial to the work of critics from Kames to Richardson. 
These ideas are still present in Coleridge, not as vestiges of an older system, but very 
often as the parameters within which his own interpretations are carried out. Equally 
present are the methods these critics employed: the rhetorical analysis of passionate 
figures elaborated by Kames, Blair, and Priestley, and the hermeneutic of character 
developed by Richardson. Coleridge’s uniqueness in this exchange arises from the self­
consciously experimental or performative manner in which he applies these methods, 
leading to a constant testing o f their limits, opening up their hidden possibilities. 
Coleridge’s readiness for self-questioning as a critic was re-enforced by the genre of the 
public lecture itself, adapted to suit the open-endedness of his inquiry. Therefore, while 
still participating in the tradition of ‘philosophical criticism’, he is putting the problems 
of self-knowledge on trial through more rigorous and sustained analyses than his 
predecessors, never quite losing sight of what defies explanation in the immediate 
experience o f reading.
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